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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
A large number of empirical studies analyze the effects of commodity prices on 
macroeconomic variables. Others measure interdependencies and causalities between 
macroeconomic variables of developed and emerging economies. A third group of 
studies examines the effects of governance on economies. Most such studies are carried 
out by analyzing only a rather small number of variables. Few studies exist that analyze 
the effects of both governance and commodity prices on macroeconomic measures in 
emerging economies. This study aims to fill this void. It merges the examination of the 
effects of both commodities and governance to one single field of study. More 
specifically, it analyses the effects of commodity prices and governance indexes on 
macroeconomic variables in Brazil and China. Also, instead of focusing on only a few 
variables, I take into account a large number of them —seventy-nine— to ensure a 
holistic view of the matter. 
The importance of governance architecture has gained significant recognition 
and appreciation over the past decade, on both regional and global levels. Especially in 
developing countries, political and corporate leadership is very much aware and 
cognizant of the positive effects a functioning governance framework and architecture 
can have (Sangmeister and Schönstedt, 2010, p. 179). By including the analysis of 
governance effects in the macroeconomic discussion and by aligning it comparatively 
with commodity price effects on emerging economies this study attempts to contribute 
to the ongoing discussion on regional and global governance architecture. In this 
context, the study attempts to draw a comparison between two sets of independent 
factors affecting emerging economies: Governance and commodity prices.  
This thesis consists of six parts (Chapters 1-6). Chapter 1 serves as its 
introduction. Chapter 2 establishes the regional focus. Chapter 3 elaborates on the data 
and data methodology used in this study. Chapter 4 presents the methodological 
framework of the econometric analysis. Chapter 5 concludes the study by performing a 
comparative econometric analysis on selected macroeconomic variables for Brazil and 
China. The conclusion in Chapter 6 is split into three parts: Overall Conclusion, 
Sectional Summaries, and Final Remarks. The overall conclusion summarizes the 
scope, objective, and findings of the study and provides a top level summary. The 
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Sectional Summaries offer an in depth summary of the thesis' individual chapters and 
their sections. The final remarks round up the conclusion and thesis as a whole. 
 
1.2  Regional Analysis 
The dissertation’s geographical scope is defined by today’s two major emerged 
forces in their respective regions. In Latin America, Brazil is dominant in its size, 
geopolitical role and economic weight. The pace of its democratic transformation and 
economic development since the mid nineties is impressive. In stark contrast to Brazil 
stands China, one of the world's oldest continuous civilizations, as archaeological 
evidence dating back more than five thousand years proves. In the mid-1800s, China’s 
GDP represented approximately 25% of world GDP. Its economy was then extremely 
bottom heavy with a very large number of family businesses and farms. China missed 
the industrial revolution at the beginning of the 1900s, triggering the country’s 
industrial base to stall. However, after China opened to the outside world in the 1980s, 
its macroeconomic development was again remarkable. At the turn of the 21st century, 
China, similar to Brazil, faced overwhelming internal challenges magnified by the 
information, communication and technology revolution.  
Chapter 2 provides a brief comparative overview of the sociopolitical 
developments of Brazil and China during the past fifty years. It illustrates the two 
countries' macroeconomic frameworks and economic structures according to their 
demographics, labor markets, domestic sectors, GDPs and their composition, natural 
resources, and external sectors. The latter two factors play pivotal roles. Brazil is a net 
exporter of energy commodities, minerals and metals, as well as soft commodities such 
as soybeans and sugar, whereas China is a net importer of all these commodities. 
Chapter 2 furthermore details the external sectors of Brazil and China, including the 
important role of commodities for their trade structures, and explores their main 
commodity sectors, including each country’s energy mix. It also provides an overview 
of Brazil’s and China’s main trading partners, revealing the changing dynamics of their 
bilateral trade relations in the past two decades. The chapter concludes with the 
assessment of the two countries' direct relations, retracing the transformation of the 
countries’ relationship from dualism in the 1990s to co-operation starting from the early 
2000s to their difficult and complex partnership at the end of the last decade. 
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1.3 Empirical Data and Data Methodology 
 Chapter 3 introduces the data sets and methodology used in the empirical and 
econometric analysis in Chapter 4. The econometric analysis comprises the following 
metric data sets: UNCTAD commodity composite price indexes; World Bank 
governance indexes (WGI); economic freedom governance indexes (EFI); and seventy-
nine selected variables from various economic topics, provided —if not otherwise 
stated— by the World Bank during Q3 2009 and Q4 2010.  
The governance dimensions of the WGI and EFI indexes complement each 
other. WGI indexes examine governance dimensions from a holistic socio-political 
perspective, whereas the scope of the EFI indexes is rather specific and to a large extent 
geared towards business and economic freedom dimensions. 
The macroeconomic variables serve as dependent variables (endogenous) which 
are affected by commodity prices and governance indexes. Governance indexes and 
commodity price indexes serve as independent variables (exogenous) in the regression 
analysis. The assumption and hypothesis for the latter is as follows (please see also 
Section 1.5): Governance framework and governance architecture are established, 
formulated, controlled, and managed at the top of central and local authority levels, and 
are thus exogenous. Commodity prices are also exogenous due to market size and the 
number of market participants.1  
 
Data Sets 
Commodity Price Indexes (exogenous): The six UNCTAD commodity indexes cover 
the annual end-of-year prices of food, vegetable oils and seeds, tropical beverages, 
agricultural raw materials, minerals as well as base and precious metals, and oil.  
World Bank Governance Indexes (exogenous): The six composite World Bank 
governance indexes cover the following dimensions: voice and accountability (degree of 
democracy), political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption.  
Economic Freedom Indexes (exogenous): The nine governance dimensions of the 
economic freedom index are based on equally weighted averages covering business 
                                                 
1
 As of 2009/2010 the value of physical trades in global commodity markets was over USD4 trillion, and 
the value of commodity related financial trades was over USD40 trillion (The Reserve Bank of 
Australia, June 2011, p. 54). 
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freedom/market-based competition, trade freedom/liberalization of foreign trade, fiscal 
freedom/economic performance, government size, monetary freedom/currency and price 
stability, investment freedom/macro stability, financial freedom, property rights/private 
property, and freedom from corruption.  
Macroeconomic Variables (endogenous): The seventy-nine macroeconomic variables 
serve as dependent variables and cover a wide range of economic activities and topics 
such as the private and trade sector, financial sector, national accounts, balance of 
payments and external debt. The World Bank data used has been accessed during the 
3rd quarter of 2009 and 4th quarter of 2010.  
 
Data Points 
The data series analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 consist of thirteen annual data 
points per variable from 1996 to 2008. This is due to the fact that World Bank 
governance indexes —measured only annually— are not available prior to 1996. Also, 
the study’s analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 does not include post crisis data points from 
2009 in order to avoid the effects of structural breaks in the data series as a result of the 
macroeconomic effects of the global financial crisis with potential subsequent distorting 
effects on correlation, causality and regression analysis. Then, due to regular updates of 
The World Bank’s Data Catalog, it is possible that data series found online after the 4th 
quarter of 2010 may deviate from data series used in this study. Macroeconomic data 
for the econometric analysis covers data points from 1996 to 2008. Any data series 
analysed and elaborated on before 1996 —for example in Chapters 2 and 3—, 
specifically between 1960 and 1995, and after 2008 are for information purposes only 
and mainly based on World Bank (2009, 2010) data if not otherwise stated.  
In Chapter 3 (Empirical Data and Data Methodology) I also elaborate on the 
price development of each commodity composite group between 1971 and 2009 and 
their correlations for the periods of 1971 to 2009 and 1996 to 2008 in order to illustrate 
co-integration and spurious correlation between commodity price indexes. In addition, I 
carry out a number of initial correlation and Granger causality tests between price 
indexes of crude, minerals and metals (e.g., base and precious metals), and soft 
commodities in order to establish commodity groupings which are essential for the co-
integration check and econometric analysis in Chapter 4. Furthermore, I include output 
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measures such as world GDP and world GDP per capita in the initial correlation and 
Granger Analysis in Chapter 3 in order to establish key assumptions on causality.  
The underlying data sets in this thesis have not gone through standardization or 
normalization of variables due to the nonparametric nature of the data series. The 
statistical methods preceding the multiple regression analysis in Chapter 4 do not 
depend on population fitting or any particular parameterized distributions. Also, the 
variables I use are either indexed, percentage shares or change rates in percentages. 
None of the variables used for analysis are denominated in absolute numbers or 
currency units. Thus, I have chosen not to standardize and not to log normalize data 
series.  
For computation and analysis purposes I use data with three digits after the 
decimal point. For illustration (e.g., charts, tables) and discussion purposes I mainly use 
and display rounded data with one or two digits after the decimal point. Data ranges are 
mostly discussed with no decimal point.  
 
1.4  Empirical and Econometric Analysis 
 The econometric analysis is the core element of this study. The objective of the 
econometric analysis is as follows: First, to test the effects of governance and 
commodity prices on macroeconomic variables of Brazil and China and reveal 
significant statistical associations such as correlation, Granger causality, and regression, 
which are then —in Chapter 5— empirically validated. Secondly, to provide a 
comparative view on macroeconomic effects of governance and commodity prices for 
Brazil and China by drawing comparative conclusions.  
 
Framework 
The majority of my empirical and econometric analyses are based on the 
standard approach used in prevalent academic literature including unit root tests, 
correlation tests, Granger causality tests, principal component analyses, and regression 
analyses. My results are significant to the choice of methodology to calculate 
correlation, Granger causality, and regression analysis.  
The econometric analysis consists of four statistical diagnostic tests designed to 
select statistically significant pairs of independent and dependent variables before 
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considering them for multiple regression analysis. The statistical diagnostic tests 
introduced below are based on the theory of hypothesis testing. In the majority of 
statistical research papers the level of statistical significance required to reject the null 
hypothesis, that is to obtain a statistically significant result, is conventionally set at 0.05, 
or 5%, representing a confidence level of 95%. In this study I follow the prevalent 
threshold convention and also chose a p-value level of 0.05. The significance level (p-
value) measures the probability that the null hypothesis H0 will be rejected incorrectly, 
provided the assumption that the null hypothesis H0 is true. Generally, the lower the 
percentage required for statistical significance, the more problematic is it to reject the 
null hypothesis H0. The lower the observed p-value is, the lower is the probability to 
wrongly reject H0. In some rare cases, which can be considered borderline cases, I will 
work with a p-value slightly higher than 0.05. 
 
Unit Root Test 
The statistical diagnostic tests in the econometric analysis in Chapter 4 begin 
with the Dickey-Fuller unit root test in which I test data series of independent and 
dependent variables on unit root in order to obtain valid correlation, causality, and 
regression results. The H0 states that the data series have a unit root, that is, the data 
series are non-stationary. Unit root analysis is carried out using SAS program software. 
 
Correlation Analysis  
After successfully passing the unit root analysis, which will reveal that all data 
series are stationary, I perform correlation analysis on the dependent and independent 
variables. I seek to identify and understand the associations of certain variables pairs 
which may be worth further investigation in the Granger causality analysis. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I posit that correlation coefficients above 0.50 but lower than 
0.70 represent moderate correlation. Correlation coefficients above 0.70 and below 0.90 
represent high correlation, and correlation coefficients above 0.90 represent very high 
correlation. In principle, I accept all correlation pairs with correlation significance at the 
minimum of a p-value of 0.05. That is, correlation pairs with a confidence level equal to 
or larger than 95% are deemed to be statistically significant and will thus be selected to 
proceed to the next stage of statistical diagnostic tests, the Granger causality evaluation. 
Correlation pairs at the 0.01 significance level will be denoted as such. Also, it is 
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important to note that the thesis focuses primarily on positive correlation pairs, except 
for ten specified macroeconomic variables for each country, for which I also perform 
correlation analysis. All correlation results for Brazil and China are summarized and 
displayed in the correlation matrix in Section 4.2.2, which is one of the key elements in 
this thesis.  
 
Causality Analysis 
The causality analysis is based on the concept of Granger causality (Granger 
causality and causality are used synonymously in this thesis). The causality analysis in 
Chapter 4 is also referred to as Granger tests or Granger causality tests.2 It examines the 
direction of interdependence —if any— between a dependent and an independent 
variable. Granger tests represent the third statistical diagnostic test in the thesis. Granger 
causality tests are an integral part of macroeconomic research —especially in time-
series analysis— to reveal the possibility of one independent variable 
controlling/affecting one dependent variable (efficient cause). I have chosen Granger 
causality testing over a vector error correction model due to the fact that Granger tests 
examine short- to medium term causality, whereas vector correction models test long-
term causality.  
The null hypothesis H0 (null, or H0) of Granger causality tests states that there 
exists non-causality. That is, significance values below 0.05 allow rejecting the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis which posits that Granger causality 
exists. The results of the Granger causality analysis for Brazil and China are 
summarized and displayed in the causality matrix (Section 4.2.3), which also 
incorporates the correlation results of the previous sections. The Granger causality 
matrix for Brazil and China, another key element of this thesis, provides the basis for 
the regression matrix for Brazil and China in Section 4.3 (Multiple Regression 
Analysis). 
 
                                                 
2
 The Granger causality tests in SAS are carried out through Granger-Wald causality tests. 
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Principal Component Analysis 
As the next step after Granger causality testing follows the principal component 
analysis. Multicollinearity is a statistical occurrence within a multiple regression model 
in which more than one independent variable is highly correlated with at least one other 
independent variable. A high degree of multicollinearity may distort the results of the 
effect of a single independent variable in a regression model. That is, a regression model 
with highly correlated or co-integrated independent variables may result in regression 
models with large standard errors (or noise). Statistically significant multiple regression 
models are those in which independent variables correlate highly with specific 
dependent variables, but correlate minimally with other non-specific variables. Multiple 
regression models with these features are characterized as low noise and statistically 
robust. Multicollinearity does not actually distort results, but it generates large standard 
errors in the related independent variables. The principal component analysis solves this 
problem and is carried out based on a set of criteria which are described in more detail 
in Chapter 4.  
 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
Following the principal component analysis, I will carry out multiple regression3 
analysis for those independent and dependent variable pairs which have been validated 
and passed the statistical diagnostic tests applied in the previous sections. In the 
regression analysis I seek to establish significant relationships between one or more than 
one of the seventy-nine dependent variables with one or several independent variables 
consisting of commodity price indexes and governance indexes. In this context I use 
adjusted R-square (or adjusted R2) as a key measure to identify how well the regression 
equation fits the data. In this thesis, an adjusted R-square above 0.80 will be considered 
to represent a strong goodness of fit to the model. Also, the t-test associated with 
regression analysis determines whether the independent variable is a significant 
predictor of the dependent variable by measuring the proportion of variance in the 
dependent variable explained by the independent variable. A t-value of above 2.0 will 
be considered to be meaningful, suggesting strong explanatory power of the 
independent variable.  
                                                 
3
 Multi regression and multiple regression are used synonymously in this thesis. 
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The correlation matrixes in Section 4.2.2, and the Granger causality matrixes in 
Section 4.2.3 represent an integral part for the creation of the multi-regression matrixes 
for Brazil and China displayed in Section 4.3. The multiple regression matrixes in 
Section 4.3 incorporate significant correlation results, significant Granger causality 
results, as well as regression results for each dependent variable. Each matrix represents 
a different analysis level of the thesis. The correlation matrix analysis results are a 
pivotal input factor for the Granger causality matrix, which in turn represents a key 
element for the multiple regression matrix in Section 4.3.  
 
Econometric Software and Statistical Application Packages  
The statistical diagnostic tests —including unit root analysis, Granger causality 
analysis, principal component analysis—, as well as regression analysis have been 
carried out with the SAS 9.1.3. Service Pack 4 XP_HOME Platform. The correlation 
tests have been performed with the PASW Statistics 18 statistical application package 
(PASW). A comprehensive overview of SAS programming syntax, and SAS output 
syntax for Chapters 3, 4, and 5 on Brazil and China can be found in the attached 
compact disk (CD-ROM). The CD-ROM contains folders for Brazil and China with 
respective sub-folders for each respective statistical diagnostic test and regression 
analysis. The CD–ROM folder structure mirrors the content structure of each respective 
diagnostic test of Brazil and China. The diagnostic test and multiple regression files are 
segregated by variables measured in percentage shares and by variables measured in 
change rates, mirroring the content structure of the respective diagnostic tests. The SAS 
output syntax for each test-run offers a vast range of statistical measures. Not all of 
these SAS measures are relevant for my econometric analysis. Such SAS output syntax 
which is neither relevant for the statistical diagnostic tests nor for the results in the 
econometric analysis is initially marked in gray letters in the attachments for purposes 
of reader friendliness.  
The correlation data in the respective matrixes in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 has been 
exported to Excel from PASW. The CD-ROM attachment contains pdf files with SAS 
program syntax, output syntax and log syntax for the unit root analysis, the causality 
analysis, the principal component analysis and the regression analysis of Chapters 2, 3, 
4, and 5, and their respective appendixes.  
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1.5  Comparative Econometric Result Analysis of Selected Variables 
Comparative Analysis 
Chapter 5 discusses the regression results and offers comparative economic 
interpretations for selected dependent variables. The objective is to uncover significant 
empirical relationships supported by findings of statistical significance. In Chapter 5 I 
do not discriminate between dependent variables which reveal significant regression 
results and those which do not. The criteria for selecting dependent variables are based 
on empirical and correlational significance, and/or causality significance, and/or 
regression significance, and also to some extent on my own subjective rationale. A 
dependent variable must reveal at least significant correlation results and yield sufficient 
empirical evidence to perform analysis on. The objective is to isolate meaningful 
macroeconomic variables and to draw comparisons on surfacing explanatory variables 
at the example of Brazil and China. Also, the fact that certain regression significant 
variables of Chapter 4 are not discussed in Chapter 5 does not imply that these variables 
are empirically insignificant.  
The structure of Chapter 5 is as follows: First, I display the regression metrics of  
Brazil and China in an introductory table of a selected dependent variable, indicating 
significance levels, correlation levels, regression results including adjusted R-square, 
and —case by case— t- and p-values. Then, in a second step, I examine and illustrate 
empirical associations by supporting these with statistical significance found through 
the correlation, causality, and regression analysis.  
 
Inverse Causality 
In a number of cases discussed in this thesis I observe inverse causality. Inverse 
causality happens when a dependent macroeconomic variable leads, or Granger causes, 
the independent variable. I observed inverse causality to a large extent with Chinese 
macro variables affecting commodity price indexes. Inverse causalities play a key role 
in revealing and pointing out inverse effects of Brazilian or Chinese macroeconomic 
variables on independent variables such as commodity price indexes and/or governance 
indexes. In Chapter 5 I provide a comparative analysis of Brazil and China by 
displaying correlation, Granger causality and regression results. There I will also 
discuss inverse Granger causality (dependent variables affecting independent variables) 
on basis of selected individual macroeconomic variables.  
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I do not perform an inverse Granger causal multiple regression analysis in which 
commodity price indexes and governance indexes are treated as dependent variables 
(endogenous), and in which macroeconomic variables are treated as independent 
(exogenous) variables. As illustrated at the beginning of Section 1.3, the reasons are as 
follows:  
(1) Governance dimensions are too complex, too heterogeneous, and politically too 
multifaceted as that they can be affected by one or more than one specific 
macroeconomic variable over the long-term. It is problematic to envision that 
governance architecture and its dimensions is caused or significantly influenced by one 
or more than one (or a set of) macroeconomic variable(s). Governance architecture is 
established, formulated, and influenced at top central and/or local authority levels, 
supporting the political and economic framework of an economy. Thus, governance 
architecture and its dimensions are treated as exogenous factors in this thesis.  
(2) As I illustrate in Chapter 3, Commodity price indexes trend with the general state of 
the global economy and not solely with the trend of a single economy such as China’s. 
Also, the volume of commodities traded and the number of market participants is very 
high. Undoubtedly, China’s economic expansion in tandem with global growth 
specifically affected global commodity prices, as I will illustrate in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 
5. Nonetheless, a hypothetical Chinese domestic expansion and simultaneous economic 
deterioration in Europe and/or the US would hardly positively affect global commodity 
prices.4  
Therefore I maintain the original hypothesis that commodity prices and 
governance are exogenous factors and choose not to perform inverse regression 
analysis. Instead, I built an inverse Granger debate within the comparative econometric 
discussion in Chapter 5 on a selective and individual variable basis. That is, I limit the 
inverse Granger causality debate to the context of significant correlation results. Inverse 
Granger discussion alone does offer insightful findings. Inverse Granger causal 
associations in the Granger causal and regression matrixes in Chapter 4.2 and 4.3 are 
marked in yellow, whereas regular or positive (non inverse) Granger causal associations 
are marked in green.  
                                                 
4
 As of 2010: China GDP to world GDP = 8.56%, US GDP to world GDP = approximately 23%, Europe 
GDP to world GDP = approximately 25% (please see Chapter 2 for details) (Data Source: World Bank, 
2009, 2010).  
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In general, I find evidence supporting the view of many researchers that exports 
drive the GDP of emerging economies. With the example of Brazil I also find statistical 
evidence that degrees of democracy are positively affected by the degree of trade 
openness. Furthermore there is empirical evidence that China’s economic expansion 
does affect specific commodity prices (inverse Granger causality). 
  
1.6  Conclusion  
 The conclusion following Chapter 5 is split into three parts: Overall Conclusion, 
Sectional Summaries, and Final Remarks.  
 The overall conclusion summarizes the scope, objective, and findings of the 
thesis and provides a top level summary. The Sectional Summaries offer an in depth 
summary of the thesis' individual chapters and their sections. The final remarks round 
up the conclusion and thesis as a whole. 
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2  Regional Analysis — Brazil and China 
2.1    Introduction 
This chapter instantiates the regional focus of this thesis by summarizing the 
sociopolitical and macroeconomic framework of both, Brazil and China. This chapter 
provides the qualitative foundation for the subsequent multiple regression analysis of 79 
identical macroeconomic variables for both countries. This chapter is hence organized 
according to the comparative analysis of Brazil and China, highlighting structural 
differences in their sociopolitical and macroeconomic frameworks; the data is mainly 
based on the World Bank (2009, 2010) data catalog if not otherwise stated. 
One of the key premises underlying Brazil’s and China’s pursuit of regional and 
global economic and political leadership has been each country’s protracted economic 
growth. China’s economic expansion and its appetite for soft and energy commodities, 
minerals and metals has increased commodity prices and amplified Chinese demand for 
key Brazilian exports, including soybeans, oil products, pulp, and iron ores. In contrast, 
Brazil has engaged in greater imports of Chinese manufactured goods in the past 
decade. The rise of China’s economy appears threatening to South American countries 
such as Brazil due to the greater degree of export complementary compared with 
Chinese exports. The intensified relationship with China has also led primary 
commodities and their share among total Brazilian exports to rise (together with imports 
of manufactured products), threatening to undermine or neutralize three decades of 
continuous efforts to build and expand Brazil’s manufacturing and high-tech export 
sector. Thus Brazil’s relationship with China comprises three phases: (1) dualism and 
competition for FDI, (2) cooperation through trade relations, and (3) partnerships in the 
form of, e.g., cross-country loan agreements, acquisitions, and joint ventures. 
Section 2.2 provides a comparative overview of the sociopolitical development 
of Brazil and China during the past 50 years. Then, Section 2.3 illustrates their 
macroeconomic frameworks and economic structures according to each country’s 
demographics, labor markets, domestic sector, GDPs and their composition, natural 
resources, and external sectors. Natural resources and the external sector play pivotal 
roles; Brazil is a net exporter of energy commodities, minerals and metals, as well as 
soft commodities such as soybeans and sugar, whereas China is a net importer of these 
commodities. In this sense, Brazil’s and China’s export structures have developed in 
diametrically opposed directions. Yet, they also remain linked by the trade in primary 
  
36 
commodities in the context of the emergence of the ‘commodity super cycle’ (Blanch, 
F. et al, 2010. Lyons, G. 2010), as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, which 
introduces commodity and governance indexes as well as the independent and 
dependent variables for the multiple regression analysis in Chapter 4. Therefore, 
Chapter 2 does not focus in depth on the countries’ monetary systems or capital 
markets, as these topics appear in the discussion of the governance index within the 
world governance index and economic freedom index framework in Chapter 3. Instead, 
Section 2.4 details the external sectors of Brazil and China, including the important role 
of commodities for their trade structures, with an elaboration on their main commodity 
sectors including each country’s energy mix. This section also provides an overview of 
Brazil’s and China’s main trading partners, revealing the changing dynamics of their 
bilateral trade relations in the past decade.  
Finally, Section 2.5 describes Brazil’s and China’s changing relationship from 
dualism to cooperation to partnership. Bilateral relations between them have changed 
considerably in the past two decades, such that the 1990s represent the competitive-
dualistic era when Brazil and China competed for global FDI. China was relatively 
more successful in attracting FDI for manufacturing and production platforms for low-
tech consumer goods sectors, mainly due to what was commonly believed to be an 
unmatched competitive advantage in terms of low labor costs. Starting in the early 
2000s, several gravitational forces changed their relations from a state of competition to 
a nascent state of cooperation, largely because of their intensified trade relations. For 
example, from 2004 to 2010, Brazil and China sought to leverage their unique 
competitive advantages by establishing joint ventures, or executing bilateral loan 
agreements in commodity-related sectors such as energy, minerals and metals to face 
global technology and supply challenges. Especially from the Brazilian perspective, 
these undertakings initiated a developing partnership stage.  
The figures in Appendixes 2.1a – 2.1g provide illustrative comparisons of key 
macroeconomic variables for Brazil and China illustrated and discussed in Chapter 2.  
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2.2    Sociopolitical Framework  
BRAZIL 
Brazil is the fifth largest country worldwide by size and population, and it 
dominates South America in terms of political and economic power. Its boundaries span 
more than 8.51 million km2, including 8.45 million km2 of land and 55,460 km2 of 
water. Its population has grown, on average, by 1.63% since 1980, reaching 193.7 
million in 2009 (World Bank, 2009, 2010) and is estimated to surpass 203.4 million in 
2012 (CIA, 2011a).  
Unlike China, Brazil is a federal republic with a relatively solid democratic 
foundation. Its 1988 constitution grants extensive powers to the federal government, 
which consists of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The directly elected 
president assumes office for four years and can be re-elected for an additional four-year 
term (U.S. Department of State, 2011a). The president appoints his or her own cabinet. 
The Brazilian senate consists of 81 senators (3 for each state) and 513 deputies, who 
serve eight- and four-year terms, respectively. Federal elections are based on a system 
of proportional representation by states, weighted in favor of geographically large but 
sparsely populated states. Brazil’s political system currently harbors 19 separate 
parties.5  
Brazil gained its independence in 1822, after more than three centuries under 
Portuguese rule. Until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the following proclamation 
of a republic by the military in 1889, Brazil continued to maintain a monarchical system 
of government. The economic importance of coffee allowed coffee exporters to 
dominate Brazil politically, at least until populist leader Getúlio Vargas gained power in 
1930 (Baer, 2008, pp. 41-48). Between the late 1920s and the late 1930s, industrial 
output increased by nearly 50%, and by 1940 it was more than double that of 
agriculture. Brazil was still a neo-colonial debtor nation, therefore industrial self-
sufficiency and protection of the country’s natural resources were seen as essential in 
order to guarantee sovereignty, economic independence and the realization of world-
                                                 
5
 Including: The Workers' Party (PT, center-left), Democrats (DEM, center-right), Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (PMDB, center), Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB, center-left), Green Party 
(PV, center-left), Socialism and Freedom Party (Psol, left), Brazilian Labor Party (PTB, center-right), 
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB, center-left), Democratic Labor Party (PDT, center-left), Communist Party 
of Brazil (PCdoB, left), Progressive Party (PP, center-right), Party of the Republic (PR, center-right), 
Brazilian Republican Party (PRB, center), and Christian Social Party (PSC, center) (Source: U.S. 
Department of State, 2011a). 
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power status (Baer, 2008, p. 41ff). Brazil remained under the control of populist and 
military governments until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to 
civilian governments (Baer, 2008, p. 41-48). However, Brazil’s cautious democratic 
transformation had actually already begun in 1974, ten years after the military coup in 
1964, so that it spanned more than 11 years. In March 1974, first steps of political 
liberalization began when General Geisel assumed power. Under President Figueiredo, 
from 1979 to 1985, liberalization efforts continued.  
In early 1984, Brazil undertook the largest political mobilization in its history 
with the ‘diretas ja’ campaign to institute direct democratic presidential elections 
(‘diretas ja’, direct elections; Lopes, 2007, pp. 2ff). However, the Brazilian military 
leadership insisted on indirect elections of the first civil government. Tancredo Neves 
became the first elected Brazilian president, designated by an electoral assembly in 
January 1985, but he died shortly before he could take office (BTI, 2008b, p. 4). The 
presidential office thus was assumed by the elected vice president, José Sarney, who 
served from 1985 until 1990. The final step of democratization took place during the 
Constitutional Convention (1987–1988), which did not include any far-reaching 
limitations on the military’s institutional autonomy (Baer, 2008, p. 41ff).  
The new Brazilian constitution took effect in October 1988; the transition to 
democracy was consolidated in March 1990 by the direct, democratic election of 
President Fernando Collor de Mello. By September 1992, public and political pressure 
in response to corruption charges pushed congress to remove President Collor from 
office, and Vice President Itamar Franco completed his term. In October 1994, 
internationally renowned sociologist, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, won the presidency, 
then established democracy as the foundation for the state and government. An 
amendment to the Brazilian constitution allowed his re-election, and Cardoso, who 
introduced significant and far reaching orthodox economic reforms, became the first 
Brazilian president to be elected for a second term from 1999 until 2002.6  
The election of President Luiz Inácio (Lula) da Silva, a former union leader and 
the co-founder and chairman of the PT (Partido Trabalhador, or workers’ party) in 
October 2002 marked the second largest sociopolitical change in Brazil's history after 
the ‘diretas ja’ movement in 1994. President Lula had previously run for office three 
                                                 
6
 For more details on the economic reforms under the Cardoso presidency please see also Section 
3.4.2.3.6 Monetary Freedom, Brazil. 
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times (in 1990, 1994, and in 1998), without success. Now, for the first time in Brazil's 
history, the country's leader was a member of the working class, which had so far been 
largely excluded from meaningful political or economic participation. During his first 
term of office (2003–2006) President Lula solidified Brazil’s macroeconomic stability 
and strengthened its social and economic framework by reducing unemployment, 
poverty, and income inequality, as well as by providing an increasingly efficient social 
safety net (BTI, 2008b, p. 5). Lula was re-elected for a second term in office despite 
various corruption and bribery scandals involving the PT between 2005 and 2006 (BTI, 
2008b, p. 5). President Lula then was succeeded by Dilma Vana Rousseff, another PT 
member, who has benefited from her predecessor’s strong popularity and the country’s 
solid economic recovery track record. Rousseff, elected president in October 2010, is 
likely to carry on President Lula’s pragmatic form of social capitalism.  
Despite its recent economic success, Brazil continues to face major challenges in 
terms of infrastructure, education, taxation, and the pension system. The government’s 
aptitude for implementing structural reforms has been limited, especially in the last 
years of Lula’s presidency, due to the lack of consensus building with view of reforms 
that required a 60% majority vote. Despite a strong mandate for the PT, coalition 
reforms remain difficult, considering the vast variety of interests, both within the PT 
and among other party members of any such coalition.  
 
CHINA  
China is the fourth largest country in terms of geographic size, after only Russia, 
Canada, and the United States. It is the largest country in terms of population. Its 
boundaries encompass 9.59 million km2, 99.7% of which is land. China’s population 
includes 91.5% Han Chinese and 8.5% other nationalities (e.g., Tibetan, Uyghur, 
Mongol, and Korean). Overall, its population has grown an average of 1.1% since 1980. 
From 1.331 billion people as of 2009 (World Bank, 2009, 2010), the population is 
predicted to surpass 1.337 billion in June 2011 (CIA, 2011b).  
For centuries, China has been the world’s leading civilization, outpacing 
everyone else in the arts and sciences. In the 19th and early 20th century China became 
overwhelmed by internal political unrest and wars, major food crises, military defeats, 
and foreign occupations. In the post-World War II era, the communists, led by Mao 
Zedong, established an autocratic, socialist, Leninist system. After 1978, Mao’s 
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successor Deng Xiaoping focused on market-oriented reforms and economic 
development. By 2000 the country’s output had quadrupled. The economic reforms that 
began in 1978 proceeded in a highly decentralized manner and allowed only for gradual 
changes, which helped China avoid significant transformation shocks that for example 
the Russian economy endured in the 1990s.  
In comparison to Brazil’s relatively democratic political system, China’s is 
characterized by the Leninist principle of concentration of state powers, with the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) as the highest locus of power, followed by the head 
of state, currently President Hu Jintao, Vice President Xi Jinping, and the State Council. 
Members of the State Council include the head of the government, Premier Wen Jiabao, 
as well as four vice premiers, five state councilors (equivalent to vice premiers but with 
narrower portfolios), 25 ministers, the central bank governor, and the auditor-general 
(U.S. Department of State, 2011b). The NPC traditionally meets at least once every five 
years, but annual gatherings often last for approximately two weeks as the Congress 
attempts to validate and approve new policy directions, laws, the budget, and major 
personnel changes. Although the NPC generally approves State Council policy and 
personnel recommendations, various NPC committees hold active debate in closed 
sessions, and changes may be made to accommodate alternate views (U.S. Department 
of State, 2011b).  
However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), authoritarian in structure and 
ideology, remains superior to the constitution and dominates the government, such that 
the NPC and local People’s Congresses are subject to CCP directives and control. No 
system of checks and balances or subordination of the party and state powers to the law 
exists. The primary organs of power in the CCP include the Politburo Standing 
Committee, which currently consists of 9 members; the Politburo, with 25 full 
members, including members of the Politburo Standing Committee; the Secretariat, 
which is the principal administrative mechanism of the CCP, headed by the Politburo 
Standing Committee member and executive secretary Xi Jinping; the Central Military 
Commission; and the Discipline Inspection Commission, which is charged with rooting 
out corruption and malfeasance among party cadres (U.S. Department of State, 2011b). 
Although China’s state is characterized by Leninist principles, communism 
effectively stopped being the country’s state ideology sometime between the Tiananmen 
Square protests of 1989 and the collapse of communism in East Europe and the Soviet 
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Union soon thereafter. As a myriad of political decisions to promote market openness 
and economic development shows, the CCP effectively has modified its rigid Leninist 
political system to embrace a more economically sensitive system that aims to adapt to 
the challenges of global trade and take advantage of China’s primary competitive edge, 
which is its low labor cost (Tsang, 2010, pp. 3-7). The CCP has imposed a social 
contract on China’s citizens by delivering stability, order, rapid growth, and generally 
improved living conditions, in return for its continued dominance of government and 
politics. Tsang (2010, pp. 3-4) thus describes a ‘general improvement in living 
conditions which include not only economic prosperity but a larger scope for individual 
freedom and improved government responsiveness to public demands’, which he 
considers to be an effect of ‘Consultative Leninism’, a system that combines Leninist 
control mechanisms with innovative economic developments to benefit China’s citizens.  
The rapid, CCP-controlled economic development of China and the rise in 
individual wealth (mainly in coastal areas and the South East) suggests that communist 
ideology no longer exclusively dominates the CCP’s policies. Key CCP policies 
manifested in its twelfth five-year plan (2011–2015) revolve around maintaining stable 
GDP growth, and a slightly higher GDP per capita growth than GDP growth, balancing 
state-controlled capitalism and maintaining social stability by enabling less privileged 
segments of the society to benefit from China’s economic prosperity. 7  Core 
macroeconomic and structural reforms to ensure sustainable growth and social stability 
are hence likely to define China’s policy in the next five years. However, many 
significant structural economic challenges remain, including the reform of the banking 
system to apply resources more efficiently for private-sector development, the 
introduction of social security systems to boost domestic consumption, the reduction of 
state-sector involvement, the liberalization of China’s capital accounts, the 
improvement of anti-corruption governance, and the reduction of environmental 
damages and destruction in light of China’s economic expansion.  
                                                 
7
 China’s current five-year plan emphasizes growth quality. The government has set an annual growth 
target of 7% p.a. for the next five years on the basis of improving growth quality in order to reflect in 
higher living standards of Chinese citizens. The five-year plan focuses mainly on balanced growth with 
domestic demand as a new source of growth, science & technology as a driving force for industrial 
upgrading, and energy saving & environment protection as an important yardstick for solidified, less 
volatile GDP growth. Annual per capita household income growth is set above the 7% GDP growth rate 
target in order to increase the share of household income to GDP to spur domestic demand (Ding et al, 
2011, pp. 1-3).   
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2.3  Macroeconomic Framework  
2.3.1  Domestic Economic Development 
BRAZIL 
Gross Domestic Product Development 
Brazil’s conversion to a market economy began in the 1930s, with a mainly 
isolated and protected local market. Its main economic policies were shaped by theories 
of industrialization through import substitution. Although import substitution fueled the 
Brazilian economy for decades, until the early 1980s it did not translate into competitive 
pressures to maximize domestic economic efficiency, for example by establishing a 
fully functional banking system and self-sustaining industrial bases, which would have 
helped reduce the risk of a balance-of-payments crisis. In the early 1980s Brazil 
eventually moved away from its long-running import substitution model to adopt a more 
outward- and trade-oriented development model. Despite soaring exports in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the new model still failed to translate into domestic economic growth. 
Existing social, economic and regional inequalities and discrepancies increased further. 
In particular, the 1980s were characterized by increasing unemployment, hyperinflation 
(1980: 101% p.a., 1990: 2,900% p.a.), highly volatile GDP growth rates measured in 
constant USD (1980: 6.6%, 1981: –6.6%, 1982: –1.7%, 1983: –5.9%, 1984–1987: 
average of 6.2%, 1988: –.1%, 1989: 3.3%, 1990: –4.3%), intensifying problems due to 
large ratios of external debt stocks to GNI (1980: 31%, 1984: 53%), and rising deficits 
(World Bank, 2009, 2010). The government’s attempts to stabilize the economy with 
various heterodox economic strategies were unsuccessful — until 1994, with the 
introduction of the Real Plan and its orthodox elements.  
 
Inflation and Plano Real 
Perennial problem in Brazil’s past was the lack and absence of essential and 
urgently needed fiscal adjustments in order to contain the risk of inflationary pressures. 
Brazil’s macroeconomic experience of the last ten years reveals the complexity of 
merging orthodox policies with socio economic measures to even out the significant 
income concentration and imbalance in wealth distribution. An orderly process of firstly 
establishing orthodox policies and then subsequently engaging in social economic 
activities proved to be highly problematic in the case of Brazil. 
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The Real Plan, or Plano Real, involved the introduction of the new Brazilian 
currency, the Real, in 1994. Under President Henrique Cardoso the plan featured the 
simultaneous application of fiscal adjustment, a nominal exchange rate anchor that 
started at USD parity, a defensive monetary strategy, and a debt restructuring agreement 
with commercial lenders. The results were very positive. Inflation, which had been at 
2,076% in 1994, dropped to 66% in 1995, 15.8% in 1996, 6.9% in 1997, and a record 
low of 3.2% in 1998. Since 1998, inflation has followed an inverted parabola, slightly 
increasing year by year to peak at 14.7% in 2003, one year after Lula’s election. Since 
2004, inflation has dropped gradually to 4.9% in 2009, in response to the conservative 
monetary policy adopted by Brazil’s Central Bank.  
Similarly, the volatility of GDP growth rates declined such that they developed 
positively and with relative stability to 4.4% in 1995, then fluctuated between a 
minimum of 0.04% in 1998 and a maximum of 6.1% in 2007. In 2009, during the global 
financial crisis, GDP growth rates dropped to –0.2%. The ratio of external debt stocks to 
GNI also developed favorably, declining from 34% in 1993 to 21.9% in 1996 and 
16.2% in 2008. Nonetheless, negative trade balances, measured as the ratio of the 
external balance of goods and services to GDP, persisted, developing negatively from 
1995 until 2001 and ranging between –1.3% and –2.2%. To manage its external 
balance, the Brazilian Central Bank opted to modify its currency regime to a managed 
depreciation regime against the USD, which led the Real to peak at BRL/USD 3.08 at 
the end of 2003 and drop to BRL/USD 2.0 in 2009. Thus it failed to cover the wider 
margin of relative inflation differentials with major trading partners, and Brazil lost 
some of its competitiveness (World Bank, 2009, 2010, Data Catalog).  
As of 2009, Brazil’s economy featured a GDP valued at USD856 billion, 
measured in 2000 constant USD, or USD1.59 trillion measured in current USD. In 
contrast, these values were USD596 billion and USD840 billion, respectively, in 1996. 
Furthermore, GDP per capita in constant (2000) and current USD terms grew from 
USD3,631 and USD5,115 in 1996 to USD4,399 and USD8,230 in 2009, respectively. 
Table 2.1: Brazil GDP Relative to World GDP 1970-2009 
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Brazil GDP (U$bio)* 42.3  123.7   235.0   222.9   462.0   769.0   644.7   882.2  1,594.5  
% of World GDP 1.47% 2.13% 2.14% 1.79% 2.11% 2.59% 2.00% 1.93% 2.74% 
Data Source: World Bank (2009, 2010), Table created and arranged by the author. *) current USD. 
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As Table 2.1 shows, Brazil’s share of global GDP, measured in current USD, fluctuated 
between 1.47% (1970) and 2.88% (1997), for an average of 1.96% between 1970 and 
2009. In contrast, China’s share of global GDP averaged 2.93% during the same period 
and reached 8.6% in 2009.8 
Despite the successes of President Cardoso’s macroeconomic measures, 
including the Real Plan, his successor and the PT initially contested the reforms, 
claiming they led to social imbalances. Yet, even with this anti-Real Plan and socialist 
rhetoric, President Inácio da Silva (or Lula) maintained the fundamental characteristics 
of the Real Plan and exhibited significantly more business-friendly acumen than 
generally had been expected by the industrial and business sector. Starting in 2002, 
President da Silva operated as an economic pragmatist and retained the Cardoso reforms 
successfully —as evidenced by the solid GDP and inflation growth rates, as well as the 
foreign exchange rates. He also added micro- and social economic reforms to Brazil’s 
macroeconomic framework. Since 2000, Brazil’s government has taken significant steps 
forward by pursuing stability-oriented policies, including a focus on a floating exchange 
rate, an inflation-targeting regime, and the generation of primary fiscal surpluses. As a 
result, the global economic downturn hit Brazil less severe, and recovery started earlier 
in Brazil than in many other Latin American countries. Key factors to this recovery 
have been strong private consumption, counter-cyclical fiscal measures, counter-
cyclical reductions of the SELIC rate (Brazilian Central Bank overnight rate), and a 
stable banking system. Brazil’s net foreign debt was 17% of current account receipts in 
2009, and its large USD currency reserves of USD238 billion covered about 13 months 
of interest payments on its foreign debt and imports of goods and services, which 
provided additional stabilizing factors to help weather the crisis of 2008/2009.  
 
Challenges 
Nonetheless, economic reforms in the fiscal, social security and labor sectors 
continue to be pivotal requirements to enhance Brazil’s growth potential. For example, 
research and development was at 1.0% of GDP in 2008 —one of the lowest levels 
among emerging economies— and it was mainly being carried out by government and 
public universities (in contrast, China continues to increase R&D expenditures as a 
                                                 
8
 For comparison purposes, United States GDP to World GDP measured in current USD was 36% in 
1970, 25% in 1980, 31% in 2000, and 24% in 2009 (Data Source: World Bank (2009, 2010)).    
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percentage of GDP, from 3.4% in 2002 to 4.0% by 20119). Although during the past 16 
years Brazil has experienced consolidated macroeconomic stability and recognized the 
significance of sound macroeconomic fundamentals as a prerequisite for private-sector 
development, it has not fully capitalized on its performance potential in terms of GDP 
growth rates. Rather, Brazil’s average annual GDP growth rate of 3.4% for the 1993–
2008 period seemed weak compared with other BRIC countries, such as China, which 
grew at an average of 10.8% in the same period. Its relatively low savings and 
investment rates also undermine Brazil’s potential output growth, which may help 
explain Brazil’s poorly developed infrastructure. In comparison with other emerging 
markets, Brazil is a relatively closed economy in terms of exports of goods and services, 
which are well diversified by destination, accounting for only about 13% of GDP as of 
2009.  
 
CHINA  
Shift in Economic Dogma 
Before 1978, China was centrally planned: The allocation of resources was 
solely determined by central and sometimes local governments. Agriculture played a 
dominant role in China’s economy with agriculture to GDP ratios ranging from 30% to 
40%. In addition, heavy industries such as the steel industry strongly influenced China’s 
economy until the late 1970s. Farming was based on a collective framework, and the 
industrial output of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was determined centrally rather than 
based on organic demand. China’s GDP growth rates were highly volatile, ranging from 
-27% in 1962 to 19% in 1970. Nominal GDP in 1961 was at USD50 billion, and almost 
doubled to USD91.5 billion by 1970. By 1978 it had surged to USD148.2 billion.  
After 1978 though, China’s economy began to change gradually from a centrally 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy in which market dynamics determine 
resource allocations. The market reform process, which began under Deng Xiaoping, 
became the catalyst for the vigorous expansion of China’s emerging market economy. 
Deng’s market reform strategy followed a carefully managed progression, liberalizing 
China’s economic framework gradually and experimentally, at first only on a trial-and-
error basis at a local level to examine their impact. Generally, macroeconomic reforms 
                                                 
9
 In 2006, China spent more than USD136 billion on R&D, becoming the world’s second-largest investor 
after the United States (Naughton, 2007, p. 355).  
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progressed through a decentralized approach that allowed for gradual changes, limited 
any implementation errors, and avoided transformation shocks. Only those reform 
initiatives that had proven successful on lower administrative levels proceeded to 
national-level adoption. One standout example was to make individual households 
responsible for agriculture, which dismantled the collectivization of farming, thus 
permitting commercialization, and the generation of private agricultural surpluses (BTI, 
2008c, pp. 1-24). With this gradual approach, China’s economy has taken on a unique 
blend of market capitalism in emerging private sectors coexisting with a planned 
economy on local and federal levels. Throughout the economic reformation process the 
private sector’s economic importance and political appreciation rose. In turn, the 
centrally managed plan economy has gradually been abandoned in favor of market 
practices that forced SOEs to accept a more competitive macroeconomic framework. 
These market reform policies have more than doubled China’s nominal GDP, from 
USD148.2 billion in 1978 to USD306.7 billion in 1985. When Deng died in 1997, 
China’s transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy 
had progressed significantly, now enjoying the necessary infrastructure and a 
modernized industrial complex to provide room for an increasingly dynamic service 
sector. Nominal GDP thus reached USD952.7 billion in 1997, an increase of more than 
300% compared with 1985.  
 
Export Orientation and Gross Domestic Product Growth 
The gradual and careful adoption of an open-door policy in the mid-1990s led to 
the establishment of special economic zones for enterprises (SEZs) along China’s 
Eastern coastal regions, introduced to encourage FDI and integrate China into global 
trade routes. As a consequence FDI rose from USD4.5 billion in 1991 to USD44.24 
billion in 2001 —the year China's integration efforts were rewarded with its acceptance 
into the WTO. Since then, FDI has continued to increase and make use of China’s vast 
and inexpensive labor, reaching USD94 billion in 2008 (though it peaked at USD138.4 
billion in 2007). China’s exports grew modestly from USD2.6 billion in 1960 to 
USD9.9 billion in 1978, but they exploded to USD62 billion in 1990 and then 
USD266.1 billion in 2001. By 2009, exports had surpassed the USD1 trillion mark. 
Furthermore, nominal GDP in 2009 was USD4.98 trillion, though it was coupled with a 
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relatively low nominal GDP per capita of USD3,744 (current USD). China’s economic 
weight thus clearly has increased significantly on a global stage.  
Table 2.2: China GDP Relative to World GDP 1970-2009 
Year 1970  1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
China GDP (U$bio)* 91.5 161.2  189.4  306.7  356.9  728.0  1,198.5  2,256.9  4,985.5  
% of World GDP 3.18% 2.78% 1.72% 2.47% 1.63% 2.45% 3.72% 4.95% 8.56% 
Data Source: World Bank (2009, 2010), Table created and arranged by the author. *) current USD. 
As Table 2.2 shows, China’s GDP share of global GDP averaged 2.93% from 
1970 to 2009, ranging between 1.6% (1987 and 1990) and 8.6% (2009), which suggests 
impressive growth in its share (in comparison, recall that Brazil’s nominal GDP and 
GDP per capita in 2009 were USD1.59 trillion and USD8,230 (current USD), 
respectively, and its global GDP share averaged 1.96% between 1970 and 2009).  
China’s external reserves continue to grow due to its continuing positive trade 
balance of USD2.5 trillion in 2009 and USD3 trillion in 2010. Its foreign exchange rate 
depreciated gradually after 1990, from RMB/USD 4.47 to RMB/USD 8.28 in 1998, 
which supported its exports. It remained at this level until 2004, then appreciated by 
17.6% to RMB/USD 6.83 in 2009. Inflation went from 3.4% in 1990 to double-digit 
rates until 1995 (16.9%), and then declined gradually to 0.7% in 2001. Although it 
picked up to 5.9% in 2008, it closed at –0.7% in 2009 according to official World Bank 
data.  
After achieving double-digit average GDP growth rates from the early 1990s to 
2006, China’s leadership shifted its focus from politically tainted debates about whether 
to establish a socialist or market-oriented economy toward the question how to ensure 
sustainable GDP growth. The 2004 revision to the Chinese constitution acknowledged 
the importance of protecting private property, which fueled significant expansion in the 
real estate sector and its peripheral industries. Economic growth and living standards 
have continued to improve significantly, reducing the absolute number of poor from 250 
million in 1978 to 55 million in 2009. 
 
Challenges 
Nonetheless, the CCP and the Chinese government face a myriad of severe 
socioeconomic challenges, including reducing rampant corruption, as well as ecological 
challenges.  
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In the 2009 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) report, China ranked 79 out of 
178, with 3.6 points, then moved up to rank 78 with 3.5 points in 2010 (In comparison, 
Brazil ranked 69th and scored 3.7 points.). Other socioeconomic challenges include 
strengthening China’s pension and health system and building a functioning social 
security system. High domestic savings rates of 42.5% of GDP in 1996 and 54.2% in 
2009 continue to limit domestic consumption to GDP, which declined from 43.5% in 
1996 to 34% in 2009. Another major project must address the challenges of sustaining 
adequate job growth for millions of migrant workers, new hires in the work force, and 
workers laid off from SOEs. Furthermore, China is facing serious ecological and 
environmental concerns as a result of its rapid growth and economic transformation, 
which have led to deterioration in air and water quality, soil erosion, and loss of arable 
land.10 Finally, the one-child policy has made China one of the most rapidly aging 
countries in the world and produced significant economic disparities in cross-
generational wealth distribution. These elements all have encouraged the continuing 
erosion of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, along with a significant 
deterioration of social stability and increasing unrest among Chinese citizens (BTI, 
2008c, pp. 1-24), who, lacking access to institutionalized channels for criticism, resort 
to violent clashes and riots with state authorities to express their despair and anger.  
 
2.3.2  Key Sectors 
BRAZIL 
Brazil’s relatively sophisticated industrial base, coupled with its relatively low 
labor costs, make it the largest FDI recipient in key economic sectors in Latin America. 
It has in particular benefited from key competitive advantages in industrial segments, 
agriculture, and livestock, which are key sources of export revenues and pivotal factors 
for its future supplementary industrial and export diversification. The ratio of net FDI to 
GDP grew gradually from 0.2% in 1990 to 0.6% in 1995. The positive effects of the 
Real Plan helped to increase net FDI from 1.3% in 1996 to a record level of 5.1% in 
2000, though it gradually reversed to 2.8% of GDP in 2008. In 2009, the ratio of net 
                                                 
10
 The environmental damages of China’s rivers are enormous. For example, Naughton (2007, pp. 487-
504) states that approximately 40% of China’s river flow is classified at IV or between IV and V on a 
scale ranging from I (acceptable for human contact) to V (highly toxic).  
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FDI to GDP dropped to 1.7% due to the financial crisis (World Bank (2009, 2010), Data 
Catalog). The following are Brazil's key sectors: 
 
Automotive 
Brazil’s industry sector, which represents 27.2% of GDP as of 2009, ranges 
from heavy engineering to consumer goods and is among the most complex and 
diversified in Latin America. Within the industrial sector, the automotive industry is by 
far the biggest segment, not only in Brazil but in South America overall. Vehicle 
production capacity increased rapidly during the mid- to late 1990s as auto producers 
invested heavily in Brazil to meet local demand and avoid protectionist trade tariffs, 
which averaged 32% in 1989 and dropped only slowly to 11% in 1995 before increasing 
to 16% in 1998 (World Bank, 2009, 2010, Data Catalog). In 2010 Brazil produced 
approximately 3.6 million vehicles (ANFAVEA, 2011).  
 
Oil  
The state-owned Petrobras’ monopoly over the Brazilian oil sector, South 
America’s largest energy sector, ended with a constitutional change in 1997. The 
Brazilian government expected that opening the oil sector to private investors would 
increase domestic exploration and production, improving oil sufficiency and export 
potential. Fuel exports as a proportion of total merchandise exports increased from 0.9% 
in 1996 to 9.5% in 2008, underscoring the importance of the energy sector.  
 
Agribusiness 
Agribusiness accounted for 6.6% of GDP in 2009, up from 5.5% in 1996. This 
sector, including both agricultural raw materials and food, is very dynamic in the 
Brazilian economy, and it accounted for almost 40% of total merchandise exports in 
2009. Brazil is among the world's leading producers of coffee, sugar cane, cocoa, 
oranges, beef, corn, and soy products. Agricultural land as a percentage of total land 
area was 26.5% in 1980, 30.6% in 1996, and 31.3% in 2008. Arable land —fertile land 
that is not already under cultivation— was 5.3% in 1980, 6.8% in 1996, and 7.2% in 
2008. Brazil has potential for expansion, especially of its soy production, which may 
create new pressure for investments in infrastructure, such as ports and roads.  
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Telecommunications 
The telecommunications sector in Brazil is among the largest and most attractive 
in the emerging markets, trailing only China’s and India’s telecom markets. The 
privatization process initiated by the government in 1996 prompted strong private 
investments. Particular interest was triggered by the 1998 sale of Telebras, the former 
state-run telecommunications operator. Foreign investor interest has been particularly 
strong in Brazil’s industrial heartland, which include the states of São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro and their well-known capitals. The main investment target has been the wireless 
segment, which has grown significantly larger than the landline segment. In 1996, there 
were 9 landline connections and 1 wireless connection per 100 inhabitants. In 2008 
there were only 21 landline connections per 100 inhabitants, while wireless (mobile) 
connections grew to 78 per 100 inhabitants. 
 
CHINA 
China’s economic activities encompass all WTO-defined fields, particularly 
telecom, insurance, financial services, and agriculture.  
 
Manufacturing and Industry 
China continues to benefit from its labor cost advantage in both light and heavy 
manufacturing, though the latter is still dominated by SOEs. In the manufacturing 
sector, industry dominates the GDP composition (46.3% in 2009; cf. Brazil’s ratio of 
27.2% in 2009). The manufacturing sector has benefited from significant reductions in 
regulatory measures, such as ownership caps, geographic restrictions, or limitations on 
foreign investors, particularly in the auto sector.11  China’s Pearl River Delta in the 
southern province of Guangdong continues to maintain its leadership position as the 
country’s biggest manufacturing hub, despite competition from Shanghai. Together with 
China’s industry sector, its manufacturing sector continues to dominate the country’s 
GDP composition. The relocation of assembly and finishing processes by many 
multinational enterprises to China has created a constant trade flow of imported 
assembly pieces, which are processed into finished goods for re-export to developed 
                                                 
11The WGIRQ index of China provided by the World Bank measures regulatory quality, which improved 
from -0.385 in 2001 to -0.15 in 2008. 
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consumer markets in the United States and Europe. The ratio of manufacturing value 
added to GDP was 33.9% in 2009 (cf. Brazil’s ratio of 15.5% in the same period). 
 
High Technology 
Despite the dominance of heavy industry and manufacturing, high technology 
(or high tech) plays an important role in China, including online gaming, software 
production, solar energy, and wireless telecommunication. In 1996, 1 of every 100 
Chinese consumers was a wireless subscriber; in 2008, the subscriber base rose to 48 
out of 100. Less than 1% of the population had internet access in 1996, but this level 
surged to 23% in 2008. As a result of high demand for online services, internet activities 
and wireless capabilities, China is gradually gaining recognition for its high tech 
industries. The focus of China’s tech affinity in the last decade has largely been the 
assembly of hardware rather than software (BTI, 2008c, pp. 2-5, pp. 10-16). 
Nonetheless, this pattern is changing towards higher value added production in the 
technology chain. The main center for high tech activities is Beijing, closely followed 
by Shanghai.  
 
Chemicals and Refining 
Refiners in China are thriving due to the massive local demand for 
petrochemical products and chemical based commodities such as polyethylene. Most of 
the chemical, petrochemical, and petrol industry is located along the Chinese Eastern 
coast to facilitate logistics from refiners to ports and vice versa. The low labor costs, 
skilled workforce, and large domestic markets represent the main incentives for refiners 
to choose this location. 
 
Energy 
China’s demand for energy is high. The country is a net importer of oil and gas, 
which means the world's largest energy firms are present in China and have 
shareholdings in Chinese energy firms. Details on the Chinese energy sector are 
discussed in Section 2.4.  
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Tourism 
Due to China’s enormous ecological variety, the World Tourism Organization 
estimates that it can establish itself as the top global tourist destination by 2020, with 
over 8% of global market share. As of 2010, China's annual air passenger volume 
reached 140 million passengers.  
 
2.3.3  GDP Composition  
2.3.3.1 Gross Capital Formation, Industry Value Added, and Agriculture Value 
Added  
BRAZIL 
In comparison with China, Brazil’s domestic economy is very different in terms 
of its GDP composition. From 1960 to 1970 industry value added to GDP fluctuated 
between 34% and 38%. From the 1970s until 1994, Brazil’s ratio of industry value 
added to GDP oscillated around 40%, peaking at 45.9% in 1989. With the fiscal reforms 
in 1995 and their positive effects on GDP, the ratio fell to 27.5% in 1995. Since then 
industry value added to GDP gradually rose to 30.1% in 2004, thereafter gradually 
declining to 27.2% in 2009.  
Agriculture, one of the largest sectors historically, displayed a value added to 
GDP ratio of 20% in 1960. The ratio then declined with high volatility to 5.7% in 1995, 
rebounding to 6.6% in 2009 due to strong demand for commodities (with a peak at 7.4% 
in 2003).  
In 1960, the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP was 19.7%, and since then it 
has ranged from 15.7% in 1984 to 27.0% in 1989. After 1989 though, the gross capital 
formation to GDP ratio gradually declined to 17.0% in 1996, oscillating around this 
level until 2009. This shift reflected the fiscal reforms in 1995, which brought stability 
to the capital intensive sectors in Brazil.  
Overall, since 1960, industry, manufacturing, together with agriculture value 
added as combined ratio of GDP have declined from 87% to 52% in 1995 and then to 
49% in 2009. These trends indicate the emergence of the Brazilian service sector, which 
accounted for almost 50% of GDP in 2009.  
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CHINA 
 From the 1960s until 1995, China’s ratio of industry value added to GDP 
displayed an average of 42% (about 3% higher than Brazil’s ratio in the same period). 
By 1995, it grew to 47.2%. This level persisted in a relative stable range until 2009, 
which underscores the importance and focus of industry and investments in China. 
Gross capital formation to GDP was 18% in 1961, gradually improving to 41.9% in 
1995, reaching 44.8% in 2009, again providing evidence of the importance of structural 
investments in China’s industry and manufacturing sectors, the key sectors to China’s 
competitive edge.  
Agriculture, historically one of the largest sectors in China, displayed a value 
added to GDP ratio of 40% in the early 1960s, which gradually decreased to 20% by 
1995, reflecting the shift from agriculture to manufacturing. After 1996, this ratio 
decreased steadily further to approximately 10.4% in 2009. China now faces a shortage 
in terms of producing soft commodities in order to match domestic demand (i.e., wheat, 
grain). Despite the fact that China's agriculturally used land sustains 200 million small 
sized farms, making it the world's largest agricultural producer, it must now import soft 
agricultural commodities in large amounts.  
China’s agricultural sector faces new challenges as incomes rise and demand for 
improved diet reshapes markets for food and beverage products. Traditionally relying 
on grain, this implies that China’s agriculture sector will need to both diversify and 
grow, which may have positive impacts on agricultural research. Thanks to imported 
green technology, biotech and other efficiency measures, China was able to increase its 
agricultural production output significantly on an absolute basis. Despite a relative 
constant agricultural land to total land ratio of 57% from 1985 to 2005, per capita yields 
of specific products grew as follows: grain developed relatively flat from 350kg to 
370kg, meat rose from 17kg to 37kg and oil seeds rose from 14kg to 24kg (Naughton, 
2007, pp. 253-258). In relative terms, China also fared well in comparison to world 
efficiency in regards to rice, wheat and corn production. For example, as of 1997 China 
produced 6.2 tons of rice per hectare, 3.7 tons of wheat, 4.6 tons of corn, and 1.7 tons of 
soybean; world average is 3.9 tons of rice per hectare, 2.7 tons of wheat, 4.3 tons of 
corn, and 2.2 tons of soybean (Naughton, 2007, p. 265). However, the improved 
productivity came at a price: Fertilizer consumption per hectare was 271kg compared to 
a world average of 94kg in the same time period. Also, China’s crop production is much 
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more labor and less machinery intensive, with 310 workers per 100 hectares and 6 
tractors per 1,000 hectares compared to world average of 82 workers and 18 tractors, 
respectively (Naughton, 2007, p. 265).  
Yet, despite a large population share emerging gradually to middle class, China 
is a major rice exporter to the Asia Pacific region. Nonetheless, imports of land 
intensive products such as soy products (mainly from Brazil as shown further down), 
corn and cotton reflect the need on part of China to internally diversify its agricultural 
production. It remains to be seen if China extends food supply into global markets, 
which would open new productivity cycles for food producers.   
  
2.3.3.2 Household Consumption, Government Final Consumption, and Gross 
Domestic Savings  
BRAZIL  
 Brazil's ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP peaked at 30.4% in 1989 and 
gradually declined to 15.2% in 1996. Fiscal reforms implemented under the Plano Real 
in 1995 and the subsequent macroeconomic stability had positive effects on consumer 
consumption, which in turn reduced the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP to 
14.79% in 1999. From 1996 until 2009, the gross domestic savings to GDP ratio 
fluctuated between 15% and 21% (in 2004), reaching 16.2% at the end of 2009. In 
contrast, household final consumption as a ratio to GDP ranged between 64% and 71% 
between 1960 and 1983, hitting a low point at 54.0% in 1989 and improving gradually 
to 59.6% in 1994. The fiscal reforms through the Plano Real eventually also led to an 
increase of final household consumption to GDP to 64.3% in 2009. Finally, the ratio of 
government final consumption expenditures to GDP was 14% in 1960, gradually 
declining to 8.3% in 1984, then surging continuously to 21.0% in 1995, oscillating 
between 19% and 21% in the period from 1996 to 2009 and closing at 19.5% at the end 
of 2009. 
 
CHINA 
China’s gross domestic savings to GDP ratio has been rising since the mid-
1970s for a number of factors, such as the absence of functional social security and 
pension systems as well as the existence of specific cultural norms regarding money and 
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spending habits. Low income levels in the centrally planned economy before 1970 did 
not leave sufficient room for discretionary savings. Generally, SOEs would provide for 
retirement funding. Due to the very minor but gradual departure from the socialist plan 
economy framework in the 1970s and due to the start of the demise of the SOEs, 
savings quotas started to rise. Gross domestic savings to GDP increased gradually from 
28.9% in 1970 to 37.3% in 1978. By 1995 gross domestic savings to GDP stood at 
44.1%, rising even more to 54.2% in 2009, which implies that significant domestic 
buying power remains captured and frozen. Accordingly, Chinese household final 
consumption declined from 63% in 1970 to 42% in 1995, then to 34.0% in 2009 — 
almost half the level of Brazil’s ratio in 2009.  
Whereas government final consumption expenditure as a ratio of GDP remained 
at 7% from 1960 until the late 1970s, it doubled to 15% in 1980 in response to an active 
government that implemented the major structural economic reforms initiated by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978. This ratio averaged 14.6% p.a. from 1980 until 2009, with a 
declining trend from 2000 until 2009, leading to a ratio of 11.5% in 2009.  
 
2.3.3.3   Trade to GDP, Exports & Imports of Goods and Services  
BRAZIL 
The most visible effect of the fiscal reforms in 1994 on Brazil’s GDP 
composition appeared in Brazil’s external sector, which benefited from a gradual but 
significant increase in economic and trade openness. Between 1960 and 1982 the ratio 
of trade to GDP developed from 14.2% to 15.9%, and exports and imports accounted 
for a relatively even share that fluctuated up to 5% on an annual basis. With a few 
exceptions in the early 1990s exports generally accounted for more than 50% of the 
trade to GDP ratio.12 In 1984, trade to GDP reached its second highest record level at 
21.5% (1974: 21.9%), declining to 14.93% in 1995. Then, since 1996, trade to GDP has 
improved significantly, reaching all-time highs (since 1960) at 28.97% in 2004, 
reverting to 26.1% in 2009. Exports accounted for 44% of the trade to GDP ratio in 
1996, compared to 49.1% in 2009, peaking at 56.8% in 2005. Exports of goods and 
services to GDP were therefore only 12.8% in 2009, nonetheless up from 7% in the 
                                                 
12
 Source: World Bank (2009, 2010). Recall, all data between 1960 and 1995, and 1996 and 2009 are 
based on the World Bank Data Catalog. Definition: The ratio of trade to GDP is the sum of merchandise 
exports and imports, divided by the value of GDP, in current U.S. dollars. 
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early 1960s. However, compared with China, Brazil remains a relatively closed 
economy measured by its trade to GDP ratio of 26.1% in 2009. 
 
CHINA  
China’s emergence as export nation has been based on a myriad of factors, 
including its size and economic growth, customer base, relatively low labor costs, vast 
and skilled workforce, and tax-light special economic zones, which have attracted 
multinational firms to set up their assembly and production lines in China.  
Perhaps the most obvious metric that underscores China’s successful 
transformation from a closed agricultural economy with focus on domestic heavy 
industry to a global export nation are trade ratios as well as exports and imports in 
nominal values, both of which have soared impressively. The ratio of trade to GDP was 
5.3% in 1970, and exports and imports of goods and services accounted each for 50% of 
it. By 1980, the trade to GDP ratio reached 21.7%, and by 1996 it had surged to 38.1%. 
The buoyant late 1990s, supported by low interest rates in the United States and Europe 
as well as vast monetary and credit supplies, fueled external demand, and thus the ratio 
hit a record level of 70.5% in 2006. By then, Chinese exports accounted for 55% of the 
trade to GDP ratio, suggesting improved added value margins compared with 1970. 
However, 2007 and 2008 represented a cooling off period in external demand; trade to 
GDP fell to 67.8% and 62.1% in these years. The global demand meltdown as a result 
of the financial crisis also adjusted trade to GDP down to 47.1% in 2009, of which 
55.6% was attributable to exports. As a result of China’s strong export position, its 
foreign reserve position also has grown very robust, equal to USD2.4 trillion in 2009 
and almost USD3 trillion at the end of 2010. These values stem from the positive 
external balance of goods and services to GDP for almost two decades: from 1.7% in 
1992 to 5.3% in 2009, peaking at 8.8% in 2007.  
Government policies supporting private consumption and the growing 
sophistication of the Chinese economy imply that imports of consumer goods and 
services may achieve higher growth rates than exports, which may well lead to a 
gradually shrinking external balance of goods and services to GDP, as well as to 
declining reserve positions.  
In comparison to Brazil, China’s trade to GDP ratio underscores the country’s 
export focus: 62.1% in 2008, slightly down from 65.4% in 2004, and 47.1% in 2009 due 
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to the global financial crisis. Exports of goods and services as a ratio of GDP were 
34.9% in 2008, down from their record level of 39.1% in 2006. In 2009 exports to GDP 
collapsed to 26.2% as a result of contracted demand due to the global financial crisis. In 
comparison to Brazil, China’s collapse in trade to GDP ratios was much more 
pronounced and drastic, which reveals China’s dependence on exports and global 
demand.  
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2.4     Commodities and the External Sector 
2.4.1  Global Commodity Production and Consumption 
Table 2.3 gives an overview of the state of global production (Prod.) and 
consumption (Cons.) of primary commodities in 2008-2009, as well as Brazil’s and 
China’s production and consumption of commodities relative to global volumes.  
Table 2.3: Commodity Production & Consumption 2008–2009  
Commodities 
(in Units13) 
World 
Prod.    Cons.* 
China  
Prod.      % 
China 
Cons.*     % 
Brazil 
Prod.    % 
Brazil 
Cons.*    % 
Aluminum 39,425 37,796 13,177 33% 12,413 33% 1,661 4% 932 2% 
Copper 18,475 18,032 3,779 20% 5,134 28% Na Na 252 1% 
Gold 2,161 2,850 222 10% 342 12% 49 2% Na Na 
Nickel 1,368 1,295 171 13% 305 24% 31 2% 25 2% 
Tea 3,804 3,170 1,200 32% 903 28% Na Na Na Na 
Coffee 128,073 130,004 Na Na Na Na 45,992 36% 17,526 13% 
Cocoa 3,515 3,508 Na Na Na Na 157 4% 216 6% 
Maize 791,627 646,188 165,900 21% 112,731 17% 51,000 6% 29,403 5% 
Rice 443,650 353,852 135,100 30% 90,955 26% 8,500 2% Na Na 
Sugar 143,781 116,211 13,317 9% 9,853 8% 31,850 22% 10,300 9% 
Wheat 682,034 518,281 112,646 17% 63,961 12% Na Na 6,000 1% 
Soybeans 210,870 168,463 15,500 7% 41,035 24% 57,000 27% 15,348 9% 
Palm oil 44,262 44,700 Na Na 5,917 13% Na Na Na Na 
Cotton 22,165 11,488 6,750 30% 3,683 32% 1,170 5% 566 5% 
Natural rubber 10,026 9,550 560 6% 2,934 31% Na Na Na Na 
Synth. rubber 12,789 12,568 2,325 18% 3,479 28% Na Na 533 4% 
Petroleum 84,878 83,117 3,821 5% 8,576 10% 2,499 3% 2,436 3% 
Data Source: World Bank (2010), Global Commodity Markets, (pp. 6-29), Table created and arranged by the author. Na: not 
available in the World Bank database. *) excluding stock. 
As Table 2.3 impressively shows, Brazil’s potential as an exporter of 
agricultural products, including food, beverages, oils and seeds, minerals and metals, is 
outstanding; it also is relatively independent of oil. China on the other hand consumes 
more than it produces in almost all of these commodity groups, except aluminum, 
maize, rice, wheat, sugar, and cotton (World Bank, 2010).  
Yet, Table 2.3 also reveals that China has a dominant share in producing and 
consuming commodities compared with global levels. China is believed to have been 
driving global commodity prices in the 2000s, mainly because its demand for oil, metals 
and soft commodities represented by a significant share of global imports. The 
relationship between commodity prices and China’s economic expansion will be 
analyzed in Chapter 3 and, especially, in Chapter 5 in which I illustrate inverse causality 
                                                 
13
 Measured in mt (year): Aluminum (2008), Cocoa (2009), Copper (2008), Cotton (2009), Gold (2008), 
Maize (2009), Nickel (2008), Palm Oil (2009), Rice (2009), Rubber (2008), Tea (2008), Soybeans (2009), 
Sugar (2009), Wheat (2009). Measured in 1000 bags: Coffee (2009). Measured in 1,000 bpd: Petroleum 
(2009). 
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effects of China’s expanding economy (e.g., fixed capital formation to GDP) on 
commodity price indexes.  
The following sections of this chapter comparatively elaborate on the dynamics 
of Brazil’s and China’s energy, agricultural, food, and minerals and metals sector, 
contrasting their relative weight in terms of exports and imports of commodities.  
 
2.4.2 Commodity Sectors  
BRAZIL 
Brazil’s emergence as a global economic power is significantly linked to its 
export revenues, based on its vast mineral, energy, agricultural, and food commodity 
resources —the latter referred to as soft commodities. These exports have experienced 
significant price appreciation in the past 16 years.  
The table below summarizes Brazil’s top ranking export and import 
commodities in 2009 (UN COMTRADE, 2011).  
Table 2.4: Top 10 Export / Import Commodities Brazil 2009 
In USD billion (2009) Exports Imports 
All Commodities 152.994 127.647 
Iron Ores and Concentrates 13.246 Na 
Petroleum Oils, Crude 9.351 9.206 
Soybeans 11.424 Na 
Sugar Cane  8.377 Na 
Meat  4.945 Na 
Aircraft  3.870 Na 
Motor Cars and other vehicles  3.244 5.466 
Parts and accessories vehicles Na 3.652 
Petroleum oils, other than Crude 3.085 4.538 
Petroleum gases Na 2.358 
Oil-Cake and other solid residues 4.592 Na 
Other commodities  2.799 9.71714 
Data Source: UN COMTRADE (2011), Table created and arranged by the author. 
 
                                                 
14
 Coal products account for USD2.07 billion, electronic integrated circuits account for USD2.9 billion, 
fertilizers for USD2.1 billion, and medicaments account for USD2.63 billion. 
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Energy Commodities and Energy Mix  
Oil 
 Brazil’s oil production in 2009 was 2.44 million barrels per day (bpd); its 
consumption was 2.49 million bpd. In comparison, world production of 84.87 million 
matched up with consumption of 83.12 million bpd in the same period.15  
 In the mid-1980s, the Brazilian government commenced an ambitious program 
to reduce Brazil oil dependency, which accounted for more than 75% of the country’s 
oil and oil derivatives needs. Today Brazil is net exporter of oil. Prior to the discovery 
of the Tupi and Carioca oil fields off the coast of Rio de Janeiro in early 2008, Brazil’s 
oil reserves were estimated at 16 billion barrels. Including the oil reserves in these 
fields, which conservative estimates put at 30 to 80 billion barrels, total oil reserves 
range somewhere from 46 billion to 100 billion barrels. Furthermore, the latest 
estimates nearly double the original assumptions about the deposits in the Tupi and 
Carioca oil fields, such that they may hold at least 123 billion barrels of reserves 
(Bloomberg, 2011a). Brazil’s fuel export to total merchandise export ratio in 1960 stood 
at less than 1%, then gradually increased to 7.2% in 1982 until —in a parabolic move— 
declining to 0.89% in 1996 and again rising to a record of 9.5% in 2008, though it 
dropped to 9.0% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis. 
 
Electricity and Energy Mix 
 Brazil consumed TWh 428.8 of electricity in 2008, which corresponds to a per 
capita usage of KWh 2,232, and it produced TWh 463.4. In comparison, consumed 
electricity in 1971 was TWh 44.8, or per capita consumption of KWh 456, with 
production levels of TWh 51.6. Moreover, in 2008 (1970), Brazil’s electricity 
                                                 
15
 Brazil’s majority government-owned oil firm, Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras), is among the ten largest 
fully vertically integrated global oil firms. As of June 27, 2011, market capitalization was at USD197 
billion (P/E ratio of 6.48x, Beta 1.01x, with a low gross yield of 0.55% expressing strong investor interest 
in Petrobras). PetroChina, China’s largest fully integrated oil firm, had a market capitalization of USD300 
billion on the same date (P/E ratio of 11.73x, Beta 1.16, gross yield 3.62%). Historically, P/E ratios in 
mainland China are significantly higher than for example in Hong Kong (offshore) and also Brazil. This 
phenomenon will be explained more in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 in stock market related topics. 
China’s major oil refiner Sinopec and CNOOC (China’s second-largest oil exploration firm) achieved 
market capitalizations of USD7.6 billion (P/E ratio of 22.78x, Beta .90, gross yield 1.14%) and USD101 
billion (P/E ratio of 12.02x, Beta 1.14, gross yield 2.61%) as of June 27, 2011, respectively (Bloomberg, 
2011c).  
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production mix consisted of 80% (84%) hydro power, 4% (12%) oil, 6.3% (0%) natural 
gas, 3% (4%) coal, 3% (0%) nuclear power, and 3.7% (0%) others.  
 Brazil’s energy consumption mix has also shifted since 1971, from combustible 
renewables towards a larger share of nuclear and fossil energy use. As of 2008, its 
energy consumption mix consisted of 13% hydro power, 2% nuclear energy, 32% 
combustible renewables (e.g., sugar cane) and waste, and 53%16 fossil energy; 8% of its 
total energy consumption was imported. Energy use in kg of oil equivalent per capita 
increased from 709 in 1971 to 1,295 in 2008, and total energy use/consumption of oil 
equivalent surged from Kt 69,768 to Kt 248,528 in the same period. In comparison, total 
energy production in Kt oil equivalent increased from Kt 49,124 to Kt 228,127, which 
led to the 8% energy import level mentioned above. In 2008, carbon dioxide emissions 
per capita were 1.9 tons, with 0.43 kg carbon dioxide emissions per one unit GDP 
(International Energy Agency, 2011a; World Bank, 2009, 2010, Data Catalog). Thus, 
despite its vast demand for energy, Brazil has managed to establish relative self-
sufficiency in terms of electricity and energy consumption, positioning itself as a net 
exporter of oil.  
 
Agricultural and Food Commodities  
 Agriculture used to be Brazil’s strongest economic sector. In 1960 agriculture 
value added to GDP accounted for 20.6% of GDP. Its share declined continuously to 
5.5% in 1996 as a result of the emerging services, industrial, and manufacturing sectors. 
Since 1996 though, agriculture, which still accounts for approximately 20% of formal 
jobs, has risen from 5.5% to 6.6% of GDP in 2009.  
 Brazil's agricultural potential is progressing in small steps, covering crops such 
as sugarcane, coffee, tropical fruits, frozen concentrated orange juice, soybeans, cotton, 
cocoa, tobacco, forest products, and commercial cattle herds (which at 170 million head 
is 50% larger than the U.S.' capacity (U.S. Department of State, 2011a)). The remaining 
agricultural production covers livestock such as poultry, pork, milk, and seafood. The 
share of agriculture in the export sector is significant, too. The ratio of agricultural raw 
materials and food exports to total merchandise exports was 87.5% in 1962 and fell to 
28.7% in 1992, but since then its share has risen continuously to almost 38% in 2009 — 
                                                 
16
 Including 9% gas, 39% oil, and 5% coal (International Energy Agency, 2011a). 
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the highest level since 1986. Moreover, food imports as a percentage of merchandise 
imports fell from 15.9% in 1962 to 10.8% in 1996 and then to 5.26% in 2009, 
underscoring Brazil’s role as food producer and exporter. The food, crops, and livestock 
production index rose continuously between 1960 and 1995. Between 1996 and 2008, 
food, crops and livestock production indexes rose from 84.0, 82.0, and 87.0 to 131.7, 
149.6 and 120.0, respectively. As Table 2.3 (Commodity Production & Consumption 
2008–2009) shows, Brazil’s production of agricultural products, food, and beverages as 
well as soy, maize, oils and seeds significantly exceeded its domestic consumption in 
2008, underscoring the country’s role as exporter of these commodities and as major 
world trade participant since the mid-1990s.  
 
Minerals and Metals Commodities 
 Brazil has ample mineral resources and is one of the world's leading producers 
of tin, iron ore, gold, bauxite, manganese, nickel, copper, lead, and uranium. Similarly 
to Brazil’s supply base of carbon-based fossil fuels, Brazil’s proven resources in 
minerals and metals are vast. Iron and manganese reserves, mainly held by Brazil’s 
former state-owned and now private Companhia Vale Do Rio Doce, are significant 
sources for industrial raw materials and export revenues. Their importance for the 
export sector is reflected by the relatively high percentage of ore and metals exports to 
total merchandise exports, which has oscillated between 8.6% in 1962 and 12.1% in 
2008.   
 
CHINA  
With a population exceeding 1.3 billion people and an average GDP per capita 
growth rate of 9.7% p.a. since 1996, China’s demand for soft commodities and energy 
commodities has increased dramatically to support the country’s rapidly expanding 
industrial and commercial base as well as private households that enjoy rising living 
standards. In 2010 China was the world’s second-largest energy consumer, using Kt 
2,116,427 of oil equivalent annually, trailing only the United States, which consumed 
Kt 2,172,107 p.a. oil equivalent.  
While Brazil is close to establishing its energy self-sufficiency, China will 
remain a net importer of all primary commodities for the foreseeable future especially of 
energy commodities (except coal) as a result of its large and growing population.  
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China’s top ten export items are dominated by computers, data equipment, 
electronic products and other manufactured commodity products. China’s top ten 
imports also are heavily concentrated on energy and soft commodities, as Table 2.5 
summarizes (UN COMTRADE, 2011).  
Table 2.5: Top 10 Export / Import Commodities China 2009 
In USD billion (2009) Exports Imports 
All Commodities 1,201.6 1,005.6 
Automatic data processing machines  101.6 21.8 
Electrical apparatus for line telephony  86.5 19.1 
Reception apparatus for television 26.7 Na 
Machine parts and accessories  26.2 13.7 
Electronic integrated circuits 23.6 120.8 
Ships (cargo, cruise, boats, ferries) 23.9 Na 
Liquid crystal devices 20.3 38.3 
Printing machinery 17.1 Na 
Textiles 14.9 Na 
Electronic transformers 14.7 Na 
Petroleum, crude Na 89.3 
Petroleum products other than crude Na 17.0 
Iron ores Na 50.1 
Soybeans/products Na 18.8 
Transistors and semiconductors Na 15.6 
Data Source: UN COMTRADE (2011), Table created and arranged by the author. 
 
Energy Commodities and Energy Mix 
Oil 
 In 2009 China’s oil production reached 3.82 million bpd, consumption was 8.57 
million bpd. Recall, that world production was 84.87 million bpd and world 
consumption 83.12 million bpd in the same period (World Bank, 2009, 2010). China’s 
known oil reserves are approximately 20.3 billion barrels (CIA, 2011b) and will be fully 
depleted in about 6.5 years, assuming a constant consumption rate of 8.57 million bpd. 
China’s rapid economic development has accelerated oil consumption, especially 
considering the large-scale transition away from mass transit toward private 
automobiles. As a result, China shifted from a net exporter to a net importer of oil in the 
early 1990s. Its oil imports as a percentage of total imports also continued to climb 
steadily, from 3.9% in 1995 to 9.7% in 2005 and 12.3% in 2009. Oil imports as a 
percentage of total merchandise imports grew from 4.97% in 1996 to 13.4% in 2009.  
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Coal 
China also possesses large energy resources of coal in the North, which 
constitutes its key domestic energy resource. For the foreseeable future China will rely 
heavily on domestic coal production and oil imports as its primary energy sources. 
However, the environmentally adverse effects of coal consumption, especially in the 
context of rising environmental awareness and high environmental costs, may 
encourage a steady increase in hydro power production and alternative energy supply 
sources. In contrast to its relatively restricted oil reserves, China’s hydro power 
potential is vast. Its main rivers extend to a cumulative total length of more than 
130,000km (Naughton, 2007, p. 492) and exert annual flow rates greater than 500 
billion cubic meters, representing tremendous hydroelectric potential. The ambitious 
construction of the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, which has received 
widespread criticism from environmentalists and engineers for alleged capital mis-
allocation and inefficiency, exemplifies a grand scale attempt to capitalize on the 
abundance of hydroelectric potential.  
 
Electricity and Energy Mix 
China consumed TWh 3,252 electricity in 2008 (approximately eight times more 
than Brazil in the same year), or KWh 2,455 per capita. Electricity production was TWh 
3,456 in the same year. In comparison, in 1971 consumed electricity was TWh 127.2, 
per capita consumption was KWh 151, and electricity production was TWh 138. In 
2008 (1971), China’s electricity production mix was heavily geared towards coal, 
consisting of 79% (71%) coal, 17% (22%) hydro power, 1% (0%) natural gas, 2% (0%) 
nuclear power, and 1% (7%) oil. In comparison to China’s energy mix, the rest of the 
world’s energy mix is much more aligned to oil and gas. Globally, in 2004 energy 
production was based on 21% coal sources, 6% hydropower, 27% natural gas, 7% 
nuclear power, and 39% oil (Naughton, 2007, p. 336).  
 In order to match its energy consumption China is expected to increase the 
number of nuclear facilities from ten as of 2008 to 38 in the next ten years. In addition, 
China plans to relax its dependency on coal by increasing the share of natural gas in its 
energy mix.17 
                                                 
17
 E.g., the establishment of two state of the art liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals in Guangdong and 
Fujian in order to accommodate LNG trade between the Near and Middle East and mainland China. 
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The absence of large, long-lasting oil fields is the reason why China’s energy 
mix is skewed towards the domestic coal fields in the Mongolian part of the country and 
hydro power. Since 1971, China’s energy consumption mix also has shifted slightly 
toward nuclear and fossil (coal) energy use. As of 2008, China’s energy consumption 
mix consisted of 86.9% fossil fuel,18 9.6% renewables and waste,19 and 3.5% nuclear 
energy. 8.2% of energy use came from imports, mainly oil. The energy use in kg of oil 
equivalent per capita increased from 466 in 1971 to 1,597 in 2008. China’s overall 
energy use of oil equivalent surged from Kt 391,708 to Kt 2,116,427 in the same period. 
In comparison, total energy production in oil equivalent increased from Kt 394,149 to 
only Kt 1,993,106, thus requiring the 8.2% of energy imports (mainly oil). 
In 2008, carbon dioxide emissions per capita were 4.91 tons, with 2.5 kg carbon 
dioxide emissions per one unit GDP (International Energy Agency, 2011b). As demand 
has outpaced production, energy efficiency and the effective use of energy resources has 
been a consistent element in China’s recent five-year plans. As a result, energy 
efficiency measured in GDP per unit of energy use in kg of oil equivalent20 improved by 
860% from 0.4 GDP units in 1980 to 3.44 GDP units in 2008. Despite these significant 
improvements, China continues to trail the energy efficiency of other BRIC countries, 
including Brazil, whose GDP per unit of energy use in kg of oil equivalent increased 
from 3.8 GDP units in 1980 to 7.6 GDP units in 2008.  
 
Agricultural and Food Commodities 
 Similarly to Brazil, agriculture used to be China’s strongest economic sector in 
terms of GDP composition. In the 1960s it accounted for 42% of GDP, but since then 
the agriculture to GDP ratio has steadily declined to 10.4% in 2009 due to the 
emergence of a strong industry sector and a manufacturing sector as well as an 
                                                                                                                                               
Through its state owned Korea Gas Corporation (Kogas), South Korea is the largest LNG importer 
globally sourcing approximately 85% of its LNG from the Middle East, but increasingly also from the 
Asia Pacific region, especially Indonesia. China’s emergence as LNG trader and LNG energy sourcer 
represents a significant threat for South Korea’s national LNG importer, Kogas (Korea Gas Corporation), 
which has mainly been the dominant LNG importer in Asia Pacific (Source: Managed transactions by the 
author as portfolio manager at investment firms in Hong Kong and New York between 2006-2008 and 
2008-2011). 
18
 Including 66.5% coal, 17.2% oil, and 3.2% gas (International Energy Agency, 2011b). 
19
 Mainly hydro power. 
20
 GDP per unit of energy use is the purchase price parity of GDP per kilogram of oil equivalent of energy 
use (Variable 74: GDP_UEnUPPPOilE). 
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emerging services sector since the early 2000s. As of 2009 China is a net importer of 
food products (including soy seeds and oils from Brazil) and accounts for 4.6% of 
global food imports, up from 2.9% in 2005 and 2.3% in 1995 (Table 2.9: Import 
Structure China 1995-2009). While the ratio of food imports to total merchandise 
imports in 2009 remained at approximately 5.0%, compared with 5.9% in 1996, the 
food exports to total merchandise exports ratio declined from 8.2% in 1996 to 2.9% in 
2009 due to an overall large increase of manufactured products for export (faster rising 
denominator). In comparison to world food exports, China’s share retrenched slightly 
from 3.7% in 2005 to 3.5% in 2009 (Table 2.7: Export Structure China 1995-2009). As 
Table 2.3 (Commodity Production & Consumption 2008–2009) shows, China’s 
production of agricultural products, food, and oils and seeds has significantly lagged its 
domestic consumption in 2008, establishing the country as major importer of these 
commodities since the mid-1990s (please see also Table 2.9: Import Structure China 
1995-2009 for China’s rising share in global food imports).  
 
Minerals and Metals Commodities 
 China’s reserves in mineral resources are vast. China holds large reserves of 
tungsten and zinc, iron, lead, aluminum, and copper. In addition, its abundant reserves 
feature mercury, tin, manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, and magnetite. Nonetheless, 
its economic expansion in the past two decades has forced China to remain a net 
importer of ores and metals, as underlined by the increase of the ratio of imports of ores 
and metals to total merchandise imports from 4.4% in 1996 to 13.1% in 2008; its 
exports of ores and metals to total merchandise exports in comparison declined from 
1.8% to 1.7% in the same period, suggesting a dire need for iron ores and minerals and 
metals to support infrastructure expansion, and housing. 
 
2.4.3 External Sector Composition  
2.4.3.1 Exports and Export Structure 
BRAZIL 
 Trade plays a pivotal role in Brazil’s GDP composition. The ratio of trade to 
GDP (Variable 25: Trade_GDP), which includes both imports and exports to GDP, was 
14.2% in 1960 and 21.9% in 1974, after which point it grew increasingly volatile, 
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fluctuating between 21.5% in 1984 and 14.9% in 1996. Since 1996, trade to GDP has 
risen gradually to reach 26.1% in 2009. Furthermore, in 1960 Brazil’s exports measured 
USD1.27 billion, but since then its exports have evolved impressively with several years 
of continuous growth, peaking at USD197.9 billion in 2008. However, in 2009 the value 
of exports declined by 22.7% to USD152.9 billion as a result of the global financial 
crisis. Imports showed a similar pattern with a 26.3% decline in 2009 to USD127.6 
billion. 
 Brazil’s external balance of goods and services to GDP (Variable 29: 
ExtBalGS_GDP) ratio was at –0.06% in 1960 and remained mostly negative, 
fluctuating between –5.8% in 1974 and –0.67% in 1982, due to its import substitution 
strategies. However, once it turned positive in 1983 (+2.4%), the external balance of 
goods and services to GDP ratio peaked at 5.2% in 1988 before it gradually dropped to 
0.35% in 1994 and then reverted to negative values from 1995 (–1.58%) to 2001 (–
1.32%). Increasing commodity prices led again to a positive ratio of external balance of 
goods and services to GDP, 1.5% in 2002, peaking at 3.9% in 2004, and gradually 
declining to 0.16% in 2008 and -0.45% in 2009 —again— due to the global financial 
crisis. 
 Brazil’s export is characterized by significantly increasing shares of food, fuel, 
and ore and metal exports at the expense of agricultural raw materials and manufactured 
goods between 1995 to 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010) as the table below shows.21  
Table 2.6: Export Structure Brazil 1995-2009 
Brazil 1995 2005 2009 
Total Exports (USD bio)   46.505   118.529   152.995  
Total Exports (%) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Food 28.5% 25.7% 33.9% 
Agricultural Raw Materials 5.2% 3.9% 3.8% 
Fuels 0.9% 6.0% 8.9% 
Ores and Metals 11.3% 10.5% 13.4% 
Others 1.3% 1.8% 1.8% 
Manufactured Goods 52.8% 52.1% 38.2% 
Chemical products 6.6% 6.1% 6.9% 
Machinery 19.0% 25.8% 17.2% 
Diversified 27.2% 20.2% 14.1% 
Total Exports: Brazil vs. World 0.90% 1.13% 1.23% 
Total Exports: US vs. World 11.3% 8.6% 8.5% 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2010), Table created and arranged by the author. 
                                                 
21
 The data of Table 2.6 has been assembled from various trade and country sections in the 2010 
UNCTAD report. The US vs. World share data in Table 2.6 and the following tables is provided for 
comparison purposes.   
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The increasing export shares in food, fuels, and ores and metals underline the 
pivotal role of these commodities for Brazil’s trade related revenues. As the table above 
shows, Brazil’s global export share rose from 0.90% in 1995 to 1.13% in 2005 and then 
1.23% in 2009, an increase of 37%. Yet, Table 2.8 (Import Structure Brazil 1995-2009) 
reveals that Brazil’s import structure development on the other hand underscores the 
notion of self-sufficiency in food, oil, and fuels. Food imports fell by almost half in 
percentage terms from 1995 to 2009. In contrast, chemical products increased their 
share, reflecting an advanced stage of economic demand in Brazil. Imported fuels, such 
as oil-related lubricants and petrochemical products rather than crude, have remained 
relatively stable since 1995 while export shares in fuels increased.  
Brazil has significantly capitalized on its trade ties with China, starting in the 
mid-1990s. In recent years, Brazil has been able to maintain a trade surplus as a result of 
increasing price levels in minerals and metals, and soft commodities. Nonetheless, as 
will be subsequently discussed, Brazil is also experiencing a concentration bias toward 
the export of primary products. Unlike most of Latin America, Brazil has manufactured 
industrial and high-tech products, such as aircraft and transport equipment. 
Nevertheless, export shares in manufactured products, as shown in Table 2.6 above, 
declined as a result of China’s demand for commodities from Brazil; export shares of 
commodities rose at the expense of export shares of manufactured products. 
 
CHINA 
China’s external trade is dominated by manufacturing and production related 
trade by foreign companies, which were set up naturally along China’s coastal regions 
to take advantage of the functioning infrastructure and the proximity to ports. In the 
context of China’s open door policy, special economic zones for enterprises (SEZs) 
were established along the Eastern coastal regions to integrate China into global trade 
flows and encourage foreign direct investment. The main incentives include favorable 
tax frameworks that aim to attract foreign investors into the SEZs as well as China’s 
relatively stable foreign exchange rate, low labor costs, and a relatively skilled labor 
force. Thus, multinational companies have relocated their assembly processes to 
China’s coastal regions, triggering the development of an intraregional market among 
China’s SEZs. Multinationals began exporting components and parts to China for 
assembly, such that the parts get successively processed into finished goods for re-
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export to mature consumer markets in Europe and the United States. The inflow of 
mainly process and manufacturing related FDI saw the net FDI to GDP ratio grow 
significantly from 0.2% in 1982 to 6% in 1995, though it declined gradually to 3.3% in 
2008 as a result of investment saturation and to 1.6% in 2009 due to the global financial 
crisis. Such developments, which have favored bilateral trade balances with Europe and 
the United States at the expense of the trade balances with the rest of Asia, were 
specifically supported by China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001. Today, more than 
90% of China’s manufacturing and trade processing firms are located in the Eastern 
coastal areas, approximately 60% of which are under foreign ownership.  
 Similarly to Brazil, trade plays a crucial role in China’s GDP composition. The 
trade to GDP ratio rose from approximately 5% in 1960 relatively steadily to 62.1% in 
2008, though its peak was at 70.5% in 2006. In 2009 the ratio crumbled to 47.1% as a 
result of trade contraction due to the global financial crisis.  
 In 1960 China’s export and import values in current USD were 2.57 billion and 
2.65 billion, respectively, approximately double the amounts of Brazil in the same year. 
Until the end of the 1960s export and imports developed relatively flatly. The big push 
in trade volumes began only in the 1970s. By 1980 exports had surged to USD18.1 
billion and imports to USD19.9 billion. Just a decade later exports of USD62.1 billion 
had surpassed imports (USD53.3 billion) for the first time. China had begun its rise as a 
major exporter. By 2000, exports surpassed USD249.2 billion, and by 2007 (two years 
before the financial crisis) exports hit the trillion-dollar threshold (USD1.22 trillion). 
Imports were USD243.6 billion and USD956.1 billion at those points in time. The year 
2008 marked a record year for China’s trade: USD1.431 trillion in exports and 
USD1.132 trillion in imports. Yet, the financial crisis led to export declines of 16% to 
USD1.2 trillion, whereas imports showed a less pronounced decline, falling by 11% to 
USD1.0 trillion in 2009. Nonetheless, China’s exports and imports constituted roughly 
eight times the value of Brazil’s exports and imports.  
 In 1970, China’s external balance of goods and services to GDP was –0.1%, 
similar to Brazil’s slightly negative value of –0.4%.22 Until 1990 this ratio showed great 
volatility in China, reaching 2.1% in 1982 and –4.1% only three years later. Since 1990 
the external balance of goods and services to GDP has remained consistently positive 
                                                 
22
 Data about the external balance of goods and services to GDP are not available prior to 1970 in the 
World Bank Data Catalog.  
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(c.f. 1993, –2.1% for Brazil) and grown in cycles, from 1.8% in 1994 to a record of 
8.8% in 2007. In 2008, this value dropped by 1%, then fell an additional 2.5% to the 
ratio of 5.3% in 2009. However, the external balance of goods and services to GDP 
remained positive, despite the financial crisis, unlike Brazil’s (c.f. –0.5% in 2009).  
 The table below clearly exhibits China’s surging machinery and diversified 
manufacturing export sector, which accounted for almost 94% of its total exports in 
2009, compared with only 10% less than 15 years earlier (UNCTAD, 2010). China’s 
global share of exports in manufactured goods was 5.5% in 1995, 13.2% in 2005, and 
17.0% in 2009. In 2009 Chinese exports of machinery goods accounted for almost 50% 
of its total exports.  
 
Table 2.7: Export Structure China 1995-2009 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2010), Table created and arranged by the author. 
 Manufactured goods grew to almost 94% of China’s total exports at the expense 
of declining export shares in commodities overall, which fell from 16.1% in 1995 to 
6.4% in 2009. On a national export share basis, exports of fuels declined from 3.6% to 
1.7% during 1995 and 2009, underscoring the domestic demand for oil. Its main non-
fuel export markets were the United States, Hong Kong, and Japan. 
China  1995 2005 2009 
Total Exports (USD bio) 148.8 761.9 1,201.6 
Total Exports (%) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Food and Seeds and Oils 8.3% 3.2% 2.9% 
China’s Global Share of Food, Seeds, Oils Exports 2.7% 3.7% 3.5% 
(US Global Share of Food, Seeds, Oils Exports) 14.0% 10.0% 10.1% 
Agricultural Raw Materials 1.8% 0.5% 0.5% 
China’s Global Share of AgriRaw Exports 2.3% 3.2% 3.6% 
(US Global Share of AgriRaw Exports) 16.7% 12.5% 12.4% 
Fuels 3.6% 2.3% 1.7% 
China’s Global Share of Fuels Exports 1.5% 1.2% 0.8% 
(US Global Share of Fuels Exports) 3.2% 2.3% 3.0% 
Ores and Metals 2.4% 2.0% 1.3% 
China’s Global Share of Ores and Metals Exports 1.9% 3.4% 2.9% 
(US Global Share of Ores and Metals Exports) 8.5% 5.7% 5.5% 
Manufactured Goods 83.9% 92.0% 93.6% 
Chemical products 6.2% 4.8% 5.2% 
Machinery 21.2% 46.3% 49.2% 
Diversified 56.5% 40.9% 39.2% 
China’s Global Share of Manufactured Goods 
Exports 
5.5% 13.2% 17.0% 
(US Global Share of Manufactured Goods Exports)  13.3% 10.1% 9.3% 
Total Exports: China vs. World 2.9% 7.3% 9.7% 
Total Exports: US vs. World 11.3% 8.6% 8.5% 
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2.4.3.2 Imports and Import Structure  
BRAZIL 
 Brazil’s global import share remained relatively stable at 1% between 1995 and 
2009 indicating that Brazil maintained parity with global import volume, whereas 
China’s imports grew stronger than the global import volume, mainly due to its 
aggressive economic expansion.  
Table 2.8: Import Structure Brazil 1995-2009 
Brazil 1995 2005 2009 
Total Imports (USD bio) 53.734 73.600 127.647 
Total Imports (%) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Food and Seeds and Oils 10.7% 4.4% 5.2% 
Agricultural Raw Materials 2.7% 1.5% 1.2% 
Fuels 12.1% 18.3% 14.8% 
Ores and Metals 3.4% 3.9% 2.8% 
Manufactured Goods 71.1% 71.9% 76.0% 
Chemical products 15.2% 19.9% 19.8% 
Machinery 39.2% 37.9% 39.9% 
Diversified 16.7% 14.1% 16.3% 
Total Imports: Brazil vs. World 1.03% 0.72%  1.1% 
Total Imports: US vs. World 14.7% 16.1% 12.8% 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2010), Table created and arranged by the author. 
 Brazil’s import structure inversely mirrors the trend of its export structure. 
Imports of manufactured goods represented about 76.0% of all imported goods in 2009, 
up from 71.1% in 1995, whereas exports of manufactured products to total exports fell 
in that period from 52.8% in 1995 to 38.2% in 2009 (Table 2.6: Export Structure Brazil 
1995-2009). Imported machinery and transport equipment, which remained relatively 
stable between 39% and 40% between 1995 and 2009, continues to dominate Brazil’s 
import structure. Similarly, imports of fuels and food fell between 2005 and 2009, and 
between 1995 and 2009 respectively, while exports of the identical commodity groups 
grew in the same time period. 
 
CHINA 
 From 1995 to 2009, imports of manufactured goods were declining. In 2009, 
China’s imports consisted of 67.2% manufactured goods —down from 79.2% in 
1995—, of which of 40.6% were machinery and transport equipment to be assembled in 
China. Almost 33% of China’s imports in 2009 consisted of soft commodities, such as 
animal and vegetable oils, fats, and mineral fuels. Between 2005 and 2009, China’s 
  
72 
main imports were electronic integrated circuits, petroleum oils, oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude and iron ores (UNCTAD, 2010; Global Insight, 2009).  
Table 2.9: Import Structure China 1995-2009    
China 1995 2005 2009 
Total Imports (USD bio) 132.1 659.9 1,005.6 
Total Imports (%) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Food and Seeds and Oils 7.0% 3.3% 4.5% 
China’s Global Share of Food, Seeds, Oils Imports 2.3% 2.9% 4.6% 
(US Global Share of Food, Seeds, Oils Imports) 7.6% 10.0% 8.1% 
Agricultural Raw Materials 5.2% 3.6% 3.1% 
China’s Global Share of AgriRaw Imports 5.5% 13.7% 18.2% 
(US Global Share of AgriRaw Imports) 11.7% 13.1% 7.4% 
Fuels 3.9% 9.7% 12.3% 
China’s Global Share of Fuels Imports 1.6% 4.5% 6.7% 
 (US Global Share of Fuels Imports) 17.6% 20.4% 15.1% 
Ores and Metals 4.7% 8.8% 12.9% 
China’s Global Share of Ores and Metals Imports 2.5% 9.8% 16.0% 
(US Global Share of Ores and Metals Imports) 11.6% 11.6% 7.7% 
Manufactured Goods 79.2% 74.6% 67.2% 
Chemical products 13.0% 11.8% 11.1% 
Machinery 40.0% 44.0% 40.6% 
Diversified 25.5% 18.6% 15.1% 
China’s Global Share of Manufactured Goods Imports 3.1% 5.9% 7.2% 
(US Global Share of Manufactured Goods Imports) 15.9% 15.9% 12.6% 
Total Imports: China vs. World 2.5% 6.1% 7.9% 
Total Imports: US vs. World 14.7% 16.1% 12.8% 
 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2010), Table created and arranged by the author. 
 
2.4.3.3 Major Trade Partners 
BRAZIL 
 Brazil’s trading partner structure changed considerably from 1990 to 2009. 
Considering this thesis’ focus on Brazil’s export relationship with China, this section 
addresses the country’s export partners only. 
 Brazil’s exports to its non–top ten trading partners increased from 37.1% in 
1990 to 46.9% in 2009; that is, Brazil’s export revenues show strong diversification 
tendencies. For decades, the United States was Brazil’s main export market, but 
between 2005 and 2009 China had assumed this position.  
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Table 2.10: Top 10 Export Trading Partners Brazil 1990-2009 
Ranking 1990 100% 2005 100% 2009 100% 
1 US 24.6% US 19.2% CHN 13.2% 
2 NL 7.9% ARG 8.4% US 10.3% 
3 JP 7.5% CHN 5.7% ARG 8.4% 
4 GER 5.9% NL 4.5% NL 5.3% 
5 IT 5.1% GER 4.2% GER 4.0% 
6 UK 3.0% MEX 3.5% JP 2.8% 
7 FR 2.9% CHI 3.0% UK 2.4% 
8 SP 2.2% JP 3.0% VZ 2.4% 
9 ARG 2.1% IT 2.7% IN 2.2% 
10 SK 1.7% RU 2.4% BL 2.1% 
Top 10  62.9%  56.6%  53.1% 
 Others 37.1% Others 43.4% Others 46.9% 
All  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2010), Global Insight (2009, pp. 18-20), Table created and arranged by the author.  
 Specifically, exports to China accounted for 13.2% (USD20.19 billion) of 
Brazil’s total exports in 2009, followed by 10.3% (USD157.4 billion) to the United 
States and 4% (USD6.2 billion) to Germany, which maintained its fifth position, 
comparable with prior years. Most exports to China involved agricultural raw materials 
and vegetable oils and seeds, such as inedible crude materials except fuels, animal and 
vegetable oils (i.e., soy), and fats and waxes, which accounted for 76%, or USD15.34 
billion of total exports to China. Manufactured goods exported to China accounted for 
8.8% (USD1.8 billion); mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials accounted for 
6.6% (USD1.33 billion), followed by machinery and transport equipment at 3.1% 
(USD630 million), food, live animals, beverages, and tobacco at 2.8% (USD565 
million), and chemicals and other commodities at 2.7% (USD545 million).  
 In essence, 88% of Brazil’s exports to China in 2009 are related to energy and 
soft commodities, whereas 12% stem from manufactured goods and machinery. In 
comparison, Brazil’s overall 2009 exports consisted to 68.7% of energy and soft 
commodities and to 31.3% of machinery and manufactured goods.  
 
CHINA  
 China’s trading partner structure changed considerably upon the country’s entry 
into the WTO. In the 1990s, its main export markets were Hong Kong —which served 
as a shipping hub— and Japan, China’s traditional export market.  
 In the early 2000s, China’s trading partner profile changed its focus to the 
United States, which has since remained China’s largest export customer (UNCTAD, 
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2010. Global Insight, 2009, pp. 18–20). Similar to Brazil, China’s top ten export 
partners decreased their share of China’s total exports, from 79.4% in 1995 to 61.5% in 
2009; China’s export revenues thus continue to diversify globally. Before China’s open 
door policy, Hong Kong had been its main export trading partner, but by the turn of the 
20th century the United States took the lead, outpacing Hong Kong and Japan. Germany 
maintained its position among the top five export markets.  
Table 2.11: Top 10 Export Trading Partners China 1990-2009 
Ranking 1990 100% 2005 100% 2009 100% 
1 HK 43.3% US 21.4% US 18.4% 
2 JP 14.7% HK 16.3% HK 13.8% 
3 US 8.5% JP 11.0% JP 8.1% 
4 GER 3.3% SK 4.6% SK 4.5% 
5 SG 3.2% GER 4.3% GER 4.2% 
6 NL 1.5% NL 3.4% NL 3.1% 
7 TH 1.4% UK 2.5% UK 2.6% 
8 IT 1.4% SG 2.2% SG 2.5% 
9 UK 1.1% RU 1.7% IN 2.5% 
10 FR 1.0% AUS 1.5% FR 1.8% 
Top 10  79.4%  68.9%  61.5% 
 Others 20.6% Others 31.1% Others 38.5% 
All  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2010), Global Insight (2009, pp. 18-20), Table created and arranged by the author.  
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2.5   Brazil and China: Dualism — Cooperation — Partnership? 
2.5.1 Dualism  
Foreign direct investment has been a persistent topic in recent literature to 
characterize the dynamics between Brazil and China since the 1990s. Most research 
indicates that China’s superior FDI attractiveness is due to its low labor costs. This 
section offers an assessment of FDI in Brazil and China and elaborates on FDI features 
through a comparison that reveals that low labor costs are not the only competitive 
advantage that can draw in FDI.  
Trade and FDI are closely linked in China, which undeniably has an FDI-
specific competitive advantage over Brazil. China’s 2009 labor participation rate is 74% 
of the total population of 1.33 billion people, down from 79% in 1990. Brazil’s labor 
participation rate has increased from 65% in 1990 to 71% of the total population of 194 
million in 2009. That is, in relative terms Brazil’s workforce is increasing, whereas 
China’s is decreasing. Yet, China maintains its significant advantage in absolute labor 
abundance and low labor costs as indicated by its vast population base, large labor pool, 
and lower GDP per capita, which is a proxy for low wages. China’s comparative 
advantage in this respect will likely persist in the mid to long-term future. China’s 
population density, which rose from 122 people per square kilometer in 1990 to 143 
people in 2009, is more than six times larger than Brazil’s. Brazil’s population density 
has grown also, but at remarkably lower levels, from 18 people to 23 people per square 
kilometer during the same period.  
Also, China’s skilled workforce is far more regionally concentrated than 
Brazil’s, which creates another form of competitive advantage for FDI in China. Such 
concentration is fueled by population-dense areas, such as the Pearl River Delta, 
Guangzhou, Shanghai, or Shenzhen, that offer industry clusters and production hubs. 
Despite the higher corruption levels and more insecure property laws in China, Western 
firms prefer it for their FDI because they can rely on sounder infrastructure levels 
among others. Such offerings provide significant FDI-related advantages. As Hunya and 
Stöllinger (2009, p. 25) find, (1) market size and growth prospects are the primary FDI 
decision factors, followed by (2) proximity to customers and markets, (3) low labor 
costs, (4) a skilled workforce, (5) industry clusters, and (6) an acceptable and sound 
infrastructure.  
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Brazil has begun to address its infrastructural weakness. In January 2007 it 
established the Plano De Aceleração Do Crescimento (PAC) 2007–2010 (enhanced by 
PAC 2 in March, 2010), which mandated capital expenditures of approximately 
USD236 billion to support infrastructure enhancement programs for 20 ports, 42,000 
km of roads, 10,000 km of railroads, more than 10 airports, and approximately 13,000 
km of high-voltage electricity transmission lines (Governo Federal, 2007, pp. 7-17. PAC 
2, 2011). 
These factors may explain the significant difference in the size of FDI flows 
when I compare China with Brazil. In 1993 FDI into China reached USD27.5 billion, 
compared with USD1.3 billion into Brazil. By 2008, FDI into China was USD147.8 
billion, compared with Brazil’s USD45 billion. FDI in China did not suffer much from 
the post-2000 global FDI decline as a result of subdued global macroeconomics. 
Whereas Brazil’s FDI declined by 31%, 26%, and 39% p.a. from 2001 to 2003, China’s 
FDI actually increased by 15% and 11% p.a. in 2001 and 2002 and only declined in 
2003 by 5% (Table: 2.12 FDI Brazil and China 1991-2009).  
Nonetheless, the GDP composition and the domestic economic situation of each 
country as well as global macroeconomic trends may alter some of the FDI decisions of 
multinational firms. Brazil’s and China’s FDI structures differ on key points. For 
example, in 2007 over 50% of FDI to China involved the manufacturing sector, whereas 
approximately 70% of FDI to Brazil entailed the service sector (Hunya and Stöllinger, 
2009, p. 11).23 Since 2000, Brazil’s FDI has maintained this bias toward the service 
                                                 
23
 It is worth to mention that China’s FDI is mainly driven by export oriented manufacturing investments 
undertaken by foreign-invested companies. There exists vast academic research on foreign direct 
investment and its effects on terms of trade of developing countries (e.g., by Bhagwati, referred to by Li, 
Huizhong, (n.d.)), which suggests that terms of trade may deteriorate due to FDI inflows depending of a 
host country’s trading mode, its degree of development, and trade openness. Under the export promotion 
strategy that China runs, foreign direct investments have indeed led to a biased growth in exports. The 
weight of processing trade in exports to imports was 86.3% to 54.9% in 1996, 81.4% to 58.5% in 2000, 
78.7% to 59.9% in 2004, and 72.5% to 51.6% in the first 11months of 2008 (Li, Huizhong, (n.d.)), 
worsening the country’s terms of trade, which declined from 105.9 in 1996 to 73.9 in 2008 (Variable 42: 
Terms of Trade (ToT), China 1996-2008). Chinese terms of trade negatively correlate predominantly 
above 70% (significance of 0.01 and 0.05) with all commodity price indexes (except tropical beverages 
and vegetables, oils and seeds price indexes) between 1996 and 2008 (Table 4.5b).     
Also, on a side note, findings by Alfaro et al (2006, pp. 29-34) provide support to the discussion that FDI 
increases productivity of a host country through spillover effects under certain preconditions. Alfaro’s 
models are based on mechanics that stress the function and role of domestic financial markets in enabling 
FDI to promote growth through the creation of backward linkages (Alfaro, 2006, pp. 34-35). One of the 
preconditions: domestic financial markets need to be developed and evolved sufficiently in order to 
generate benefits for the host country through backward linkages between the foreign and the local 
companies with positive spillovers to the economy, which would lead to higher growth; in contrast, host 
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sector, whereas FDI to China stays focused on manufacturing. Furthermore, when 
comparing the FDI coverage of China and Brazil in 1993, I note that China’s FDI was 
21.3 times greater than Brazil’s. Undeniably, China has an array of competitive 
advantages in terms of FDI attractiveness. However, the positive effects of the Plano 
Real allowed FDI into Brazil to increase in 1995 and 1997, such that the comparison of 
China-to-Brazil FDI coverage fell to 2.3 times in 1997 and to 1.4 times in 1999. In 
2007, FDI was particularly strong in China —and in Brazil—, leading to China-to-
Brazil FDI coverage comparisons of 4.0 times, and just 3.0 times after the 2009 crisis. 
The FDI coverage ratios, as shown in Table 2.12, cannot conclusively demonstrate that 
FDI inflows intrinsically favor China over Brazil, solely due to market size, growth 
perspectives, proximity to markets, or low labor costs. Rather, global macroeconomic 
conditions and Brazil’s improved macroeconomic status also play significant roles.  
Table 2.12: Foreign Direct Investment Brazil and China 1991–2009 
Year 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Brazil (USD bio) 1.10 1.29 4.86 19.65 28.58 22.46 10.14 15.07 34.58 25.95 
Change rate 12% -37% 58% 75% -10% -31% -39% -17% 84% -42% 
China (USD bio) 4.47 27.51 35.85 44.24 38.75 44.24 47.08 79.13 138.41 78.19 
Change rate 25% 147% 6% 10% -11% 15% -5% 44% 77% -47% 
Coverage (x) 4.0x 21.3x 7.4x 2.3x 1.4x 2.0x 4.6x 5.3x 4.0x 3.0x 
FDI change rate 
Correlation 
15%, Sig. 0.271 (1991-2009) 
     
57%, Sig. 0.043 (2000-2009) 
Data Source: FDI data from the World Bank (2009, 2010). Coverage ratios and correlation calculated by the author with PASW 
Statistics 18. Table created and arranged by the author. 
In addition, the FDI change rate correlation between Brazil and China from 1991 
to 2009 was 15% (Sig. 0.271 (not significant)), whereas the FDI change rate correlation 
between Brazil and China from 2000 to 2009 was 57% (significant below the 0.05 p-
value threshold). That is, change rates of FDI flows into Brazil and China between 2000 
and 2009 appear to be driven largely by a buoyant global macroeconomic environment. 
For Brazil I note that the stabilizing fiscal and monetary framework as a result of the 
Plano Real may have additionally contributed to the healthy FDI inflows. In contrast, 
Brazil’s low FDI in the early 1990s may be associated with its generally difficult 
macroeconomic environment prior to the Plano Real, especially compared with the 
more stable economic framework of China in the same period. This is reflected by a 
lower FDI change rate correlation between Brazil and China in the period from 1991 to 
2009.  
                                                                                                                                               
countries with less developed financial markets would not benefit from the spillover effect (Alfaro, 2006, 
pp. 34ff). 
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Brazil’s economic growth between 2003 and 2007 was of historic dimensions, 
yet still below the rate of the very high growth periods in the 1970s. Although Brazil’s 
growth figures never reached Chinese levels, Brazil enjoyed solid growth coupled with 
large foreign currency reserves, which emphasized its relative stability and encouraged 
increased FDI. Many factors contributed to this boom, including a relatively stable 
economy as a result of the Plano Real and generally strong global demand for Brazil’s 
key export commodities (Bull, Kasahara, 2011, p. 2-7), specifically from China, one of 
the main single factors that can explain Brazil’s expansion — and thus the increase in 
commodity prices as I will illustrate in Chapter 4 and 5. 
 
2.5.2 Cooperation 
In the early 2000s the gravitational forces between Brazil and China changed 
significantly, from a dualistic to a more cooperative notion. Today Brazil and China 
seek to leverage their competitive advantages by forging joint ventures in commodity-
related sectors, such as in the oil or iron ore sector, so that both countries can confront 
global and technology challenges. China’s double digit annual GDP growth rates from 
2003 to 2008 were a major impulse for the growth in Brazil’s exports to China, which 
initiated increasingly cooperative trade ties.  
Table 2.13: Trade Balance Brazil and China 2000–2008 
China (USD billion) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Imports from Brazil 1.6 2.3 3.0 5.8 8.7 10.0 12.9 18.3 29.6 
Exports to Brazil  1.2 1.3 1.5 2.1 3.7 4.8 7.4 11.4 18.8 
Trade Balance -0.4 -1.0 -1.5 -3.7 -5.0 -5.2 -5.5 -6.9 -10.8 
Trade Deficit Ratio * -14% -28% -33% -47% -40% -35% -27% -23% -22% 
Data Source: World Trade Organization (2009a, 2009b). Table created by the author. *) Trade Balance / (Imports plus Exports). 
As Section 2.4 detailed, China is a leading importer of minerals and metals, food 
commodities, and oil commodities, as well as Brazil’s top export partner. Thus, there is 
a direct association between Chinese commodity imports and Brazilian commodity 
exports. Since 2000, the Brazilian–Chinese trade balance has been moving increasingly 
in Brazil’s favor on an absolute basis, such that it recorded a trade surplus of USD10.8 
billion in 2008. In relative terms however, China gradually improved its trade balance 
with Brazil; the trade deficit ratio improved from -47% in 2003 to -22% in 2008. 
Brazil’s terms of trade index also experienced rather volatile developments, 
increasing from 66.4 index points in 1990 to 108.3 in 1996, then declining to 96.98 in 
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2003, and then gradually improving to 110.4 index points in 2008 as a result of global 
commodity demand. It dropped to 107.8 index points in 2009 in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. China’s terms of trade index on the other hand demonstrates the 
country’s status as a major export manufacturer but also as a major importer of 
commodities. It improved from 102 index points in 1990 to 110.6 in 1998, then it 
dropped to 73.9 index points in 2008 as a result of its immense demand for commodities 
as previously mentioned. 
China’s emergence as Brazil’s main trading partner has been a tension-filled 
process. Brazil’s appreciating currency, lack of labor market reforms, and poor 
improvements in infrastructure conditions have reduced Brazil’s competitiveness in the 
industrial private sector, at least from a Chinese import perspective. Conventional 
wisdom among economic observers indicates that Brazil’s main risk is the so-called 
‘Dutch Disease’24; that is, the de-industrialization of the country’s economy as a result 
of structural export–import imbalances with China. For Brazil, growing trade relations 
with China bear the risk of being a step backward. As a commodity importer China 
controls quantity and prices, which means less control for the exporter (Brazil); 
ultimately a less transparent market. In comparison, in the manufacturing sector prices 
are more visible due to longer term contract features. Furthermore, the commodity 
sector creates lower-grade jobs in comparison to the manufacturing sector, which also 
creates larger multiplier effects through longer production chains.  
Brazil’s overall export structure is thus heavily geared toward the export of 
commodities, as Table 2.6 (Export Structure Brazil 1995-2009) shows. The export of 
food, fuels, agricultural raw materials, and ores and metals accounted for roughly 62% 
of Brazil’s global exports in 2009, benefiting companies such as Vale Do Rio Doce25, 
whereas the export of manufactured products such as aircraft and machinery accounted 
for only 38.2%.26 The Brazilian export structure to China is even more unbalanced with 
                                                 
24
 This expression refers to the presumed negative effects of the exploitation of a country’s natural 
resource base at the expense of its industrial sector. ‘Dutch Disease’ was formulated in 1977 by The 
Economist (2010) to refer to a newly discovered gas field and then a declining manufacturing sector in 
the Netherlands in the late 1950s. Another prominent example of Dutch Disease is Venezuela in the 
1970s and in the last decade (until today), where oil revenues undermined the development of non-oil 
sectors because oil revenues increased national income in ways unmatched by increased national 
productivity; agricultural and industrial imports were cheaper than their production in Venezuela.  
25
 Customers from China, which constitute a major customer base of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, 
accounted for 17.7% of revenues for Companhia Vale Do Rio Doce in 2007 (2007, p. 5).  
26
 Geromel (2011).  
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commodities exports of 89% and manufactured products of 11% of total export volume 
to China (World Trade Organization, 2009a). That is, Brazil’s export structure with 
China is more commodity-centric than Brazil’s overall export structure. In contrast, 
Brazil’s overall import structure is heavily geared toward manufactured goods, which 
accounted for 76% in 2009, as Table 2.8 shows. At the same time, Brazil’s imports from 
China are 94% manufactured products. That is, Brazil’s import structure with China is 
more focused on manufactured products than Brazil’s overall import structure.  
The Brazil–Chinese trade interdependence also has some effects on the 
manufacturing sector as evidenced by the purchase manager index (PMI) for Brazil and 
China (Bloomberg, 2011b). As the figure below shows, Brazil’s PMI has lagged 
China’s by one to three months since April 2007, with a correlation of 70.3% at a 
confidence level of above 99% (sig. < 0.00).  
Figure 2.1: PMI Index Brazil–China April 2007 – May 2011 
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       Data Source: Bloomberg (2011b). Correlation analysis computed and Figure arranged by the author.  
Considering China’s share of only approximately 15% of total Brazilian exports 
over the last years and considering Brazil’s greater than 60% commodities exports in 
2009 compared with its overall export volume, it appears that Brazil’s Dutch Disease 
dilemma is not rooted so much in its increased trade relations with China and its 
sustained demand for commodities, but rather in the deep-seated shortcomings in 
Brazil’s economic structure. Brazil exports more primary and resource-based 
manufactured products; China specializes increasingly its exports to provide higher-
technology products. Brazil’s structural problems are long-term and politically complex 
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to solve. Nonetheless, imports from China and the push of Chinese firms into Brazil to 
gain ownership of commodity producing assets in Brazil, as well as to rebalance foreign 
currency holding compositions away from the USD, constitutes a viable threat to 
Brazil’s private sector independence. Prevalent warning signs suggest Brazil is locking 
itself into a position as a commodity exporter, reversing the positive trend of its past 30 
years of increasing industrial production and exports.27 
 
2.5.3 Partnership? 
China’s increasing importance as a primary trading partner of Brazil is a positive 
development from the perspective of commodity-related revenue streams. Yet, despite 
this connection, relations between Brazil and China are not without tensions or conflicts 
of interest. Brazilian exporters face increased competition from Chinese competitors, 
both within onshore and offshore markets, for various segments of manufactured 
products. According to a survey by the Brazilian National Confederation of Industry, 
between 2006 and 2010 45% of Brazilian firms that competed against Chinese firms 
lost domestic market shares, and 67% of Brazilian exporters competing against Chinese 
counterparts lost shares in offshore markets (Bull and Kasahara, 2011, p. 6). Thus, 
Brazilian exporters have been forced to realign their cost structure and productivity to 
maintain their competitiveness. In particular, Brazil’s textile industry has been 
significantly threatened by low-cost Chinese textile producers (Barbosa and Mendes, 
2006, pp. 8-9).  
Even more pressure on the competitiveness of Brazil’s private sector stems from 
China’s economic expansion. China’s substantial demand for commodities and the 
associated increases in commodity prices have created incentives for China to expand 
through asset acquisitions in the commodity sector, investments, or bilateral loan 
agreements with governments in commodity-rich regions —like South America,28 and 
specifically Brazil, but also Africa— to secure a supply chain of vital commodities.  
                                                 
27
 Industry value added and manufacturing value added to GDP declined from 30.1% and 19.2% in 2004 
to 27.2 and 15.6% in 2009.   
28
 For example Argentina: In 2009 the Chinese oil firm CNOOC sealed a joint venture with Bridas 
Energy Holdings Ltd., a family-owned Argentine firm, which CNOOC used as vehicle to buy out British 
Petrol’s shares in Pan American Energy, which generates 18% of Argentina's oil and natural gas 
production. In 2011 the joint venture acquired Exxon Mobil’s shares in Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay, including a refinery and more than 700 service stations. CNOOC also owns 50% of Argentina's 
largest oil field, Cerro Dragon, which provides the license for all associated oil and gas reserves in the 
Santa Cruz province in southern Argentina for the next 40 years. For this transaction, the China 
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Sino-Brazilian economic and political relations date back to 1993 when China 
and Brazil forged their first strategic partnership (Sangmeister and Zhang, 2008, p. 12). 
Under the rule of President Lula, Brazil extended this strategic partnership by signing 
and executing many bilateral agreements that incorporated agricultural trade accords, oil 
and iron ore supply agreements, and bilateral loan programs. In 2004, President Lula 
and his business delegation took their second visit to China and signed 14 separate 
agreements, including those between:  
1. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce and the Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation 
(Soliani, 2009), closing a USD3.6 billion joint venture.29 
2. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce and the Aluminum Corporation of China for 
bauxite exploration and export to China. 
3. Petrobras and Sinopec for the exploration and export of oil. 
4. China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation and 
Central Termelétrica Do Sul for the construction of a coal thermoelectric plant in 
Rio Grande do Sul. 
5. Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico and the Chinese Citic Group to 
develop export focused finance and joint venture projects (Barbosa and Mendes, 
2006, pp. 8-9).  
                                                                                                                                               
Development Bank provided a USD2.6 billion 10-year term loan to restore a freight train system that 
connects Buenos Aires to Argentina's central region. In the Rio Negro province, the Metallurgical 
Corporation of China paid USD80 million to revive an iron ore mine. China's Beidahuang Group pledged 
a USD14 billion irrigation infrastructure investment for a 20-year license to grow agricultural products 
such as corn, wheat, soy, and dairy to supply Chinese domestic demand. In the southern Tierra del Fuego, 
Chinese firms are investing USD1 billion to produce fertilizer and build an energy plant, in exchange for 
natural gas supplied by Argentina over a 25-year period ((James, 2011), (CNOOC, 2010)).  
Chile: In 2005, the Chilean and Chinese governments executed a USD2 billion sales-and-lease-back 
investment joint venture that secures 836,250 metric tons of copper over a 15-year period. The collateral 
for China includes 49% in Chile's state-owned Codelco, plus an option for China to acquire 100% of one 
of Chile’s largest copper mines (James, 2011). 
Venezuela: In 2009, the China Development Bank extended a USD32 billion term loan to the Venezuelan 
government in exchange for a 10-year oil supply contract at market rates (James, 2011). 
Ecuador: Also in 2009, Petro China agreed to arrange an USD1 billion loan to the state-owned 
PetroEcuador in exchange for oil supplies. As a flanking measure, in the first quarter of 2011, the China 
Development Bank pledged an additional USD1 billion to Ecuador's government in exchange for oil 
supplies (James, 2011). Also in 2011, it offered another USD1 billion for oil, increasing total Chinese 
loan amounts to Ecuador to USD3 billion (El Comercio, 2011).  
29
 Companhia Vale Do Rio Doce (2007, p. 25) also holds majority and minority shares in a number of 
additional joint ventures based in Brazil and China (e.g., Zhuyhai Yueyufeng Iron and Steel Co. Ltd, 
Zhuhai, Guangdong/China). 
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Furthermore, China is deploying its state-owned China Development Bank as a 
strategic financing and economic vehicle to shape foreign economic policy. In the past 
10 years, it has become the primary vehicle for Chinese foreign economic activities and 
policy, providing large term loans with maturities up to 25 years to governments and 
state-owned enterprises in South America and Africa in return for exploration licenses 
and shipments of energy and agricultural commodities. A recent prominent example is 
China Development Bank’s May 2009 loan agreement, providing USD10 billion to 
Brazil's state-owned Petrobras in exchange for guaranteed oil supply to Sinopec, China's 
largest refiner (Xiaokun and Zhang, 2009).30  
Because iron ore has become one of the most important Brazilian exports, many 
Chinese investments are focused on expanding mines and exploring new reserve fields. 
China’s persistent demand for iron ore continues to encourage Sino–Brazilian 
cooperation, such that Companhia Vale do Rio Doce invested USD10 billion to expand 
its mining activities and double output by 2015, according to a June 2010 announcement 
by the firm. In addition to the huge landmark agreements, a significant number of 
bilateral investment and trade agreements between small to medium sized Brazilian and 
Chinese companies in various sectors further strengthen Sino–Brazilian economic ties 
(Sangmeister and Zhang, 2008, pp. 12-13).  
The Brazilian government’s reaction to the Chinese threat to its domestic market 
has been twofold: On the one hand, Brazil’s government under President Lula continued 
strengthening its diplomatic ties with China to increase Brazil’s prominence on the 
international political level. It established bilateral commissions, such as the Brazil–
China High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Commission (COSBAN). On the other 
hand, the Brazilian government initiated defensive trading measures, such as anti-
dumping procedures and law suits with the WTO to avoid the possibility that Chinese 
products would flood the Brazilian market at the expense of domestic products (Bull 
and Kasahara, 2011, pp. 6-8). According to Bull and Kasahara (2011, pp. 6-7), 
approximately 26% of the anti-dumping procedures established between 1988 and 2009 
targeted Chinese imports. In light of current trends, including intensifying pressure from 
Chinese imports on Brazil’s trade balance, anti-Chinese import measures appear likely 
to increase under President Dilma Roussef’s administration. 
                                                 
30
 The agreement includes 150,000 barrels a day of crude oil provided to Sinopec in 2009 and 200,000 
barrels per day for nine years from 2010 onwards. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Both Brazil and China have undergone significant economic changes and 
integration development in the past two decades as a result of their respective 
competitive advantages in context of increasing degrees of economic openness.  
From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, Brazil and China offered general trade 
complementarities in their export structures. Brazil has largely benefited from its vast 
natural resources, which have dominated the country’s export structure. This structure 
in turn has been partially shaped by China’s immense demand for agricultural and 
energy commodities. On the other hand, China could benefit from its vast and skilled 
labor base, coupled with low wages in high density areas, which attracted FDI to its 
SEZs and enabled the country to serve as an assembly bench for export markets in 
Europe and the United States. 
Then, starting in the early 2000s, a new trading pattern emerged. The Chinese 
trade deficit ratio with Brazil narrowed from 47% in 2003 to 22% in 2008 (Table 2.13). 
Meanwhile, Brazil’s export balance of goods and services to GDP declined from 3.88% 
in 2004 to 0.16% in 2008, even though it retained a relatively strong position as a global 
provider of natural resources. The increasingly tight trade relations between Brazil and 
China have resulted from their complementarities: Brazil’s abundance of commodities, 
China’s dynamic industrialization strategy.  
However, Brazil’s continued structural weaknesses coupled with increasing 
Chinese exports of manufactured products to Brazil suggest a major threat to Brazil’s 
industrial base, one that haunts public discussions about Brazilian job losses and a 
potential return to a commodity-based economy. Furthermore, Chinese acquisitions and 
investments in Brazilian commodity sectors appear likely to increase significantly in the 
future, considering China’s need to import commodities to maintain its domestic 
growth. Brazil’s concentration on exporting commodities and the threat of Chinese 
manufactured imports have together prompted concerns among Brazilian economists, 
industry lobbies, and the public. If Brazil becomes locked into a role as a commodity 
exporter it will undermine its positive trends of a widening industrial base and increased 
exports.  
Together with increasing dependence on exported primary products, the 
Brazilian–Chinese relationship has fundamental effects and consequences for the 
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Brazilian development paradigm and for domestic support of the idea of stronger 
relations with China. The main question in this context involves the direction and 
quality of the developing relationship between the two countries. Will Brazil and China 
develop as partners, continue to enter mutually beneficial FDI projects and joint 
ventures —even though Brazil’s FDI is quite small compared with China’s— and 
achieve balanced trade relations? Or will the two countries emerge as competitors on 
both regional and global levels?  
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3 Empirical Data and Data Methodology  
3.1    Introduction 
Chapter 3 consists of four sections: Section 3.1 provides the introduction of the 
data and the data methodology. In Section 3.2 I outline the scale and scope of the 79 
macroeconomic variables employed in this thesis, as well as their measures and sources. 
As rationalized in Section 1.3 and 1.5, these macroeconomic variables serve as the 
dependent variables of the analysis in Chapter 4. Commodity prices and governance 
indexes serve as independent variables, as introduced in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.  
I also elaborate on the price development of each commodity composite index 
from 1971 to 2009 and their inter-correlations for the periods of 1971 to 2009 and 1996 
to 2008. Commodity price indexes represent the first set of independent variables. In 
Section 3.3.3, I test the crude price index and the minerals and metals index on Granger 
causality. Oil price and metals price indexes are major indicators of global activity in 
capital markets. In the same section I illustrate the correlation and Granger causality 
levels between the individual composite commodity price indexes and world GDP per 
capita. In doing so I will give statistically support to the intuitive notion that global 
demand represented by GDP per capita affects/causes commodity price indexes. The 
methodology on correlation and Granger causality is introduced and discussed in 
Section 4.2 (Statistical Diagnostic Tests).  
In Section 3.4, I elaborate on the second set of independent variables, those 
representing governance dimensions. These include the World Bank governance index 
(WGI index) and the economic freedom index (EFI index). These governance indexes 
are complementary: The former examines governance dimensions from a holistic 
perspective; for example the WGIRQ index by the World Bank, which covers the 
regulatory framework governance as a whole. EFI indexes in comparison are rather 
specific and cover governance dimensions largely in economic terms. The World Bank 
indexes, which were first introduced in 1996, are composite indexes, whereas the 
economic freedom indexes are —with few exceptions— non-composite, genuine 
indexes. 
The governance indexes are based on a questionnaire about perceptions, as well 
as evidence related to each governance dimension. Indexes of a socially responsible 
market economy measure not only free markets and property rights but also principles 
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of social justice, equal opportunities, and sustainability. Both WGI and EFI indexes rely 
on the analysis of multiple economic freedom and competition components, some of 
which are composites of additional quantifiable measures.  
The econometric analysis of change rates of the independent and dependent 
variables consists of annual data points measured from 1996 to 2008, including absolute 
governance index data, absolute commodity price index data, and dependent variables 
expressed as percentage shares. The analysis and computation period in this thesis 
covers annual data points from 1996 to 2008 due to data restrictions of Worldwide 
Governance indexes. Worldwide Governance indexes are provided only for 1996 going 
forward. I included 2009 data for information purposes only. 
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3.2 Dependent Variables: Selected Macroeconomic Measures 
3.2.1  Data Source 
The primary source for these macroeconomic variables is the World Bank’s 
publicly available Data Catalog section (World Bank, 2009, 2010 (Data Catalog)). The 
World Bank has significantly increased the scope of its monitoring of global world 
development indicators. Today, it provides data of more than 1,150 individual variables 
of more than 200 economies, covering a time span from 1960 to 2009. It updates its 
world development indicators tri-annually, in April, September, and December. The 
World Bank data I used stems from the 3rd quarter in 2009 and the 4th quarter in 2010. 
Therefore, slight deviations might exist between the macroeconomic data used in this 
thesis and data posted online as of today due to regular World Bank update batches.   
The macroeconomic variables cover a wide range of topics, including, but not 
limited to, balance of payments, external debt, national accounts, the financial sector, 
and infrastructure. A full overview of all macroeconomic variables definitions and their 
topics can be found in Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 3.2. 
The World Bank is the main source for macroeconomic variables statistically 
analyzed in this study for several reasons. First, whereas data from national providers 
such as Banco Central in Brazil or the National Statistic Buero in China are published 
mainly in local currency, World Bank data are denominated in US dollars (USD), 
eliminating any currency translation problem. Second, national data providers often lack 
the scale and scope of the macroeconomic variables compared to the World Bank. The 
data time frame of national data providers is also restrictive, whereas the World Bank 
offers publicly accessible data dating back to 1960. Third, in terms of data compatibility 
and integrity, the World Bank generates share percentages, such as the trade to GDP 
ratio, derived from macroeconomic data comparisons that have relied on the same data 
generation methodology for all economies and years. Thus, this data ensures integrity 
for country comparisons. Fourth, World Bank data is among the most current and 
accurate global development data available and is widely used in academic research.  
In general, data examined in this thesis is based on World Bank Group data, if 
not otherwise stated. 
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3.2.2    Data Methodology 
 The World Bank’s aggregated macroeconomic variables used in this thesis are in 
form of (1) percentages of macroeconomic variables measured, e.g., trade to GDP; (2) 
change rates, such as aggregated GDP change rates; (3) trade indexes, including e.g., 
export value index; or (4) price indexes, such as the consumer price index (CPI). The 
majority of the macroeconomic variables in this study are percentage measures or 
change rate measures as opposed to index variables. Macroeconomic variables as a 
share percentage are measured annually on a weighted average basis, whereas 
macroeconomic variables, such as agriculture value added growth rate, are based on 
constant USD. Trade indexes rely on an average calculation; the base period is usually 
the year 2000. Finally, aggregated price indexes such as CPIx (Variable 58: consumer 
price index) are based on the Laspeyres (L) price index, expressed as PL= [ ∑ (pci,tn · 
qci,t0) / ∑ (pci,t0 · qci,t0) ], where p denotes the price of good ci (i=1,…,k), t indicates the 
time period, q is the quantity, and n and 0 are the current and previous periods, 
respectively. In the Laspeyres price index, the reference quantities are those associated 
with the price reference period 0, which means it uses the basket of the earlier of two 
periods.  
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3.2.3  Data Series 
This section introduces the macroeconomic variables data series selected for the 
econometric analysis performed in Chapter 4. As noted previously, this thesis examines 
79 macroeconomic variables over the period from 1996 to 2008 on an annual basis. The 
econometric analysis measures the effects of the independent variables, namely 
commodity price and governance indexes, on the dependent variables.  
Table 3.1: Macroeconomic Topics and Subsets 
Private Sector & Trade Economic Policy & Debt 
Exports Shares of GDP  
Imports Other Share measures  
Trade Indexes Growth Rates  
Total Merchandise Trade Debt Ratios and Other Items 
Tariffs Capital & Financial Account 
 Reserves and Other Items 
International Merchandise Indexes National Accounts & Balance of Payments 
Terms of Trade Indexes  
Purchasing Power Indexes of Exports Financial Sector 
 Capital Markets 
Environment  Monetary Holdings 
Agricultural Production Interest Rates 
Energy Production & Use Exchange Rates & Prices 
Density & Urbanization  
 Infrastructure 
Labor & Social Protection Communications 
Unemployment Technology 
Source: World Bank (2009, 2010). Table created and arranged by the author.   
The macroeconomic variables analyzed for both, Brazil (Tables 3.2a-c) and 
China (Tables 3.3a-c), cover seven topics as categorized by the World Bank: (1) 
economic policy & debt: national accounts, (2) private sector & trade, (3) financial 
sector, (4) environment, (5) infrastructure, (6) international merchandise indexes, and 
(7) labor and social protection.  Each category contains several subsets, as summarized 
in Table 3.1.  
The Tables 3.2a-c and 3.3a-c below give an overview of the entire set of 
macroeconomic variables of Brazil and China, respectively, covering the entire analysis 
period from 1996 to 2008. The variables in these tables are stated in abbreviated form. 
The definition of each dependent variable, its extended as well as its abbreviated form, 
is provided in Appendix 3.1. 
Most of the variables (38 of 79) come from the topic of economic policy & debt, 
13 variables are from the private sector & trade topic, followed by ten from the financial 
  
91 
sector topic and seven from the environment topic. The infrastructure topic supplies six 
variables, and the international merchandise topic contains four variables. Labor & 
social protection supplies only one variable (unemployment). Within the economic 
policy & debt topic, the selected variables cover a broad selection of key economic 
performance and output measures, their change rates (e.g., GDP growth rates) as well as 
shares of GDP, e.g., the ratio of household final consumption to GDP. In addition, this 
category contains debt ratios and important national account variables, as well as capital 
and financial account variables.  
The financial sector topic offers key variables from a wide range of subsets, such 
as capital markets, monetary, and interest and foreign exchange (FX) rate subsets. Thus, 
it can measure the impact of governance and commodity prices on financial and 
monetary sectors.  
Private sector & trade and international merchandise indexes are neighboring 
topics and include a range of trade-related indexes, which are essential for measuring 
the effects of price changes of commodities and trade-related governance of Brazil and 
China. The comparative analysis thus highlights the different effects the independent 
variables have in the dissimilar contexts of Brazil and China, i.e., on a major global 
commodity exporter in the case of Brazil versus a major global commodity importer in 
the case of China. 
The selected variables from the environment, infrastructure, and labor & social 
protection topics complement the analysis of significant effects of commodity prices 
and governance for the macroeconomic framework in Brazil and China. 
Typographically, during the course of this study —for information purposes and 
reader friendliness— the variables are initially either put in abbreviated form first with 
their order number and extended form in brackets, e.g., GDP_gr (Variable 2: GDP 
growth rate). Or —depending on the context— they are put in extended form first with 
their order number and abbreviated form in brackets, e.g., GDP growth rate (Variable 2: 
GDP_gr).  
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3.3 Independent Variables Set 1: Commodity Price Indexes  
3.3.1 Data Source  
The primary source of data for commodities is the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2009). Its data series for commodity price 
indexes are publicly available, wide in scope and scale, and date back to 1961. The 
scope of my econometric analysis is from 1996 to 2008 only, but several charts and 
tables include 2009 data for information and reference purposes. The analysis contains 
six individual groups of composite commodity price indexes, following the commodity 
group framework established by UNCTAD as introduced below. Each composite 
commodity price index consists of several individual price indexes.  
 
3.3.2 Methodology  
Commodities are key input factors in various sectors. Their prices have profound 
effects on various macroeconomic measures. UNCTAD categorizes commodities into 
six composite commodity indexes, each of which consist of multiple commodity sub-
indexes priced in USD, British Pound (GPB), Singaporean dollar (SGD), and Malaysian 
Ringgit (MYR):  
(1) Minerals, ores, and metals index (MinMetalsIx), with 21 sub-indexes ranging from 
prices for phosphate rock to silver. 
(2) Agricultural raw materials index (AgriRawIx), consisting of 26 sub-indexes 
including but not limited to the prices of different types of cotton, rubber, and 
plywood. 
(3) Vegetable oil seeds and oils index (VegOilSeedsIx), with nine sub-indexes ranging 
from soybeans to cottonseed oil prices. 
(4) Tropical beverages index (TropBevIx), consisting of prices for eleven sub-indexes, 
such as different types of coffee, cocoa, and tea. 
(5) Food index (FoodIx), consisting of eleven sub-indexes such as prices for wheat, rice, 
and fish meal. 
(6) Crude index (CrudeIx), an equally weighted blend of Dubai/Brent/Texas crude 
measured in USD per barrel. 
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Appendix 3.4 contains an overview of the individual commodity constituents for 
each composite commodity price index in UNCTAD’s categorization. These 
commodity price indexes are based on the Laspeyres price index, as previously detailed. 
Appendix 3.3 provides an overview of the definition of each commodity price index. 
And Appendix 3.5 provides the constituent weightings of each composite commodity 
price index (UNCTAD, 2009, 2010). 
 
3.3.3    Commodity Price Indexes 
3.3.3.1 Data Series 
Although I examine the effects of commodity prices on macroeconomic 
variables between 1996 and 2008, Table 3.4 also includes the most recent data points 
for 2009 as well.  
Table 3.4: Commodity Price Indexes 1996–2009 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
FoodIx 144 136 118 98 100 103 102 104 119 127 151 164 234 220 
Change % 9.0 -5.4 -13.6 -16.8 2.1 2.8 -0.5 1.9 13.9 7.2 19.0 8.5 42.5 -6.0 
TropBevIx 136 177 150 118 100 79 89 94 100 126 134 148 178 182 
Change % -16.6 29.8 -15.4 -21.0 -15.4 -20.6 11.7 6.2 6.4 25.5 6.7 10.4 20.2 1.9 
VegOilSeedsIx 159 158 170 125 100 94 117 137 155 141 148 226 298 213 
Change % 
-4.9 -0.5 7.5 -26.2 -20.3 -6.4 24.9 17.4 13.2 -9.5 5.0 52.9 31.9 -28.4 
AgriRawIx 134 123 108 98 100 96 95 111 125 129 147 164 198 163 
Change % -11.2 -8.2 -12.0 -9.3 2.1 -4.2 -1.4 17.0 13.4 3.2 13.3 12.0 20.5 -17.5 
MinMetalsIx 110 112 91 89 100 89 87 98 137 173 278 313 333 232 
Change % -13.8 1.4 -19.0 -1.8 12.4 -10.8 -2.7 12.4 40.7 26.2 60.3 12.8 6.2 -30.2 
CrudeIx 72 68 46 64 100 87 88 102 134 189 228 252 344 219 
Change % 20.7 -6.0 -31.8 38.7 55.6 -13.3 2.0 15.8 30.7 41.3 20.4 10.7 36.4 -36.3 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2009), Table created and arranged by the author. Index data is rounded. 
Commodities emerged as a broad new tradable asset class in the early 2000s in 
the context of new product development in capital markets due to asset diversification 
and investor demand. Commodity prices move in cycles depending on global demand, 
which is represented by world GDP per capita in this section. Figure 3.1 displays the 
price development of the six individual UNCTAD composite commodity groups from 
1971 to 2009 (2000 is the base year). 
From 1995 to 2000, commodity prices were declining, then rising in 2000, 
displaying a sustainable positive trajectory of unmatched levels until the dawn of the 
financial crisis in the second half of 2008. The financial crisis triggered a sharp reversal 
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of commodity prices. Although remarkable, it is helpful to place the recent boom in 
commodity prices —in the literature often referred to as the 'commodity super cycle'— 
in an historical context. Oil prices quadrupled between 1973 and 1974 due to the oil 
crisis and again doubled in 1979. After the strong upward trend of non-fuel and energy 
commodities during 1973 and 1979, the steep rise of US interest rates in the early 1980s 
were the catalyst for the decline in price indexes for all non-fuel commodities between 
1980 and 2002.  
Figure 3.1: Commodity Price Indexes 1971–2009 
 
              Data Source: UNCTAD (2009, 2010), Figure created and arranged by the author.  
The amplitude of the rise in commodity prices from 2002 to 2008 was 
unprecedented. By mid-2008, virtually all UNCTAD commodity price indexes except 
the tropical beverage index reached their highest levels. From 2002 to 2008 the crude 
index rose by approximately 289%; the minerals, ores and metals index jumped by 
283%; the food, vegetable oil seeds and oils, and the agricultural raw material indexes 
rose by 129%, 155%, and 109%, respectively. The tropical beverages index rose by 
101% over the same period. Among all commodity groups the crude price index 
increase is the most striking: Oil rose sharply from a 2002 average monthly level of 
USD25 to USD108 per barrel in the first half of 2008. The historically extreme price of 
oil in July 2008, when oil traded at USD147 per barrel, was due to momentum by oil 
speculators though, rather than elevated consumer demand (Masters, 2008, pp. 3-7).  
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Structural shifts in commodity prices are already observable, caused mainly by 
the emerging middle classes in developing countries, which swing the demand pull of 
commodities towards emerging markets in Asia, Asia Pacific, and Latin America, 
particularly China, India, and Brazil.  
Appendix 3.6 provides a figurative overview of the development of each 
composite commodity price index including its constituents. Appendix 3.14 displays in 
detail the commodity price index data series including its yearly changes between 1971 
and 2009, as well as world GDP, world trade to GDP, and world GDP per Capita.31 
 
3.3.3.2 Commodity Price Indexes: Correlation and Granger Causality  
Correlation 
As shown in Table 3.5, commodity price indexes inter-correlate significantly. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the crude index (CrudeIx) and the minerals, 
ores, and metals index (MinMetalsIx) is very high compared with all other commodity 
group correlation coefficients. Between 1971 and 2009 this correlation coefficient 
reached 90.7%.  
Table 3.5: Pearson Correlation Commodity Price Matrix 1971–2009 
1971-2009 FoodIx TropBevIx VegOilSeedsIx AgriRawIx MinMetalsIx CrudeIx 
FoodIx 1 0.244 .794** .746** .719** .681** 
TropBevIx 0.244 1 .451** 0.306 0.108 0.186 
VegOilSeedsIx .794** .451** 1 .696** .668** .686** 
AgriRawIx .746** 0.306 .696** 1 .836** .778** 
MinMetalsIx .719** 0.108 .668** .836** 1 .907** 
CrudeIx .681** 0.186 .686** .778** .907** 1 
* Significant at .05. ** Significant at 0.01. Source: Calculated and arranged by the author.  
I have found that correlation coefficients increase across the board for the time 
period between 1996 and 2008 compared to that from 1971 to 2009. Table 3.6 shows 
the correlation coefficients among the six individual UNCTAD commodity price 
indexes for the 1996 to 2008 period. The high correlation coefficient between the crude 
index (CrudeIx) and the minerals, ores and metals index (MinMetalsIx) increased even 
further, from 90.7% between 1971 and 2009 to 95.8% between 1996 and 2008. In 
general, correlation coefficients increased across all commodity groups between 1996 
and 2008 compared with the period of 1971 to 2009. The reason for this development is 
based on the increasing interconnectedness of global trade sectors since the mid-1990s 
                                                 
31
 World GDP output data is available only since 1970 in the World Bank database. 
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and the emergence of tradable commodity indexes, commodity baskets, and benchmark 
funds since the early 2000s. World trade as a ratio of world GDP increased gradually 
from 27.1% in 1971 to 59.0% in 2008, though it dropped to 46.7% in 2009 due to the 
global financial crisis (Appendix 3.14). In addition, the gradual advancement of 
automated trading platforms since the mid-1990s facilitated rapid trade executions 
which reveal the commodity trading patterns by market participants such as banks, asset 
managers, and institutional investors in context of macroeconomic outlook. 
Table 3.6: Pearson Correlation Commodity Price Matrix 1996–2008 
1996-2008 FoodIx TropBevIx VegOilSeedsIx AgriRawIx MinMetalsIx CrudeIx 
FoodIx 1 .753** .929** .969** .859** .838** 
TropBevIx .753** 1 .762** .699** 0.55 0.42 
VegOilSeedsIx .929** .762** 1 .917** .787** .755** 
AgriRawIx .969** .699** .917** 1 .923** .895** 
MinMetalsIx .859** 0.55 .787** .923** 1 .958** 
CrudeIx .838** 0.42 .755** .895** .958** 1 
*Significant at .05. **Significant at 0.01. Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The correlation analysis of commodity price indexes reveals that the correlation 
between the constituents of a specific composite index and the specific index itself is 
fairly high, particularly when considering the period between 1996 and 2008 
(Appendixes 3.7 and 3.8: Pearson Correlations of Constituents and Composite Indexes). 
For example, the correlation analysis of minerals and metals (MinMetalsIx) constituent 
prices between 1971 and 2009 reveals that the correlations of gold prices with any other 
constituent of the composite MinMetalsIx range between 45.7% for tungsten and 88.7% 
for iron ore (AUS), all highly significant at a p-value of 0.01. These correlations 
increased for the period of 1996 to 2008 to 87.5% for tungsten and 96.6% for iron ore 
(AUS). And the MinMetalsIx composite index itself correlates at 55.4% and 89.6% with 
tungsten and iron ore (AUS) between 1971 and 2009 (Appendix 3.8); these correlations 
rose to 96.0% and 90.6% for the period of 1996 to 2008, respectively. Therefore, 
MinMetalsIx —which includes base metals such as aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, 
and zinc, as well as highly liquid tradable metals— offers a fair proxy for observing the 
moves of its constituents. Similarly, UNCTAD composite indexes for agricultural raw 
materials, vegetables, oils and seeds, and food represent fair proxies of their 
constituents, according to the high constituent correlations. Appendix 3.7 shows the 
correlations among all constituents within their respective commodity price index 
during the periods of 1971 to 2008 and 1996 to 2008. Appendix 3.8 compares the 
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correlations of commodity price index constituents with its respective composite price 
index (e.g., MinMetalsIx with tin) between 1971 and 2009, and between 1996 and 2008. 
Before proceeding to the causal analysis of world GDP per capita and 
commodity prices, I point out —for the sake of completeness— association peculiarities 
within the commodity price index set, namely the price pattern between oil (CrudeIx) 
and minerals and metals (MinMetalsIx).   
      
Granger Causality between Crude Oil- and Minerals and Metals Price Index 
The correlation between the crude index and the minerals and metals index plays 
a significant role in capital markets and the commodity trading space because of the 
trade link between crude futures and metal futures. Crude futures are a leading indicator 
of global economic activity, and crude oil is one of the most actively traded 
commodities globally. Crude markets are highly liquid. The largest, most liquid and 
most popular crude oil trade location is the New York Mercantile Exchange’s 
(NYMEX) Light Sweet Crude Oil (light sweet) Futures division. Light sweet is the 
most popular grade of crude oil traded.  
Gold, silver, and platinum are the three main precious metals within 
MinMetalsIx which are also actively traded on exchanges. Prevalent academic literature 
empirically analyzes the movement of gold prices, together with respect to changes in 
other economic variables such as inflation and interest rates. Gold prices in particular, 
but also silver and platinum, often trend in directional patterns with inflation. With its 
price inelasticity (due to industrial demand), gold tends to retain more price stability 
than silver and platinum in volatile market conditions. In the context of economic 
outlook, oil prices tend to serve as a leading indicator.  
It is widely accepted in the marketplace that metal futures follow oil futures, 
such that the change in metal prices is caused by the change in oil prices. A validation 
of this theory can be undertaken by Granger causality testing carried out on the crude 
index (CrudeIx) and the minerals and metals index (MinMetalsIx) for the period of 
1996 to 2008. Table 3.7 presents the result of such a Granger causality test, which 
reveals that the crude price index Granger causes changes in the minerals and metals 
price index at a 0.01 significance level. That is, changes in the crude price index induce 
changes in the minerals and metals price index, and not vice versa. 
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Table 3.7: Granger Causality: Crude Index and Minerals and Metals Index 1996–2008 
Test Group 1 Variables Group 2 Variables Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
1 CrudeIx MinMetalsIx 0.00 0.9913 
2 MinMetalsIx CrudeIx 11.98 0.0005 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The null hypothesis of the first Granger test (Granger 1, or Test 1) is defined as 
follows: The change of the crude price index is only affected by itself and not by the 
change in the minerals and metals price index (Null Hypothesis test for non-causality). 
This null hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected because the p-value of 0.9913 is very high, 
suggesting a 99.13% probability of wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis.32 By contract, 
the null hypothesis for the second Granger causality test (Granger 2, or Test 2) states 
that the minerals and metals price index is only affected by itself and not by the crude 
price index. This null hypothesis can be rejected at a significance level of less than 1%. 
The minerals and metals index is affected by the crude index, not vice versa.  
The findings for these two indexes are relevant for the principal component 
analysis carried out in Section 4.2.4. The significant correlation levels between crude 
prices and minerals and metals prices suggest that there exists multicollinearity between 
the crude price index and the minerals and metals price index. 
 
3.3.3.3 Commodity Price Indexes and World GDP per Capita 
In this section I compare the intuitively plausible presumption that changes in 
commodity prices are due to changes in world GDP per capita. I reflect on the strong 
correlation and Granger causality associations.  
Significant changes in commodity prices have been observed in times during 
abnormal inflationary pressure, such as the high inflationary period of the early 1990s, 
or the period at the end of the 1990s to mid-2008. 
The correlation analysis results between changes in commodity price indexes 
and changes in GDP per capita are statistically favorable in comparison to the 
correlation analysis between commodity price indexes and changes in world GDP per 
                                                 
32
 The p-value stands for the significance level of a test for which the null hypothesis can be rejected. It 
represents the actual significance level of the test. If a p-value is small, then the result is significant. By 
contract, significance threshold is a p-value of 0.05. The smaller the p-value, the more convincing is a 
rejection of the null hypothesis. The significance level of a statistical hypothesis test is the probability of 
wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis that is actually in fact true. Type I error means, the null hypothesis 
is wrongly rejected; Type II error means, the null hypothesis is not rejected even though it actually is 
false. 
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capita. This is due to the fact that the former compares two change values whereas the 
latter compares an index value with a change value. The latter analysis may therefore 
lead to statistically distorted results due to data integrity issues. However, for 
demonstration and completeness purposes I also present a figurative comparison 
between commodity price indexes and changes in world GDP per capita. 
 
Commodity Price Indexes and Change in World GDP per Capita 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the highly cyclical moving patterns of commodity price 
indexes in the context to changes in global aggregate demand measured by the world 
GDP per capita change rate. 33  Between 1971 and 2009 world GDP per capita in 
constant USD grew at an annual compound rate of 1.44%.34 In comparison, the crude 
price index rose by 8.5%, the food index 3.7%, tropical beverages 3.0%, vegetable oil 
seeds and oils 2.6%, agricultural raw materials 3.7% and minerals and metals grew by 
4.2% on an annual compound basis. As history has shown, periods of high or low price 
fluctuations are typical in commodity markets, irrespective of their length. 
Figure 3.2: Commodity Price Indexes and Change in World GDP per Capita 1971–2009  
 
            Data Source: UNCTAD (2009, 2010), Figure created and arranged by the author. 
                                                 
33
 World GDP and world GDP per capita correlated at 98.4% between 1971 and 2009. 
34
 Annual growth compound rate = ((Reference year t / Base yearn)(1/(t-n))-1); Base year is 2000.  
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The recent commodity super cycle, from 2001 to 2008, was driven by buoyant 
global economic growth in developed economies, and supported by the strong economic 
and industrial growth in developing countries.  
 
Change in Commodity Price Indexes and Change in World GDP per Capita 
Correlation 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the change rates of the UNCTAD commodity price indexes 
in comparison with the change rate of world GDP per capita. The correlation between 
the change rates of commodity price indexes and the change rate of world GDP per 
capita from 1971 to 2009 is high, with a high degree of significance, except for the 
tropical beverages price index as Table 3.8 illustrates. 
Figure 3.3: Change in Commodity Price Indexes and Change in World GDP per Capita 1971–2009 
 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2009, 2010), Figure created and arranged by the author. 
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Correlation 1971 - 2009 
Table 3.8: Correlation — Change in Commodity Price Indexes and Change in World GDP per 
Capita 1971–2009 
1971-2009 FoodIx TropBevIx VegOilSeedsIx AgriRawIx MinMetalsIx CrudeIx 
W. GDPpCap .684** 0.158 .589** .703** .773** .727** 
**Significant at 0.01. Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The rising degree of global trade integration increased the correlation not only 
among commodity price index composites but also between commodity prices indexes 
(except VegOilSeedsIx) and world GDP per capita. Table 3.9 reflects on these increased 
correlation coefficients.  
 
Correlation 1996 - 2009 
Table 3.9: Correlation — Change in Commodity Price Indexes and Change in World GDP per 
Capita 1996–2009 
1996-2009 FoodIx TropBevIx VegOilSeedsIx AgriRawIx MinMetalsIx CrudeIx 
W. GDPpCap .752* 0.112 0.417 .710* .744* .874** 
*Significant at .05. **Significant at .01. Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The correlation coefficient between the change in crude, which is widely 
accepted as leading indicator for global economic activity, and world GDP per capita 
was 72.7% between 1971 and 2009. Between 1996 and 2008 the correlation coefficient 
of crude and world GDP per capita rose to 87.4%. 
 
Granger Causality 
Table 3.10 illustrates the Granger causal relationship of changes in global GDP 
per capita and changes in commodity price indexes. The null hypothesis H0 states that 
GDP per capita is not affected by changes in the crude index. The first Granger test of 
world GDP per capita and the change in crude price index suggests that world GDP per 
capita is not affected by the change of the crude price index. P-value is 0.0622, which 
leads to non-rejection of the null. The null hypothesis of the second Granger test states 
that the crude price index is not affected by changes in GDP per capita. A p-value of 
0.0038 (<0.05, 0.05 = p-value threshold) allows the rejection of the null (H0); that is, it 
is statistically safe to say that changes in world GDP per capita Granger cause the 
change in crude price index, and not vice versa.  
Table 3.10 also illustrates the results of the Granger causality tests for changes 
in world GDP per capita and commodity price indexes. Granger causality applies to 
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changes in food prices, changes in crude prices and changes in minerals and metals 
prices (borderline case with Granger 2 test, p-value at 0.0621). The results of Granger 
tests on changes of the vegetables, oils, and seed price index, the tropical beverages 
price index, and the agricultural raw materials price index are somewhat ambiguous. 
However, the moderately high, high, and very high correlations of commodity price 
indexes (except TropBevIx) at significance levels of 0.01 with the crude price index as 
shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 (Pearson Correlation Commodity Price Matrix 1971–2009, 
1996-2008) support the suggestion that world GDP per capita Granger causes changes 
of each of these commodity indexes, except for the tropical beverage price index. In 
borderline cases in which the p-value is slightly above the 0.05 threshold (such as 
0.0621 for MinMetalsIx, or 0.0752 for VegOilSeedsIx) the null hypothesis for Granger 
2 may be rejected. The tropical beverage price index is the only UNCTAD commodity 
price index without Granger causality in either direction and with a low correlation to 
oil prices (CrudeIx).  
Table 3.10: Granger Causality — Change in Commodity Price Indexes and Change in World GDP 
per Capita 1971–2009 
Test  Group 1 Variables Group 2 Variables DF Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
1 World GDP per capita FoodIx 1 9.83 0.0017 
2  FoodIx World GDP per capita 1 11.43 0.0007 
Test Group 1 Variables Group 2 Variables DF Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
1 World GDP per capita TropBevIx 1 0.14 0.7089 
2  TropBevIx World GDP per capita 1 0.31 0.5777 
Test Group 1 Variables Group 2 Variables DF Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
1 World GDP per capita VegOilSeedIx 1 7.43 0.00640 
2  VegOilSeedIx World GDP per capita 1 3.17 0.0752 
Test Group 1 Variables Group 2 Variables DF Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
1 World GDP per capita MinMetalsIx 1 1.90 0.1678 
2  MinMetalsIx World GDP per capita 1 3.48 0.0621 
Test Group 1 Variables Group 2 Variables DF Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
1 World GDP per capita AgriRawIx 1 5.56 0.0184 
2  AgriRawIx World GDP per capita 1 1.87 0.1718 
Test Group 1 Variables Group 2 Variables DF Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
1 World GDP per capita CrudeIx 1 3.48 0.0622 
2  CrudeIx World GDP per capita 1 8.37        0.0038 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author.  
Changes in commodity prices fluctuate with changes in global GDP per capita. 
As shown above, there exist significant Granger causalities between the changes in 
world GDP per capita and the changes in commodity price indexes between 1971 and 
2009. That is, world GDP per capita drives variations in the crude index, food price 
index, minerals and metals index, and vegetables, oils, and seeds index. 
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In Chapter 4, I examine such causality from a regional view for Brazil and 
China. Specifically, I examine the Granger causality effects of commodity price 
changes on macroeconomic variables in the emerging economies of Brazil and China.35 
In Chapter 4, I also examine inverse Granger causalities for Brazil and China to assess 
the effects when macroeconomic variables (inversely) Granger cause global commodity 
prices due to economic expansion. 
 
3.3.3.4 Commodity Price Indexes and China’s GDP 
As established in the previous sections, commodity prices tend to move in cycles 
correlating with changes in global aggregate demand. As shown before, changes in 
world GDP per capita cause changes in the majority of commodity price indexes 
between 1971 and 2009 with a fairly high correlation. Also, as seen in Table 3.9, 
correlations between GDP per capita and commodity price indexes rose significantly 
when considering the period between 1996 and 2008. 
It is commonly presumed that China’s expansion is one of the main drivers of 
commodity price changes since the early 2000s, affecting prices of oil, metals, and soft 
commodities — hence the catchphrase ‘China moves markets’ (Wittner, 2010; Girault, 
2010). As seen in Chapter 2, China's imports of soft commodities, energy commodities, 
and minerals and metals represent a significant share of global imports of these 
commodities. Also, as shown in Chapter 2, China’s GDP relative to global GDP grew 
dramatically between 1990 and 2009. In comparison, Brazil’s GDP was fairly volatile 
in the low single percentages during the same period (Tables 2.1, 2.2: Brazil, China 
GDP Relative to World GDP). In this section I therefore briefly reflect only on China’s 
GDP causing changes in commodity price indexes. 
In order to establish a link to the previous sections in the context of the findings 
of Chapter 4 (e.g., on ‘China moves markets’), I first reveal the correlation effects 
between Chinese GDP change rates and change rates of commodity price indexes 
between 1971 and 2009. At this stage, I only analyze correlation effects between change 
rates of commodity prices and changes of China’s GDP per capita. I do not yet perform 
                                                 
35
 I specifically differentiate between the analysis of change rates of dependent variables (such as GDP 
growth rate) for which I create change rates of the respective independent variables, and the analysis of 
percentage shares of dependent variables (such as gross domestic savings to GDP) which I compare with 
the respective independent indexes.  
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Granger causality computations. Granger causality computations and the analysis of 
specific macroeconomic variables (e.g., GDP per capita) with commodity prices will be 
discussed in the context of the multiple regression analysis in Chapter 4 and the 
econometric analysis in Chapter 5.  
Figure 3.4: Changes in Commodity Price Indexes and China GDP Growth Rate 1971–2009  
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    Data Source: UNCTAD (2009, 2010), World Bank (2009, 2010), Figure created and arranged by the author.  
China’s GDP change rate, i.e., growth rate (in red), does not reveal any 
significant signs of positive correlation with any of the six aggregated UNCTAD 
commodity price indexes between 1971 and 2009, as shown by Figure 3.4.  
Table 3.11 below provides the correlation coefficients for Figure 3.4 above. 
Based on the data I can say that between 1971 and 2009 there exists no significant 
correlation between China’s GDP growth rate and changes in commodity prices.  
Table 3.11: Correlation of Changes in Commodity Price Indexes and China GDP Growth Rate 
1971– 2009 
1971-2009 FoodIx TropBevIx VegOilSeedsIx AgriRawIx MinMetalsIx CrudeIx 
China GDP_ gr -0.041 -0.165 0.149 -0.115 0.093 -0.344* 
*Significant at .05. Source: Calculated and arranged by the author.  
The correlation analysis in Table 3.11 supports the notion that there is no 
conclusive correlation associated with the rather cyclical rise of China’s GDP and 
commodity prices between 1971 and 2009. However, the picture changes dramatically 
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when analyzing the period between 1996 and 2008. The effects of China’s rising global 
GDP share on commodities are specifically observable during that shortened time span. 
Recall from Chapter 2 that China’s GDP share of global GDP grew substantially from 
3.2% in 1970 to 8.6% in 2009. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I provide significant findings 
related to China’s expansion and its effects on commodity prices.  
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3.4  Independent Variables Set 2: Governance Indexes  
3.4.1  Worldwide Governance Index 
3.4.1.1 Data Source 
Overview 
Governance architecture covers a myriad of complex socioeconomic 
dimensions, such as political stability, government effectiveness, business freedom, and 
the degree of democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, 2010 p. 16). Many 
aspects of the relationship between good governance and national prosperity are still 
poorly understood and may vary across countries. In addition, governance indexes 
remain a relatively new empirical research area. For example, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s research indicates that levels of democracy and prosperity are 
interdependent, with inconclusive causality effects however. 
Rigobon and Rodrik (2005, p. 5) go a step further and argue that democracy and 
rule of law have a positive effect on economic performance. Moreover, in their 
interrelationship study they found that trade openness measured by trade to GDP is 
adversely affecting democracy levels. However, with the example of Brazil in Chapters 
4 and 5 I show that trade openness actually positively affects levels of democracy 
(WGIVA); trade openness is not only highly correlating with the World Bank’s voice 
and accountability index (WGIVA, i.e., democracy index) but also Granger causing it. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I perform empirical and econometric analyses of correlation 
and causality associations between the various governance indicators and the 79 
macroeconomic variables of Brazil and China. 
 
Data Source 
The worldwide governance indexes (WGI) are published by the World Bank, its 
worldwide governance project is a relatively new area of research. The annual 
governance data encompasses six composite WGI indexes dating back to 1996 that are 
publicly and freely available on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicator 
website (2009).  
The worldwide governance project includes approximately 440 governance 
variables from more than 30 different organizations and sources, including (1) 
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commercial business information providers such as Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence and The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008, 2010), (2) surveys of firms and 
households such as the Gallup World Poll and the World Competitiveness Yearbook, 
(3) nongovernmental organizations such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and 
Reporters Without Borders, and (4) public-sector data providers such as the Asian 
Development Bank and the OECD Development Center (The World Bank, 2010a, 
2010b). Appendix 3.9 provides an overview of the definitions of each WGI governance 
dimension. And Appendix 3.10 provides an overview of the data sources used by the 
worldwide governance project.  
 
3.4.1.2 Data Methodology  
The composite WGI indexes form an aggregate of individual governance 
indicators for 212 countries, with scores ranging between –2.5 index points and +2.5 
index points (or points), where –2.5 represents the worst level of governance and +2.5 
the best. In addition, the data note the percentile rank of different countries on 
governance, indicating the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below any focal 
country. The higher the value the better the governance level of that dimension. The 
overall rankings of Brazil and China are hence not only affected by their own 
governance levels, but also by the shifting governance levels of other countries. Because 
my goal is to compare Brazil to China, I do not analyze the percentile rank of both 
countries. Instead, I focus on the range score between -2.5 and +2.5. 
The following brief description summarizes the six WGI governance dimensions 
based on the definition and formulation by the World Bank (2010a, 2010c):  
(1) Voice and Accountability (WGIVA): According to the WGI methodology, the 
governance indicator for voice and accountability considers the level of democracy in a 
country including freedom of expression, freedom of association, free media, as well as 
the ability of citizens to participate in selecting their country’s government.  
(2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence (WGIPS): The probability or 
likelihood that a government may be destabilized, undermined, or thrown off through 
unconstitutional and/or violent actions and activities, including political and 
nonpolitical violence or terrorism. 
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(3) Government Effectiveness (WGIGE): The government’s policy formulation 
quality, provision of public services, the capacity of its civil service offerings and the 
civil service’s independence from political pressures. Also, WGIGE examines the 
implementation and credibility of the government's commitment to its policies. 
(4) Regulatory Quality (WGIRQ): A government’s competence and ability to provide, 
implement, and operate sound policies and regulations to promote and support private-
sector development and improvement. 
(5) Rule of Law (WGIRL): The extent to which citizens, organizations, parties, and 
other agents abide by and are confident in the rule of law of a country or nation, 
including the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the executive force 
(police), and the judicial and legislative systems. The rule of law measure refers 
specifically to the likelihood of crime and violence. 
(6) Control of Corruption (WGICC): The perception of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as manipulating or corrupting/seizing the state by elites and private interest 
groups. 
The WGI indexes are aggregated, weighted averages of primary data material 
used by the worldwide governance project (World Bank, 2010a, 2010c). The weights 
represent the accuracy of each individual data source; the method that underlies this 
weighted average aggregation is the unobserved component model. This model predicts 
that any monitored correlation between two measures of a specific governance 
dimension results from their common, unobserved signal of the specific governance 
dimension. Therefore, data sources that are more correlated grant more information 
reliability to a specific governance dimension, which translates into a greater weight for 
the data source. A fuller description of this model has been published by the World 
Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2009), which also provides the data from all 
underlying sources to calculate an individual indicator. To compare indicators over time 
and across countries it is necessary to rescale the individual ratings from 0 (low) to 1 
(high). Confidence levels can be selected interactively at 50%, 75%, 90%, and 95%. For 
this study, I selected a confidence level of 95% (probability of 95% that governance 
index levels are within the indicated range). The worldwide governance project does not 
offer data points for 1997, 1999, or 2001. To close this data gap, I created a new data 
point by averaging the preceding and the following yearly data points.  
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3.4.1.3 Data Series  
3.4.1.3.1 Summary View: Brazil and China 
The multiple regression analysis in Chapter 4 includes data from 1996 to 2008. 
Due to metric distortions the quantitative analysis excludes data points for the year 
2009, which was negatively impacted by the global financial crisis unfolding at the end 
of 2008. Nevertheless, Figure 3.5 includes 2009 data for information purposes only to 
provide a comparative overview of Brazil’s and China’s governance levels between 
1996 and 2009.36 
Figure 3.5: Worldwide Governance Indexes Summary — Brazil versus China 
Brazil’s individual governance indexes, unlike China’s, displayed wide swings 
since 1996.  Regulatory quality for example deteriorated notably after 1996, despite the 
hike in 2007, and rule of law improved from –0.45 in 2005 to –0.2 in 2009, recovering 
somewhat after having dropped from –0.18 in 1996. Overall, Brazil’s general 
governance climate improved significantly after 2007.  
China’s governance framework developed in a less volatile way. China’s 
governance dimensions are mostly in negative territory and oscillate between –0.5 and 
0.0, except for WGIVA, which consistently remains near the –1.5 mark.  
                                                 
36
 The following WGI figures are based on World Bank (2010c) governance indicators. All figures have 
been created and arranged by the author. World Bank governance data is being updated on a regular basis. 
Therefore, data displayed in this thesis and data online may slightly differ. 
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The following sections compare each individual governance index of Brazil and 
China between 1996 and 2009. The regression analysis in Chapter 4 incorporates data 
series from 1996 and 2008 only. 
 
3.4.1.3.2 Voice and Accountability  
Figure 3.6: WGI Voice and Accountability 
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           Data Source: World Bank (2010c). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
 
BRAZIL 
 Brazil’s transition from military rule to democracy effectively began in the mid-
1980s. Since then Brazil's democratic transformation has been impressive. Today it is a 
democratic republic with a presidential system. The president is directly elected by the 
people and serves as both head of state and head of government. Members of the 
executive and legislative branches are directly elected. The voice and accountability 
governance index thus has been improving from 0.18 points in 1996 to 0.51 points in 
2009 — an impressive improvement of 183%. The positive trend is mainly attributable 
to growing political awareness and an improved culture of political debate among 
Brazil’s citizenry and political parties.  
The Brazilian constitution guarantees unrestricted freedom of opinion, assembly, 
and association rights — rights generally respected by the government. Freedom of 
press and media, which often catalyze political investigations and uncover political 
scandals, is non-restrictive and generally respected. Yet, despite the media’s vigorous 
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reporting style, media ownership is highly concentrated and information is often biased 
by powerful special interest groups (BTI, 2008b, p. 7).  
The political participation of citizens grew especially under the Lula 
administration, which institutionalized direct consultations with a vast number of civil 
society organizations that represented various interest groups, e.g., such as labor, 
women’s rights, environmentalists, ethnic minorities, and so on. The establishment of 
councils on municipal, regional, and state levels is an important democratic factor for 
establishing effective public policies.  
However, the degree of democracy decreases from the South of Brazil to its 
North, where powerful landlords tend to control and own local judiciaries and police, 
who in recent history responded violently to agrarian reform movements, for example.  
 
CHINA 
 In the case of China, the voice and accountability index has generally been at a 
very low level, oscillating around the –1.5 mark, with some improvements in the late 
1990s but then again deteriorating since 2000. Thus, in stark contrast to Brazil’s 
improved level of democracy, China’s very low degree of democracy is illustrated by a 
governance index as low as –1.72 in 2007. China’s democratic landscape has not 
effectively changed in the past 14 years: It remains an autocratic system with limited 
opportunities for citizens to engage in political activities that have not been previously 
approved by the ruling Communist Party (CCP). Freedom of expression is severely 
limited. The media are controlled by state organs or state-owned companies. Journalists 
who cover sensitive and controversial issues such as human rights or criticize the CCP 
suffer harassment or much worse. To further restrict press freedoms, new legislation in 
2006 allowed government to punish and fine media units that ran independent reports 
on public issues. In September 2006, the Chinese government also released new 
restrictions that granted the government-owned Xinhua News Agency control over 
network and information distribution within China. Foreign agencies are censored by 
Xinhua when the topics relate to national unity or social stability. Internet restrictions 
are also severe. Critical websites and chat rooms have been shut down, access to foreign 
websites is controlled, and the e-mail correspondence of political activists is monitored. 
According to Reporters Without Borders (2009), China has jailed more journalists than 
any other state, and it ranks 168 out of 175 countries on its press freedom index (Brazil 
  
118 
is ranked 71). In 2010, China dropped to rank 171 out of 178, while Brazil improved to 
rank 58 (Reporters without Borders, 2010).   
Freedom of religion is somewhat recognized; the CCP officially recognizes but 
also strictly controls the main five religions, namely Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam. Questions about the legitimacy of the CCP and eroding 
traditional family values that have arisen during China’s rapid economic and social 
development have led to a spiritual vacuum, as a response to which many Chinese 
citizens searching for spiritual guidance have created a revival of Buddhism and 
Confucianism. The CCP is allowing such forms of spiritual guidance, which so far have 
not had political implications (BTI, 2008c, pp. 8-12, 10-16). 
At the central level of state, there are no democratic institutions. The judiciary is 
not independent. It is institutionally differentiated, but there is a significant lack of 
judicial independence because judges’ decisions must be vetted and approved by the 
courts’ CCP committees (U.S. Department of State, 2011c). The outlook for 
democratization remains bleak; CCP leadership appears completely unprepared to share 
power with other political actors and consistently rejects Western models of pluralist 
democracy.  
However, China’s large population, geographic size, and social diversity make 
effective autocratic rule from Beijing difficult. Central leaders increasingly work to 
build consensus for new policies among party members, local and regional leaders, 
influential non-party members, and the population at large (US Department of State, 
2011b). Although consultative Leninism is meant to preempt democratization (Tsang, 
2010, pp. 3-7), the implementation and acceptance of this model involves specific 
changes that are common to democratization processes, such as expanding good 
governance practices, granting a wider scope for civil liberties, and permitting political 
participation.  
The most important general elections in China are not those for the National 
People’s Congress but for the Communist Party’s national congress (Tsang, 2010, pp. 3-
7). In periods of greater economic openness Chinese entrepreneurs and citizens outside 
the formal structure of the CCP gained increased influence, especially in rapidly 
developing coastal regions. Yet, the CCP still aims to maintain its influence in all key 
government, economic, and cultural institutions, which might explain why the intensity 
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of the CCP’s control is very high in coastal areas and relatively softer in rural areas, 
where the majority of Chinese people live (Tsang, 2010, pp. 10-14). 
 
3.4.1.3.3 Political Stability  
Figure 3.7: WGI Political Stability 
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            Data Source: World Bank (2010c). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
 
The political stability and absence of violence index (WGIPS) observes the 
likelihood that governments may be destabilized, undermined or thrown off through 
coup d’etats, non-constitutional actions and/or military activities, including political and 
non-political related motivated violence or terrorism. 
 
BRAZIL 
From 1964 to 1985, Brazil was governed by military regimes. They left behind 
fewer victims than the dictatorships in neighboring countries such as Argentina and 
Chile, where some 300 and 10,000 people, respectively, were murdered.  
Recall that Brazil’s military government introduced its gradual democratic 
transformation in the mid-1980s. Worldwide governance data are available only since 
1996, so no direct comparison is possible between the decades before with those after 
1996. However, due to the military’s influence and the nature of Brazil’s governments 
prior to the 1990s, it is sensible to assume that political stability has improved 
significantly in the past two decades.  
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Yet, Brazil’s political stability index between 1996 and 2009 is still 
characterized by high volatility, with notable recent improvements. For example, the 
period from 2007 to 2009 was marked by significant democratic political debate and 
participation prior to the federal elections in October 2010. These elections were 
required by law because President da Silva’s (Lula) second four-year term had ended. 
Constitutional restrictions prevented da Silva from running for a third presidential term. 
A run-off election led to the appointment of Brazil’s first female president, Dilma 
Rousseff, who effectively controls both the military and police forces. Brazil thus has 
underscored its strengthening political democratic culture and stability among its peers 
in Latin America. In conclusion, Brazil’s political landscape and people’s participation 
developed to the better compared to its entire history.  
 
CHINA 
In contrast, China’s political stability index displays lower volatility but also a 
consistently negative trend, deteriorating from –0.35 points in 1996 to –0.44 points in 
2009. Its dictatorial government maintained the grip on political power by further 
limiting freedom of speech, free press, and citizen engagement in political anti-
government activities. The CCP’s power is still absolute. These restrictions seemingly 
fuel the threat of a violent collective upraising of citizens. In recent years a growing 
number of public uprisings have been recorded, threatening the political stability 
measured by WGIPS.37 Accordingly, the very recent history of violent events such as 
concerted attacks on police stations or government buildings is partly reflected in the 
deteriorating WGIPS for China. 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Examples include violent protests in the provinces of Urumqui, sporadic uprisings in Tibet, and 
economic protests —some of which grew very violent— in industrial centers, demanding judicial justice, 
the elimination of police brutality, and laws to address political bribery.  
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3.4.1.3.4 Government Effectiveness 
Figure 3.8: WGI Government Effectiveness 
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             Data Source: World Bank (2010c). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
The WGI of government effectiveness (WGIGE) includes both policy 
formulation and public service provision quality. It thus captures the capabilities of the 
government’s civil service offerings and the civil service’s independence from political 
pressures. However, this latter measure plays no role for China’s WGIGE because there 
is no independence of federal and state service providers from the government. In 
comparison with China, Brazil’s WGIGE improved significantly from –0.24 in 1996 to 
0.08 in 2009. China’s index gained slightly from 0.04 to 0.12 in the same period, after 
absorbing a drastic deterioration of its WGIGE from 1996 to 1998. Both countries’ 
indexes improved despite high volatility.  
 
BRAZIL 
The federal government’s organizational capabilities in Brazil are limited by 
virtue of constitutional provisions regarding federalism, where it is curtailed by the 
significant autonomy of the individual states and municipalities (BTI, 2008b, p. 20). 
The government’s success in implementing large-scale reform policies or fiscal growth 
plans, such as the Plano De Aceleração Do Crescimento (PAC), have been mediocre at 
best due largely to the conflicting interests and differing policy goals of the ruling 
parties, as well as due to a fragmented political system with a very large number of 
parties (BTI, 2008b, p. 20). In addition, the governmental decision making process is 
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susceptible to political tensions as exemplified by the corruption scandals in 2005 and 
2006 that dominated the political scene and public debates until 2007. This development 
is reflected by the relative decline of WGIGE between 2003 and 2009.  
 
CHINA 
All of China’s policies are formulated and steered centrally. Despite political 
barriers on the federal, state, or municipal levels, the effectiveness of economic policies 
improved somewhat starting in 2006 when the CCP introduced its 11th Five-Year Plan, 
aimed at strengthening China’s domestic consumption. The latter stood at 34.8% of 
GDP in 2006, increasing to 36.8% in 2008, which was still lower than the 2000 high of 
46.7%. Thus, the plan aimed to establish a more sustainable domestic growth 
framework to lift the heavy reliance on export-led growth, which is reflected by the high 
trade to GDP ratio of 70.5% in 2006 (Bank of East Asia, 2010). Since then 
environmental regulations have been introduced, energy prices have been liberalized, 
and export rebates have been trimmed further. In addition, China’s government 
produced a 15% appreciation of its national currency, the Renminbi (RMB), from 
RMB/USD 7.97 in 2006 to RMB/USD 6.83 in 2009 in an effort to curb exports. Yet, 
the ratio of household final consumption expenditures to GDP also increased from 
34.8% in 2006 to 36.8% in 2008. The financial crisis caused this ratio to drop to 34.0% 
in 2009. The trade to GDP ratio started dropping from 70.5% in 2006 to 62.1% in 2008 
and then to an astounding 47.1% in 2009.  
Despite rising production costs and wages, China’s global share of exports as a 
percentage of world exports increased from 7.25% (2.8%) in 2005 (1995) to 9.68% in 
2009 (Table 2.7: Export Structure China 1995-2009), compared with Brazil’s 
percentages (Table 2.6: Export Structure Brazil 1995-2009) of 1.13% (0.90%) in 2005 
(1996), up to 1.23% in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010). China’s ratio of exports to world 
exports grew despite its currency appreciation, higher wages, and the competition of 
low cost producers from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Bangladesh. It thus appears that 
China’s exporters have gradually adjusted to rising costs. According to China’s 12th 
Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), a key target is the continuous increase in China’s share in 
the ratio of final consumption to GDP, from 45.8% in 2009 to 55% in 2015 (Bank of 
East Asia, 2010). A stronger RMB would support this goal by lowering the price of 
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imports and increasing final household consumption, in addition to inducing strong 
wage growth. 
These measurable effects of the CCP’s policy implementation proved the 
government’s ability to execute some policies effectively using various instruments, 
such as (1) increasing the minimum wage in July 2009, (2) intervening/managing the 
RMB/USD FX rate as seen in the past, and (3) granting access for foreign investors to 
mainland stock exchanges to fuel stock market driven wealth in conjunction with 
currency appreciation and thereby strengthening the growth of domestic consumption.38 
Nonetheless, in many areas resources are still not used efficiently.  
However, overall efficiency levels of public services and the judiciary are still 
heavily restricted by corruption and embezzlement. A lack of public oversight means 
nepotism and arbitrary behavior on virtually all levels of federal, state, and municipal 
government, undermining effective and efficient management and control. Another 
serious issue is the conflict of interests between state and municipal levels due to their 
conflicting policy objectives and interests. The national government’s recent efforts to 
control GDP growth counteracts the incentive structures of local officials, who 
participate directly in ensuring high economic growth rates in their municipalities. 
Local officials even tend to thwart national policies by fueling excess development in 
their localities, undermining the centrally planned, controlled, and sustained growth 
path. Freedom of speech and free media remain the missing catalysts to uncover 
corruption and its detrimental effects on government effectiveness.  
 
 
                                                 
38
 On January 18, 2011, the Chinese government announced that it would open mainland stock markets 
(Shanghai and Shenzhen) and grant access for international investors, potentially leading to the 
appreciation of the RMB. 
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3.4.1.3.5 Regulatory Quality  
Figure 3.9: WGI Regulatory Quality 
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            Data Source: World Bank (2010c). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
Regulatory quality (WGIRQ) pertains to the government’s competence and 
ability to provide, implement, and operate sound policies and regulations to promote 
and support private-sector development and improvements. Both Brazil and China 
recorded overall declines in WGIRQ, from 0.36 to 0.18 index points and from 0.195 to 
–0.2 index points, respectively. Both countries also experienced deterioration with the 
exceptions of two brief hikes, when the index reversed trends in 2002 and 2007 for 
China and Brazil, respectively.  
 
BRAZIL  
Brazil’s WGIRQ decline has taken longer than China’s, and reversed only in 
2007. Reform projects in the judicial, educational, and agrarian arenas showed limited 
progress in President Lula’s first term. Reforms to electoral and party legislation, a 
precondition for efficient governing in Brazil, were pushed back. The trend reversal in 
2007 is largely the result of Lula’s achievements in improving the regulatory framework 
in his second four-year term, which started on January 2007. Lula pledged faster 
economic growth and a stronger focus on developing Brazil’s educational system by 
improving Brazil’s regulatory environment.  
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CHINA 
In comparison to Brazil, the CCP’s regulatory focus is mainly on 
macroeconomic stability and economic development. Macroeconomic stability demands 
monetary and administrative actions to prevent the economy from overheating. 
Monetary measures, such as setting reserve requirements or interest rates, are 
implemented stringently. The success of administrative measures such as investment 
guidelines and policies for municipalities depend to a large extent on the support of 
local governments. Local governments at times oppose the implementation of the 
CCP’s policies, whether to support their personal gains or because of their corruption, 
which disables the development of an effective regulatory framework.  
Furthermore, despite strengthening its legal framework since joining the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), China’s intellectual property and related laws (e.g., 
trademark, copyright, patent) are difficult to enforce. Despite stronger statutory 
protections, China continues to harbor one of the highest rates of product, brand and 
copy right piracy in the world.  
 
3.4.1.3.6 Rule of Law 
Figure 3.10: WGI Rule of Law 
 
              Data Source: World Bank (2010c). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
The rule of law (WGIRL) measures the extent to which citizens, organizations, 
groups, and firms are confident in the rules of law, such as contract enforcement and 
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property rights, as well as the fairness of the police, the judicial system, and the 
legislative system.  
Strikingly, Brazil and China follow similar patterns between 1996 and 2009. The 
correlation of WGIRL between Brazil and China is moderately high at 66.3%.39 Both 
countries’ starting points are relatively similar, at –0.18 points for Brazil and –0.202 
points for China. The index deteriorates for both countries, reaching a nadir of –0.45 for 
Brazil in 2005 and –0.52 for China in 2006. Whereas Brazil’s WGIRL reverses 
impressively to increase to –0.18 in 2009 (levels of 1996), China’s WGIRL remains flat 
after it reached –0.33 in 2009. Overall, Brazil’s WGIRL index did not improve between 
1996 and 2009, whereas China’s even deteriorated. 
 
BRAZIL 
The judiciary system in Brazil is institutionally well differentiated and generally 
free from unconstitutional interference by social interest groups or governmental 
institutions. In theory, human rights are guaranteed by the constitution, and the 
separation of powers is warranted by mutual checks and balances. In practice though the 
Brazilian judiciary system is overstretched and overburdened. Access to judicial organs 
and legal counsel is unequal and heavily skewed to wealthier segments of society. 
Extreme inequalities concerning access to the Brazilian law and court system, which is 
burdened by procedural and technical complications, restrict the availability of legal 
support to all citizens. Furthermore, the prosecution of human rights abuses tends to 
depend on the socioeconomic context. Capital crimes and drug-related violence 
correlate highly with the firearms-related death rate. Brazil has one of the highest 
homicide rates in the world. In 2003 its homicide rate stood at 33.1 per 100,000 
inhabitants, in 2005 at 29.2 per 100,000, declining to 22.0 per 100,000 in 2008 
(UNODC, 2011). In comparison, China’s was at 1.2 per 100,000 in 2007 according to 
China’s Statistic Buero.40 Furthermore, Brazil’s prison system is chaotic, overcrowded, 
and nearly anarchic. Brazilians generally feel that their human rights and personal safety 
are not well secured. 
 
                                                 
39
 High significance at 0.01 (performed with PASW).   
40
 In comparison, Germany’s homicide rate was at 0.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008. UNODC’s 
homicide rates for China are based on data from the China Statistic Buero.  
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CHINA 
In theory, China’s system of checks and balances subordinates political actors 
and state powers to the law. In practice however, the constitutional framework does not 
recognize a system based on separation of powers, nor is the judicial system 
independent, but subject to influence from local officials. Rule of law in China is 
perceived to be highly arbitrary. The government maintains absolute power in all 
socioeconomic and political realms. The CCP takes superiority over the constitution and 
is consequently incontestable in its decisions. Court decisions must be approved and 
vetted by various layers of CCP committees. Judges are appointed by local People’s 
Congresses and paid by local governments, which implies widespread political 
interference with judicial decisions. Law enforcement is politically influenced and 
serves to protect the interests of the party, local governments, and local party officials. 
To a certain extent law enforcement acts as a local and regional form of control by local 
authorities. Chinese official data compiled by UNODC (2011) suggests that China’s 
homicide rate ranks among the lowest globally. Nonetheless, judicial corruption also is 
common, leading to skewed law enforcement activities. Fewer lawyers take on civil or 
human rights cases, which further curbs citizens’ already restricted opportunities to seek 
judicial protections against rights violations. 
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3.4.1.3.7 Control of Corruption  
Figure 3.11: WGI Control of Corruption 
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              Data Source: World Bank (2010c). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
The WGICC measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as 
well as the risk of manipulating or corrupting/seizing the state by elites and private 
interest groups. 
Brazil’s and China’s WGICC indexes began at similar levels (–0.25 and –0.202, 
respectively), but whereas Brazil has managed to improve its index to neutrality, 
China’s index widened the gap, closing at –0.53 in 2009.  
 
BRAZIL 
The improved index for Brazil prior to 2003 is the result of perceived 
progression with regard to anti-corruption governance. However, such progress came to 
a severe halt in 2004 and 2005 due to the corruption scandals that rocked the Lula 
administration. Particularly disastrous was the year 2005, when it became increasingly 
evident that the ruling Workers Party (PT) was not only using illegal funds to finance 
political campaigns but also bribing allies in congress to win support. The corruption 
scandal caused the most serious political crisis Brazil had seen in years, and it 
significantly undermined the ruling Workers Party credibility and ethical aspirations in 
2005 and 2006 —notions that had been its key points of differentiation from other 
parties in previous elections.  
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In general, increased media coverage about corruption made voters increasingly 
aware of and educated about corruption. Anti-corruption governance mechanisms had 
been publicly supported by the government but offered medium effectiveness at best. 
For example, the Fiscal Responsibility Act in theory ensures scrutiny and transparency 
into political actors and their fiscal performance, but in practice it lacks control 
effectiveness.  
 
CHINA 
In comparison with Brazil, China’s control of corruption index has significantly 
weakened since it was first measured in 1996. In China corruption is punishable by law. 
However, theory and practice are worlds apart. The CCP’s anti-corruption efforts have 
proven partially successful at low, small levels, whereas large-scale corruption remains 
an increasingly serious concern. At higher political levels corrupt officials are often 
shielded from punishment, except for a few showcases that attract extensive media 
coverage and reinforce the image that the government is committed to eradicating 
corruption. Corruption is rampant in both government agencies and among the ruling 
bodies of the CCP, which perpetuates the steady decline of China’s scores in this index.   
In comparison to the deteriorating WGI control of corruption index, EFI’s 
corruption index on China, which is primarily based on Transparency International’s 
corruption perception index, improved from 21.6 in 1996 to 36.0 in 2009. That is, 
compared to the EFI index, the corruption index of the WGI deteriorates between 1996 
and 2009. This is due to differences in the data generation; the WGI index is a 
composite index and based on a larger number of data providers. From a quantitative 
point of view, both EFI’s and WGI’s corruption indexes are very low, suggesting that 
corruption remains a major issue in mainland China irrespective of either index's trend 
lines. Nonetheless, the trend line of EFI’s and WGI's corruption index will play a role in 
the correlation and causality analysis in Chapter 4 and 5.  
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3.4.2 The Economic Freedom Index  
3.4.2.1 Data Source 
Overview 
 The economic freedom index (EFI) is provided by the Heritage Foundation, 
based in Washington DC (Heritage Foundation, 2009). The data is freely and publicly 
available. Published annually by the Heritage Foundation, the current EFI —e.g., the 
EFI of 2009— is based on data compiled from the prior year —e.g., 2008. In this thesis 
the annual EFI data for a respective year is based on the data compiled for the same year 
in order to maintain annual data comparability with the WGI indexes, the commodity 
price indexes and the macroeconomic variables.    
 
Data Source 
The EFI measures a country's governance in the context of ten different 
dimensions such as property rights, freedom from government regulation, and trade. 
Some elements of these economic freedom dimensions measure the extent of an 
economy’s openness to global investment or trade and are hence external in nature. 
However, the majority of the governance dimensions is internal and measures for 
example the liberty of a country’s citizens to conduct business without being limited by 
any government interference. 
EFI governance indexes provide a good complement to the WGI indexes —
which the latter are based on governance data from up to 31 independent providers— 
for several reasons. The EFI evaluates a wider range and more specific topics of 
economic freedom dimensions in the private sector. While WGI considers six 
dimensions of governance, EFI covers ten (this study analyzes only nine of them). The 
EFI labor freedom dimension has been added only very recently (in 2005), whereas all 
other EFI dimensions date back to 1996. Therefore, I do not include EFI labor freedom 
(dimension # 10) in the analysis.  
The Heritage Foundation’s EFI indexes are assembled into four main 
classifications which include (i) rule of law (property rights index, freedom from 
corruption index. Recall, the WGI differentiates specifically between the rule of law 
index (WGIRL) and the corruption index (WGICC)), (ii) government activity (fiscal 
freedom index, government spending index), (iii) regulatory efficiency (business 
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freedom index, labor freedom, monetary freedom index), and (iv) free markets (trade 
freedom index, investment freedom index, financial freedom index) (Heritage 
Foundation, 2011c). 
In some cases the EFI also uses external data sources in addition to internal data 
sources to generate its annual governance indexes. External sources include, but are not 
limited to, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Eurostat, the 
World Bank’s Macroeconomic Data Catalog, the World Bank’s Doing Business Study, 
the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, and the US Department of Commerce (Heritage Foundation, 2011a).  
 
3.4.2.2 Data Methodology 
The ten individual EFI economic freedom dimensions are measured on a scale of 
0 to 100, with 100 as the best score. Each governance dimension score is based on 
multiple factors and weighted equally. A country's overall economic freedom score is a 
simple average of its scores of the individual freedom dimensions. Recall that for my 
study the overall economic freedom score is measured on the basis of the nine 
individual freedom indexes described below. In order to provide an inclusive view on 
all EFI dimensions, this Section 3.4.2.2 also includes labor freedom for descriptive 
purposes; however EFI labor freedom will not be part of the empirical and econometric 
analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Please note that very few of the EFI’s components of 
economic freedom indexes are themselves composites of supplementary quantifiable 
data measures (Heritage Foundation, 2011b), as detailed in the following sections.  
The economic freedom indexes are summarized and illustrated below and based 
on the definition and formulation by the Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation, 
2009, 2010, 2011a): 
(1) Business Freedom is a quantitative measure that examines the ability to start, 
operate, and close a business. It characterizes the overall regulatory burden and 
regulatory efficiency of the government. The Heritage Foundation bases business 
freedom on ten equally weighted factors: (i) starting a business, number of procedures; 
(ii) starting a business, time in days; (iii) starting a business, cost (% of income per 
capita); (iv) starting a business, minimum capital requirement (% of income per capita); 
(v) obtaining a license, procedures (number); (vi) obtaining a license, time (days); (vii) 
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obtaining a license, cost (% of income per capita); (viii) closing a business, time (years), 
(ix) closing a business, cost (% of estate), and (x) closing a business, recovery rate 
(cents on the dollar).  
(2) Trade Freedom reflects the openness of an economy to imports of goods and 
services and exports from/to around the world and the ability of citizens to interact 
freely as buyers and sellers in international marketplaces. This composite index 
measures the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of 
goods and services. The index is based on two scores: the trade-weighted average tariff 
rate and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The NTBs exert a penalty of 0 to 20 points, based 
on quantity (i.e., import quotas, export limitations), price, regulatory (i.e., licensing), 
investment (foreign exchange controls), and customs restrictions, as well as direct 
government intervention (i.e., subsidies and other aid, government industrial policy).  
(3) Fiscal Freedom: This measure involves the extent to which citizens of a country 
and its businesses may keep and control their income and wealth stock for their own 
good and benefit. Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden imposed by the 
government and includes the direct top tax burden for individuals and corporations, as 
well as the overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.  
(4) Government Size/Spending considers the level of government expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP. This index is nonlinear. Government spending close to 0 receives 
low penalties whereas levels of government spending that exceed 30% of GDP receive 
lower scores, according to the following quadratic measurement:  
GEi = 100 – α (Expendituresi)2 
GEi represents country’s i expenditure score. Expendituresi represents the total amount 
of government spending at all levels as a portion of GDP (between 0 and 100%), and α 
is a coefficient to control for variation among scores.41 The burden of disproportionate 
government spending creates a critical economic freedom issue related to the need to 
generate revenue and spending. To a certain extent government spending involves 
capital expenditures, such as investments in infrastructure, funding for research and 
development, or education spending. Government spending entails a potentially 
significant crowding out effect and opportunity costs that rival the value of private 
                                                 
41
 Set at 0.03. For more details please see Heritage Foundation (2011b). 
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investment and private consumption which would have materialized if the resources had 
been left in the private sector.  
(5) Monetary Freedom measures the stability of a currency and market-determined 
prices, basing the score on the weighted average inflation rate for the most recent three 
years and price controls. The latter is a detriment, such that it can lead to the subtraction 
of up to 20 points from the base score.  
(6) Investment Freedom evaluates a myriad of restrictions that may be imposed on 
investment. The ideal score of 100 points drops by 25, 15, or 5 points depending on the 
severity (high, medium, low) of specific restrictions in a country’s investment system. 
Investment restrictions include but are not limited to the national treatment of foreign 
investment, restrictions on landownership, foreign exchange controls, capital controls, 
and sectoral investment restrictions.   
(7) Financial Freedom: This measure evaluates five areas: (i) the extent of government 
regulation of financial services, (ii) the degree of state intervention in banks and other 
financial firms through direct and indirect ownership, (iii) the extent of financial and 
capital market development, (iv) the government influence on the allocation of credit, 
and (v) the openness to foreign competition. Deductions to the index depend on the 
degree of government influence, ranging from repressive (–100 points) to negligible 
influence (0 points).   
(8) Property Rights: The degree of property rights measures the ability of a country’s 
inhabitants to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are entirely 
enforceable. The more secure and stable a legal system is for protecting property, the 
higher the score. When private property is guaranteed by the state and its laws, the score 
is 100, whereas a state without private property rights receives 0 points.  
(9) Freedom from Corruption: The Heritage Foundation derives and rescales its 
freedom of corruption index on the basis of Transparency’s International’s corruption 
perception index, which rates the degree of corruption on a scale from 0 to 10 points. A 
score of 0 (10) indicates the highest (lowest) degree of corruption.  
(10) Labor Freedom (not part of the analyses in Chapters 3, 4, and 5): Finally, labor 
freedom is measured according to various characteristics of the legal and regulatory 
framework of a country’s labor market. The Heritage Foundation uses six equally 
weighted quantitative factors: (i) the ratio of minimum wage to the average value added 
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per worker, (ii) restrictions on hiring employees, (iii) rigidity of hours, (iv) restricted 
hire and fire mentality, (v) legally mandated notice period, and (vi) mandatory 
severance pay. 
 
3.4.2.3 Data Series  
3.4.2.3.1 Summary View: Brazil and China 
Figure 3.12: Economic Freedom Indexes — Brazil versus China 
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Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009) and Heritage Foundation (2010). Figures created and arranged by the author.42 
The economic freedom indexes (EFI) of Brazil and China draw a less conclusive 
picture than —in direct comparison— the world governance indexes (WGI) of Brazil 
and China do. The EFI instead show a relatively mixed picture. Compared to China, 
Brazil fares better on investment freedom, financial freedom, and property rights. China 
fares better on government size. In the context of business freedom, trade freedom, 
fiscal freedom, monetary freedom, and freedom from corruption, both maintain 
relatively similar governance levels. However, Brazil significantly deteriorated in 
several governance dimensions since 2003, such that it is now only slightly better or at 
par with China. Brazil’s business freedom dropped from 70.0 points in 1996 to 54.5 
points in 2009, and its fiscal freedom dropped from 88.3 points to 68.4 in the same 
period. 
A sound financial and investment freedom framework and dependable property 
rights consist of various interdependent pillars. Institutionalized rules, accepted policies, 
                                                 
42
 The Heritage Foundation updates its data on a regular basis. Therefore, the data displayed in this study 
and the data online may slightly differ.  
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capital and reserve requirements, the enforcement of rights and contractual obligations, 
independent regulatory organs with a competitive market — all of these are conditiones 
sine quibus non for high degrees of financial and investment freedom and property 
rights. In financial and investment markets, the development of a high degree of 
financial and investment freedom together with strong property rights represents a 
challenging and long-winded process that demands considerable political determination 
and regulatory efforts. This complexity is clearly conveyed by the rigid, relatively 
constant shifts in the financial freedom, investment freedom, and property rights 
indexes for both Brazil and China. From a statistical analysis perspective, the flat and 
relatively rigid development of these indexes is of limited usage for correlation and 
causality tests (Chapter 4). However, they do offer some insights for a comparative 
analysis. 
 
3.4.2.3.2 Business Freedom  
Figure 3.13: EFI Business Freedom 
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             Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009), Heritage Foundation (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
Compared with other EFI indexes, the business freedom index for Brazil and 
China exhibits a less volatile development between 1996 and 2005. The reason for this 
is the apparently constant level of business governance as a result of a relatively rigid 
private sector framework, which does not allow for down- or up-ticks in Brazil’s and 
China’s business governance index. 
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BRAZIL 
The country’s industrialization model in the 1970s and 1980s was based on a 
principled market economy, emphasizing private ownership and private property. Yet, 
the government remained closely involved in economic activities. For example, the 
national development plan instituted by the Geisel administration (in its second term in 
1975–1979) had at its core a government-driven economic expansion, including capital 
expenditures in the steel and petrochemical sectors as well as investments in 
transportation, communication, and hydropower industries, designed as import 
substitution strategies. Thus, for decades Brazil’s economic infrastructure was 
dominated by state-owned companies and state-driven activities. This picture changed 
with the gradual transition toward democracy in the 1990s and demands for necessary 
fiscal adjustments in the mid-1990s, which led to a rapid privatization of state-owned 
firms and a strong shift towards a private sector framework.  
As a result, the business freedom profile of Brazil between 1996 and 2009 
changed for the better compared with the periods prior to 1996. Due to data restrictions, 
I can only analyze the period between 1996 and 2009 in this section.  
In Brazil the EFI business freedom index stays at a constant 70.0 points from 
1996 to 2005, reflecting the significantly improved business framework prior to 1996; 
then it drops to 53.5 points and stabilizes at 54.5 points in 2009. The drop from 70.0 to 
54.5 points between 2004 and 2009 is due to the following factors: 
 As mentioned before, Brazil’s economy is characterized by free market 
competition, a result of the strong constitutional support for the private sector and its 
activities through the 1994 Competition Act. Thus, Brazil has established a consistent 
anti-monopoly and anti-cartel framework to strengthen its market-based economy. In 
2004, Brazil’s congress approved a bankruptcy law, and in 2006 an antitrust law was 
sent to congress. The pricing framework in the private sector is mainly free of 
restrictions, and Brazil’s currency has been freely convertible since 1999. 
Yet, Brazil’s relatively stable private-sector framework is undermined by its 
informal sector, which generated approximately 40% of Brazil’s GDP in 2009 (Global 
Insight, 2009). Brazil’s overburdened regulatory environment does not help either. The 
growing informal sector, which is a result of a number of weaknesses, such as 
difficulties in obtaining financing and high interest rates, poses serious threats to fiscal 
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stability and a strong private sector because it creates massive foregone tax revenues 
and asymmetric competitive landscapes. This rather weak regulatory environment, 
which is also reflected by the deteriorating WGIRQ between 1996 and 2009, continues 
to deter the country’s private sector. According to the International Finance 
Corporation’s Doing Business Report (IFC, 2010, pp. 110-114), Brazil ranks only 129th 
out of 183 countries for ease of doing business (the lower the rank, the better). For 
example, in Brazil it takes 120 days to obtain a business license compared with the 
world average of 35 days.  
 
CHINA 
In 2010 China ranked 151 in the IFC’s Doing Business Report (IFC, 2010, pp. 
110-114). Although it only takes about 37 days to open a business in China, its overall 
starting/obtaining a business license rank is 151 of 183 (cf. 129 for Brazil), partially due 
to China’s very high minimum capital requirement threshold of 131% of income per 
capita (Brazil’s requirement threshold: 0%). Overall business freedom in China is 
heavily restricted by its detrimental regulatory environment, suffering from a lack of 
legal and regulatory clarity.  
Even though the CCP has managed to transform its state-controlled economic 
framework into a semi market-based economic framework during the past 20 years, 
serious issues that hinder continuous private sector development remain. To put 
business freedom in Brazil and China into perspective it is necessary to consider the 
gradual transition of China’s economy from a command- to a market-based model. In 
particular, the successful de-collectivization of rural farming and addition of partially 
market-based activities helped produce agricultural surpluses, which defined the initial 
stage of the market transition process in the late 1970s. This stage established a basic 
consumer marketplace. As the command-driven economy was progressively dismantled 
to set the stage for market pricing, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had to adhere to 
market-oriented and commercial practices, which meant the demise of the pure plan 
economy (i.e., soft budget setting, planned price levels, and hierarchical fulfillment).  
The gradual transition between 1979 and 1993 also was fueled by a dual track 
pricing system that allowed suppliers to sell at market prices after they reached their 
production plan fulfillment, creating incentives for hard budgets led by profit, contracts, 
and market prices (Naughton, 2007, pp. 91-95). Price controls still exist, mainly for 
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food and energy, but less than one-tenth of consumer goods and agricultural products 
remain under a price control regime. Industrial goods, especially energy-intensive 
products, experience more intensive price controls; they have an estimated share of 10% 
of all industrial products. 
The second wave of market transition reforms began in the mid-1990s and 
increased government attention to SOEs and their improvement in terms of governance 
and profit delivery. As natural competitors of townships and village enterprises (TVEs), 
SOEs had to adjust to a more competitive environment. Between 1978 and 1996 output 
by collectives and TVEs increased from 23% (TVEs only: 9%) to 36% (TVEs only: 
28%) of GDP; output by SOE declined from 77% to 33% in the same period (Naughton, 
2007, p. 300). The remainder of the production came from collective non-TVEs, such as 
private or foreign firms.  
Despite these improvements, China's economy is far from a market-based 
system. Since 1996 it has emerged as a so-called tripod economy, incorporating state-
owned firms, collective enterprises, and private firms.43 Further liberalization is needed 
to ensure the continued reformation of China’s relatively narrow and basic financial 
system, which remains dominated by state-owned banks. Limited financing options are 
a significant barrier for many private firms, which are ready to progress along the value 
chain from low cost, labor-intensive to high technology and capital-intensive activities.  
The transition process since the 1990s has led to the rapid decline in the number 
of SOEs, from 120,000 to 31,750 (Naughton, 2007, pp. 303, 313), which has also meant 
vast layoffs of employees from the public sector. These employees —including 
privately employed and self-employed citizens, rural migrant labor, and former SOE 
employees— have moved to the informal sector, leading to tremendous employment 
levels. Estimates suggest that the informal sector grew from 48 million to almost 160 
million between 1990 and 2004. In comparison, the urban formal sector shrank from 
                                                 
43
 The increased public offerings of SOEs must be put in context with the government’s objective to 
prepare former SOEs for successful transition into a market-based economy. Joint stock companies such 
as Sinopec and PetroChina, which are majority state-owned and listed on the Shanghai stock exchange, 
dominate China’s exchanges in share circulation and market capitalization. Stock market listings support 
initial market-based oversight systems, which ultimately may lead to better corporate governance (also 
referred to as the Anglo American system; Naughton, 2007, p. 320). In addition, stock listed SOEs 
provide more organizational autonomy, independence, de-politicization, and a stronger focus on profit 
maximization in comparison to traditional, non-stock listed SOEs. However, improving governance and 
its implementation takes time, especially considering that the majority owners of all joint stock SOEs are 
government agencies.  
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150 million in 1996 to 105.5 million in 2003, reflecting the demise in SOEs (Naughton, 
2007, pp. 189-191).  
Even though the CCP continuously refines and reshapes China’s economic 
framework by introducing new rules and requirements to grant privately held companies 
access to sectors that previously were dominated and controlled by SOEs (e.g., utilities, 
financial sector, defense), the implementation of the CCP’s policies is frequently 
undermined by local governments’ protectionist behavior, which can not only interfere 
with but even oppose central decisions, such that they favor SOEs, from which their 
local governments benefit directly.  
Local governments’ opposition to centrally planned austerity policies, as 
discussed previously in the context of the WGI governance effectiveness index, also 
hampers the CCP’s attempts to counterbalance China’s overheated economy. This 
situation has resulted in significant over-investment in industries such as steel, cement, 
and real estate, leading to ill-guided investments and poorly performing loan ratios for 
state-owned banks and finance corporations. According to official Chinese data the loan 
loss ratio to total loans peaked at 29.8% in 2001, declining to 26% and 20.4% only two 
years later and then declining gradually even further to 2.4% in 2008. 44  To 
counterbalance local governments’ reluctance to support austerity policies, the CCP is 
increasingly using reserve requirements for banks, raising interest rates, and, more 
recently, imposing environmental requirements to curtail the overheating.  
In light of the above and despite the recent deterioration, China’s degree of 
business freedom improved dramatically during the last four decades. However, there 
exists significant room for improvement.  
                                                 
44
 The drastic decline in loan loss ratios is in large parts the result of outsourcing distressed loans to 
government-owned asset management companies (AMC), which absorbed a significant portion of under-
performing loans from the big four state-owned banks (for more details please see the section on financial 
freedom).   
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3.4.2.3.3 Trade Freedom 
Figure 3.14: EFI Trade Freedom  
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           Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009), Heritage Foundation (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
Both Brazil’s and China’s EFI trade freedom indexes have developed favorably 
over the analysis period. Among all governance indexes, trade indexes for both 
countries improved the most. China’s EFI trade freedom index displays a more 
aggressive development though, from 30.0 points in 1996 to 72.2 points in 2009, 
compared with Brazil’s development from 57.0 to 69.2 points over the same period. As 
of 2009, EFI’s trade freedom index ranks Brazil and China almost at par, with China 
showing a slightly higher value. 
 
BRAZIL 
In comparison with China, Brazil has been liberalizing its economy for longer 
and with a greater degree of intensity. In comparison with China’s economy, which 
started as a command economy in the 1940s, Brazil’s economic model has moved from 
an import-substitution model to a more trade-related, external sector–oriented model, 
which helped solidify Brazil’s manufacturing export base in recent decades. Brazil has 
been traditionally relatively quick to establish inclusive trade liberalization programs 
with strong unilateral and regional components. In roughly seven years, Brazil 
introduced three reforms that slashed tariffs and removed non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In 
the first reform in 1988, reductions in tariffs reduced the weighted average of tariffs 
from nearly 60% in 1987 to approximately 43% in 1988. With the 1989 reform, the 
weighted average of tariffs declined even further to 33%. Finally, the third reform 
between 1991 and 1993 continued to slash tariffs, leading to a reduction of weighted 
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average of tariffs to 13% according to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(2011). However, this initial momentum in trade liberalization slowed in the mid-1990s 
due to unfavorable macroeconomic and international trends. At the turn of the century, 
favorable macroeconomic policies were put in place by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
Brazil’s 34th president. In addition, Brazil began to enjoy the benefits of the commodity 
super cycle in the early 2000s.  
Despite initial concerns about the new government lead by President Da Silva in 
2003, actual political changes did not lead to a noteworthy economic policy reversal. 
Brazil’s weighted average tariff continued to drop, reaching 6.7% in 2008 —a new all-
time low.45 Brazil’s simple average tariff, which includes tariffs for all traded products 
(including exports) declined from 15.1% to 13.1% between 1996 and 2008.  
From 1996 to 2009, Brazil’s trade to GDP ratio improved from 14.9% to 26.1%, 
supported by global demand for Brazilian commodities and flanked by supportive trade 
tariffs and export programs. Unlike China, which is still very reliant on exports, the 
financial crisis had only a minimal effect on Brazil’s trade to GDP ratio, judging by the 
slight decline from 27.41% in 2008 to 26.12% in 2009.   
 
CHINA 
Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, foreign trade restrictions have 
been continuously loosened. This accession was granted in December 2001 in return for 
China’s acceptance of regulatory changes that would allow it to blend into the global 
trade framework. Trade reforms and commitments to reduce tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers as well as trading rights were crucial to China’s participation in the global 
trading system and established long-standing trends. Trade reforms and commitments to 
reduce tariffs and NTBs were crucial prerequisites of China’s entry into the global 
trading system. The WTO-imposed reforms materialized over a 15-year period, 
including substantial tariff reductions and the elimination of most NTBs. Trade 
intervention by authorities also declined. In addition, import barriers, such as most 
favored nation tariffs and duty rates, were reduced together with the elimination of 
import quotas and trading rights (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004, pp. 3-7). Overall, the 
weighted average of tariffs declined from 32% in 1992 to 6.5% in 2003 and then to 
                                                 
45
 Weighted average applied tariff is the average of effectively applied rates weighted by the product 
import shares corresponding to each partner country according to the World Bank Group.  
  
142 
3.9% in 2008. The simple average of tariffs, including all tariffs for all traded products, 
declined from 37.1% to 8.6% during the same period. In light of this favorable tariff 
development, China’s trade to GDP ratio improved from 38.1% to 62.1% during 1996 
to 2008. 
 
3.4.2.3.4 Fiscal Freedom 
 Both, Brazil and China, receive relatively high marks for fiscal governance.  
Figure 3.15: EFI Fiscal Freedom 
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            Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009) and Heritage Foundation (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
 
BRAZIL 
Brazil’s fiscal freedom index developed relatively flatly and at high levels, at 
approximately 90 points between 1996 and 2004. Then from 2004 to 2006 it dropped to 
the 70 points mark and maintained this level until 2009.  
The presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luis Inácio da Silva 
managed to gain investor confidence through reducing external vulnerabilities to high 
debt levels and by maintaining a prudent fiscal policy toward government spending.  
Brazil’s highest marginal individual income tax rate between 2003 and 2009 was 
27.5%, 17.5% lower than China’s. The highest marginal corporate tax rate between 
2001 and 2009 was 34%, while China’s was 25% in 2008 and 2009. Nevertheless, 
Brazil’s fiscal metrics have developed in favorable directions since 1996.  
 The ratio of external debt stocks to gross national income (Variable 65: 
ExtDebtST_GNI), which in 1996 stood at 21.9%, deteriorated to 42.97% in 1999, and 
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then improved steadily to 16.2% in 2009. Total foreign reserves in USD as a ratio of 
total external debt (Variable 69: TTRes_TTExtDbt) improved significantly from 32.9% 
to 75.8% in the same period, and the interest rate spread (Variable 62: IRSSpread) 
diminished from 53.8% in 1997 to 35.59% in 2009.  
As a result of the successful implementation of the Real Plan and its positive 
effects on Brazil’s debt structure, investor confidence improved. As of 2008, Brazil’s 
debt structure changed significantly compared with 1995, when approximately 60% of 
all foreign debt was supplied by commercial banks, 10% by supplier credit lines, 5% by 
bond investors, and the remainder by supranational entities. By 2008, the debt structure 
indicated 60% international bondholders, and commercial bank’s exposures declined to 
approximately 10%, though the other figures were relatively unchanged. 
In recent years the Brazilian government has thus demonstrated impressive fiscal 
credibility by improving its public debt management. A significant achievement of 
Lula’s administration was the instruction of a tax reform package in 2003 that reduced 
tax rates from 44 items to only five, reduced sales and production tax rates, shifted 
gradually from production oriented to consumption oriented tax rates and transformed 
the temporary capital transaction tax into a permanent version thereof. Another key 
element was the modification of Brazil's bankruptcy law, which originally favored 
workers above tax authorities and creditors. The new law put creditors in a higher 
position, before payments to workers, which represented a major step in the effort to 
expand credit offered by banks to the private sector. Yet, even with these improvements, 
taxes on profits and capital gains deteriorated after 2003, increasing from 28.4% in 2006 
to 31.3% in 2008 according to data from the World Bank (2009, 2010). These values, 
together with a relatively high marginal income tax, led to the deterioration of the fiscal 
freedom index since 2003 when President Lula first assumed office.  
Rapid privatization programs in the mid-1990s, which increased government 
revenues from USD2 billion p.a. (1985) to more than USD35 billion p.a. in 1995 (Baer, 
2008, pp. 140-144), favored a private sector framework. 46  In comparison, Lula’s 
administration emphasized a conditional framework that would benefit people with 
lower income levels. The core dilemma was how to retain a good socio-economic 
                                                 
46 Careful privatization attempts became already visible at the end of the 1970s when a fiscally 
unsustainable position led to attempts to control state expansion by privatizing state owned firms with the 
help of the newly created Special Secretariat for the Control of State Enterprise (SEST) (Baer, 2008, p. 
226).  
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balance in the context of a macro-economic policy that would be sufficiently orthodox 
to gain acceptance by international capital markets.  
Figure 3.16: Credit Default Swaps of Brazil and China 2004–2010 
 
  Source: Bloomberg (2011d). 
Lula’s administration adopted a two-pronged approach: First win the confidence 
of financial markets and then pursue socio-economic balance. Nonetheless, the orthodox 
policies ultimately may not be compatible with a significant switch to socio-economic 
policies if the tax, business freedom, and financial freedom scenarios have not yet 
reached maturity, as is still the case for Brazil.  
Also, despite its orthodox policies the Lula administration increased non-
discretionary spending to counter low growth in the early 2000s instead of focusing on 
investments in infrastructure (which were low), education, or private-sector capacity. 
This choice curtailed opportunities for strong future growth rates. 
Nonetheless, Brazil’s continuous GDP growth in the context of its strengthening, 
free-floating currency, and in that of an improving macroeconomic framework have led 
to significant improvements in 5-years credit default swap (CDS) levels between mid-
2004 and 2010, dropping from 460 basis points to approximately 100 basis points.47 
 
                                                 
47
 Not taking into consideration the time period of financial stress during the unfolding of the global 
financial crisis at the end of 2008.  
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CHINA 
China’s fiscal freedom index developed relatively flatly, too, oscillating around 
the 70 points line between 1996 and 2009. During that period there has been no 
significant adverse or unfavorable development in China’s fiscal policies that would 
warrant a significant adjustment in its fiscal freedom index according to the Heritage 
Foundation (2011a) chart line. China’s highest individual marginal income tax rate 
remained at 45% from 2003 until 2009 (World Bank, 2009, 2010). Its highest corporate 
marginal tax rate was 33% between 2003 and 2007 and then dropped to 25% in 2008/ 
2009. Also, China promotes new technology by issuing lower tax rates to firms in high-
tech sectors, as low as 15%. The data from 2007 show that taxes on income, profits, and 
capital gains of revenue were 16.4% and taxes on GDP were 9.9%.  
China’s comparative advantage through its low labor costs, together with its 
export-dependent economy, led to some unprecedented favorable developments in its 
fiscal metrics. Total foreign reserves in USD as a ratio to total external debt stocks 
improved from 86.7% in 1996 to 519.8% in 2008. External debt stocks to GNI 
improved from 15.3% to 8.7% in the same period. Interest rate spreads remained 
relatively volatile, fluctuating between 260 and 360 basis points.  
As Figure 3.16 above shows, China’s 5-year credit default swap level highly 
correlate with Brazil’s, though at lower level than Brazil’s, due to the capital markets' 
perception that China offers greater macroeconomic stability through the size of its 
economy, large foreign currency reserves —USD2.4trillion in 2009— in combination 
with rapid growth and a fixed foreign exchange rate.48 
 
                                                 
48
 This assessment is based on the author’s practical experience in New York in context of CDS trading 
with counterparties domiciled in New York, São Paulo, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
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3.4.2.3.5 Government Size 
Figure 3.17: EFI Government Size 
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            Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009), Heritage Foundation (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
The EFI Government size index considers the level of government expenditures 
as a percentage of GDP. Both countries’ government size indexes were relatively high 
at the start of the analysis period. In 1996 Brazil’s index measured 80.8 points, 
compared with 95.39 points for China. Since then both indexes have declined steadily. 
However, while China’s government size index declined from 95.39 points in 1996 to 
88.1 points in 2009 (-7.6%), Brazil’s government size index declined at a much faster 
rate, falling from 80.8 index points in 1996 to 50.3 index points in 2009, a decline of 
38%. 
 
BRAZIL 
Between 1996 and 2009 Brazil’s general government final consumption 
expenditures to GDP measure (Variable 14: GovFinConExp_GDP) stood at a relatively 
moderate level of 20%, with the highest level of 20.64% in 1998 and the lowest of 
19.17% in 2000. In comparison, in 1980 government final consumption expenditure to 
GDP was at less than 10%. Also, the government’s efforts in expanding Brazil’s 
infrastructure through fiscal expansions have received high priority despite slow actual 
progress in context of the PAC program. The gradual deterioration of the government’s 
final consumption expenditures to GDP since 2002 reflects increased government 
spending under the Lula administration. 
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CHINA 
China’s general government final consumption expenditures as a ratio to GDP 
(Variable 14: GovFinConExp_GDP) were 14.0% in 1996, oscillating by 2% over the 
past decade before finally improving to 11.5% in 2009. In comparison with Brazil’s, 
China’s general government final expenditures such as transfer payments and 
consumption in GDP terms are low. In the most recent year central government 
spending equaled 19.9% of GDP according to official data provided by World Bank. 
The government’s involvement in various industrial sectors is a paramount factor in 
China’s economy, including the still relatively large number of SOEs. For example, the 
banking sector still hosts mainly majority state-owned enterprises such as Bank of 
China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of China, and 
China Construction Bank. The steel sector is also dominated by SOEs or firms in which 
the state maintains a significant share and runs a government monopoly. For example, 
Nanjing Iron & Steel United Co. Ltd. is 40% state owned, and the Jiangsu Shagan 
Group is fully state owned.49 China’s oil industry also is entirely owned by the state 
through China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China National Petroleum 
Corporation, and Petro China Company Limited, the stock-listed subsidiary of China 
National Petroleum Corporation. The transport sector is dominated by China Ocean 
Shipping Company and China Shipping Container Lines, both of which are held by the 
state. Yet, a first anti-monopoly law was enacted in August 2008 by the government in 
order to establish the framework for yet another privatization cycle.  
Therefore, given the size of the government’s current economic involvement in 
context to actual government spending, China’s high marks on EFIGovtS may be 
somewhat misleading.  
  
 
                                                 
49
 The Chinese government continues to maintain de facto control of many enterprises in various sectors. 
For example, the Jiangsu Shagan Group was established as a village enterprise (part of the TVE sector) in 
1975 and is now the largest private steel firm in China and overall the fourth largest steel firm in China. 
The ownership structure is a mix of the company’s labor union, CCP-related general management, and 
employees of the firm; all of which are controlled by the CCP (Price, A., Brightbill, T.C., Weld, C.B., 
Nance, D.S. (2007, pp. 1-7)). 
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3.4.2.3.6 Monetary Freedom 
Figure 3.18: EFI Monetary Freedom and Inflation 
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           Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009), Heritage Foundation (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
 
BRAZIL 
Brazil has a long history of hyperinflation caused by an array of correlating 
factors such as cost pass through, income compensation through indexation, and fiscally 
generated subsidized credit by the state to the private sector. In addition, Brazil’s 
monetary and fiscal governance problem has hinged on the dilemma of who can finance 
the government’s expansion. Historically, fiscal expansion strategies were financed 
through central bank funding, which increased inflation. Inflation levels thus reached 
extreme highs in the beginning of the 1990s and in 1994, peaking at 2,948% and 
2,076%, respectively.  
Austerity measures and rigid price controls in the context of the Real Plan 
developed by the Cardoso administration managed to contain inflation rates and 
stabilize Brazil’s monetary and fiscal position. The Real Plan was initially not based on 
targeting inflation but rather consisted of a mix of open economy policies, such as 
spending cuts of USD7 billion p.a., high interest rates, an exchange rate anchor, tax 
increases, and non-central bank deficit financing. Inflation targeting started later, in 
1999, after the devaluation of the Real.50 
                                                 
50
 Inflation bands are set at Banco Central Do Brazil’s internal COPOM (Meeting of the Monetary Policy 
Committee) meetings and regulated through resolution assemblies. For example, in 1999 upper and lower 
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The Real Plan was finally effective after various attempts. In 1995, inflation 
(Variable 59: Infltn) dropped to 66%. Two years later, inflation was at relatively 
acceptable levels of 6.9% and then improved further to 3.2% in 1998. 
Prudent fiscal policies and rigid monetary strategies had led to a relatively stable 
inflation rate, fluctuating between 3.6% and 8.5% until 2009, when it settled at 4.89%. 
The containment of high inflation rates since 1996/1997 have improved Brazil’s 
monetary freedom index accordingly.  
Compared with other South and Central American countries, Brazil’s Central 
Bank enjoys relatively high monetary independence. In addition, since 1995 Brazilian 
governments have consistently displayed a strong commitment to an inflation-targeting 
regime by synchronizing inflation and foreign exchange policies with other economic 
policy objectives. Although Brazil’s Central Bank lacks full operational authority, it is 
responsible for monitoring inflation target results and setting interest rates on a ten-day 
basis. Contained inflation thus helped the Central Bank to cut the primary interest rate 
from a peak of about 29% in December 1998 down to 19.75% in mid-2005, to 18.0% in 
January 2006, 15.75% in April 2006, and as low as 8.65% as of December 2009 (Banco 
Central Do Brazil, 2010a). Price controls play another essential part in Brazil’s anti-
inflation policies. Public services such as telecommunications, utilities, and 
transportation have been privatized, but regulatory agencies such as the National 
Petroleum Agency control wholesale prices for fuel, while the government controls 
airfares directly.  
The Brazilian Real was made fully convertible in January 1999. Since then it has 
experienced significant volatility swings, reaching a peak of BRL/USD 3.08 as a result 
of various factors, such as global volatility in commodity and equity markets, but also 
partially due to general investor unease as a result of the new PT administration lead by 
President Da Silva in 2003.  
 Since 2003 however, the currency has strengthened significantly against the 
USD improving even to BRL/USD 1.36 in mid-2007. This level reflects the prudent 
interest rate and monetary policy by Brazil’s government and Central Bank, as well as 
established investor confidence after the short prelude of the Real depreciation in 2003.  
                                                                                                                                               
bands were agreed at 6.0%-10.0% p.a. In 2004 the target range was set between 1.25% and 6.25%. Since 
then and projected until 2013, the target range is set at 2.5% to 6.5% (Banco Central Do Brazil, 2010b).  
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Figure 3.19: FX Rates and Inflation 
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          Data Source: World Bank (2009, 2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
The correlation between the BRL/USD foreign exchange rate and inflation from 
1996 to 2009 was 67%. Brazil’s emerging domestic economy, relatively low stock 
market valuation, and credible stability policies have attracted large investments from 
institutional investors, as well as fast money.51 At the time of writing, the BRL’s 52-
week range was BRL/USD 1.64–1.92.  
Control of inflation remains a critical monetary governance metric for Brazil’s 
economic and political stabilization. By containing chronically high inflation rates, the 
Brazilian government has fueled domestic and international investor confidence and 
thus spurred both internal consumption and net foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP 
levels (Variable 51: FDInet_GDP). The latter improved from 0.21% of GDP in 1990 to 
1.33% in 1996. It reached its peak in 2000 at 5.08%. In 2008, net FDI to GDP was 
2.75%, and then dropped to 1.65% in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis.  
 
CHINA 
The World Bank’s first inflation data on China dates from 1987 and shows a 
relatively volatile inflation regime, especially before 1996. However, China’s inflation 
levels (Variable 59: Infltn) were far from Brazil’s peak inflation levels in the beginning 
of the 1990s; China’s inflation highs prior to 1996 were 18.7% in 1988 and 24.2% in 
                                                 
51
 Fast money is a term used for hedge funds, asset managers and non-institutional investors that have the 
ability to quickly react and to move large amounts of cash and cash near liquidity into and out of specific 
regions and asset classes, such as emerging markets and/or commodity related assets.   
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1994. Since 1996, China’s inflation rate has been moderate, dropping from 8.3% in 
1996 to even slightly negative rates of -0.8%, -1.4%, -0.77%, and -0.7% in 1998, 1999, 
2002, and 2009, respectively. Inflation in 2008 was at 5.86% according to World Bank 
data. The government in China determines prices for energy and utilities as well as for 
pharmaceuticals, agricultural and other crucial products to restrain inflation pressures. 
Nonetheless, shares of price controlled products represent a small minority of overall 
products traded.  
During the analysis period from 1996 to 2008, China amassed a gigantic amount 
of foreign reserves through its exports: USD1.966 trillion in 2008, up from USD111 
billion in 1996. In 2009 total reserves climbed by 25% and reached a record of USD2.4 
trillion. China’s external balance of goods and services was USD17.5 billion in 1996 
and reached USD349 billion in 2008, then declined to USD261.8 billion in 2009 as a 
result of the global financial crisis. Despite partial price controls, inflation remains a 
pivotal problem in China, especially considering the reported growth of M2. The M2 to 
GDP ratio (Variable 60: M2_GDP) grew from 90.65% in 1996 to 159.38% in 2009, 
which indicates high inflation pressure despite the relatively low officially publicized 
numbers. 
China’s monetary policy entails a two-pronged strategy: targeting monetary 
supply through direct control measures to ensure economic growth, and controlling the 
exchange rate with the USD in order to maintain currency stability. The control of the 
monetary supply in order to meet implicit inflation targets (He and Wang, 2011, p. 10) 
relies on credit caps and bank reserve ratios in addition to indicative M2, fundraising 
and banking-system credit targets. Monetary instruments include the aforementioned 
bank reserve ratios, the open-market operations introduced in 2000 to control liquidity 
and monetary supply, and artificially set lending and deposit rates by the People’s Bank 
of China (He and Wang, 2011, p. 10). That is, China’s rates system consists of a dual-
track interest-rate system in which bank deposit interest rates and lending interest rates 
are regulated while rates for China’s money markets and bond markets are market-
determined. Bank deposit as well as bank lending rates are set as deposit-rate ceiling 
and as a lending-rate floor in order to control competition between banks which use the 
deposit and lending rate as competitive differentiators. Set lending and deposit rates also 
ensure a profitable, easier to control formal banking sector. Nonetheless, due to the fact 
that overall credit and loan supply is also controlled by the Peoples Bank of China, 
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lending rate floors are factually non-binding, as pointed out by He and Wang (2011, pp. 
7-10). The rate dual-track system is a market intervening practice, which is considered 
to be part of the transitioning process of China’s banking system, coherent and in 
harmony with China’s general economic transitioning process (He, Wang, 2011, p. 7ff).   
Generally, China has made significant progress in liberalizing its financial 
markets, including monetary freedom governance, since the early 1990s. China’s 
strategy to liberalize capital and monetary markets consists of a multi-step approach 
which includes the liberalization of, firstly, money and bond markets and, secondly, the 
deposit and lending sector (He and Wang, 2011, p. 35). This has been achieved to the 
extent that retail customers, firms and institutions were relatively free in 2008 compared 
to the early 1990s in choosing their financial institutions, which in return have now 
higher latitude to extend credit. 
Nonetheless, restrictions in rates, lending control mechanisms, regularly 
imposed changes in reserve requirements, as well as fixed foreign currency rates weigh 
on China’s degree of monetary freedom. To improve China’s final household 
consumption, the government accepted the risks of a short-term money driven 
overheating economy measured by high M2 to GDP growth rates since the mid-1990s 
and relatively high M2 to GDP levels since 2001, which also might explain the 
deterioration of its formerly improving monetary freedom governance index, from 
87.56 points in 2001 to 70.60 points in 2009.  
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3.4.2.3.7 Investment Freedom 
Figure 3.20: EFI Investment Freedom  
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             Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009) and Heritage Foundation (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
The EFI investment freedom indexes for Brazil and China display relatively 
rigid developments. Brazil’s index follows the 50-point line, dropping from 50 to 45 
points in 2009. China’s index drops from initially 50 points to 30 points in 2000 and 
then falls to 20 points in 2009. 
 
BRAZIL  
A key legal accomplishment in support of Brazilian foreign direct investments 
was the amendment to the 1988 Federal Constitution that removed investment 
restrictions in certain industries, such as oil, mining, and local gas services. The 
amendment also revoked provisions that distinguished between the definition of a 
Brazilian company and a Brazilian company of national capital.52 However, Brazil’s 50 
point score since 1996, and 45 points in 2009, recognize the still relatively regulated 
investment environment. Restrictions persist in industries such as nuclear energy, health 
services, media, and aerospace. In general, the investment bureaucracy is not 
transparent, complex, and filled with administrative layers, including corruption as an 
additional detriment.  
 
                                                 
52
 A Brazilian company of national capital is a firm controlled by Brazilian public entities or persons 
permanently residing or domiciled in Brazil (Tozzini et al, 2002).   
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CHINA 
China’s investment regime is also heavily burdened by regulatory requirements. 
Whereas in Brazil investment restrictions tend to have an administrative character, 
investors in China are confronted with a severe lack of regulatory transparency, ever 
changing regulatory rules, inconsistently enforced laws and regulations, fragile 
protections of intellectual property rights, and investment share limits in the context of 
establishing domestic companies. Corruption and protective policies for local firms 
represent significant legal contract risks. China’s foreign investment catalog specifies 
the industries that are eligible or restricted from foreign investment. Furthermore, 
foreign investors face restrictions and limitations on expatriating their profits or cash to 
holding companies outside China.53  
The rigidity of the EFI investment freedom indexes for both Brazil and China 
mean these data have limited applicability for the correlation and causality analysis in 
Chapter 4 due to its relatively static data series.   
 
                                                 
53
 This assessment is based on the author's first-hand experience in the context of distressed debt and debt 
to equity swap transactions at investment firms in Hong Kong with acquisition target companies 
domiciled in Singapore and subsidiaries across APAC, including mainland China (Guangdong and 
Shenzen).  
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3.4.2.3.8 Financial Freedom  
Brazil’s and China’s EFI financial freedom indexes describe straight lines at the 
50 mark for Brazil, with the exception of a drop to 40 points in 2006 and 2007, and at 
the 50 and the 30 mark (since 2000) for China. 
Figure 3.21: EFI Financial Freedom 
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         Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009) and Heritage Foundation (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author. 
 
BRAZIL 
High interest rates and the disappearance of inflation meant that loan losses for 
banks rose from 7% to 21% from 1993 to 1995 (Baer, 2008, p. 145). To fight the crisis, 
Brazil's government introduced several measures, including the Credit Guarantee Fund, 
which encouraged mergers & acquisitions in the banking sector to reduce state 
involvement and to strengthen market-based practices. Since the mid-1990s, Brazil’s 
banking sector and capital markets have developed well, characterized by a fairly high 
degree of diversification and competitiveness compared with other economies in Latin 
America. Local currency bond markets are deep and wide and relatively liquid. Brazil’s 
financial markets are internationally competitive and compatible with international 
standards, such as enforceability of collateral in public and private debt capital markets. 
The system of banking supervision is efficient, and bank internal risk rating engines and 
risk reporting systems are effective and efficient. Capital to assets ratios have developed 
with relative stability, between 9% in 2001 and 10% in 2008. The nonperforming loans 
to total gross loans ratio was 8.5% in 2000, then declined to 3.1% in 2008. In contrast to 
FDI, capital markets are fully accessible to all classes of domestic and foreign capital. 
The financial sector is sophisticated, and systemic risk is low. Brazil’s four largest 
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banks (Itau Unibanco, Santander Brazil, Banco De Brazil, and Banco Bradesco) 
accounted for more than 30% of total bank assets in the fourth quarter of 2010, with 
Tier I ratios of 15.7%, 23.4%, 14.3%, and 15.9%, respectively.54  
Although access to banking products and services for the poor has increased in 
recent years, small business owners still have limited opportunities for accessing 
finance options. Furthermore, real interest rates (Variable 63: RealIR) in Brazil are 
among the highest in the world: 38.0% in 2009, down from 78.8% in 1998, impeding 
access to credit for investment and curtailing small business endeavors. Thus, financial 
freedom marks for Brazil remain relatively low.       
 
CHINA 
The banking and financial systems prior to the 1990s were remarkably passive. 
Lending decisions were made mainly on the basis of political considerations. Large 
retail networks of state-owned banks and rural credit cooperatives provided the only 
credit opportunities; medium- to long-term loans or term notes were not part of lending 
practices. Lending prior to the 1990s was primarily shaped by short to medium term 
trade credit. China’s banking industry thus displayed a relatively low degree of market-
based commercial lending expertise, which may explain the high nonperforming loan 
ratios in the subsequent years during the transition to a more market-based economy.  
 
Bail Outs and Nonperforming Loans Ratio 
Financial and banking markets underwent heavy restructuring in the second half 
of the 1990s when the government established the People’s Bank of China (PBC) as a 
central bank, succeeded by the China Bank Regulatory Commission in 2003. The 
banking reform also included the establishment of nine regional branches of the PBC, in 
conjunction with its mandate of deploying monetary policy, which ultimately translated 
into more conservative lending practices for state-owned companies (Naughton, 2007, 
p. 103). Financial supervision gained traction through the creation of four asset 
management companies, which inherited nonperforming assets from the state-owned 
banks. Today, China displays all the pillars of a modern financial system, with the PBC 
                                                 
54
 Total market capitalization of these four banks was USD304.7 billion in October 2010, with Itau 
Unibanco at USD113.9 billion, Santander Brazil at USD55.1 billion, Banco Do Brazil at USD56.8 
billion, and Bradesco at USD78.9 billion (Citigroup, 2010, pp. 1-7).    
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setting the monetary policy and providing credit to commercial banks. Nonetheless, the 
banking market remains dominated by the big four state-owned commercial banks: 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), 
China Construction Bank (CCB), and Bank of China (BOC). In practice, political 
influence on banking markets in mainland China is still prevalent. 
In the wake of the transition in the late 1990s, tighter lending standards became 
common practice leading to the closure of many SOEs. By the end of 2002, the 
nonperforming loan ratio (NPL ratio) reached 40% (or RMB2.3 trillion) of all loans in 
the banking system, or approximately 19% of GDP (Naughton, 2007, p. 461). By 2005, 
15% of all loans in the banking system were NPL, equal to 6.7% of GDP (RMB1.2 
trillion). In an unprecedented rescue effort, the government issued bonds valued at 
RMB270 billion to alleviate the pressure on the big four after decades of ill-guided, 
politically motivated lending (Naughton, 2007, p. 462). Distressed loans of up to 
RMB1.4 trillion were carved out and contained in special purpose vehicles; asset 
management companies (AMC) were created quickly to manage the distressed and toxic 
portfolios. Debt-to-equity swaps on distressed loans required additional government 
cash infusions to recapitalize the big four, after which equity ratios started to rise.  
A second government-supported rescue effort in 2003 granted BOC and CCB 
additional cash injections of RMB373 billion (USD45 billion) after their significant 
write-offs of additional NPLs. Employee and branch reduction measures helped to 
stabilize the BOC and the CCB. Five years later in 2008, ABC received —for the first 
time— RMB158 billion (USD19 billion) from the government to stabilize and 
restructure its balance sheet. 
The creation of the AMCs, which acquired NPLs at face value, were an 
important financial innovation in China’s finance sector, promoting structured 
transactions such as debt-to-equity swaps and allowing for deeper and wider capital 
market developments, as well as promoting distressed debt expertise, which should have 
benefited lending practices in the long run. The emergence of AMCs thus is —
unintentionally— an integral part of the reformation of the banking system, which has 
displayed a more independent and profit-oriented lending governance since the end of 
the 1990s.  
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Narrow Capital Markets 
In comparison to Brazil, China’s capital markets are tightly controlled by the 
government, as reflected by China’s 30-point financial freedom index. China’s stock 
exchange system is relatively restrictive, consisting of A-shares, B-shares, H-shares, 
and Red-chip segments. The A- and B-shares are mainly denominated in RMB and 
traded at the Shanghai and Shenzhen (onshore) exchanges by local and selected 
international investors. H-shares and Red-chips instead are open to international 
investors and traded at the Hong Kong stock exchange (offshore). Red-chips represent 
companies headquartered in Hong Kong that operate in mainland China. H-shares 
instead are mainland Chinese firms that have obtained a license to list on the Hong 
Kong stock exchange. Due to their restrictive natures, the A- and B-share segments are 
far less liquid than the H- or Red-shares.  
Mainland bond markets work mainly with local currency, are narrow and 
relatively illiquid compared to bond markets in London and New York and are largely 
restricted to foreign investors. Equity markets have developed and gained depth, 
especially since the establishment of the exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzen. However, 
China's structured debt markets and structured equity markets remain in their infancy in 
terms of complexity and are nowhere near the complexity of the markets in London or 
New York. Club deals, project financing, international trading, and structured 
transactions in debt markets continue to be sourced and marketed mainly through 
international banks in Hong Kong or Singapore due to the lack of structuring 
knowledge, legal and collateral enforceability risks in mainland China. Therefore, the 
Chinese capital markets will likely remain Hong Kong–centric in the medium- to long-
term.55 
 
                                                 
55
 The market value of bonds listed in Shanghai was at USD720 billion in 2010, USD267 billion in 2009, 
USD263 billion in 2008, and USD246 billion in 2007. In comparison, the bond market size in Hong Kong 
was at USD62.8 billion, USD50.5 billion, USD53.4 billion, and USD54.9 billion respectively. In 
comparison, Bovespa’s market value of listed bonds was USD81.4 billion, USD74.8 billion, USD55.3 
billion, and USD65.5 billion during the same periods (World Federation of Exchanges 2011c). In 
contrast, equity market capitalization of Bovespa was at USD465 billion as of December 2008, dropping 
from USD1.1 trillion as of June 2008 due to the global financial crisis (BMF Bovespa, 2011). In 
December 2009 and 2010, Bovespa’s equity market capitalization stood at USD1.33 trillion and USD1.54 
trillion. Shanghai’s exchange (SSE) equity market capitalization was at USD1.4 trillion, USD2.7 trillion, 
and USD2.72 trillion in December 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. The Hang Seng’s equity market 
capitalization was at USD1.3 trillion, USD2.3 trillion, and USD2.7 trillion during the same periods, 
respectively; and just for relative comparison purposes: NYSE’s market capitalization stood at USD9.2 
trillion, USD11.8 trillion, and USD13.4 trillion in December 2008, 2009, and 2010 (World Federation of 
Exchanges, 2011c). 
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Restrictive Bank Lending 
Four of the six largest banks in China are government held. Privatization in the 
banking and financial sectors is not highly developed. The vast majority of non-bank 
financial institutions, such as life insurance, investment firms, and securities companies 
are also state-owned or controlled and managed by local governments. Generally, the 
banking system remains dominated by state banks, and the state-controlled banks have a 
bias against lending to private firms. As a result, private firms have to resort to saving 
or borrowing on the black market at very high interest rates. Credit supply is controlled 
by the government and primarily channeled to government-owned enterprises.  
 
Risk Management 
Risk management and internal controls in Chinese banks remain weak, as 
reflected by the low capital to assets ratios and large ratio of nonperforming loans to 
gross loans in recent years. Despite improvements observed by the end of the 1990s, 
risk management and internal controls in Chinese banks are also still soft. The capital to 
assets ratio improved slowly, from 3.8% in 2003 to 6.1% in 2008. Nonperforming loans 
to gross loans was estimated at a 50% peak. In 2000, this value fell to 22.4%, but 
climbed back to 29.8% in 2001. Since then, the ratio has improved to 20.4% in 2003, 
rising to 24% in 2008, according to the latest World Bank data. According to 
calculations from Garcia-Herrero, Gavila, and Santabarbara (2006, p. 309, pp. 357-360) 
the nonperforming loan amount in the Chinese financial system accumulated up to 
USD480bio in 2004, with many more NPL USD billions recorded between 2004 and 
2008. The restructuring plan for the Industrial Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in 
early 2005 alone demanded a financial support package from the government worth 
more than USD80 billion (Podpiera, 2006, pp. 7, 8-9). According to Podpiera (2006, p. 
11) the NPL amount between 2000 and 2004 tops USD 615billion56 (RMB 4.8trillion), 
even exceeding the estimates by Garcia-Herrero et al.  
Also, since joining the WTO, China has gradually removed market access 
restrictions for foreign banks, although they still account for no more than 2% of total 
bank assets. Until the end of 2010, China’s equity markets were accessible to only a 
very small group of selected foreign investors. In January 2011, China announced it 
                                                 
56
 Based on the foreign exchange rate of RMB/USD 7.8075 as of December, 2006.  
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would gradually liberalize equity markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen to allow foreign 
investor participation.57 
In conclusion, the Chinese government seeks to reduce local governmental 
involvement and improve accountability by adopting provisioning and capital 
requirements. The Banking Regulatory Commission is responsible for enforcing these 
measures, though Podpiera’s (2006, pp. 3-10, pp. 18-20) analysis of the period from 
1997 to 2004 is inconclusive about whether state-owned banks have significantly 
altered their credit risk pricing and adopted more selective and risk-averse lending 
practices. It appears that, despite their significant loan losses, state-owned banks 
continue to be driven mainly by funds availability instead of risk-and-reward practices. 
In conjunction with recapitalizing banks and implementing administrative controls to 
reduce investments in overheated sectors, the government is preparing state-owned 
banks for public listing. The Chinese Banking and Regulatory Commission are moving 
the sector toward international principles and market practices, though the rate of 
change is slow. Fundamental changes in the Chinese banking sector with respect to the 
behavior of state-owned banks will take time, even after major high-level reforms such 
as capital requirements and provisioning have been implemented. 
A sound financial freedom framework consists of various pillars. 
Institutionalized rules, policies, and requirements, such as capital and reserve 
requirements as well as independent regulatory organs and competitive markets, are 
utter necessities to achieve a high degree of financial freedom. In financial markets, the 
development of a high degree of financial freedom is a long, evolutionary process that 
requires considerable political and regulatory efforts. The rigid and static EFI financial 
freedom indexes for both, Brazil and China, conveys the complexity of creating a sound 
financial freedom framework. Thus, the financial freedom index offers limited insights 
for the econometric analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.   
 
                                                 
57
 The announced access to mainland stock markets may be a supportive measure for RMB appreciation, 
which may have a positive effect on import volume and value and ultimately potentially supporting 
domestic consumption —a declared target of the 12th Five-Year Plan for 2011-2015.   
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3.4.2.3.9 Property Rights  
Figure 3.22: EFI Property Rights 
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          Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009), (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author.  
The development of a dependable and sound regime of property rights is an 
evolutionary process that demands considerable political determination, regulatory 
resolve, and a firm judicial framework. Similar to the financial freedom and investment 
freedom indexes, the EFI property rights index indicates overall soundness from a 
holistic perspective rather than displaying single milestone achievements, which 
generally do not significantly change the overall status quo. The rigid and static 
property rights indexes for both Brazil and China thus offer limited usage for the 
correlation and causality analysis in Chapter 4. The EFI property rights indexes for 
Brazil and China are stable at 50 points and 30 to 20 points, respectively, indicating 
relatively inefficient and weak property rights, which are subject to political 
arbitrariness, at least for China.  
 
BRAZIL 
Property rights governance has seen meaningful developments since the 
beginning of the 1990s. Prior to 1990, Brazilian SOEs dominated nearly all economic 
sectors. The Collor Plan, named after Brazil’s first democratically elected President 
(1990 to 1992) after a long line of military rulers, aimed at fighting hyperinflation.58 To 
                                                 
58
 The Collor Plan encompassed a myriad of economic reforms and stabilization measures to fight 
hyperinflation and the deteriorating economic landscape. The reforms included indexation of taxes, 
temporary wage freezes, deposit freezes for more than a year, and gradual market opening to attract 
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do so the plan initiated meaningful privatization momentum, leading to equity transfers 
to private investors of more than USD70 billion along with USD17 billion in debt, 
representing one of the largest privatization programs ever. This moment was the peak 
of the Brazilian privatization process, which halted after President Itamar Franco took 
office subsequent to Collor’s corruption-related impeachment. Under Cardoso’s 
presidency (1995–2002), the government introduced a comprehensive privatization 
process in line with several constitutional amendments. State monopolies in key sectors, 
such as mining, energy, or steel, were abolished. Formerly state-owned firms such as 
the National Steel Company CSN, the mining company Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, 
or the oil company Petróleo Brazileiro (Petrobras) were radically privatized. Thus, 
privatization is well established. Enforcement of property rights is advanced in many 
areas, such as mining, transport, banking, and telecommunications, due to the legislative 
framework assigned to newly established authorities that enjoy technical, financial, and 
administrative autonomy. Generally, property rights are well defined, and property 
acquisition is in theory regulated (BTI, 2008b, p. 13). 
However, in practice Brazilian property rights continue to lack resources 
because the judicial system is so overburdened. Binding judgments by the Supreme 
Federal Tribunal for the protection of intellectual property have neither deteriorated nor 
improved noticeably in recent years. President Lula also did not maintain the 
momentum for implementing the privatization policies supported by his predecessors. 
The Lula administration rather favored an active state role in managing both economic 
growth and social justice (BTI, 2008b, p. 13). Instead of further sales of public assets, 
the Lula administration shifted the government position on privatization by establishing 
laws to regulate public–private partnerships in the hope of attracting private investors to 
support public infrastructure capital expenditures. 
 
CHINA 
China’s long-running communist culture has shaped its private property rights. 
Attempts to initiate a framework of private property rights in 2002 included the 
introduction of a bill related to the creation, transfer, and ownership of land in order to 
strengthen the property rights of citizens. After multiple modifications, the bill was 
                                                                                                                                               
foreign investors in combination with the privatization of government-owned industries (Baer, 2008, pp. 
121-123).  
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finally ratified in 2007 after years of raging disputes regarding the constitutional 
conflicts of interest between the socialist character of the PRC and the private property 
rights of citizens. The bill marries three types of property: private, collective, and state 
property. Thus, it attempts to align a traditionally socialist culture with the dynamics of 
the new economic system in China. The EFI property rights index of China persists at 
its consistently low levels though, even dropping from 30 to 20 points in 2006 due to an 
increasingly weak judicial system, and the unenforceability of property rights. Chinese 
citizens still cannot legally own land. Instead, they acquire property- and land-use rights 
(see Articles 39–44 of the Property Rights Law of the PRC, Lehman, Lee, and Xu, 
2011). Despite the 2007 bill, China’s property law stipulates that state authorities may 
expropriate holdings if it is in the state’s interest. In practice, this caveat translates into 
frequent violations of property rights when corrupt, negligent, or ignorant local 
authorities take property for development ventures.  
  
3.4.2.3.10 Freedom from Corruption  
Figure 3.23: EFI Freedom from Corruption 
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        Data Source: Heritage Foundation (2009), (2010). Figure created and arranged by the author.  
 
BRAZIL 
The Transparency International Corruption Perception index resembles the 
development of the WGICC, which is a composite index also incorporating the 
corruption perception index by Transparency International (2011). The EFI freedom 
from corruption index improved until 2000, and deteriorated significantly since 2005.  
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The index started at 27 points in 1996 and improved to 41 points in 2001. But in 
2005/2006 bribery scandals dominated the public and political agendas in Brazil for 
more than a year, with severe negative effects on the corruption index. The Workers 
Party had to endure multiple defeats in Congress before Lula managed to recover 
electoral support and win the election in October 2006. Nevertheless, Brazil’s freedom 
from corruption index remains very low indicating that corruption in Brazil still is 
substantial.  
For comparison purposes, the Transparency International (2011) Corruption 
Perception index for Brazil was 2.96 in 1996, improving to 3.5 and 3.6 in 2008 and 
2009.  
 
CHINA 
In the early years of the establishment of the PRC, from 1949 to 1966, China 
effectively contained the spread of corruption. Social awareness was high, with strong 
ethical restrictions and severe punishment by anti-corruption agencies and systems. 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1978) corruption was a means of getting by in a 
paralyzed state. Then, in the reconstruction phase starting in 1978 and in the industrial 
revolution that began in 1992, corruption remained high despite increasing education, 
prevention, and punishment efforts. During its transition from a planned economic 
system to a market economy, with the related macroeconomic transitions, corruption in 
China gained momentum and climbed to damaging levels in the mid-1990s.  
EFI’s freedom from corruption index for China still improved from 1996 to 
1999, from the low 20s to 35 points, out of recognition of government efforts to fight 
backdoor dealing, misappropriation, and embezzlement of state-owned assets. Since 
2006, the index has climbed again, in response to domestic campaigns to eradicate 
corruption through reforms and severe punishments, including death sentences. Even in 
this climate, the lack of independent investigative bodies remains a key facilitator of 
corruption. Thus, China’s freedom from corruption index remains low compared with 
the levels in Asian and European democracies, such as Japan, South Korea, or 
Germany, which scored 75, 51, and 78 points on this index in 2009. Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception index for China was 2.43 in 1996 but improved to 
3.6 by 2008 and maintained this level for 2009. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced the data, data sources, and methodology for the 
dependent and independent variables that will provide the input for the empirical and 
econometric analysis in Chapter 4. 
The dependent variables for Brazil and China include 79 identical 
macroeconomic variables from the World Bank Data catalog, covering topics such as 
economic policy & debt, private sector & trade, financial sector, environment, 
infrastructure, international merchandise indexes, and labor and social protection. These 
macroeconomic variables are displayed as share percentages (e.g., trade to GDP), 
change rates (e.g., GDP change rates), or indexes (e.g., trade indexes).  
The independent variables refer to two sets: (1) commodity price indexes from 
UNCTAD and (2) governance indexes provided by (2a) The World Bank (governance 
index (Worldwide Governance Project)), and (2b) The Heritage Foundation (economic 
freedom index). The worldwide governance indexes (WGI) cover six governance 
dimensions, the economic freedom indexes by the Heritage Foundation cover nine. All 
data series are considered to be metric. 
The correlation and Granger causality analysis of the six commodity price 
indexes in Section 3.3.3 (Commodity Price Indexes) identify the correlation groups that 
will be subjected to the principal component analysis in Chapter 4.  
I also performed various correlation and Granger causality analyses of the six 
commodity price indexes and world GDP per capita as well as on China’s GDP per 
capita measure to identify any significant relationships and associations across 
measures. For example, I illustrated that almost all commodity price indexes are highly 
inter-correlated (sig 0.05 to 0.01). Specifically, CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx are very 
highly correlated (sig 0.01), and CrudeIx Granger causes MinMetalsIx. In addition, I 
found that the correlation among all commodity price indexes rose for the period of 
1996 to 2008 compared to the period of 1971 to 2009. Furthermore, I have illustrated 
that world GDP per capita Granger causes commodity price indexes between 1971 and 
2009 as well as between 1996 and 2008. When looking at and analyzing the period 
between 1971 and 2009, China shows no impact on global commodity price indexes. 
However, as I will show in Chapter 4 and 5, this picture changes when shortening the 
analysis period to 1996-2008. 
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Section 3.4 (Independent Variables Set 2: Governance Indexes) offers a 
qualitative and quantitative comparative analysis of Brazil’s and China’s governance 
dimensions, measured by the worldwide governance index (WGI) and the economic 
freedom index (EFI). The WGI framework reveals that Brazil improved its governance 
in all dimensions except regulatory quality and rule of law. Specifically, Brazil made 
great strides in improving its democracy governance, measured by the voice and 
accountability index, which rose from 0.018 to 0.51 from 1996 to 2009. In comparison, 
China’s democracy index developed relatively flatly and at very low levels, from -1.66 
to -1.65, during the same period. For China, I note that all WGI indexes deteriorated 
except government effectiveness, which improved slightly from 0.04 to 0.12 during this 
period.  
In terms of the economic freedom indexes, trade, monetary, and corruption 
governance improved for both Brazil and China. Monetary governance developed 
favorably from 1996 to 2009, as expressed by the rise of the EFI monetary governance 
index from 70.0 to 75.8 and from 62.7 to 70.6 for Brazil and China, respectively. 
Similarly, EFI’s corruption index improved for Brazil and China, rising from 27.0 to 
35.0 and 21.6 to 36.0, respectively. The governance dimension with the largest 
improvement is trade governance, which rose dramatically from 57.0 to 69.2 for Brazil 
and from 30.0 to 72.2 for China between 1996 and 2009. As I will show in Chapter 4, 
trade governance represents a key governance dimension on both absolute and relative 
basis for the Brazilian and Chinese economy, affecting a vast number of 
macroeconomic variables. 
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4  Empirical and Econometric Analysis 
4.1       Introduction  
Overview 
The following econometric analysis in which commodity prices and governance 
indexes serve as independent —exogenous— variables is the core of this study. As 
introduced in Chapter 3, macroeconomic variables are the dependent variables.  
Main purpose of the econometric analysis is the following: First, the 
econometric analysis provides the means and the tools of testing the effects of 
governance and commodity prices on macroeconomic data. Secondly, the econometric 
analysis provides a comparative analysis of the macroeconomic effects of governance 
and commodity prices on China and Brazil and allows drawing a comparative 
conclusion. I am interested in examining the interdependencies between the 
macroeconomic measures and the two sets of independent variables represented by (1) 
commodities price indexes and (2) governance indexes. 
Economics literature features Granger causal analyses of commodity prices and 
their effects on specific macroeconomic variables such as GDP or inflation. A wide 
array of studies identifies independent and dependent variables from a set of 
macroeconomic variables using correlation, Granger causality and regression methods 
to evaluate macroeconomic effects. However, it appears that so far no study has 
comparatively analyzed the effects of commodity price indexes and governance indexes 
on a wide range of macroeconomic variables of developing economies such as Brazil 
and China. This study intends to fill this gap.  
 
Null Hypothesis H0 
Before performing multiple regression analyses, I undertook statistical 
diagnostic tests to validate correlation pairs and Granger causality pairs in order to 
examine statistical significance and usefulness of each independent and dependent 
variable. Unit root tests, Granger causality tests, and principal component tests are 
typically part of statistical diagnostic tests in academic research papers. In most 
statistical research papers the level of statistical significance required to reject the null 
hypothesis —that is, to obtain a statistically significant result— is set at 0.05 (5%) or 
0.01 (1%) (Rubinfeld, 2000, pp. 430-431). The significance level (p-value) measures 
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the probability that the null hypothesis H0 (or H0, or null) will be rejected incorrectly, 
provided H0 is true. Generally, the lower the percentage required for statistical 
significance, the more problematic it is to reject H0. The lower the observed p-value, the 
lower is the probability of an improper rejection of H0. Technically speaking, the p-
value is the probability of error associated with wrongly rejecting H0, which may for 
example state that no correlation relationship exists between the independent and 
dependent variables. The lower the p-value, the higher is the probability of rightly 
rejecting the null hypothesis. A smaller p-value indicates a more significant correlation 
or causality between the independent and the dependent variables. The 5% p-value 
criterion is the main threshold. However, I also use the 0.01 p-value criterion to identify 
confidence levels at the 99% level in order to point to very strong relationship patterns.  
To establish a relationship with strong association evidence I use two-tailed 
correlation tests; one-tailed tests produce p-values that are half the p-value of two-tailed 
tests. The selection of a one-tailed test makes it easier to reject a null hypothesis, 
whereas a two-tailed test makes a null hypothesis rejection less likely.  
Establishing the null hypotheses is an essential part of the statistical diagnostic 
tests in this study.59 To formulate a null hypothesis it is necessary to establish a specific 
proposition as a base argument. The null hypothesis can be simplified as two opposing 
statements: a null hypothesis denoted H0 and an alternative hypothesis denoted H1. The 
null hypothesis H0 takes special consideration and relates to statements being tested; the 
alternative hypothesis H1 relates to the statement to be accepted if the null hypothesis is 
rejected. The ultimate conclusion of the hypothesis tests is always given in terms of the 
null hypothesis: one either rejects H0 in favor of H1, or one does not reject H0. The 
conclusion not to reject H0 does not necessarily indicate that the null hypothesis is true; 
it suggests only that there is not sufficient evidence against H0 in favor of H1. Rejecting 
H0 in turn suggests that H1 may be accepted.  
                                                 
59
 The vast majority of empirical research papers I found deployed common statistical diagnostic tests 
including unit root tests, co-integration tests, or Granger causality tests, depending on the objective of the 
research. A few of the authors of these studies are mentioned here: Olomola (2006, pp. 28-34), Aliyu 
(2009, pp. 13-16), Sjuib (2009, pp. 91-96), Labys and Maizels (1990, pp. 8-18), Kwon (2007, pp. 106-
113). My research framework incorporates a 4-level diagnostic framework including unit root tests, 
correlation tests, Granger causality tests, and principal component analysis before proceeding to 
regression analysis.  
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Hypothesis testing also involves the recognition that there is an assured low 
probability (p-value) of wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis (Type I error). 60  To 
prevent making false decisions and to protect H0, the value of the significance level 
should be fairly low. Therefore, as previously stated, the threshold significance level I 
chose must not be larger than 5% (or 0.05). 
 
Variables Standardization  
The underlying data sets in this thesis have not gone through standardization or 
normalization processes for several reasons: The data series used are metric in nature, 
and the underlying data set is nonparametric. Generally, nonparametric procedures offer 
good ease of use and avoid relying on estimations of parameters, such as the mean or 
standard deviation, to describe the distribution of the variable of interest in the data 
set.61  By relieving this requirement for parameters the underlying variables become 
more applicable for a larger variety of tests, none of which necessitate the mean, sample 
size, standard deviation, or estimation of other related parameters when none of that 
information is available.  
 
Structure of Chapter 4 
The econometric analysis consists of four statistical diagnostic levels which are 
instrumental in selecting statistically significant pairs of dependent and independent 
variables before considering them for the multiple regression analysis in Section 4.3. 
The statistical diagnostic tests introduced next are based on the theory of hypothesis 
testing as just described. The diagnostic tests are necessary validation tests preceding 
multiple regression analysis and include unit root tests, correlation and Granger 
causality tests, and principal component analysis (multicollinearity) (Oxford Journals, 
2009a, p. 46). 
 
                                                 
60
 A type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is rejected although it is actually true, i.e. when H0 is 
wrongly rejected. A type II error occurs when the null hypothesis H0 is not rejected although it is actually 
false, that is H0 is wrongly accepted. A Type I error, which is inversely related to a Type II error, is 
generally considered more serious and thus more important to avoid than a Type II error.  
61
 Nonparametric techniques are also called parameter- or distribution-free methods. 
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Unit Root Analysis  
The Pearson correlation and Granger causality tests in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
are preceded by tests for the presence of unit root in each of the independent and 
dependent variables for both Brazil and China. The statistical diagnostic tests in Section 
4.2 begin with the Dickey-Fuller unit root test, in which I analyze the stability of each 
independent and each dependent variable. The multiple regression analysis (Section 4.3) 
requires that all data series are stationary in nature. However, many economic time-
series are non-stationary processes. The usual approach to address this problem is to 
take the difference in the series. A time-series that can be made stationary by 
differencing has no unit root. The unit root test has been performed with SAS.  
 
Correlation Analysis  
The correlation analysis quantifies the degree of association between the 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Correlation analysis 
methods assume that for any set of values in a given set of conditions, variation in each 
variable is random and follows a normal distribution pattern. Performing correlation 
analysis on dependent and independent variables generates a correlation coefficient (r), 
reflected as adjusted R-square (or adjusted R2) in the regression analysis. The adjusted 
R2 of this statistical parameter describes the proportion of the variation in the dependent 
variable that is associated with the variation in the independent variable in the 
regression model.62 Convention in this thesis is that an adjusted R2 of at least 0.80 is 
considered evidence of strong goodness of fit for regression models. Also, in this thesis, 
correlation coefficients above 0.50 but lower than 0.70 represent moderate correlation, 
those above 0.70 and below 0.90 represent high correlation, and coefficients above 0.90 
represent very high correlation. That is,  
Moderate correlation:  .50 < ri < .70,  
High correlation:   .70 ≤ ri < .90, and  
Very high correlation:  .90 ≤ ri ≤ 1.0, for i = 1,…, n.63 
                                                 
62
 In comparison to R-square, adjusted R-square is an adjustment of R-square that considers the number 
of independent variables in a model. The adjusted R-square —unlike R-square— improves only if the 
new term improves the model more than would be expected by chance. 
63
 For multi regression purposes I analyse the correlation coefficients of 21 independent variables with 79 
dependent variables (1,659 correlation coefficients), and 1,659 × 2 Granger causality tests (Granger 1 
causality test and Granger 2 (inverse) causality test).  
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Section 4.2.2 (Correlation Analysis) unveils significant correlation pairs 
between independent and dependent variables of Brazil and China. Correlation pairs 
with a confidence level equal to or greater than 95% are statistically significant and 
selected to proceed to the next stage of statistical diagnostic tests, as represented by the 
Granger causality evaluation in Section 4.2.3. The selection criterion of the relevant 
correlation pairs in Section 4.2.2 is quantitative and not yet based on economic 
judgment or economic rationale. The interpretation of the economic relationship pairs 
and independent and dependent variables is being given in Chapter 5.  
The stepwise progression of the correlation analysis for both Brazil and China in 
this section is as follows: First, I differentiate between positive and negative correlation 
pairs as examined in the correlation matrix. In a second step I examine the number of 
significant correlation events (counts) between dependent variables and independent 
variables of the commodity price index set, the WGI index set, and the EFI index set. 
Following the correlation count examination I identify non-significant correlation pairs 
between dependent variables and independent variables in order to exclude them from 
progression into the multiple regression analysis. Significant positive correlations are 
marked in green, and significant negative correlations are marked in yellow throughout 
this thesis, specifically in the correlation matrixes in Section 4.2.2, the Granger 
causality matrixes in Section 4.2.3 and the multiple regression matrixes in Section 4.3 
for Brazil and China, respectively.  
The study uses PASW Statistics for correlation calculation, with a focus 
primarily on positive correlation pairs, except for ten specified macroeconomic 
variables on which I also perform correlation analysis. Correlation analysis is a 
prerequisite for causality analysis, which examines the direction of interdependence —if 
any— between a dependent and an independent variable. 
 
Causality Analysis  
The causality analysis is based on the concept of Granger Causality. Granger 
causality analysis in Section 4.2.3 examines the direction of interdependence —if any— 
between a dependent and independent variable and represents the third statistical 
diagnostic test in the thesis. Granger causality analysis suggests an operational 
definition such that in a time-series the independent variable causes the dependent 
variable provided that the probability of the dependent variable is conditional on its own 
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past history and the past history of the independent variable and not conditional on the 
dependent variable’s history alone. 
Granger causality testing is an integral part in macroeconomic research and has 
been used to reveal the possibility that an independent variable controls a dependent 
variable to influence a third one (efficient cause), especially in a time-series approach. 
Nonetheless, because Granger causality testing is based on incremental predictability 
rather than an efficient cause it cannot fully reflect causal interdependence between two 
variables. In this context, it is difficult to differentiate between a causal relationship 
based on incremental predictability and empirical regularities, which remains an open 
issue in the development of econometric studies (Kwon, 2007, pp. 5-10). 
Granger causality testing is an important tool to select significant relationships 
between independent and dependent variables, which establishes the base for further 
quantitative analysis through regression analysis (Section 4.3). The confidence 
threshold for Granger causality tests I use is the 95% level. The tests are logical in 
sequence and explore the possibility of significant interdependence by exploring the 
possibility of a statistically significant relationship between independent and 
macroeconomic variables of Brazil and China, as well as the direction of the inferential 
relationships from the independent to the dependent variables and vice versa. In the 
discussion of Granger causal associations, I also selectively elaborate on inverse 
Granger causal relationships (i.e., negative Granger causality), in which one of the 79 
macroeconomic variables causes or leads to changes in commodity prices or governance 
indicators. Inverse Granger causality is also part of the variable and relationship 
discussion in Chapter 5.  
The stepwise sequence of the Granger causality analysis in this section for both 
Brazil and China is as follows: Firstly, I identify significant Granger causality and 
inverse Granger causality events as examined in the Granger causality matrix. In a 
second step, I examine the number of significant Granger causality and inverse Granger 
causality events (or associations) of dependent variables and independent variables of 
the commodity price index set, the WGI index set, and the EFI index set. Following the 
Granger causality event count examination I identify non-significant Granger causality 
pairs in order to exclude them from the multiple regression analysis. Significant 
Granger causality associations are marked in green, and significant inverse (negative) 
Granger causality associations are marked in yellow throughout this thesis, specifically 
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in the Granger causality matrixes in Section 4.2.3, as well as in the multiple regression 
matrixes in Section 4.3.  
 
Principal Component Analysis 
Section 4.2.4 performs principal component analysis (PCA) for all independent 
variables in order to identify multicollinearity. This statistical occurrence in a multiple 
regression model indicates that more than one independent variable is highly correlated 
with at least one other independent variable. A high degree of multicollinearity may 
distort the results of the effect of a single independent variable in a regression model. A 
regression model with highly correlated independent variables may indicate the effect of 
the entire group of independent variables on a dependent variable, not the effect of one 
individual independent variable on any given dependent variable. In statistically 
significant multiple regression models, independent variables correlate highly with 
specific dependent variables but minimally with other nonspecific variables. Multiple 
regression models with these features are characterized as low noise and statistically 
robust. Multicollinearity does not actually distort the results, but it generates large 
standard errors in the respective independent variables.  
The PCA in Section 4.2.4 groups independent variables together to obtain one 
common, newly generated independent variable that combines the highly correlated 
independent variables. The PCA grouping is based on the following main criteria:  
(1) Correlation equal or above 69.9%, and  
(2) A sensible economic categorization of governance indexes and commodity price 
indexes.  
Throughout the entire thesis, I differentiate between the analysis of (i) change 
rate measures of independent index variables and change rate measures of 
macroeconomic variables, and (ii) index measures of independent variables and 
macroeconomic variables displayed in share percentages. Thus, in the PCA I also 
differentiate between independent variables sets with change rates and actual index 
levels. That means the PCA analysis is performed on each set of independent index 
variables and on change rates of each set of independent index variable. 
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Multiple Regression Analysis 
Section 4.3 performs multiple regression analysis on independent and dependent 
variable pairs that were validated and successfully passed the statistical diagnostic tests 
in Section 4.2. In the regression analysis I seek to establish significant relationships 
between one of the 79 dependent variables and one or several independent variables of 
the commodity price and governance index sets. 
Correlation and regression analyses are statistical techniques used extensively in 
various industry sectors, such as geology, finance, or marketing to examine causal 
relationships between variables and to reveal patterns in reserve estimates, price and 
metric moves, or consumer demand. In the regression analysis in Section 4.3, I measure 
the degree of fit in the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variables. The dependent variable should be a function of one or more independent 
variables. Their values are anticipated to be determined in a random, error-free manner.  
Multiple regression analysis can predict the possible value of a dependent 
variable that corresponds to an independent variable. In this context I use adjusted R-
square as a measure to identify of how well the regression equation fits the data. 
Convention in this study is that an adjusted R-square above 0.8 has a strong goodness of 
fit. The t-test associated with regression analysis also determines whether the 
independent variable (predictor variable) has significant predictive power on the 
dependent variable by measuring the proportion of variance explained. In this thesis a t-
value greater than 2 is considered meaningful, suggesting strong explanatory power of 
the independent variable. 
The sequence of the multi regression section is as follows: At first I establish the 
multi regression matrix based on the results of the correlation and the Granger causality 
examination of the previous sections. I differentiate between non-significant regression 
results and significant regression results, which are presented at the end of the multiple 
regression analysis section. 
 
Empirical and Econometric Results  
I offer key findings in light of significant correlation pairs, significant Granger 
causality associations, and regression results. These results are then being discussed in 
the context of empirical observations in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 thus represents the 
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conclusion of the statistical analysis tests and offers a comparative interpretation of the 
econometric rational of the results of Chapter 4 on the selected macroeconomic 
variables for Brazil and China.  
 
Econometric Software and Statistical Application Packages  
Unit root tests, Granger causality tests, PCA, and multiple regression analyses 
throughout the thesis have been carried out with the SAS 9.1.3 Service Pack 4 
XP_HOME Platform. A comprehensive overview of the SAS programming syntax and 
SAS output of Chapters 3, 4, and 5, can be found in the attached CD-ROM. The CD-
ROM contains folders for Brazil and China with respective sub-folders for unit root 
tests, Granger causality tests, PCA, and multiple regression analyses. The diagnostic test 
files are separated by variables which are measured in percentage shares and by 
variables which are measured in changes rates. For reader friendliness, non-relevant 
SAS Output syntax (which comes automatically upon running certain diagnostic tests 
and regression analysis) is marked in gray letters.  
The correlation analysis has been performed by PASW Statistics 18. All 
correlation analysis results associated with the econometric examinations in this thesis 
have been recorded and are presented in the correlation matrixes in Section 4.2.2 as well 
as specifically illustrated in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
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4.2   Statistical Diagnostic Tests  
4.2.1 Unit Root Analysis  
4.2.1.1 Methodology and Hypothesis 
The Pearson correlation and Granger causality tests in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
are preceded by tests for the presence of unit root for each of the independent and 
dependent variables of both Brazil and China. Unit root tests are conducted using the 
Dickey-Fuller technique. The Dickey-Fuller test is performed to assess whether a data 
time series is stationary or not. A time series is deemed to be stationary in nature if the 
mean and variance are constant over the passage of time. If both the mean and variance 
are constant over time the series has no unit root (stationary process); otherwise, the 
series is said to be a non-stationary process, i.e., it has a unit root. If the test statistic’s p-
value is less than the critical value of 0.05 then the null hypothesis H0 (H0: there exists 
unit root, that is, data is non-stationary) is rejected, which implies that the data time 
series has no unit root and is stationary (Dickey, 192-30, n.d.). 
Macroeconomic variables often possess a stochastic trend that can be removed 
by differentiating the variables. The Dickey-Fuller test examines if a time series is 
stationary and determines the differentiation order required for such time series which 
are not stationary in nature. The study initiates the examination by testing for order of 
integration of the series using Dickey-Fuller and the respective null hypothesis of the 
tests. The unit root test based on the Dickey-Fuller technique can be a generalized auto-
regression model and may be formulated as follows (Mohamed, 2008, pp. 1-6):  
Null hypothesis H0: Non-stationarity of time series.  
Alternative hypothesis H1: Stationarity of time series.  
Model: ∑ −
=
−
∆+=∆ ktiki
n
k
titi xxx ,,
1
1,, ϖκ tk ,ε+  
tix ,∆  : 1st-differenced value of x   
1, −tixκ  : 1
st
-lagged value of x 
∑ −
=
∆ ktiki
n
k
x ,
,
1
ϖ : n-th lagged of 1st-differenced of values of x 
tk ,ε  : Error term 
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4.2.1.2 Unit Root Tests Results  
To test non-stationary data I use SAS programming. The Dickey-Fuller tests for 
variables on Brazil and China are performed using SAS at a 0.05 significance level. 
Results of the unit root test for all dependent and independent variables for Brazil and 
China show that all p-values are below 0.01, implying that the null hypothesis, which 
states that each data series has a unit root (non-stationary), can be rejected for all data 
series. Hence, all dependent and independent variables series are stationary. Therefore, 
no differentiation needs to be performed on any dependent and independent variable.  
 
4.2.2     Correlation Analysis 
4.2.2.1 Correlation Methodology  
In this section I illustrate the selection process of dependent variables based on 
significant correlation between the 21 independent variables and the 79 dependent 
variables for Brazil and China, respectively. The correlation analytics are based on 
Pearson’s correlation measure rxy for two variables x and y and n data points, whereas 
x  and y  represent the sample means of x and y:     
2
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The null hypothesis (H0) states that there is no association between the two 
variables; that is, the correlation is zero. The alternative hypothesis (H1) states that there 
is an association between the two variables. 
The key selection criterion for the dependent variables is not the fact that there is 
a positive or negative correlation for independent-dependent pairs, but the significance 
level denoted by the p-value or p-level of each correlation pair. The reason for selecting 
the p-value as selection criterion is the fact that a correlation can be strong and yet not 
significant. Conversely, a correlation relationship may be weak, but significant. The 
correlation matrixes of Brazil and China in Sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.3 denote 
significant correlation coefficients with a single asterisk ‘*’ and double asterisk ‘**’. 
Double asterisk ‘**’ represents correlation at the significance level of 0.01 (2-tailed). 
Cells denoted with a single asterisk ‘*’ represent correlation at the significance level of 
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0.05 (2-tailed). Positive correlation pairs are marked in light green whereas negative 
correlation pairs are marked in light yellow.  
 
4.2.2.2 Correlation Analysis Brazil  
This section describes the second statistical diagnostic test in which I select 
macroeconomic variables which significantly correlate with any of the 21 independent 
variables of Brazil. At this stage, the study performs macroeconomic variable selection 
solely based on the correlation significance between a dependent and independent 
variable.  
 
CORRELATION MATRIX BRAZIL 
Positive Correlations 
The correlation display of an independent and dependent variable in the matrix 
in Table 4.1 contains three cells: The first cell displays the degree of correlation. The 
second cell denoted as ‘Sig. (2-tailed)’ right below the correlation cell reveals the 
correlation significance as represented by the p-value. The third cell in the column 
denoted as ‘N’ shows the number of data points analyzed; 13 annual data points for 
percentage share measures (1996-2008) and 12 annual data points for change rates 
(1997-2008).  
For example, Brazil’s GDP per capita growth (Variable 3: GDPpCap_gr) in 
Table 4.2a (Correlation Matrix Brazil) positively correlates with the following three 
independent variables: food price index (FoodIx), agricultural raw material price index 
(AgriRawIx), and minerals and metals price index (MinMetalsIx).  
Table 4.1: GDP Per Capita Growth Correlations Brazil 
Independent Variables Correlation Test GDPpCap_gr (Dependent Variable) 
FoodIx Correlation .729** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007 
 N 12 
AgriRawIx Correlation .675* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.016 
 N 12 
MinMetalsIx Correlation .579* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.048 
 N 12 
  Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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Food price index (FoodIx) correlates with GDPpCap_gr (Variable 3: GDP per 
capita growth rate) at 72.9% over the evaluation period from 1996 to 2008. The p-value 
of this correlation pair is 0.007, that is, the significance level is better than 0.01 and thus 
denoted with an ‘**’ asterisk in the correlation matrix Tables 4.2a-c. In comparison, 
GDPpCap_gr correlates at 67.5% and 57.9% with AgriRawIx (agricultural raw material 
price index) and MinMetalsIx (minerals and metals price index) at a significance level 
below 0.05, respectively. 
 
Negative Correlations 
The correlation matrix also includes selected macroeconomic variables that 
show negative correlations with independent variables. Their selection is based on the 
following economic rationale: Increasing commodity prices as well as specific 
improving governance dimensions may inversely affect specific key macroeconomic 
measures. For example, lower external debt levels to gross national product (Variable 
65: ExtDebtST_GNI) for Brazil may be an indirect result of higher commodity prices, 
which may have increased Brazil’s export values, generating higher tax revenues for the 
central government from private or majority state owned firms such as Petrobras. This 
in turn may translate into a higher degree of financial flexibility of the central 
government, leading to a higher degree of foreign currency denominated external debt 
reduction, reducing the developing economy’s susceptibility to external shocks. 64 
Similarly, the inverse relationship of real interest rates (Variable 63: RealIR) in the 
context of improving fiscal and monetary governance constitutes another example of 
negative correlation pairs worth further analysis. 
The following eleven selected macroeconomic variables show negative 
correlation with independent variables at the example of Brazil. These variables 
(definition in parentheses) were selected to be part of the econometric analysis on Brazil 
for the following reasons: 
(1)  Variable 44: TariffAllweight (tariff rate applied weighted mean, all products)  
                                                 
64
 In capital markets, foreign denominated credit exposure (e.g., in USD) to a developing sovereign or 
local firm in a developing economy (or lower rated economy) is also called wrong-way risk. If the local 
currency depreciates, the USD denominated debt service and repayment will be more expensive in local 
currency terms, exposing the creditor/lender to credit related general wrong way risk. Wrong-way risk 
carries self-reinforcing negative effects, such that the credit risk deterioration of the debtor may positively 
correlate with a deteriorating local macroeconomic environment including a depreciating local currency.  
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The study attempts to reveal significant relationships and/or associations and 
causalities between governance, specifically trade governance, as well as 
commodity prices and tariff rates. Strong trade governance is reflected through 
the setting of low tariffs in order to support the import industry and the 
generation of international currency reserves. Also, the study seeks to uncover 
potential causality directions between the price development of commodities and 
trade governance represented by tariff levels. TariffAllweight correlates very 
highly with simple mean tariffs, which represent all trade tariffs in an economy 
(including export tariffs). 
(2)  Variable 61: M2 growth rate (M2_gr) 
The study attempts to reveal significant relationships and/or associations 
between M2 growth rate and governance indexes and/or commodity prices. 
(3)  Variable 62: IRSSpread (interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate)), 
and 
(4)  Variable 63: RealIR (real interest rate) 
The study seeks to reveal significant relationships and/or associations between 
interest rate spreads, real interest rates (RealIR) and governance indexes as well 
as commodity price indexes in order to uncover potential significant associations 
and interdependencies between the Central Bank’s interest rate regime in context 
of changing commodity prices and overall country governance.  
(5)  Variable 64: ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc (external debt to exports of goods, services, 
income) 
(6)  Variable 65: ExtDebtST_GNI (external debt stocks to gross national income) 
(7)  Variable 66: STD_ExpGSInc (short-term debt to exports of goods, services & 
income) 
(8)  Variable 67: STD_TTExtDbt (short-term debt to total external debt) 
(9)  Variable 68: STD_TTResv (short-term debt to total reserves) 
(10)  Variable 71: MultiDebt_TTExtD (multilateral debt to total external debt) 
External long-term and short-term debt stocks as a percentage of national 
account measures ought to decline, that is improve, in the face of increasing 
export values due to rising commodity prices and favorable trade governance. 
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Specifically, export oriented economies such as Brazil should benefit from 
export related revenues, which in turn positively affect national reserve accounts 
and debt levels. The study seeks to uncover potential significant causalities to 
support this notion.  
(11)  Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp (rural population to total population) 
I seek to reveal significant associations between rural-urban migration and 
improving governance dimensions and increasing commodity prices which in 
turn may be affected by the development and the expansion of urban areas and 
cities as a result of, e.g., the establishment of industry clusters. 
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CORRELATION COUNT BRAZIL 
Significant Correlation  
The correlation test for Brazil reveals 352 significant correlation counts, spread over 
the three sets of independent variables. Table 4.3 gives an overview of the distribution of 
negative and positive correlations across the three sets of independent variables.  
Table 4.3: Significant Correlation Counts Brazil  
 Positive 
Correlations 
Negative 
Correlations 
Total Total  
% Share 
Commodity Price Indexes 128 28 156 44.3% 
FoodIx 26 3 29 8.2% 
TropBevIx 9 1 10 2.8% 
VegOilSeedsIx 16 3 19 5.4% 
AgriRawIx 25 5 30 8.5% 
MinMetalsIx 23 8 31 8.8% 
CrudeIx 29 8 37 10.5% 
Worldwide Governance Indexes 83 14 97 27.6% 
WGIVA 31 7 38 10.8% 
WGIPS 9 3 12 3.4% 
WGIGE 12 1 13 3.7% 
WGIRQ 15 1 16 4.5% 
WGIRL 13 1 14 4.0% 
WGICC 3 1 4 1.1% 
Economic Freedom Indexes 87 12 99 28.1% 
EFIBiz 12 1 13 3.7% 
EFITrade 32 8 40 11.4% 
EFIFisc 11 0 11 3.1% 
EFIGovtS 11 1 12 3.4% 
EFIMon 7 0 7 2.0% 
EFIInvest65 0 0 0 0.0% 
EFIFin 3 1 4 1.1% 
EFIPropRi 0 0 0 0.0% 
EFICorrup 11 1 12 3.4% 
Total 298 54 352 100.0% 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
From a dependent variable point of view it is observable that the largest positive 
correlation count within the dependent variable set pertains to the financial sector topic, the 
private sector, and the trade topic, specifically within the trade indexes sub topic. Trade 
indexes, such as ExpValx (Variable 36: export value index), ImpValIx (Variable 37: import 
                                                 
65
 Data provided by The Heritage Foundation for both, EFIInvest index as well as PropRi index are held 
constant at 50 points over the data series period from 1996 to 2008. Thus, neither a meaningful correlation nor 
causality calculation can be performed. As a result, regression analysis for EFIInvest and EFI PropRi cannot 
be performed (displayed as ‘a’ in the matrixes). 
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value index) reveal a high correlation count with almost all commodity price indexes and 
the EFI trade index.  
From a correlation perspective I note that the correlation pair with the largest 
correlation coefficient is represented by export value index to CrudeIx (Variable 36: export 
value index, Table 4.2b: Correlation Matrix Brazil), displaying a correlation of 99% at the 
significance level of 0.01 (corr. 99%, sig. 0.01).  
 
Commodity Price Index 
From an independent variable set point of view the vast majority of significant 
correlation counts (or ‘events’), that is 44.3% or 156 of 352 counts, occur within the 
commodity price index set. This underscores the importance of Brazil’s commodity sector 
for the economy, specifically for its trade sector. The crude index records the largest 
number of correlation counts within the commodity price index set, counting a total of 37 
correlation events. Of 37 correlation events 8 are negative. That is, positive changes in 
CrudeIx go along with negative changes in these 8 dependent variables.  
MinMetalsIx, AgriRawIx, and FoodIx count 31, 30, and 29 correlation events, of 
which 8, 5, and 3 are negative, respectively. VegOilSeedsIx and TropBevIx count 19 and 
10 correlation events, suggesting a lower importance of vegetables, oils and seeds and 
tropical beverages for Brazil’s commodity sector compared to oil, minerals and metals, 
food, and agricultural raw materials. It is observable that price changes in all commodity 
groups correlate negatively with debt level ratios such as external debt stocks to exports of 
goods, services and income (Variable 64: ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc) 66  and external debt 
stocks to gross national income (Variable 65: ExtDebtST_GNI).  
Furthermore, commodity prices seem to have a profound effect on Brazil’s financial 
and economic policy and debt sector. Oil and minerals and metals seem to have an effect on 
Brazil’s interest rate spread (Variable 62: IRSSpread) and real interest rate (Variable 63: 
RealIR) judging by the negative correlation rates of 77.0% and 73.7% as well as 66.6% and 
61.6%, at significance levels of 0.01 and 0.05, respectively. Then, the consumer price index 
(Variable 58: CPIx) significantly correlates with all commodity groups, except with 
                                                 
66
 Negative correlations are significant for all commodity price indexes except for TropBevIx.  
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tropical beverages. All commodity price indexes do also show significant positive 
correlations with Brazil’s total reserves to total external debt (Variable 69: 
TTRes_TTExtDbt) which implies that Brazil’s improving reserve position may be 
associated with improving commodity prices.   
Also, among others, FoodIx, AgriRawIx, and MinMetalsIx significantly correlate 
with the GDP change rate (i.e., growth rate) (Variable 2: GDP_gr) and the GDP per capita 
growth rate (Variable 3: GDPpCap_gr), suggesting that demand and export increases in 
food commodities, agricultural raw materials as well as mineral and metals affect GDP_gr 
and GDPpCap_gr of Brazil.   
Furthermore, as previously stated, nearly all commodity price indexes positively 
correlate with high significance with trade indexes such as ExpValx, ImpValIx, ExpVolx, 
ImpVolIx, UnitValIxExp, UnitValIxImp (Variables 36 to 41), thus underscoring the 
importance of Brazil’s commodity sector for its external sector.67 Then, all commodity 
price indexes significantly correlate at the 0.01 p-level with the stock value index to GDP 
(Variable 52: StoxVal_GDP) suggesting strong interrelations between stock market 
valuation and Brazil’s commodity sector.  
 
Economic Freedom Index 
The second largest number of correlation counts occurs within the economic 
freedom index set, which records a total of 99 correlation counts with dependent variables, 
or 28.1% of 352 counts. The dominant individual governance dimension with the largest 
correlation impacts on the 79 selected macroeconomic variables is EFITrade (trade 
governance), counting an astounding 40 correlation events, 8 of which are of negative 
nature. EFITrade is followed by EFIBiz (business index), EFIGovtS (government size), and 
EFICorrup (corruption index) with 13, 12, and 12 correlation counts, respectively. It is 
revealing that EFI corruption index displays a relative high number of correlation counts, 
suggesting a relatively strong impact on economic activity in Brazil, specifically on the 
trade sector (Variable 25: Trade_GDP, Variable 26: MrchTrade_GDP). 
                                                 
67
 Exceptions: ExpValx does not significantly correlate with TropBevIx, and ExpVolx does not significantly 
correlate with FoodIx, TropBevIx, and VegOilSeedsIx.   
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With 40 significant correlation counts, trade policies are a crucial governance 
dimension in Brazil. Overall, EFITrade is the dominant individual independent variable 
among all 21 independent variables for Brazil. This finding underscores the importance of 
Brazilian trade policies and its effects on the country’s macroeconomics, specifically on 
variables of the monetary sector such IRSSpread and RealIR (Variables 62 and 63), and 
variables of external debt and reserve accounts such as ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc (Variable 
64), ExtDebtST_GNI (Variable 65), STD_ExpGSInc (Variable 66), STD_TTResv 
(Variable 68: short-term debt to total reserves), and TTResv_TTExtDbt (Variable 69: total 
reserves to total external debt), but also on food, crop, and livestock production indexes 
(Variable 55: FoodPrdIx, Variable 56: CropProdIx, Variable 57: LivStockProdIx).  
Also, obviously, EFITrade which negatively correlates at -86.7% with 
TariffAllWeight at the 0.01 significance level (Variable 44: overall weighted trade tariffs) 
shows significant positive correlations with trade indexes such as ExpValx, ImpValIx, 
ExpVolx, ImpVolIx, UnitValIxExp, UnitValIxImp (Variables 36 to 41) underscoring the 
importance of Brazil’s trade policies to its external sector. This is reflected by improving 
scores in ExtBalGS_GDP (Variable 29: external balance of goods and services to GDP), 
and CurrAcc_GDP (Variable 30: current account to GDP). Furthermore, EFITrade displays 
positive correlation below the significance threshold of 0.05 with StoxVal_GDP (Variable 
52: Stocks traded total value to GDP) and MarktCapList_GDP (Variable 54: market 
capitalization of listed companies to GDP).  
 
Worldwide Governance Index 
The worldwide governance index counts 97 correlation events, or 27.6% of 352 
total correlation events for Brazil. The dominant index within the WGI index subset is the 
WGI voice and accountability index (WGIVA), displaying a total of 38 correlation events 
(7 of which are negative), suggesting that a larger degree of democracy fosters 
macroeconomic activity and growth. Regulatory quality (WGIRQ), rule of law (WGIRL), 
government effectiveness (WGIGE), and political stability (WGIPS) count 16, 14, 13, and 
12 correlation events, of which 1, 1, 1, and 3 correlations are negative, respectively.  
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It is revealing that the voice and accountability index (WGIVA), the political 
stability index (WGIPS), and the government effectiveness index (WGIGE) exhibit 
significant positive correlations with the external sector represented by Trade_GDP 
(Variable 25: trade to GDP) and MrchTrade_GDP (Variable 26: merchandise trade to 
GDP), as well as ExpGS_GDP (Variable 27: export of goods and services to GDP), and 
ImpGS_GDP (Variable 31: import of goods and services to GDP). Also, WGIVA 
correlates positively at the significance level of 0.01 with Brazil’s national savings quotas 
such as GrossSav_GDP, GrossSav_GNI, and GrossDomSav_GDP (Variables 10-12).  
 
Non-significant Correlation  
In conclusion, the correlation tests of Brazil reveal that out of 79 dependent 
variables only 8 macroeconomic variables do not display any significant correlation with 
any of the 21 independent variables. As a result, these 8 macroeconomic variables, which 
are marked in red in the Correlation Matrix Brazil (Table 4.2a-c), are not qualified to 
proceed to the Granger causality test in Section 4.2.3 of Brazil, and will therefore be 
excluded from any further econometric analysis. The excluded dependent variables include 
the following 8 individual macroeconomic variables:  
(1) Variable 5: Agri_gr (agriculture value added growth rate) 
(2) Variable 8: ManuValAdd_GDP (manufacturing value added to GDP)  
(3) Variable 14: GovFinConExp_GDP (general government final consumption 
expenditure to GDP) 
(4) Variable 21: GroCapF_GDP (gross capital formation to GDP) 
(5) Variable 28: ExpGS_gr (exports of goods and services growth rate) 
(6) Variable 47: ICTImp_TTImp (information communication technology goods 
imports to total goods imports) 
(7) Variable 59: Infltn (annual inflation) 
(8) Variable 70: M2_TTReserv (money and quasi money (M2) to total reserves) 
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4.2.2.3 Correlation Analysis China  
Similarly to the section on Brazil, this section represents the second statistical 
diagnostic test for China. At this stage, I perform macroeconomic variable selection for 
China solely based on significant correlation events between independent and dependent 
variables. The correlation matrix for China in Tables 4.5a-c highlight all significant 
positive and selected negative correlation pairs of independent and dependent variables.  
 
CORRELATION MATRIX CHINA 
Positive Correlations 
The correlation pairings of independent and dependent variables for China in the 
Correlation Matrix in Tables 4.5a-c below contain three cells which are to be read in similar 
fashion as with the example of Brazil. 
Table 4.4: Consumer Price Index Correlation China 
Independent Variables Correlation Test Consumer Price Index (Dependent Variable) 
FoodIx Correlation .893** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 N 13 
TropBevIx Correlation .564* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .045 
 N 13 
VegOilseedsIx Correlation .869** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 N 13 
AgriRawIx Correlation .930** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 N 13 
MinMetalsIx Correlation .951** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 N 13 
CrudeIx Correlation .967** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 N 13 
WGIGE Correlation .666* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .013 
 N 13 
EFITrade Correlation .815** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
 N 13 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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For example, as shown in Table 4.4 above, China’s consumer price index (Variable 
58: CPIx) in the correlation matrix for China in Table 4.5c correlates very highly with 
AgriRawIx, CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx, and highly with FoodIx, VegOilseedsIx, and 
EFITrade. It correlates only moderately with TropBevIx and WGIGE. The significance is at 
the 0.01 level for all variables, except for WGIGE and TropBevIx which are at the 0.05 
significance level.  
 
Negative Correlations 
Similarly to Brazil, the correlation test for China also includes selected 
macroeconomic variables which show negative correlations to independent variables. The 
selection of the macroeconomic variables with negative correlation to independent 
variables is based on the suggestion that increasing commodity price and governance 
indexes may negatively affect specific macroeconomic measures whose improvement is 
illustrated by a negative measure development.  
According to the correlation matrixes in Tables 4.5a-c below, I observe that Chinese 
inflation (Variable 59) correlates negatively with WGIVA and EFIMon at 66.8% and 
67.7% at a significance level of below 0.05 and above 0.01 for each (p-values of 0.013 and 
0.011, respectively), depicted with ‘*’. This suggests that Chinese inflation, which was 
highly volatile between 1996 and 2008 (ranging between 8.3% and -1.4% according to 
World Bank data), increases/decreases with a deteriorating/improving monetary 
governance index (EFIMon) and a deteriorating/improving voice and accountability index 
measured by WGIVA.  
The following ten selected macroeconomic variables show negative correlations 
with independent variables in China. 8 of these 10 dependent variables below are identical 
to the Brazilian dependent variables showing negative correlations. The rationale for 
including the 8 identical selected macroeconomic variables below has already been 
provided at the example of Brazil further above in Section 4.2.2.2 (Correlation Analysis 
Brazil). Thus, I only illustrate the economic selection rationale for the two newly added 
dependent variables of the negative correlation analysis: inflation (Variable 59: Infltn) and 
money and quasi money to total reserves (Variable 70: M2_TTReserv).  
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(1) Variable 44: TariffAllweight (overall tariff rate weighted mean)    
(2) Variable 59: Infltn (annual consumer price inflation) 
 The study seeks to uncover effects of commodity price increases and changes in 
governance on consumer price inflation provided by World Bank data on China. 
Academic research suggests that inflation is linked to the development of 
commodity prices (Labys and Maizels, 1990, pp. 1-14, 17-18). Through correlation 
analysis, Granger causality analysis, and regression analysis this study seeks to 
reveal significant relationships between the independent variables and inflation.  
(3) Variable 62: IRSSpread (interest rate spread lending rate minus deposit rate)  
(4) Variable 63: RealIR (real interest rate)  
(5) Variable 64: ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc (external debt stocks to exports of goods, 
services, income) 
(6) Variable 65 ExtDebtST_GNI (external debt stocks to GNI) 
(7) Variable 67: STD_TTExtDbt (short-term debt to total external debt)  
(8) Variable 70: M2_TTReserv (M2 to total reserves) 
 The study aims to reveal significant relationships between governance, specifically 
monetary policies, as well as commodity price increases and money and quasi 
money (M2) to total reserves. 
(9) Variable 71: MultiDebt_TTExtD (multilateral debt to total external debt) 
(10)  Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp (rural population to total population) 
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196 
CORRELATION COUNT CHINA 
Significant Correlation  
The correlation test for China reveals 440 significant correlation counts, spread out 
over the three sets of independent variables. In comparison, Brazil shows 352 significant 
correlation counts.  
Table 4.6: Significant Correlation Counts China 
 Positive 
Correlations 
Negative 
Correlations 
Total Total  
% Share 
Commodity Price Indexes 177 30 207 47.0% 
FoodIx 25 4 29 6.6% 
TropBevIx 7 1 8 1.8% 
VegOilSeedsIx 26 4 30 6.8% 
AgriRawIx 39 7 46 10.5% 
MinMetalsIx 42 7 49 11.1% 
CrudeIx 38 7 45 10.2% 
Worldwide Governance indexes 69 12 81 18.4% 
WGIVA 8 2 10 2.3% 
WGIPS 12 1 13 3.0% 
WGIGE 24 6 30 6.8% 
WGIRQ 5 1 6 1.4% 
WGIRL 6 1 7 1.6% 
WGICC 14 1 15 3.4% 
Economic Freedom Indexes 132 20 152 34.5% 
EFIBiz 13 1 14 3.2% 
EFITrade 39 7 46 10.5% 
EFIFisc 4 1 5 1.1% 
EFIGovtS 16 1 17 3.9% 
EFIMon 4 1 5 1.1% 
EFIInvest68 12 2 14 3.2% 
EFIFin 12 2 14 3.2% 
EFIPropRi 18 1 19 4.3% 
EFICorrup 14 4 18 4.1% 
Total 378 62 440 100.0% 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
Table 4.6 gives an overview of the distribution of negative and positive correlation 
counts across the three sets of independent variables. From a dependent variable point of 
view it is observable that the largest positive correlation count within the dependent 
variable set refers to the private sector & trade topic —specifically within the trade indexes 
                                                 
68
 Data provided by The Heritage Foundation for the EFIInvest index as well as PropRi index is held constant 
at 50 points over the data series period (1996 to 2008). Thus, neither a meaningful correlation nor causality 
calculation can be performed. As a result, there will be no regression analysis performed for EFIInvest and 
EFIPropRi.  
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sub topic—, international merchandise topic, and the financial sector topic. The highest 
correlation coefficient is between CrudeIx (crude price index) and GDPDefl (Variable 1: 
GDP deflator), between CrudeIx and UnitValIxImp (Variable 41: unit value index imports), 
and between EFITrade and FoodProdIx (Variable 55: food production index); all three 
pairs correlate at 98.7% below the 0.01 significance level.  
 
Commodity Price Index  
Commodities are a pivotal and vital ingredient for China’s economic and military 
expansion strategy. As a result, it is not surprising that composite commodity price indexes 
display high/very high correlations to many of the specific 79 economic variables of China. 
The correlation analysis validates this notion. From an independent variable set point of 
view it is observable that the vast majority of significant positive correlation counts, 47.0% 
or 207 of 440 events, occur within the commodity price index set. Within the commodity 
price index set minerals and metals price index (MinMetalsIx) records the largest number 
of significant correlations, 49 counts, followed by AgriRawIx, and CrudeIx with 46 and 45 
significant correlation counts, respectively. Price movements of tropical beverages show 
the lowest correlation association (8 counts) with the dependent variables.  
Changes in commodity price indexes seem to predominantly affect dependent 
variables of the private and trade sector, the international merchandise indexes topic, as 
well as the environmental sector, the financial sector, and the economic policy & debt 
sector (mainly GDP composition variables). For example, all commodities except tropical 
beverages mainly show significant positive correlation to trade indexes (Variables 35 to 
41), trade variables such as Trade_GDP, MrchTrade_GDP, and ExpGS_GDP (Variables 25 
to 27), ExtBalGS_GDP (Variable 29), and CurrAccount_GDP (Variable 30). Also, 
StoxVal_GDP (Variable 52) shows positive correlation to all commodity price indexes, 
except to TropBevIx. MarketCapList_GDP in contrast significantly correlates with 
MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx only. Furthermore, all commodity price indexes except 
TropBevIx show positive correlations with Chinese savings quotas such as GrossSav_GDP, 
GrossSav_GNI, and GrossDomSav_GDP (Variables 10 to 12).  
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Price changes in agricultural raw materials, minerals and metals, and crude oil 
positively correlate with capital formation variables such as GroCapF_GDP (Variable 21: 
gross capital formation to GDP), and GrossFixCapForm_GDP (Variable 23: gross fix 
capital formation to GDP) at significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01. Also, commodity price 
indexes of vegetables, oils and seeds, agricultural raw materials and minerals and metals 
correlate positively with GDP_gr (Variable 2), and GDPpcap_gr (Variable 3).  
Similarly to Brazil, the consumer price index (Variable 58: CPIx) correlates 
positively with all commodity price indexes at the 0.01 significance level.  
 
Economic Freedom Index 
The economic freedom index set provides the second largest number of significant 
correlation counts (152 out of 440). The freedom of trade index (EFITrade) is the dominant 
independent variable within the EFI index set, revealing an overwhelming significant 
correlation count of 46, followed by freedom of property rights (EFIPropRi) with 19 
counts, and freedom of corruption (EFICorrup) with 18 counts.  
The correlation analysis validates the importance of the CCP’s trade governance for 
the Chinese economy. Also, the correlation analysis reveals that property rights as well as 
government activities may have sizable effects on economic activities in China. 
Nonetheless, the correlation effects of government related activities and of property rights 
on the Chinese economy are notably lower than the correlation effects of trade governance. 
Trade governance (EFITrade) correlates positively at significance levels between 
0.05 and 0.01 with nearly all trade indexes (Variables 36 to 41), as well as trade related 
variables such as Trade_GDP (Variable 25), MrchTrade_GDP (Variable 26), ExpGS_GDP 
(Variable 27), ExtBalGS_GDP (Variable 29), CurrACC_GDP (Variable 30), and 
ImpGS_GDP (Variable 31), exports of high technology products (Variable 45: 
HiTekExp_ManuExp), and exports and imports of information and communication 
products (Variables 46 and 47). Also, environmental variables show significant correlation 
values with EFITrade, suggesting that improving trade governance affects domestic 
production in food (Variable 55: FoodProdIx), crops (Variable 56: CropProdIx), and 
livestock (Variable 57: LiveStockProdIx). In addition, EFITrade displays significant 
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negative correlations to variables of the financial sector such as RealIR (Variable 63), 
ExtDebtSsT_ExpGSInc (Variable 64), ExtDebtST_GNI (Variable 65), and positive 
correlation to TTRes_TTExtDbt (Variable 69), suggesting that improving trade governance 
may have an effect on lower debt levels and an increasing reserve account. Also, EFITrade 
reveals positive correlations to China’s savings quotas represented by GrossSav_GDP, 
GrossSav_GNI, and GrossDomSav_GDP (Variables 10 to 12), as well as to China’s gross 
capital formation measured by GroCapF_GDP (Variable 21), and GrossFixCapForm_GDP 
(Variable 23).  
Finally, monetary governance (EFIMon) reveals significant negative correlation 
with inflation (Variable 59), suggesting that positive governance in monetary policy may 
have an effect on improving inflation levels.  
 
Worldwide Governance Index 
With 81 counts, the worldwide governance index set shows the fewest significant 
correlation counts with the selected 79 dependent variables. Government effectiveness 
measured by WGIGE is the leading governance dimension within the WGI index set 
measured by correlation counts (30 significant correlation counts), followed by WGI’s 
corruption index (WGICC) with 15, and political stability (WGIPS) with 13 correlation 
counts. Regulatory quality (WGIRQ) and rule of law (WGIRL) in China seem to have a 
relatively low effect on general economic activities in China as indicated by only 6 and 7 
significant correlation counts.  
 
Non-significant Correlation  
The correlation analysis on China also reveals that out of 79 dependent variables 
only (and coincidentally to Brazil) 8 dependent variables do not display any significant 
correlation to any of the 21 independent variables. The 8 macroeconomic variables are 
marked in red in the correlation matrix and do not proceed to the causality test in Section 
4.2.3. The 8 variables below will thus be excluded from being subject of any further 
econometric analysis.  
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(1) Variable 15: GovFinConExp_gr (government final consumption expenditure growth 
rate) 
(2) Variable 17: FinConExp_gr (final consumption expenditure growth rate) 
(3) Variable 18: HHFinConExp_gr (household final consumption expenditure growth 
rate) 
(4) Variable 24: GrossFixCapForm_gr (gross fixed capital formation growth rate) 
(5) Variable 28: ExpGS_gr (exports of goods and services growth rate) 
(6) Variable 32: ImpGS_gr (imports of goods and services growth rate) 
(7) Variable 66: STD_ExpGSInc (short-term debt to exports of goods services and 
income) 
(8) Variable 68: STD_TTResv (short-term debt to total reserves) 
Only one of the excluded dependent variables is identical for Brazil and China in 
context of the correlation analysis: Variable 28 (exports of goods and services growth rate) 
does not show significant correlation for either Brazil or China. 
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4.2.3 Causality Analysis 
4.2.3.1 Causality Methodology and Hypothesis 
Granger Causality 
In this section I analyze causality effects of all those independent variables to 
dependent variables which passed the previous correlation tests. That is, Granger causality 
analysis in this section is performed on only those pairs of independent and dependent 
variables which showed positive as well as negative correlation with a significance of at 
least 0.05. I am testing independent and dependent variables on the possibility of causal 
relationships in order to reveal significant interdependencies between them. The specific 
objective of this section is to reveal significant effects from changes in independent 
variables to cause changes on dependent variables. 
The concept of Granger causality leans on the idea that the cause of an event that 
changes a variable must occur before the effect on that variable. The Granger causality 
analysis is a statistical diagnostic test in which a dependent variable is lagged on past 
values of itself and then regressed on lagged or past values of the independent variable; in 
this study I use a time lag of twelve months because data series are based on annual data 
points. This procedure is then performed in reverse order. The methodology of causal 
influence on data series has been firstly introduced by Wiener-Granger. In academic 
research literature it is common to state that a variable xt Granger causes yt, that is, the past 
of xt helps to forecast or predict yt (Hurlin, 2004, pp. 1-5).  
titi
n
iti
n
t xyy εαβ ++= −− ∑∑
11
 
Granger tests are based on the null hypothesis H0 of non-causality. H0: xt does not 
cause yt.(Chao, Corradi, and Swanson, 2000, pp. 1-4). That is, in the model above ai= 0, 
with a being a polynomial lag operator defining the magnitude of the explained variation 
based on the past of yt relative to xt. βi represents the best linear predictor variable for yt 
based on its history, and εt is the prediction error (Chao, Corradi, and Swanson 2000, pp. 4, 
12). When ai is zero, the null hypothesis of non-causality H0 cannot be rejected.  
In the Granger causality analysis, changes in commodity price indexes and changes 
in governance indexes are said to cause changes in the dependent variables if the current 
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value of the dependent variable is better predicted from past values of the dependent and 
the independent variable than by past values of the dependent variable alone. The p-value 
threshold for significant causal relationships between independent and dependent variables 
is set at 0.05 —similarly to the p-level in the correlation analysis—, which implies a 
confidence level of 95%. That is, the p-value is the probability of error associated with 
wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis H0 which states that there is a non-causality 
relationship between the independent and dependent variable. Put differently, the lower the 
p-value is, the higher is the probability of rightly rejecting the null hypothesis. The smaller 
the p-value is, the more significant is the causal relationship between the independent and 
the dependent variable.  
The Granger causality test in this section deploys two types of Granger tests: 
Granger causality test 1 (Test 1, or Granger 1), and Granger causality test 2 (Test 2, or 
Granger 2). The null hypothesis of Granger 1 states: the independent variable is affected by 
itself only, and not by the dependent variable. A p-value above 0.05 leads to no rejection of 
the H0. That is, the independent variable is not affected by the dependent variable. Granger 
2 in contrast is significant at p-values below 0.05 and states that the dependent variable is 
affected by itself and not affected by the independent variable. That is, a p-value at or 
below 0.05 allows the rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e., the dependent variable is caused 
by the independent variable.  
Example: The following Granger 1 and Granger 2 test (Test 1, Test 2) exemplify 
Granger causality tests in SAS syntax at the example of Brazil’s GDP change rate, i.e., 
GDP growth rate (Variable 2: GDP_gr), in comparison to the minerals and metals price 
index (MinMetalsIx).  
The p-value for MinMetalsIx of Granger 1 test is 0.2638. The null hypothesis H0 
(H0: changes in MinMetalsIx are only affected by itself and not by GDP_gr) can hence not 
be rejected. The p-value of Granger 2 test is 0.0161; the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
The null hypothesis of Test 2 states that GDP_gr is only affected by itself and not by 
changes in MinMetalsIx. Thus, changes in the global minerals and metals price index cause 
changes in Brazil’s GDP change rate.   
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The syntax below is an illustration of the SAS output syntax in the CD–ROM 
attachment of Granger analysis on change rates for macroeconomic variables and change 
rates of independent variables at the example of change rates of GDP (i.e., GDP_gr) and 
MinMetalsIx for Brazil.  
Figure 4.1: SAS Syntax Granger Causality Example — GDP_gr and changes in MinMetalsIx  
                                 Granger-Causality Wald Test
                                Test        DF    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq
                                   1         1          1.25        0.2638
                                   2         1          5.79        0.0161
                                Test 1:  Group 1 Variables:  MinMetalsIx
                                         Group 2 Variables:  GDP_gr
                                Test 2:  Group 1 Variables:  GDP_gr
                                         Group 2 Variables:  MinMetalsIx
 
Source: Calculated by the author with SAS 9.1.3. Service Pack 4 XP_HOME Platform. 
 
Inverse Granger Causality 
This thesis primarily analyzes effects of changes in governance and commodity 
prices on selected macroeconomic variables leading subsequently to regression analysis. I 
do not perform an explicit regression analysis on inverse Granger causal relationships 
between independent and dependent variables. Reasons for not performing an inverse 
regression analysis are as follows: First, as discussed in Section 1.5, it is questionable to 
suggest that macroeconomic variables affect governance indicators on a broad and 
sustainable scale due to the fact that governance frameworks are designed, formulated and 
established by ruling institutions and state organs. Secondly, Brazil’s and China’s 
expanding economies are in themselves too small to cause commodity prices to rise when 
for example economies of the US and Europe stall or contract.  
However, for complementary purposes in context of correlation and Granger 
causality analysis I discuss inverse Granger causalities between macroeconomic variables, 
commodity price indexes, and governance indexes in Chapter 5 only (Comparative 
Econometric Result Analysis of Selected Variables). That is, Chapter 5 includes the 
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discussion of Granger causality by illustrating the effects of changes in macroeconomic 
variables on governance indexes and commodity price indexes. The objective of inverse 
Granger causality analysis is to identify macroeconomic variables which either affect 
commodity prices —primarily at the example of China— or affect governance dimensions. 
In several cases, inverse Granger causalities do not always offer a sound economic 
rationale, especially when looking at governance dimensions. However, there exist some 
examples of persuasive inverse Granger causalities in which changes in macroeconomic 
variables cause changes in —foremost— commodity price indexes and in a few specific 
governance dimensions (e.g., trade governance (EFITrade), political stability (WGIPS), 
degree of democracy (WGIVA)). 
 
4.2.3.2    Causality Analysis Brazil  
This section carries out the third statistical diagnostic test for Brazil by selecting 
dependent variables on basis of significant Granger causal relationships in which 
independent variables Granger cause dependent variables. The selection of those dependent 
variables which proceed to the regression analysis is solely based on significant Granger 
causality results. The Granger causality matrix for Brazil in Table 4.8a-c illustrates the 
direction of all significant interdependencies between an independent variable and the 79 
macroeconomic variables.  
 
GRANGER CAUSALITY MATRIX BRAZIL 
The pair-wise Granger causality tests are performed on significant correlation pairs 
only and test whether the respective dependent variable is an endogenous variable, affected 
by commodity price indexes and/or governance indexes. Dependent variables Granger 
caused by commodity price indexes or governance indexes are marked in green in the 
matrixes in Table 4.8a-c. Inverse Granger causalities, i.e., dependent variables Granger 
causing independent variables, are marked in yellow. Cells of Granger 1 and Granger 2 
tests showing no significant Granger causal relationship between independent and 
dependent variables are kept either blank or white. 
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Significant and simultaneous results of Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests represent 
feedback (both-ways) results. Feedback results are displayed in bold letters and also 
marked in green. Causality pairs with p-values below 0.05 for Granger 1 and Granger 2 
tests are —by convention— interpreted as if the independent variables Granger cause the 
dependent variables. The Granger causality tests in this study shall be interpreted as within-
sample causality tests due to the fact that they only indicate the Granger endogeneity of the 
dependent variable within the sample period from 1996 to 2008.  
The Granger causality display in Table 4.7 below exemplifies the display of a 
Granger causality result of the Matrix in Table 4.8a-c at the example of GDP_gr (Variable 
2). For each independent-dependent variable pair the Granger causality Matrix in Table 
4.8a-c shows three cells. The first cell displays correlation and respective p-value level ( * 
or **) of the correlated variable pair. The second cell displays the p-value of Granger 1 test. 
The third cell below shows the p-value of Granger 2 test. The null hypothesis of Granger 1 
states that the independent variable is only affected by itself and not affected by the 
dependent variable. The null hypothesis of Granger 2 states that the dependent variable is 
only affected by itself and not by the independent variable.  
For example: FoodIx and GDP_gr (Variable 2) correlate with 69.7% at a p-value 
significance of 0.05. The correlation field is marked green because the correlation is both 
positive and significant. The Granger 1 null hypothesis H0 states that FoodIx is only 
affected by itself and not by Brazil’s GDP_gr. This null hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected 
due to a Granger 1 p-value of 0.4079; the p-value is above the 0.05 threshold. In other 
words, wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis bears a probability of 40.79%. In contrast, the 
Granger 2 null hypothesis states that GDP_gr is only affected by itself and not by FoodIx. 
The p-value of 0.0486, which is below the p-value threshold of 0.05, prompts me to reject 
the null hypothesis with a minimum confidence level of 95%. In conclusion, GDP_gr is 
indeed affected by FoodIx, and not vice versa. In summary, I can say that the results of the 
Granger causality tests lend statistical credence to the suggestion that GDP_gr in Brazil is 
caused by changes in global food prices, even though correlation is only moderate and 
significant at the 0.05-level. Due to the fact that Brazil is an exporter of food products it 
may be sensible to presume that rising food prices cause Brazil’s GDP growth; they may 
perhaps not be the only cause, but are a statistically validated one. Due to the acceptable 
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correlation coefficient in conjunction with the significant Granger causality results, I chose 
to include FoodIx and GDP_gr in the regression analysis on Brazil. In this context it is 
worth mentioning that an in-depth discussion and economic interpretation of correlation, 
causality and regression relationships (including inverse Granger causal observations) is 
performed at length in Chapter 5 for selected macroeconomic variables, one of which is 
GDP_gr (GDP change rate).  
Similarly, AgriRawIx and GDP_gr correlate at 64.3% with a significance level of 
0.05 (sig. 0.05). P-values of Granger 1 and Granger 2 are at 0.7507 and at 0.0003, 
suggesting that GDP_gr is also caused by changes in AgriRawIx. Therefore, I also include 
AgriRawIx in the regression analysis on Brazil. 
Table 4.7: Granger Causality GDP_gr Brazil 
Independent Variables Test Type GDP_gr (Dependent Variable) 
FoodIx Correlation .697* 
 Granger 1 .4079 
 Granger 2 .0486 
AgriRawIx Correlation .643* 
 Granger 1 .7507 
 Granger 2 .0003 
MinMetalsIx Correlation .569* 
 Granger 1 .2638 
 Granger 2 .0161 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. *) significance of 0.05, **) significance of 0.01.  
MinMetalsIx and GDP_gr correlate positively at 56.9* (sig. 0.05). The respective 
Granger 1 test (p-value of 0.2638) statistically indicates that changes in MinMetalsIx are 
caused/affected by itself only and not by GDP_gr. Granger 2 test (p-value of 0.0161) 
indicates that the H0 (GDP_gr is only affected by itself and not by MinMetalsIx) can be 
rejected with high confidence. I therefore also include MinMetalsIx in the regression 
analysis of GDP_gr for Brazil.  
In conclusion, the Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests above in Table 4.7 indicate that 
changes in Brazil’s GDP_gr are not only caused by MinMetalsIx, but also by AgriRawIx, 
and FoodIx. In light of this statistical proposition, Granger results seem plausible from an 
empirical point of view. 
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GRANGER CAUSALITY COUNT BRAZIL 
Significant Granger Causality  
The Granger causality analysis for Brazil identifies a total of 224 significant counts 
of Granger causal relationships, of which only 95 (or 42.4% of total counts) indicate that 
changes in dependent variables are Granger caused by changes in independent variables. In 
contrast, 129 counts (or 57.6% of total counts) indicate that dependent variables are 
Granger causing the change of independent variables (inverse Granger causality). For 
example, household final consumption expenditure growth rate (Table 4.8a, Variable 18: 
HHFinConExp_gr) correlates at 57.8% (*sig. 0.05) with the food price index (FoodIx). 
Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests reveal that changes in FoodIx are caused by changes in 
HHFinConExp_gr, and not vice versa.  
Table 4.9: Significant Granger Causality Counts Brazil 
 Granger  
Causality 
Inverse Granger  
Causality 
Total Total  
% Share 
Commodity Price Indexes 46 67 113 50.4% 
FoodIx 6 16 22 9.8% 
TropBevIx 2 3 5 2.2% 
VegOilSeedsIx 2 15 17 7.6% 
AgriRawIx 13 16 29 12.9% 
MinMetalsIx 11 14 25 11.2% 
CrudeIx 12 3 15 6.7% 
Worldwide Governance Indexes 27 28 55 24.6% 
WGIVA 13 16 29 12.9% 
WGIPS 4 1 5 2.2% 
WGIGE 4 1 5 2.2% 
WGIRQ 5 4 9 4.0% 
WGIRL 1 5 6 2.7% 
WGICC 0 1 1 0.4% 
Economic Freedom Indexes 22 34 56 25.0% 
EFIBiz 3 5 8 3.6% 
EFITrade 7 20 27 12.1% 
EFIFisc 3 2 5 2.2% 
EFIGovtS 2 4 6 2.7% 
EFIMon 0 1 1 0.4% 
EFIInvest 0 0 0 0.0% 
EFIFin 2 1 3 1.3% 
EFIPropRi 0 0 0 0.0% 
EFICorrup 5 1 6 2.7% 
Total 95 129 224 100.0% 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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At the example of HHFinConExp_gr (Variable 18) I observe inverse Granger 
causality. As stated earlier, inverse Granger causality analysis (or negative Granger 
causality) will be part of the economic discussion in Chapter 5. The inverse causal nature of 
HHFinConExp_gr on FoodIx prompts me to exclude HHFinConExp_gr from the 
regression analysis on Brazil. 
There are 22 pairs of Granger causal feedback relationships within the commodity 
price index set (16 counts), WGI set (5 counts), and EFI set (1 counts) which display 
significant p-values for the Granger 1 test and Granger 2 test. These 22 feedback (two-way) 
Granger causalities are marked in bold letters. They predominantly appear within the 
financial sector topic, private sector and trade topic. Feedback Granger causalities will be 
regarded as Granger causalities of independent variables causing dependent variables. That 
is, feedback Granger causalities will be part of the regression analysis by convention (if not 
otherwise explicitly stated) by rejecting the H0 of Granger 2 and not rejecting the H0 of 
Granger 1.69  
 
Commodity Price Index 
The commodity price index set discloses a total count of 113 Granger causalities 
(50.4% of total Granger causalities) of which 46 consist of independent variables Granger 
causing dependent variables. And 67 counts reveal inverse Granger causality (46 Granger 
causalities: 67 inverse Granger causalities).  
The largest numbers of causality counts within the commodity price index occur 
within AgriRawIx (13:16), followed by CrudeIx (12:3), MinMetalsIx (11:14), FoodIx 
(6:16), VegOilSeedsIx (2:15), and TropBevIx (2:3). 
According to the Granger causality findings I also note that commodity prices in 
Brazil predominantly affect dependent variables within the private & trade sector 
(Variables 37-40), such as import volume index and export volume index, and within the 
                                                 
69
 For example, export volume index (Table 4.8b, Variable 38: ExpVolx) positively correlates at 82.7% (sig. 
0.01) with MinMetalsIx. Granger causality analysis reveals feedback results. Granger 1 test and Granger 2 
test are both significant below the 0.01-level (sig. 0.01). Granger 1 indicates that prices of minerals and metals 
are caused by increasing export volumes, whereas Granger 2 indicates that export volumes are caused by 
increasing minerals and metals prices (MinMetalsIx). By convention, ExpVolx (Variable 38) is therefore 
caused by MinMetalsIx and thus included in the regression analysis. 
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economic policy & debt topic such as GDP_gr and GDPpCap_gr (Variables 2 and 3). 
GDP_gr and GDPpCap_gr correlate positively with AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx, 
suggesting that Brazil’s vast reserves and wealth in iron ores as well as in agricultural 
commodities, and external demand thereof, affect GDP_gr and GDPpCap_gr. Granger 
causality analysis supports this suggestion by revealing that GDP_gr and GDPpCap_gr are 
Granger caused by MinMetalsIx and AgriRawIx. Similarly, it appears that increases in 
AgriRawIx cause IndustValAd_gr (Variable 7) and ManFactValAdd_gr (Variable 9). Also, 
government final consumption expenditures growth rate (Variable 15: GovFinConExp_gr) 
is driven by rising VegOilseedsIx. Then, increasing commodity prices in food (FoodIx) and 
agricultural raw materials (AgriRawIx) seem to Granger cause gross fixed capital formation 
to GDP (Variable 23: GrossFixCapForm_GDP).  
Trade indexes (Variables 36 to 41) display a large concentration of Granger 
causality counts. Half of it is of inverse nature. For example, export value index (Variable 
36: ExpValx) displays inverse Granger causality to all commodity price indexes except to 
tropical beverages (TropBevIx). This suggests that rising Brazilian export values are 
causing/affecting global commodity prices, specifically those of soy and iron ores, which 
are exported in large volumes by Brazil to China. China’s import value index and import 
volume index (Variables 37, 39: ImpValIx, ImpVolIx) in turn show significant Granger 1 
results and significant Granger 2 results (both p-values are below 0.05) to nearly all 
commodity price indexes. This suggests that commodity demand by China, reflected by 
high global commodity import shares to China, affect commodity prices on a global scale 
between 1996 and 2008. Significant Granger 1 and Granger 2 results of Brazil’s ExpVolx 
(Variable 38) with AgriRawIx (p-value1 0.0001, p-value2 0.0064), with MinMetalsIx (p-
value1 0.0004, p-value2 0.0005), and with CrudeIx (p-value1 0.096, p-value2 0.0009) 
support the argument that increased demand for these commodities, especially from China, 
causes Brazilian ExpVolx to rise. Therefore, in this case, p-values of Granger 1 test of the 
Chinese import volume index (Variable 39: ImpVolIx) may be accepted, i.e., Granger 1 H0 
would have to be rejected for all commodity price indexes except TropBevIx, and Granger 
2 H0 (despite p-values below 0.05) of Chinese ImpVolIx may not be rejected for all 
commodity price indexes except TropBevIx (Table 4.11b: Granger Causality Matrix 
China). The feedback relationship will be disregarded in favor of the hypothesis that 
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imports to China cause changes in relevant commodity prices. This relationship will be 
assessed in more depth in Section 5.2.8 (Trade Indexes). 
Also, the Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests for stock value to GDP (Variable 52: 
StoxVal_GDP) reveal that commodity prices of food, agricultural raw materials, minerals 
and metals as well as oil Granger cause StoxVal_GDP. Market capitalization to GDP 
(Variable 54: MrktCapList_GDP) however is affected by CrudeIx only. M2_GDP 
(Variable 60: money and quasi money (M2) to GDP) is caused by agricultural raw 
materials, minerals and metals as well as crude oil prices (CrudeIx). Rising CrudeIx 
together with MinMetalsIx cause the rise of Brazil’s total reserves to external debt ratio 
(Variable 69). Furthermore, declining ExtdebtSt_ExpGS (Variable 64) seem to be Granger 
caused by rising food prices, showing a high significant negative correlation of 69.9%.  
The declining rural population to total population ratio (Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp) 
appears to be Granger caused by MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx, showing a high and significant 
negative correlation of -76.7% and -86.1%. This suggests that there exists an association 
between rural migration and increasing commodity prices in conjunction with an increasing 
commodities export sector in industrial centers such as São Paulo, Rio De Janeiro, Salvador 
De Bahia, or Porto Alegre.   
In conclusion, commodity price indexes display the largest number of causality 
counts compared to all sets of independent variables, underscoring the importance of all 
commodity groups for Brazil’s economy, especially food, vegetables, oils and seeds, 
agricultural raw materials, minerals and metals, and oil.  
 
Economic Freedom Index 
 EFI index shows 56 significant Granger causalities of which 34 are of inverse 
(negative) nature. Trade governance (EFITrade) is the dominant governance dimension 
within the EFI set and one of the most dominant individual independent variables overall, 
counting 27 Granger causalities (12.1% of all causality counts for Brazil), 20 of which are 
of inverse nature. This is remarkable and suggests that trade governance in Brazil may be 
caused by macroeconomic variables which reflect on the improving macroeconomic 
dynamics between 1996 and 2008. Deteriorating business governance (EFIBiz), down from 
  
214 
70.0 index points to 54.4 index points between 1996 and 2008, is the second strongest 
governance index of Brazil, counting 8 Granger causalities, five of which are of inverse 
nature. This illustrates the low intensity of Granger causality effects from EFIBiz to the 
dependent variables. 
The Brazilian EFITrade (trade governance), which improved from 57.0 to 71.6 
points from 1996 to 2008, reveals significant Granger causal effects in the context of 
significant negative correlations with debt related variables such as external debt stocks to 
gross national income (Variable 65: ExtDebST_GNI), short-term debt to total reserves 
(Variable 68: STD_TTRsv), and a positive correlation with total reserves to total external 
debt (Variable 69: TTRes_TTExtDbt). The latter indicates that improving trade governance 
causes lower external debt and higher reserves positions for Brazil. This indication is 
underscored by the significantly negative correlation of EFITrade with 
ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc (Variable 64) and STD_ExpGSInc (Variable 66), correlating at 
96.3% and 91.1%, respectively, in context of a significant positive correlation with unit 
value of exports index (Variable 40: UnitValIxExp), which as well is Granger caused by 
trade governance (EFITrade) at the 0.01 significance level.  
The improved trade governance seems to also positively affect stock market related 
variables such as StoxVal_GDP (Variable 52: total value of stocks traded to GDP) and 
MrktCapList_GDP (Variable 54: market capitalization of listed companies to GDP), 
indicating that an increasingly open Brazilian economy attracted stock market investors 
into the IBOVESPA index and its constituents, which are primarily lead by commodity 
firms in the oil, and minerals and metals sector (e.g., Petrobras, Companhia Vale Do Rio 
Doce).  
The declining freedom of business governance on the other hand reveals significant 
Granger causal effects on declining manufactured exports to total merchandise exports 
(Variable 50: ManExp_MrchExp). This provides statistical evidence that an expanding 
domestic export oriented commodity sector impinges the development of the domestic 
manufacturing sector, leading to lower exports and imports of manufactured goods as a 
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result of redirected resources into the commodity sector. 70  Imports of manufactured 
products to total merchandise imports (Variable: 34) also displayed moderately high 
correlations to declining fiscal governance (EFIFisc index), increasing government 
involvement (i.e., declining EFIGovtS index), and declining freedom of finance governance 
(EFIFin index) at significant levels. Granger causality indicates that ManfImp_MerchImp 
seems to be negatively affected by the decline of EFIBiz, EFIFisc, and EFIFin.  
 
Worldwide Governance Index 
The WGI index set shows 55 significant Granger causality counts. More than half 
(28 counts) are of inverse nature. The dominant independent variable within the WGI (and 
also within the entire independent variable sets) is the voice and accountability index 
(WGIVA) counting 29 significant Granger causalities, 16 of which are of inverse nature. It 
is remarkable that trade variables such as Trade_GDP, Mrchtrade_GDP, and ExpGS_GDP 
(Variables 25-27) are Granger caused by political stability (WGIPS), showing positive 
correlations of 64.6%, 62.1%, and 56.2% below the significance level of 0.05.  
Equally remarkable is the following: Trade_GDP, MrchTrade_GDP, and 
ExpGS_GDP Granger cause the voice and accountability index (WGIVA, i.e., degree of 
democracy index) at significance levels close to 0.01, displaying correlations of 77.2%, 
78.3%, and 82.3% also at significance levels close to 0.01. This suggests the following: The 
improving degree of democracy index (WGIVA) is caused by improving trade openness 
represented by rising Variables 25 to 27. In this context it is revealing that 
MarktCapList_GDP is Granger caused by not only minerals and metals and oil prices but 
also by WGIVA at significant levels with a correlation of 64.6% (sig. 0.05). Furthermore, 
the causality analysis reveals that improving trade indexes (Variables 36-39, 41) are in turn 
Granger caused by WGIVA at significant levels (sig. 0.05). Also revealing is that an 
improving degree of democracy (WGIVA) seems to Granger cause the increase in internet 
connections (Variable 76: Internet_100 (internet lines per 100 households)) which stood at 
                                                 
70
 The declining economic freedom index of business correlates positively at a high significance level with 
ManfImp_MerchImp (Variable 34: manufactured imports to merchandise imports), and 
ManufExp_MerchExp (Variable 50: manufactured exports to merchandise exports). Variable 50 
(manufactured exports to merchandise exports) declined from 53.8% in 1998 to 44.9% in 2008. Variable 34 
(manufactured imports to merchandise imports) was relatively flat at 70% at the end of 1996 and 2008.   
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0.45% in 1996 and 37.52% in 2008 in Brazil (in comparison to 0.01% and 22.5% in China 
during the same period). However, this measure does not necessarily reveal sufficient 
information about the degree of critical political dialog and content issued through the 
internet, which in turn may serve in itself as a measure of the degree of democracy (e.g., 
freedom of speech).  
 In contrast, deteriorating regulatory quality governance (WGIRQ) —down from 
0.36 to 0.07 between 1996 and 2008— appears to Granger cause the decline of the 
following variables: GrossNatExp_GDP (Variable 13), FinConExp (Variable 16), 
HHFinConExp_GDP (Variable 19), ManfImp_MrchImp (Variable 34), 
ManuExp_MrchExp (Variable 50) at significant levels (< sig. 0.05 for Variables 13, 16, 19, 
and < sig. 0.01 for Variables 34, 50).   
 
Non-significant Granger Causality 
The Granger causality analysis in this section reveals that there are a number of 
dependent variables which show significant inverse Granger causality to an independent 
variable. The purpose of this section is not only the identification of Granger caused 
dependent variables, but also the elimination of dependent variables which are not 
significantly Granger caused by any of the independent variables. The elimination of these 
dependent variables is a further selection step as I proceed towards the regression analysis. 
Dependent variables which are not significantly Granger caused by any independent 
variable are marked in red in the Granger Causality Matrix Brazil (Table 4.8a-c) and 
include the following 27 dependent variables:  
(1) Variable 4: Agri_GDP (agriculture value added to GDP) 
(2) Variable 10: GrossSav_GDP (gross savings to GDP) 
(3) Variable 11: GrossSav_GNI (gross savings to gross national income) 
(4) Variable 17: FinConExp_gr (final consumption expenditure growth rate) 
(5) Variable 18: HHFinConExp_gr (household final consumption expenditure growth 
rate) 
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(6) Variable 20: HHFinConExpPCap_gr (household final consumption expenditure per 
capita growth rate) 
(7) Variable 22: GroCapF_gr (gross capital formation growth rate) 
(8) Variable 24: GrossFixCapForm_gr (gross fixed capital formation growth rate) 
(9) Variable 29: ExtBalGS_GDP (external balance of goods and services to GDP) 
(10) Variable 30: CurrACC_GDP (current account to GDP) 
(11) Variable 31: ImpGS_GDP (imports of goods and services to GDP) 
(12) Variable 32: ImpGS_gr (imports of goods and services growth rate) 
(13) Variable 44: TariffAllweight (weighted tariff rate all products) 
(14) Variable 45: HiTekExp_ManuExp (high technology exports to manufactured 
exports) 
(15) Variable 46: ICTExp_TTExp (information communication technology exports to 
merchandise exports) 
(16) Variable 48: AgrRwExp_MerchExp (agricultural raw material exports to 
merchandise exports) 
(17) Variable 49: FoodExp_MrchExp (food exports to merchandise exports) 
(18) Variable 51: FDInet_GDP (net foreign direct investment to GDP) 
(19) Variable 55: FoodPrdIx (food production index) 
(20) Variable 56: CropProdIx (crop production index) 
(21) Variable 61: M2_gr (money and quasi money growth) 
(22) Variable 62: IRSSpread (interest rate spread) 
(23) Variable 63: RealIR (real interest rate) 
(24) Variable 66: STD_ExpGSInc (short-term debt to exports of goods, services, and 
income) 
(25) Variable 67: STD_TTExtDbt (short-term debt to total external debt) 
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(26) Variable 72: EnrgyImp_Euse (energy imports to energy use) 
(27) Variable 73: GDP_UEnUKPPPOilE (GDP per unit of energy use (USD per kg of 
oil equivalent)) 
 
4.2.3.3 Causality Analysis China  
This section represents the third stage of statistical diagnostic tests for China. The 
dependent variables are selected based on independent variables Granger causing 
dependent variables. Similarly to the selection process applied at the example of Brazil, the 
selection of dependent variables for regression analysis is solely based on significant 
positive Granger causality. Non-Granger causal dependent variables or inverse (or 
negative) causal dependent variables will not be part of the regression analysis. The 
Granger causality matrix for China in Table 4.10 below illustrates the Granger causality 
framework in this thesis at the example of China.  
 
GRANGER CAUSALITY MATRIX CHINA 
Similarly to the example of Brazil, the Granger matrix Tables 4.11a-c display 
dependent variables Granger caused by independent variables (marked in green). Inverse or 
negative Granger causalities are marked in yellow; the null hypothesis of Granger 1 test can 
be rejected based on a significance value threshold of 0.05, whereas the null hypothesis of 
Granger 2 test may not be rejected. Granger causality result fields without any significance 
are either kept blank or in white.   
Granger causality pairs showing a significant Granger 1 test result as well as a 
significant Granger 2 test result are marked in bold letters (feedback results, both p-values 
are below 0.05). Per convention, causality pairs which display p-values below 0.05 for 
Granger 1 test and Granger 2 test will be interpreted as independent variables Granger 
causing dependent variables and therefore be part of the regression analysis. The Granger 
matrix Table 4.11 below shows Granger causality results for each independent-dependent 
variable pair and their respective p-values.  
Example 1: Trade_GDP (Variable 25: trade to GDP) exemplifies the interpretation 
of the Granger causality matrix in Tables 4.11a-c of China. AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, and 
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CrudeIx correlate at 59.8%*, 73.7%**, and 79.4%** with Trade_GDP at significant levels 
(*sig. 0.05, **sig. 0.01). CrudeIx displays a Granger 1 test p-value of 0.4343 and a Granger 
2 test p-value of 0.0010 indicating that the changes in CrudeIx Granger cause changes in 
trade to GDP. Both, AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx show p-values below 0.05 for Granger 1 
and Granger 2 test. The respective p-values displayed in bold for Granger 1 test and 
Granger 2 test are at 0.0007 and 0.0002 for AgriRawIx, and 0.0001 for both Granger 1 test 
and Granger 2 test for MinMetalsIx. I observe feedback (two-way) Granger causality for 
AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx. P-values below 0.05 of Granger 1 and Granger 2 test suggest 
that there exists positive and negative Granger causality between the independent and 
dependent variables. As stated before, convention in this thesis dictates that feedback 
results (simultaneously significant Granger 1 and Granger 2 test results) will be treated as 
independent variables Granger causing the dependent variable. That is, in case of feedback 
results the Granger 1 test null hypothesis will not be rejected while the Granger 2 test null 
hypothesis will be rejected. Therefore, AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, as well as CrudeIx ought 
to Granger cause changes in Trade_GDP. AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx are thus included in 
the regression analysis, as is CrudeIx.  
Table 4.10: Granger Causality Trade_GDP China  
Independent Variables Test Type Trade_GDP (Dependent Variable) 
AgriRawIx Correlation .598* 
 Granger 1 0.0007 
 Granger 2 0.0002 
MinMetalsIx Correlation .737** 
 Granger 1 <0.0001 
 Granger 2 <0.0001 
CrudeIx Correlation .794** 
 Granger 1 0.4343 
 Granger 2 0.0010 
EFITrade Correlation .911** 
 Granger 1 0.0103 
 Granger 2 0.9239 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
Trade_GDP and EFITrade are inversely Granger causal as implied by the Granger 1 
test p-value of 0.0103 and Granger 2 test p-value of 0.9239. The null hypothesis of Granger 
1 is: the independent variable is only affected by itself and not affected by the dependent 
variable. I reject this null due to its p-value of 0.0103. The null hypothesis of Granger 2 test 
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states that the dependent variable (Trade_GDP) is only affected by itself and not by the 
EFITrade index. The null of Granger 2 must not be rejected as the p-value is above 0.05 
and very high. From an economical perspective this statistical result implies —if true— 
that an increasing trade to GDP ratio in China implies reactive moves in China’s trade 
governance. That is, trade to GDP causes trade governance. A sensible economic 
explanation for this may point to the dynamics of a growing external sector in China which 
has been the catalyst for continuous and gradually improving trade governance changes 
imposed by the central government in order to fully comply with WTO provisions and in 
order to capitalize on China’s comparative —export related— advantages.  
Due to the inverse Granger causality, EFITrade is not included in the regression 
analysis of Trade_GDP for China.  
Example 2: GDP growth rate (Variable 2: GDP_gr) serves as another example for 
the result interpretation of the Granger causality matrix. VegOilSeedsIx and GDP_gr 
correlate at 59.0%* (* p-value sig. 0.05). The correlation field is marked in green in order 
to flag the high significance of the correlation test. Granger 1’s null hypothesis states that 
VegOilSeedsIx is only affected by itself and not by China’s GDP_gr (H0: no Granger 
causality). The null can be rejected due to a p-value of 0.0272. The probability of wrongly 
rejecting the null hypothesis is at 2.72 %. In contrast, Granger 2 H0 states that GDP_gr is 
only affected by itself and not by VegOilSeedsIx. Due to a p-value of 0.1281, which is 
above the p-value threshold of 0.05, I choose to not reject the null hypothesis at a high 
confidence level (above 95%). That is, GDP_gr is not Granger caused by VegOilSeedsIx. 
In summary I can say GDP growth in China Granger causes global VegOilSeedsIx based 
on the Granger causality tests performed. However, the correlation is only moderate. In 
light of China’s imports of vegetables, oils and seeds compared to world imports it may be 
valid to state that China’s GDP growth helped to drive global VegOilSeedsIx between 1996 
and 2008. Due to the inverse Granger causality I cannot include VegOilseedsIx in the 
multiple regression analysis of GDP_gr for China.  
Similarly, AgriRawIx and GDP_gr correlate at 61% at a significance level of 0.05 
(sig. 0.05). P-values of Granger 1 and Granger 2 are above 0.05 and thus Granger causality 
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does not exist, or is at least unclear. Thus, AgriRawIx is not included in the regression 
analysis of GDP_gr for China. 
Lastly, MinMetalsIx and Chinese GDP_gr correlate positively at 65.1% (sig. 0.05). 
Granger 1 test (p-value of 0.8333) indicates that changes in MinMetalsIx are 
caused/affected by itself only and not by GDP_gr. Granger 2 test (p-value of 0.0007) 
indicates that the H0 (H0: GDP_gr is only affected by itself and not by MinMetalsIx) can be 
rejected. That is, Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests indicate that changes in MinMetalsIx 
lead/cause changes in GDP_gr. I therefore include MinMetalsIx in the regression analysis 
of GDP_gr for China.  
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GRANGER CAUSALITY COUNT CHINA 
Significant Granger Causality 
The Granger causality analysis in Granger matrix Table 4.11a-c above on China 
identifies 267 counts of significant Granger causal relationships. Out of these 267 
significant causalities, 158 counts (or 59.2%) are of inverse nature, which means there are 
158 inverse Granger causal dependencies in which dependent variables Granger cause 
independent variables. Similarly to Brazil, the causality tests on China reveal that the 
majority of Granger causalities are of inverse nature; 109 Granger causalities vs. 158 
(∑267) inverse Granger causalities (Brazil: 95 Granger causalities vs. 129 inverse Granger 
causalities).  
Table 4.12: Significant Granger Causality Counts China 
  Granger  
Causality 
Inverse Granger  
Causality 
Total Total  
% Share 
Commodity Price Indexes 66 92 158 59.2% 
FoodIx 6 17 23 8.6% 
TropBevIx 1 3 4 1.5% 
VegOilSeedsIx 6 19 25 9.4% 
AgriRawIx 11 26 37 13.9% 
MinMetalsIx 26 18 44 16.5% 
CrudeIx 16 9 25 9.4% 
Worldwide governance indexes 12 36 48 18.0% 
WGIVA 2 5 7 2.6% 
WGIPS 2 10 12 4.5% 
WGIGE 3 18 21 7.9% 
WGIRQ 1 0 1 0.4% 
WGIRL 0 0 0 0.0% 
WGICC 4 3 7 2.6% 
Economic Freedom Indexes 31 30 61 22.8% 
EFIBiz 2 1 3 1.1% 
EFITrade 10 15 25 9.4% 
EFIFisc 0 0 0 0.0% 
EFIGovtS 5 1 6 2.2% 
EFIMon 1 3 4 1.5% 
EFIInvest 3 2 5 1.9% 
EFIFin 3 2 5 1.9% 
EFIPropRi 3 6 9 3.4% 
EFICorrup 4 0 4 1.5% 
Total 109 158 267 100.0% 
  Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
I note that there is an inverse Granger causal cluster effect of GrossSav_GDP 
(Variable 10), GrossSav_GNI (Variable 11), and GrossDomSav_GDP (Variable 12) 
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Granger causing VegOilSeedsIx, AgriRawIx, and MinMetalsIx. That is, changes in gross 
savings and gross domestic savings relative to GDP and GNI cause statistically speaking 
changes in price indexes for vegetables, oil seeds and oils (VegOilSeedsIx), agricultural 
raw materials (AgriRawIx), and minerals and metals (MinMetalsIx). Furthermore, the 
Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests reveal that a few macroeconomic variables of the financial 
sector topic such as TTres_TTExtDbt (Variable 69) Granger cause all commodity price 
indexes except that for tropical beverages (TropBevIx).    
39 variable pairs show significant p-values of Granger 1 as well as of Granger 2 test 
(marked in bold letters in Granger Matrix Tables 4.11a-c).71 These 39 feedback (two-way) 
causalities, 35 of which reside within the commodity price index set, affect predominantly 
macroeconomic variables within the financial sector topic as well as the private sector and 
trade topic. As already discussed at the example of Brazil, convention is that feedback 
causalities are treated as Granger causalities in which independent variables cause 
dependent variables. 
 
Commodity Price Index 
Similarly to Brazil, commodity price indexes (except TropBevIx) play a 
predominant role in revealing significant causalities between independent and dependent 
variables of China. Of overall 267 significant Granger causality counts, 158 counts (or 
59.2%) reside within the commodity price index set, and 92 of these are of inverse nature. 
For example, Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests on GDP growth rate and GDP per capita 
growth rate (Variable 2: GDP_gr, Variable 3: GDPpCap_gr) reveal that changes in 
VegOilSeedsIx are Granger caused by GDP_gr and GDPpcap_gr, indicating that the 
economic expansion by China measured by GDP_gr and GDPpCap_gr may be a driver for 
prices of vegetables, oils and seed products.  
The dominance of commodity price indexes in the context of causality testing 
unveils the major role commodities play for China’s economic expansion. Within the 
commodity price index set, the largest count is MinMetalsIx (44 counts), followed by 
                                                 
71
 35 feedback (or two-way) causalities appear within the commodity price index set, three occur within the 
EFI index set, and one occurs within the WGI index set.  
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AgriRawIx (37 counts), VegOilSeedsIx and CrudeIx (25 counts each), FoodIx (23 counts), 
and TropBevIx (4 counts).  
AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, and CrudeIx Granger cause macroeconomic variables 
particularly within the Economic Policy & Debt Topic such as Trade_GDP (Variable 25) 
and within the private sector and trade sector such as MerchTrade_GDP (Variable 26), 
ExpGS_GDP (Variable 27), and ExtBalGS_GDP (Variable 29). Also, the increase of 
AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, and CrudeIx Granger causes the decline of rural population as 
percentage to total population (Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp).  
Increasing demand for minerals and metals as well as for agricultural raw materials, 
food, vegetables, oils, and seeds represented by the increasing import value and import 
volume index (Variable 37: ImpValIx, Variable 39: ImpVolIx) appear to Granger cause the 
increase of global prices for these commodities. However, the feedback causalities between 
Variables 37 and 39 and their respective commodity price indexes also imply that ImpValIx 
(Variable 37) and ImpVolIx (Variable 39) increase as a result of higher commodity prices. 
Correlations between ImpValIx and ImpVolIx and FoodIx, VegOilSeedsIx, AgriRawIx, 
and MinMetalsIx are moderately high and very high between 61.3% and 94.1% at 
significance levels of 0.01 (except for the ImpVolIx and VegOilSeedsIx pair (sig. 0.05)) 
and also display significant feedback (two-way) Granger causalities (except for 
VegOilSeedsIx, CrudeIx and ImpValIx). Similarly, MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx seem to 
affect the value increase in ImpGS_GDP (Variable 31). However, there also exists a 
significant association between an increasing value of imports (ImpGS_GDP) and 
MinMetalsIx, revealing a correlation at 63.5% and a significant inverse Granger causality, 
which implies that Chinese imports (ImpGS_GDP) cause/affect global prices for minerals 
and metals.     
Increasing MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx seem to also drive stock market valuation 
measured by StoxValIx and MrktCapList_GDP (Variables 52 and 54), which rose from 
29.9 index points to 120.7 index points and from 13.3 index points to 61.6 index points 
respectively between 1996 and 2008. Furthermore, increased oil and minerals and metals 
prices seem to positively affect (Granger cause) China’s energy-production efficiency 
measured by the purchase price parity GDP per one unit of energy use per kilogram of oil 
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equivalent (Variable 74: GDP_UEnUPPPOilE (at the significance level of 0.01)). The 
correlation of CrudeIx, MinMetalsIx and GDP_UEnUPPPOilE is at 76.8%, and 86.5% (sig. 
0.01). Also, rising CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx seem to Granger cause the consumer price 
index in China (Variable 58: CPIx).  
 
Economic Freedom Index 
The EFI index set reveals 61 counts of significant Granger causalities, of which 
more than half (31 events) are Granger causalities and 30 are inverse Granger causalities. 
EFITrade is the dominant governance dimension within the EFI index set, Granger causing 
10 dependent variables of the private sector and trade topic as well as of the financial sector 
topic (Variables: 35, 36, 38, 47, 54, 63, 65, 72, 74, 79). In turn, fifteen dependent variables 
cause EFITrade (trade governance). That is, these macroeconomic variables from the 
private sector & trade topic such as trade to GDP (Variable 25: Trade_GDP) or fuel imports 
to merchandise imports (Variable 35: FuelImp_MerchImp) cause changes in trade 
governance (EFITrade). 
It is also observable that freedom in EFIPropRi (property rights) is second to 
EFITrade, Granger causing 3 dependent variables, whereas EFIPropRi is Granger caused 
by 6 dependents variables (Variables 13, 16, 34, 42, 70, 71). EFIGovtS shows 6 causality 
counts, one of which is an inverse Granger causality. Specifically, increasing government 
size, that is deteriorating government size governance seems to significantly (sig. 0.05) 
Granger cause decreasing final consumption expenditure to GDP (Variable 16: 
FinConExp_GDP) and household final consumption expenditure to GDP (Variable 19: 
HHFinConExp_GDP).  
 
Worldwide Governance Index 
Within the Worldwide Governance index set there are 48 significant Granger 
causalities, 36 of which are of inverse nature. Causality tests suggest that among all WGI 
governance dimensions WGIGE and WGIPS play dominant roles within the Chinese 
economy, counting 21 and 12 significant Granger causality events, 18 and 10 of which are 
of inverse nature.  
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Intriguingly, deterioration in corruption governance measured by WGICC (4 
Granger causalities vs. 3 inverse Granger causalities) seems to affect Agri_GDP (Variable 
4), which declined from 19.7% in 1998 to 10.7% in 2008, as well as FinConExp_GDP 
(Variable 16), and HHFinConExp_GDP (Variable 19), which declined from 57.5% to 
49.8%, and from 43.5% to 36.8% between 1996 and 2008, respectively.  
 
Non-significant Granger Causality  
The Granger causality analysis in this section reveals that there are 22 dependent 
variables which do not show any significant Granger dependency to independent variables. 
That is, 22 dependent variables are not Granger caused by any of the 21 independent 
variables of the commodity price index set, the EFI and WGI governance index sets. In 
comparison, Brazil’s Granger causality analysis reveals 27 dependent variables that are not 
Granger caused by any of the independent variables. The dependent variables which have 
been identified of not being Granger caused by independent variables are marked in red in 
the Granger Causality Matrix China (Tables 4.11a-c). The following 22 dependent 
variables are therefore excluded from the regression analysis:  
(1) Variable 1: GDPDefl (gross domestic product deflator) 
(2) Variable 5: Agri_gr (agriculture value added growth rate) 
(3) Variable 6: IndustValAd_GDP (industry value added to GDP) 
(4) Variable 8: ManuValAdd_GDP (manufacturing value added to GDP) 
(5) Variable 9: ManFactValAdd_gr (manufacturing value added growth rate) 
(6) Variable 12: GrossDomSav_GDP (gross domestic saving to GDP) 
(7) Variable 20: HHFinConExpPCap_gr (household final consumption expenditure per 
capita growth rate) 
(8) Variable 21: GroCapF_GDP (gross capital formation to GDP) 
(9) Variable 22: GroCapF_gr (gross capital formation growth rate) 
(10) Variable 23: GrossFixCapForm_GDP (gross fixed capital formation to GDP) 
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(11) Variable 33: AgRawImp_MrchImp (agricultural raw material imports to merchandise 
imports) 
(12) Variable 34: ManfImp_MrchImp (manufactured imports to merchandise imports) 
(13) Variable 41: UnitValIxImp (unit value index of imports) 
(14) Variable 42: ToT (terms of trade) 
(15) Variable 44: TariffAllweight (tariff rate weighted mean of all products) 
(16) Variable 50: ManufExp_MrchExp (manufactured export to merchandise exports) 
(17) Variable 55: FoodProdIx (food production index) 
(18) Variable 56: CropProdIx (crop production index) 
(19) Variable 57: LiveStockProdIx (livestock production index) 
(20) Variable 60: M2_GDP (money and quasi money to GDP) 
(21) Variable 71: MultiDebt_TTExtDbt (multilateral debt to total external debt) 
(22) Variable 78: Unempl_Lforce (unemployment to total labor force) 
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4.2.4   Principal Component Analysis  
4.2.4.1 Methodology 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to discard the effects of 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity in a regression analysis model is a statistical occurrence 
in which two or more independent variables are observed to be highly correlated. 
Multicollinearity does neither diminish the reliability nor reduce the predictive power of a 
regression model as a whole within a given data set. This is due to the fact that high 
correlation among two or more variables suggests that they are measuring the same 
phenomenon or construct. In other words, highly correlated variables convey the same 
information. Multiple regression fits a model to predict a dependent variable from several 
independent variables. If the regression model fits the data series, the overall R2 value will 
be high and the corresponding p-value will be low.72 As for the p-value of an individual 
variable, the overall p-value for a multiple regression represents the level of significance for 
the entire regression analysis. A low p-value indicates that a particular independent variable 
significantly improves the fit of the model. The individual p-value is calculated by 
evaluating the goodness-of-fit of the model as a whole to the goodness-of-fit in case the 
specific independent variable is not included, that is, omitted. In specific cases, results of 
multiple regression analysis may seem conflicting. Even though the overall multiple 
regression results’ p-value is low, all of the individual p-values are high. That is, the model 
fits the data well despite of the high p-values of the independent variables, which indicates 
statistical insignificance on predicting a single dependent variable alone. In such a case, no 
single independent variable contributes significantly to the model. But together they 
contribute a lot, suggesting that the regression model is exposed to multicollinearity.   
Multicollinearity has an effect on calculations with respect to independent variables 
only. Multiple regression models with highly correlated independent variables demonstrate 
how well the entire collection of independent variables predicts the dependent ones, 
however it does not necessarily give valid results about any individual independent 
                                                 
72
 The adjusted R2 coefficient is used as a statistical metric to reveal the goodness of fit of a model. In 
regression analysis an adjusted R2 coefficient demonstrates how well the regression line approximates real 
data points with each newly added variable. An adjusted R2 of 1.0 means the regression line perfectly fits the 
data series. 
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variable, or about which independent variables are redundant. In regression analysis, 
multicollinearity is an unwanted condition in which correlations among the independent 
variables are strong to the extent that multiple regression results may seem inconsistent or 
paradoxical. For instance, a regression model fits the data well represented by a high F-test 
(joint significance) even though none of the independent variables has a statistically 
significant effect on explaining or predicting the dependent variable. That is, 
multicollinearity generates statistical insignificance among variables while they should be 
otherwise significant. Multicollinearity can be either perfect or imperfect. Perfect 
multicollinearity is established when two or more independent variables have an error free 
linear relationship. However, perfect multicollinearity contradicts the classic assumption 
that no independent variable is a perfect linear function of other independent variables. As a 
result, the assumption of perfect multicollinearity within econometrics is of very low 
significance at best. Nonetheless, imperfect multicollinearity, i.e., a strong linear functional 
relationship between two or more independent variables, occurs often —as it does in this 
econometric study.  
Commodity price indexes and governance indexes are compared to macroeconomic 
variables measured as percentage shares and change rates. 73  The principal component 
analysis in this study will therefore differentiate between change rates of independent index 
variables and index values of independent index variables. Section 4.2.4.2 performs PCA 
on commodity price indexes, Sections 4.2.4.3 and 4.2.4.4 perform PCA on worldwide 
governance indexes and economic freedom indexes. 
Prevalent literature suggests that the following propositions (a) and (b) are adequate to 
sense or to suspect the existence of multicollinearity within a data set: 
(a) The correlation between independent variables is equal or greater than 70.0%.  
The modified correlation threshold at which the study performs the principle 
component analysis in the context of proposition (a) is 69.9%, 0.1% lower than the 
                                                 
73 The following macroeconomic variables are measured as percentage change rates: GDP_gr (Variable 2), 
GDPpCap_gr (Variable 3), Agri_gr (Variable 5), IndustValAd_gr (Variable 7), ManFactValAdd_gr (Variable 
9), GovFinConExp_gr (Variable 15), FinConExp_gr (Variable 17), HHFinConExp_gr (Variable 18), 
HHFinConExpPCap_gr (Variable 20), GroCapF_gr (Variable 22), GrossFixCapForm_gr (Variable 24), 
ExpGS_gr (Variable 28), ImpGS_gr (Variable 32), M2_gr (Variable 61).  
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suggested threshold of 70% in statistics literature. This is to include border line cases 
which may reveal promising multiple regression results. 
(b) The correlation coefficient between independent variables is larger than the correlation 
coefficient between the dependent and independent variables. 
In order to detect multicollinearity I apply proposition (a), which I view as key proposition, 
and proposition (b) for completeness purposes. 
 
Commodity Price Indexes 
Principal Component Analysis Approach for Commodity Price Indexes 
Commodity prices are affected by a myriad of global factors. The principal 
component analysis on commodity price indexes can thus not be confined to a regional 
view on commodity price indexes in Brazil or China. Fourteen of the seventy-nine 
macroeconomic variables are measured in change rates. As a result, I will carry out the 
PCA on commodity price indexes in two stages, differentiating commodity prices into (i) 
commodity price indexes, and into (ii) change rates of commodity price indexes in order to 
establish comparability to the dependent variables which itself are measured in percentage 
shares and change rates.  
 
Multicollinearity Criteria for Commodity Price Indexes 
In a first step of the PCA I will apply the above mentioned proposition (a) in order 
to detect multicollinearity of commodity price indexes and their change rates. In a second 
step, I aim to reduce the impact of multicollinearity by also considering proposition (b) 
which states that the correlation coefficient between independent variables is larger than the 
correlation coefficient between dependent and independent variables. 
One way to reduce the impact of multicollinearity is to increase the sample size by 
adding more data points in conjunction with narrower confidence intervals. Due to the 
annual data point limitations (12 change rates and 13 percentage share data points, 
respectively) this approach has to be disregarded. Instead, I bundle independent variables of 
a given set based on high correlation coefficients and on economic rationale. I therewith 
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create a composite independent interaction term, the product of the bundled independent 
variables.   
  
Governance Indexes 
Principal Component Analysis Approach for Governance Indexes 
Commodity price indexes are a quantitative composite measure based on reported 
individual commodity composite constituents. Commodity price indexes are transparent 
and observable on a daily basis. Commodities, which emerged as a separate asset class in 
the early 2000s, tend to trend in pairings, responding to idiosyncratic economic causes, 
expectations and a myriad of market factors including liquidity and technical factors.   
 In contrast, governance indexes cover a wide area of governance dimensions which 
in itself are fragmented in a high number of quantitative and qualitative assessments, which 
in turn are measured by a large number of qualitative components. Also, governance 
indexes move slower than commodity price indexes due to their annual assessment cycles, 
whereas commodity price indexes can be observed and measured daily. Furthermore, 
governance indexes may impose interdependent effects on each other due to overlapping 
causes. For example, political stability (WGIPS) may be affected by the degree of 
democracy (WGIVA) of a country, which in turn may be affected by the political stability 
(WGIPS) of a political system. Similarly, large government spending, i.e., large and costly 
governmental expenditures and activities (EFIGovtS) —as witnessed for example in 2009 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 in the US and China in order to dampen the 
negative effects of the financial crisis— may affect and impact fiscal governance (EFIFisc) 
of a state. While commodities tend to move in positively correlating patterns, highly 
correlating governance indexes do not necessarily imply similar causes. The correlation 
may be purely random or based on a strong Granger causality between governance 
dimensions.   
Due to the diversity and complexity of governance dimensions used in this thesis 
the PCA analysis for governance indexes is at best of limited usefulness. However, in order 
to apply the same statistical tests on all independent variables I will also apply PCA on all 
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governance indexes and on changes of governance indexes, provided that the interpretation 
of combining two governance indexes is empirically and/or economically sensible.  
 
Multicollinearity Criteria for Governance Indexes 
In order to take into account the qualitatively structural differences between 
governance indexes compared to commodity price indexes I will add two additional 
selection criteria (a’) and (a’’) to the above mentioned modified multicollinearity detection 
propositions (a) (The correlation threshold is 69.9%) and (b) (the correlation coefficient 
between independent variables is larger than the correlation coefficient between dependent 
and independent variables).    
The multicollinearity criterion for governance index sets, which includes the 
modified correlation threshold of 69.9%, will be expanded by the two following additional 
criteria (a’) and (a’’): 
(a’) Correlation confidence level is equal or above 99.0% (sig. 0.01), and 
(a’’) The independent variable pair with the highest correlation within a governance index 
set will be selected for PCA.  
The additional multicollinearity selection criteria for governance indexes, 
supplementing the 69.9% correlation threshold criterion used for commodity price indexes, 
serve to keep the number of newly created independent PCA variables at a minimum of one 
per governance set in order to acknowledge and consider the wide array of qualitative 
differences within the governance indexes.  
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4.2.4.2 Principal Component Analysis of Commodity Prices  
4.2.4.2.1 Principal Component Analysis of Commodity Price Indexes 
In the context of the principal component analysis, the correlation analysis in Table 
4.13 of commodity price indexes reveals that multicollinearity exists across the entire set of 
commodity price indexes except for TropBevIx on MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx. The 
multicollinearity pairs are displayed in bold letters and green shading. 
Table: 4.13 Pearson Correlation of Commodity Price Indexes 1996 – 2008  
1996-2008  FoodIx TropBevIx VegOil 
SeedsIx 
AgriRawIx Min 
MetalsIx 
CrudeIx 
FoodIx Pearson  1 .753** .929** .969** .859** .838** 
 
Sig.   0.003 0 0 0 0 
  
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
TropBevIx Pearson .753** 1 .762** .699** 0.55 0.42 
 
Sig.  0.003  0.002 0.008 0.052 0.153 
  
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
VegOilSeedsIx Pearson .929** .762** 1 .917** .787** .755** 
 
Sig.  0 0.002  0 0.001 0.003 
  
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
AgriRawIx Pearson .969** .699** .917** 1 .923** .895** 
 
Sig. 0.00 0.008 0  0 0 
  
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
MinMetalsIx Pearson  .859** 0.55 .787** .923** 1 .958** 
 
Sig.  0 0.052 0.001 0  0.00000 
  
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
CrudeIx Pearson  .838** 0.42 .755** .895** .958** 1 
 
Sig.  0 0.153 0.003 0 0.00000  
  N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
 Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The table above shows the Pearson correlation coefficients (Pearson) including the 
significance level (Sig.) and the number of observations (N). Crucial correlations range 
above 69.9%. All confidence levels ranging at or above 99% are marked by ‘**’. FoodIx 
and AgriRawIx show the highest correlation with 96.9% within the commodity price index 
with a confidence level of above 99%. Significant correlations between all other composite 
commodity price indexes range between 69.9% and 96.9%, displaying confidence levels of 
99%. It is observable that TropBevIx does not correlate significantly with CrudeIx and 
MinMetalsIx. However, TropBevIx does correlate with all other commodity price indexes 
with correlation coefficients above 69.9%. CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx display the second 
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largest correlation at 95.8%, while their confidence level is the highest at almost 100% (sig. 
0.0000). 
 
Soft Commodity Subset and Oil and Metals Subset 
The commodity price indexes will be bundled into two subsets: The oil and metals 
subset and the soft commodity subset. The oil and metals subset comprises CrudeIx and 
MinMetalsIx, whereas the soft commodity subset comprises FoodIx, TropBevIx, 
VegOilSeesIx, and AgriRawIx. The rationale behind segregating the commodity price 
indexes is twofold: The correlation and significance levels above reveal a strong pattern 
between CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx on one hand, and a significant correlation pattern within 
the soft commodity subset on the other hand. The relationship between oil and metals 
shows long dated historical price patterns, as revealed by the correlation comparisons 
between 1971 and 2009 in Section 3.3 in Chapter 3 (Independent Variables Set 1: 
Commodity Price Indexes). Also, as established in Chapter 3, I note that CrudeIx is 
Granger causing MinMetalsIx, which additionally supports the distinction between the oil 
and metals subset on one hand and the soft commodity subset on the other hand. 
 
Newly Created Principal Components  
As a result of the PCA for commodities price indexes I have created six artificial 
independent variables, three for each Brazil and China, in order to address the 
multicollinearity problem. The newly created independent variables derived from the PCA 
are as follows: 
Table 4.14: PCA of Commodity Price Indexes — Newly Created Independent Variables 
New MCA Independent Variable Commodity Composite Combination Country 
BMca1MetOil CrudeIx & MinMetalsIx Brazil 
BMca2FdAg  FoodIx & AgriRawIx Brazil 
BMca3BevAg  TropBevIx &AgriRawIx Brazil 
CMca1MetOil CrudeIx & MinMetalsIx China 
CMca2FdAg  FoodIx & AgriRawIx China 
CMca3FdVegAg FoodIx & VegOilSeedsIx & AgriRawIx China 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
Each newly created independent variable reflects a specific combination of 
commodity price indexes based on significant results derived from the correlation and 
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Granger causality analysis carried out (Section 4.2.3) on Brazil and China. The 
BMca1MetOil of Brazil and CMca1MetOil of China reflect the result of the PCA in the 
context of the combination of CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx.74 BMca2FdAg, BMca3BevAg, 
CMca2FdAg, and CMca3FdVegAg stand for the new independent variables derived from 
the soft-commodity subset of Brazil (B) and China (C).75  
The multiple regression analysis will use these newly created independent variables 
provided that there is more than one commodity price index significantly affecting a 
dependent variable based on correlation and Granger causality analysis. If correlation and 
Granger causality tests do not display more than one commodity price index within each 
commodity subset affecting a dependent variable, then the respective individual commodity 
price index is kept in its original form (i.e., CrudeIx, MinMetalsIx, AgriRawIx, FoodIx, 
TropBevIx, VegOilSeedsIx). 
For example, if there is only one relevant commodity price index left in the context 
of correlation and Granger causality tests on a specific macro-variable, then there is no 
need to create a new independent variable because PCA does not apply. If however there 
are two or more than two relevant commodity price indexes, and neither is CrudeIx nor 
MinMetalsIx, then there is the need to create a new PCA variable. The same applies if the 
two independent variables are CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx, for which I create a new PCA 
independent variable combining CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx. If there are two variables one 
of which is CrudeIx and the other a soft commodity price index, I will not create a new 
PCA independent variable. 
                                                 
74
 Abbreviations: B=Brazil, C= China, PCA= principal component analysis, 1= ordinal measure (the first new 
multicollinearity (M) generated independent variable for Brazil), MetOil=CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx. The 
newly created independent variables BMca1MetOil and CMca1MetOil represent the combination of CrudeIx 
and MinMetalsIx for Brazil (B), and China (C).  
75
 Abbreviations continued: BMca2FdAg and CMca2FdAg have the same vector and represent the new 
independent variables for Brazil (B) and China (C), combining FoodIx (Fd) and AgriRawIx (Ag). 
BMca3BevAg stands for the third (3) multicollinearity (M) driven principal component (c) analysis (a) on 
TropBevIx (Bev) and AgriRawIx (Ag) for Brazil (B); BMca3BevAg. CMca3FdVegAg stands for the new, 
third, independent variable combining FoodIx, VegOilSeedsIx, and AgriRawIx for China.  
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4.2.4.2.2 Principal Component Analysis of Changes in Commodity Price Indexes 
The principal component analysis of changes in commodity price indexes is 
necessary due to the fact that correlation and Granger causality analysis has been performed 
on dependent variables measured in change rates in context of changes in commodity price 
indexes.  
Change rates of MinMetalsIx and AgriRawIx correlate below the 69.9% threshold 
criterion established for the PCA analysis. As such MinMetalsIx and AgriRawIx do not 
pose a multicollinearity problem. Also, as already established in Chapter 3, CrudeIx and 
MinMetalsIx form a historical and economically validated correlation pair. Therefore, there 
is no conclusive reason to combine MinMetalsIx and AgriRawIx into a new independent 
variable. 
Table 4.15 reveals that the multicollinearity problem affects AgriRawIx and FoodIx 
which correlate at 83% (sig. 0.01) above the principal component threshold criterion of 
69.9% (marked in green shading and bold letters).  
Table 4.15: Pearson Correlation of Changes in Commodity Price Indexes 1996 - 2008  
1996-2008 
 FoodIx TropBevIx VegOil 
SeedsIx 
AgriRawIx Min 
MetalsIx 
CrudeIx 
FoodIx Pearson  1 0.47 0.481 .830** 0.491 0.374 
 
Sig.   0.123 0.113 0.001 0.105 0.231 
  
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
TropBevIx Pearson 0.47 1 0.454 0.413 0.352 0.105 
 
Sig.  0.123  0.138 0.182 0.262 0.745 
  
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
VegOilSeedsIx Pearson 0.481 0.454 1 0.568 0.055 -0.256 
 
Sig.  0.113 0.138  0.054 0.864 0.421 
  
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
AgriRawIx Pearson .830** 0.413 0.568 1 .624* 0.454 
 
Sig. 0.001 0.182 0.054  0.03 0.138 
  
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
MinMetalsIx Pearson  0.491 0.352 0.055 .624* 1 0.507 
 
Sig.  0.105 0.262 0.864 0.03  0.092 
  
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
CrudeIx Pearson  0.374 0.105 -0.256 0.454 0.507 1 
 
Sig.  0.231 0.745 0.421 0.138 0.092  
  N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The Granger causality analysis in Tables 4.8 and 4.11 for Brazil and China uncover 
that the multicollinearity problem of changes in AgriRawIx and changes in FoodIx only 
affects GDP_gr (Variable 2) of Brazil. The new PCA-derived independent variable 
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combining changes in AgriRawIx and FoodIx is thus labeled as BgrMcaFoodAg (‘gr’ 
stands for growth rate). Therefore BgrMcaFoodAg will be included in the multiple 
regression analysis for Brazil. The multi regression analysis will, however, reveal that 
BgrMcaFoodAg does not significantly affect GDP_gr, as I will show in Chapter 4.3 and 5.  
Table 4.16: PCA of Changes in Commodity Price Indexes: Newly Created Independent Variable 
New PCA independent Variable Commodity Composite Combination Country 
BgrMcaFoodAg  FoodIx & AgriRawIx Brazil 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
 
4.2.4.3    Principal Component Analysis of Worldwide Governance 
4.2.4.3.1 Principal Component Analysis of Worldwide Governance Indexes 
BRAZIL 
Each WGI index represents a different governance dimension, which at first sight 
implies that statistically significant correlations among individual WGI indexes may be 
random and not related to intrinsic information similarities.  
Table 4.17: Pearson Correlation of Worldwide Governance Indexes Brazil 1996 - 2008 
1996-2008  WGIVA WGIPS WGIGE WGIRQ WGIRL WGICC 
WGIVA Pearson  1 0.261 0.442 -.772** -.789** -0.109 
 
Sig.   0.389 0.13 0.002 0.001 0.724 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIPS Pearson  0.261 1 .823** -0.04 -0.333 .553* 
 
Sig.  0.389  0.001 0.896 0.267 0.05 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIGE Pearson  0.442 .823** 1 -0.1 -0.34 .749** 
 
Sig.  0.13 0.001  0.745 0.256 0.003 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIRQ Pearson  -.772** -0.04 -0.1 1 .839** 0.39 
 
Sig.  0.002 0.896 0.745  0.000 0.188 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIRL Pearson -.789** -0.333 -0.34 .839** 1 0.159 
 
Sig.  0.001 0.267 0.256 0  0.603 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGICC Pearson -0.109 .553* .749** 0.39 0.159 1 
 
Sig.  0.724 0.05 0.003 0.188 0.603  
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
However, certain pairs of WGI indexes not only correlate but also may affect each 
other. For example, political stability (WGIPS) and voice and accountability (WGIVA, i.e., 
degree of democracy) represent governance dimensions which may affect each other even 
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though correlation is non-significant. Similarly, control of corruption (WGICC) may affect 
the effectiveness of government services (WGIGE); WGICC and WGIGE correlate at 
74.9% (sig. 0.003). Likewise, regulatory quality (WGIRQ) may be affected by judicial 
decisions and the rule of law (WGIRL); both correlate at 83.9% (sig. 0.01). 
According to the PCA correlation threshold criterion of 69.9%, the following WGI 
pairs would have to be combined in order to avoid multicollinearity: (1) WGIGE and 
WGICC (74.9%, sig. 0.003), (2) WGIPS and WGIGE (correlation of 82.3%, sig. 0.01), and 
(3) WGIRQ and WGIRL (correlation of 83.9%, sig. 0.0001). By convention, WGIRQ and 
WGIRL need to be paired for principal component analysis. However, Granger causality 
analysis on Brazil revealed that there is no WGIRL-WGIRQ pair displaying significant 
causality to any dependent variable. Therefore, I will not apply principal component 
analysis on WGI indexes. PCA on WGIRQ and WGIRL in this case is redundant and does 
not render any additional conclusions.  
Even though WGIGE and WGIPS as well as WGIGE and WGICC do show 
significant positive correlation above 69.9% I chose not to generate a new independent 
variable combining them due to either the qualitatively relatively unrelated nature and 
dissimilar scope of the respective governance dimensions (e.g., WGIGE and WGIPS), or 
due not significant Granger causality results between them (WGIGE and WGICC; Granger 
1 p-0.1978; Granger 2 p-value 0.8632).  
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CHINA 
Table 4.18 below reveals that for China the only significant correlation pair found is 
WGIVA-WGIPS, which correlates at 77% (sig. 0.01), above the 69.9%-threshold. 
Table 4.18: Pearson Correlation of Worldwide Governance Indexes China 1996 - 2008 
1996-2008  WGIVA WGIPS WGIGE WGIRQ WGIRL WGICC 
WGIVA Pearson  1 .770** -.812** -.333 -.107 .421 
 
Sig.   .002 .001 .267 .728 .152 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIPS Pearson  .770** 1 -.625* -.340 .254 .400 
 
Sig.  .002  .022 .256 .403 .176 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIGE Pearson  -.812** -.625* 1 .242 .018 -.321 
 
Sig.  .001 .022  .426 .952 .286 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIRQ Pearson  -.333 -.340 .242 1 .620* .258 
 
Sig.  .267 .256 .426  .024 .395 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGIRL Pearson -.107 .254 .018 .620* 1 .389 
 
Sig.  .728 .403 .952 .024  .189 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WGICC Pearson .421 .400 -.321 .258 .389 1 
 
Sig.  .152 .176 .286 .395 .189  
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The WGIVA-WGIPS pair appears to be significant at the example of government 
final consumption expenditure (Variable 14: GovFinConExp_GDP). The multiple 
regression analysis for China on GovFinConExp_GDP and individually counting in 
WGIVA and WGIPS does not provide a statistically meaningful result. However, creating a 
new independent variable CMca4WvAPs, combining WGIVA and WGIPS, does render a 
statistically meaningful result in the multiple regression analysis. This implies that WGIVA 
and WGIPS individually are too weak to generate a significant multi regression result. 
Because of that I need to incorporate CMca4WvAPs in the multi regression analysis for 
GovFinConExp_GDP (Variable 14) for China.  
Table 4.19: PCA of WGI China — Newly Created Independent Variable 
New PCA Independent Variable WGI Composite Combination Country 
CMca4WvAPs WGIVA & WGIPS China 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
WGIRQ and WGIRL also display significant correlation but do not reach the 69.9% 
threshold to qualify for the PCA. As such no new independent variable will be created by 
combining WGIRL and WGIRQ.  
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4.2.4.3.2 Principal Component Analysis of Changes in Worldwide Governance 
Indexes 
BRAZIL 
Table 4.20: Pearson Correlation of Changes in Worldwide Governance Indexes Brazil 1996-2008 
1996-2008  WGIVA WGIPS WGIGE WGIRQ WGIRL WGICC 
WGIVA Pearson  1 -0.123 -0.147 0.22 0.181 0.1 
 
Sig.   0.703 0.649 0.493 0.573 0.756 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIPS Pearson  -0.123 1 0.208 -0.051 0.067 -.803** 
 
Sig.  0.703  0.516 0.875 0.836 0.002 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIGE Pearson  -0.147 0.208 1 0.129 0.49 -0.067 
 
Sig.  0.649 0.516  0.688 0.106 0.835 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIRQ Pearson  0.22 -0.051 0.129 1 0.355 0.019 
 
Sig.  0.493 0.875 0.688  0.258 0.953 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIRL Pearson 0.181 0.067 0.49 0.355 1 -0.058 
 
Sig.  0.573 0.836 0.106 0.258  0.858 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGICC Pearson 0.1 -.803** -0.067 0.019 -0.058 1 
 
Sig.  0.756 0.002 0.835 0.953 0.858  
 N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The correlation matrix of changes in worldwide governance indexes in Table 4.20 
shows no positive significant correlation within the WGI set for Brazil. In addition, 
correlation and Granger causality tests carried out for Brazil reveal that none of the 
dependent variables measured in change rates is affected by any corresponding WGI 
variable measured in change rates. As a result, no new PCA independent variables have 
been created. 
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CHINA 
Table 4.21 below reveals no correlation among changes in WGI indexes for China. 
As a result there is no necessity to create a new PCA independent variable. 
Table 4.21: Pearson Correlation of Changes of Worldwide Governance Indexes China 1996-2008 
1996-2008  WGIVA WGIPS WGIGE WGIRQ WGIRL WGICC 
WGIVA Pearson  1 .173 .162 -.266 -.326 .143 
 
Sig.   .590 .615 .403 .301 .657 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIPS Pearson  .173 1 .204 -.282 .325 -.532 
 
Sig.  .590  .526 .374 .302 .075 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIGE Pearson  .162 .204 1 .144 -.287 .026 
 
Sig.  .615 .526  .655 .365 .935 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIRQ Pearson  -.266 -.282 .144 1 .250 .020 
 
Sig.  .403 .374 .655  .433 .950 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGIRL Pearson -.326 .325 -.287 .250 1 -.371 
 
Sig.  .301 .302 .365 .433  .235 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
WGICC Pearson .143 -.532 .026 .020 -.371 1 
 
Sig.  .657 .075 .935 .950 .235  
 N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
  Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
 
4.2.4.4    Principal Component Analysis of Economic Freedom  
4.2.4.4.1 Principal Component Analysis of Economic Freedom Indexes 
BRAZIL 
Table 4.22 below shows five pairs of EFI governance indexes positively correlating 
above 69.9% with confidence levels above 99%. The pairs of independent variables 
displaying a positive correlation above the 69.9% threshold are marked in bold letters and 
green shading.  
The following EFI-pairs pass the 69.9% correlation threshold: (1) EFIBiz-EFIFisc, 
(2) EFIBiz-EFIGovtS, (3) EFIFisc-EFIGovtS, (4) EFIFisc-EFIFin, and (5) EFIMon-
EFICorrup. EFIFisc-EFIGovtS displays the highest correlation at 91.7% (sig. 0.000) and 
the highest confidence level within the set. Also, cause and effect between the EFIFisc-
EFIGovtS are more plausible than cause and effect among the remaining four correlation 
pairs. Hence, I combine EFIFisc and EFIGovtS.  
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Table 4.22: Pearson Correlation of Economic Freedom Indexes Brazil 1996-2008 
 
1996-2008  EFI 
Biz 
EFI 
Trade 
EFI 
Fisc 
EFI 
GovtS 
EFI 
Mon 
EFI 
Invest 
EFI 
Fin 
EFI 
PropRi 
EFI 
Corrup 
EFIBiz Pearson  1 -.843** .867** .759** 0.018 na .634* na 0.089 
 Sig.   0 0.000 0.003 0.953 . 0.02 . 0.772 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFITrade Pearson  -.843** 1 -.758** -.694** -0.095 na -0.54 na 0 
 Sig.  0  0.003 0.008 0.758 . 0.057 . 1 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIFisc Pearson  .867** -.758** 1 .917** 0.013 na .716** na 0.168 
 Sig.  0.000 0.003  0.000 0.967 . 0.006 . 0.584 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIGovtS Pearson  .759** -.694** .917** 1 -0.139 na .615* na -0.023 
 Sig.  0.003 0.008 0.000  0.65 . 0.025 . 0.941 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIMon Pearson  0.018 -0.095 0.013 -0.139 1 na 0.157 na .744** 
 Sig.  0.953 0.758 0.967 0.65  . 0.609 . 0.004 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIInvest Pearson  na na na na na na na na na 
 Sig.  . . . . . . . . . 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIFin Pearson  .634* -0.54 .716** .615* 0.157 na 1 na 0.163 
 Sig.  0.02 0.057 0.006 0.025 0.609 .  . 0.595 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIPropRi Pearson na na na na na na na na na 
 Sig.  . . . . . . . . . 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFICorrup Pearson 0.089 0 0.168 -0.023 .744** na 0.163 na 1 
 Sig.  0.772 1 0.584 0.941 0.004 . 0.595 .  
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
EFIFisc measures the governance level of Brazil’s tax regime. EFIGovtS measures 
the size of government activities within the economy. It appears that increasing 
governmental activities and spending correlate with a deteriorating tax regime in Brazil. 
Furthermore, Granger causality reveals (not shown in the table) that a deteriorating fiscal 
tax regime (higher taxes) Granger causes deteriorating EFIGovtS. That is, a heavier tax 
regime may lead governmental spending measured by EFIGovtS. EFIFisc-EFIGovtS passes 
the PCA criteria. Thus I create the new independent variable BMca4EfscGvt which 
combines EFIFisc and EFIGovts.  
Table 4.23: PCA of EFI Brazil — Newly Created Independent Variable  
New PCA independent variable EFI Composite Combination Country 
BMca4EfscGvt EFIFisc & EFIGovtS Brazil 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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In the multiple regression model, however, BMca4EfscGvt is not affecting 
ManfImp_MrchImp (Variable 34), neither on a single constituent basis (EFIFisc, 
EFIGovtS) nor on a combined basis (BMca4EfscGvt). 
 
CHINA 
Table 4.24 below shows six pairs of EFI governance indexes positively correlating 
with each other at the significance of 0.05 and 0.01. The six EFI indexes pairs are: (1) 
EFIBiz-EFIGovts, (2) EFIInvest-EFIGovts, (3) EFIFin-EFIGovts, (4) EFICorrup-
EFITrade, (5) EFICorrup-EFIMon, and (6) EFIFin-EFIInvest. 
 Table 4.24: Pearson Correlation of Economic Freedom Indexes China 1996-2008 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
Only two of the following pairs display a correlation above 69.9%: EFIFin-
EFIInvest shows a correlation of 100% at a significance level of <0.000, and EFICorrup-
1996-2008  EFI 
Biz 
EFI 
Trade 
EFI 
Fisc 
EFI 
GovtS 
EFI 
Mon 
EFI 
Invest 
EFI 
Fin 
EFI 
PropRi 
EFI 
Corrup 
EFIBiz Pearson  1 -.734** .174 .588* .135 .388 .388 .479 -.228 
 
Sig.   .004 .569 .034 .660 .190 .190 .097 .454 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFITrade Pearson  -.734** 1 -.456 -.796** .219 -.772** -.772** -.734** .658* 
 
Sig.  .004  .117 .001 .473 .002 .002 .004 .015 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIFisc Pearson  .174 -.456 1 .551 -.316 .540 .540 .362 -.386 
 
Sig.  .569 .117  .051 .294 .057 .057 .224 .192 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIGovtS Pearson  .588* -.796** .551 1 -.440 .676* .676* .347 -.717** 
 
Sig.  .034 .001 .051  .132 .011 .011 .246 .006 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIMon Pearson  .135 .219 -.316 -.440 1 -.556* -.556* .277 .783** 
 
Sig.  .660 .473 .294 .132  .049 .049 .359 .002 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIInvest Pearson  .388 -.772** .540 .676* -.556* 1 1.000** .365 -.690** 
 
Sig.  .190 .002 .057 .011 .049  .000 .220 .009 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIFin Pearson  .388 -.772** .540 .676* -.556* 1.000** 1 .365 -.690** 
 
Sig.  .190 .002 .057 .011 .049 .000  .220 .009 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFIPropRi Pearson .479 -.734** .362 .347 .277 .365 .365 1 -.208 
 
Sig.  .097 .004 .224 .246 .359 .220 .220  .495 
 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
EFICorrup Pearson -.228 .658* -.386 -.717** .783** -.690** -.690** -.208 1 
 
Sig.  .454 .015 .192 .006 .002 .009 .009 .495  
 N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
  
247 
EFIMon 76  shows a correlation of 78.3% at a significance level of 0.002. Due to the 
selection criteria for governance indexes I will create CMca5EInvFin which combines 
EFIFin and EFIInvest. The Heritage Foundation applied the same yearly grading points for 
EFIFin and EFIInvest for China. This implies that the governance dimensions EFIFin and 
EFIInvest are idiosyncratic in scope and scale. 
Table 4.25: PCA of EFI China — Newly Created Independent Variable 
New PCA independent variable EFI Composite Combination Country 
CMca5EInvFin EFIInv & EFIFin China 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
                                                 
76
 The Granger causality analysis shows that there is no dependent variable affected by EFIMon and 
EFICorrup at the same time. As such a newly created independent variable combining EFIMon and 
EFICorrup is redundant. 
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4.2.4.4.2 Principal Component Analysis of Changes in Economic Freedom Indexes 
BRAZIL 
Table 4.26 below reveals that there is no significant correlation above 69.9% among 
changes in EFI indexes of Brazil. As a result there is no necessity to create a new PCA 
independent variable.  
Table 4.26: Pearson Correlation of Changes in Economic Freedom Indexes Brazil 1996-2008 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
 
1996-2008  EFI 
Biz 
EFI 
Trade 
EFI 
Fisc 
EFI 
GovtS 
EFI 
Mon 
EFI 
Invest 
EFI 
Fin 
EFI 
PropRi 
EFI 
Corrup 
EFIBiz Pearson  1 -0.22 -0.029 -0.213 -0.267 na -0.004 na 0.086 
 
Sig.   0.493 0.929 0.506 0.401 . 0.99 . 0.792 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFITrade Pearson  -0.22 1 0.063 0.161 -0.574 na -0.009 na -0.368 
 
Sig.  0.493  0.847 0.617 0.051 . 0.978 . 0.24 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIFisc Pearson  -0.029 0.063 1 .653* 0.296 na 0.464 na 0.288 
 
Sig.  0.929 0.847  0.021 0.35 . 0.128 . 0.365 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIGovtS Pearson  -0.213 0.161 .653* 1 0.022 .a 0.205 na 0.102 
 
Sig.  0.506 0.617 0.021  0.945 . 0.523 . 0.752 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIMon Pearson  -0.267 -0.574 0.296 0.022 1 .a 0.259 na 0.385 
 
Sig.  0.401 0.051 0.35 0.945  . 0.416 . 0.217 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIInvest Pearson  na na na na na na na na na 
 
Sig.  . . . . . . . . . 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIFin Pearson  -0.004 -0.009 0.464 0.205 0.259 Na 1 na 0.272 
 
Sig.  0.99 0.978 0.128 0.523 0.416 . . . 0.393 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIPropRi Pearson na na na na na na na na na 
 
Sig.  . . . . . . .  . 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFICorrup Pearson 0.086 -0.368 0.288 0.102 0.385 .a 0.272 .a 1 
 
Sig.  0.792 0.24 0.365 0.752 0.217 . 0.393 .  
 N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
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CHINA 
The correlation analysis of changes in economic freedom indexes for China reveals 
that there is only one pair of EFI governance indexes with a significant correlation above 
69.9%: EFIFin-EFIInvest.  
Table 4.27: Pearson Correlation of Changes in Economic Freedom Indexes China 1996-2008 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
Both governance indexes combined do neither reveal any Granger causality nor any 
other association to any dependent variable for China. As a result there is no necessity to 
create a new PCA independent variable.  
 
1996-2008  EFI 
Biz 
EFI 
Trade 
EFI 
Fisc 
EFI 
GovtS 
EFI 
Mon 
EFI 
Invest 
EFI 
Fin 
EFI 
PropRi 
EFI 
Corrup 
EFIBiz Pearson  1 -.858** -.383 .136 .196 -.011 -.011 -.388 .000 
 
Sig.   .000 .220 .673 .541 .973 .973 .213 .999 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFITrade Pearson  -.858** 1 .305 -.037 .189 -.013 -.013 .346 .278 
 
Sig.  .000  .335 .910 .556 .968 .968 .271 .381 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIFisc Pearson  -.383 .305 1 -.056 -.114 .013 .013 .510 -.017 
 
Sig.  .220 .335  .862 .724 .967 .967 .090 .959 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIGovtS Pearson  .136 -.037 -.056 1 -.289 -.587* -.587* -.212 -.389 
 
Sig.  .673 .910 .862  .362 .045 .045 .509 .212 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIMon Pearson  .196 .189 -.114 -.289 1 .068 .068 .327 .639* 
 
Sig.  .541 .556 .724 .362  .833 .833 .300 .025 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIInvest Pearson  -.011 -.013 .013 -.587* .068 1 1.000** -.091 .237 
 
Sig.  .973 .968 .967 .045 .833  .000 .779 .459 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIFin Pearson  -.011 -.013 .013 -.587* .068 1.000** 1 -.091 .237 
 
Sig.  .973 .968 .967 .045 .833 .000  .779 .459 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFIPropRi Pearson -.388 .346 .510 -.212 .327 -.091 -.091 1 .334 
 
Sig.  .213 .271 .090 .509 .300 .779 .779  .289 
 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
EFICorrup Pearson .000 .278 -.017 -.389 .639* .237 .237 .334 1 
 
Sig.  .999 .381 .959 .212 .025 .459 .459 .289  
 N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
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4.3   Multiple Regression Analysis  
4.3.1 Methodology 
Multiple regression analysis goes beyond the computation of correlations. Multiple 
regression analysis is an econometric method in which a regression line is calculated to 
transmit the average value of the dependent variable to the values of one or more than one 
predictor or independent variable.77 Multiple regression analysis observes and explores the 
quality of these relationships (Sykes, 1992, pp. 5-10, 15-20). Given a dependent Y and 
several independent (or regressor) variables X, multiple regression fits a model to assess 
the relationships between these variables through the following equation: 
Ya= β0 + β1X1+ β2X2+ β3X3+ β4X4+ βiXi, 
whereas βi represents the regression coefficient (also referred to as beta coefficient) of each 
independent variable Xi (i=1 …, n; in this study n=21) for each dependent variable Ya 
(a=1,…, 79). In the equation above, β0 is the intercept of the line with the y-axis when X 
equals 0, and βi is the slope —the amount of vertical change in the line for each unit of Xi. 
Estimates (beta coefficients) in the multiple regression analysis measure the contribution of 
the independent variables to the model. Large beta coefficients indicate that a unit change 
in an individual independent variable causes a large effect on the dependent variable.  
The null hypothesis states that the slope is zero, H0: βi = 0. If that is true, then the 
regression coefficient is zero and there is no significant correlation; that is, a linear 
regression with Xi cannot be established. The p-value’s significance threshold is 0.05, so 
estimates with p-values equal or below 0.05 are considered to be significant; the null 
hypothesis can be rejected and a regression with Xi can be established. 
The adjusted R2 is a statistical measure of variation in the dependent variable that is 
accounted for by all the regressor variables. It provides a measure of the overall goodness-
of-fit of the multiple regression equation (Garson, 2009). If the model fits the data well, the 
adjusted R2 (R-square) value will be high, and the corresponding overall p-value will be 
low, in which case the good fit is unlikely to be a coincidence. In addition to the overall p-
                                                 
77
 The multiple regression line is typically calculated by applying the standard method of least squares in 
which the values of the coefficients β0 and βi are calculated so that the sum of the squared deviations of the 
points from the line is minimized. As such, positive deviations and negative deviations of equal size are 
counted equally, and large deviations count more than small deviations. 
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value, the multiple regression analysis also delivers an individual p-value for each 
independent variable (Berger, 2003, pp. 1-3). A low individual p-value indicates that the 
independent variable significantly improves the fit of the model. The p-value for a regressor 
(or independent) variable is calculated by comparing the goodness-of-fit of the entire model 
to the goodness-of-fit when the individual regressor variable is excluded or omitted. If the 
fit is much worse without that specific regressor variable, then its individual p-value has a 
significant impact on the model.  
In this time-series correlation study I illustrate the movement of composite 
commodity prices as well as governance indexes with macroeconomic variables between 
1996 and 2008. Due to the fact that commodity price indexes and macroeconomic variables 
tend to have substantial growth lines or trends in common, adjusted R2 tends to be larger as 
a result of correlation. In this study an adjusted R2 of higher than 50% but lower than 80% 
is considered to imply that the overall goodness-of-fit of the multiple regression equation is 
moderate, whereas an R2 above 80% is considered to represent a high degree or strong 
goodness of fit.  
T-values indicate the degree of impact of the explanatory variable, and p-values 
measure the significance of the regression results. A large absolute t-value and small p-
value proposes that an independent variable is having a large impact on the dependent 
variable (Oxford Journals, 2009b, pp. 19-29). In this study I follow the standard approach 
in academic literature on multiple regression analysis application (Rubinfeld, 2000, pp. 
417-468, Oxford Journals, 2009a, 2009b).  
 
4.3.2  Multiple Regression Analysis Brazil 
4.3.2.1 Multiple Regression Matrix Brazil 
The statistical diagnostic tests for Brazil revealed that out of seventy-nine selected 
dependent variables forty-four dependent variables show significant correlation and 
Granger causality results to at least one commodity price or governance index. As a result, 
these forty-four macroeconomic variables qualify for the multiple regression analysis in 
this section. The statistical diagnostic tests also reveal that the following governance 
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indexes do not show any effect on any dependent variable. These governance indexes are 
hence redundant for the multiple regression analysis for Brazil. 
(1)  EFIPropRi 
(2) EFIInvest  
(3) EFIMon  
(4) WGICC  
Tables 4.28a-b give an overview of those dependent variables which show positive 
results in the correlation and Granger causality tests to specific individual independent 
variables. Tables 4.28a-b (I. Correlation-Granger Causality Matrix and II. Multiple 
Regression Matrix) display all significant correlation and Granger causality pairs for 
specific dependent variables and their respective independent variables. The multi 
regression matrix in Tables 4.28a-b (II. Multiple Regression Matrix) displays the structural 
results of the multiple regression analysis for each dependent variable by displaying the 
respective independent variables of each regression line. Independent variables marked in 
red represent insignificant regression results. The Brazil-China flag marks the dependent 
variables which proceed to the regression analysis for both countries. ‘Brazil’ and/or 
‘China’ marked in red means that the country’s respective regression results on the 
identical dependent variable do not reveal comparable significant regression results.  
Table 4.28a (I. Correlation-Granger Causality Matrix and II. Multiple Regression 
Matrix Brazil) is to be read in a similar way as the preceding correlation and Granger 
causality matrixes. For example: (i) GDPDefl (Variable 1) show a moderate to high 
positive correlation to all commodity price indexes except to TropBevIx. The Granger 
causality analyses for AgriRawIx and GDPDefl show feedback causalities because the 
Granger 1 and Granger 2 tests display p-values of below 0.05 (p-value Granger 1 <0.0001, 
p-value Granger 2  0.0273). According to my statistical findings, household final 
consumption expenditures to GDP (Variable 19: HHFinConExp_GDP) correlate at 78.7% 
with and seem to be Granger caused by WGIRQ for Brazil (Granger 1 p-value of 0.0307, 
Granger 2 p-value of 0.0137). For China, HHFinConExp_GDP (Variable 19) seems to be 
significantly affected by EFIPropRi correlating at 75.7% with a Granger 1 p-value of 
0.0008 and a Granger 2 p-value of 0.0360 (Table 4.32a).  
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Identical dependent variables which show significant results for both Brazil and 
China are marked with a light blue background (e.g., Brazil&China) in the Tables 4.28a-b 
(I. Correlation-Granger Causality Matrix and II. Multiple Regression Matrix Brazil).78 
Black letters indicate that the multiple regression results for an identical dependent variable 
are positive in conjunction with at least one independent variable for both Brazil and China. 
Red letters (e.g., Brazil&China) indicate that the multiple regression analysis shows no 
significant relationships with independent variables for a country (China in this example).  
Consider final consumption expenditure to GDP (Variable 16: FinConExp_GDP) 
for Brazil and China. FinConExp_GDP for Brazil shows a significant regression 
relationship with WGIRQ at a correlation 76.4% (Granger 1 p-value 0.0037, Granger 2 p-
value 0.0322). For China, FinConExp_GDP (Variable 16) shows no significant regression 
results with any independent variable, even though WGICC and EFIGovts indicate 
significant correlations of 73% and 63% with Granger 1 p-values of 0.8965 and 0.6703 and 
Granger 2 p-values of 0.0001 and 0.0135, respectively. Thus, FinConExp_GDP is marked 
as Brazil&China (China in red letters).  
The entire sets of regression results computed with SAS are provided in the attached 
CD-ROM.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78
 Tables 4.28a-b represent key matrixes for Brazil in this thesis, combining correlation analysis, Granger 
causality analysis and PCA analysis. Tables 4.28a-b have been computed, compiled, arranged by the author. 
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Non-significant Multi Regression Dependent Variables 
The multiple regression analysis for Brazil reveals that out of the 44 dependent 
variables that passed the statistical diagnostic tests, only 9 do not show significant multiple 
regression results. These 9 dependent variables are marked in red letters in the regression 
matrix in Tables 4.28a-b and are listed below:  
(1) Variable 2: GDP_gr 
(2) Variable 3: GDPpCap_gr 
(3) Variable 27: ExpGS_GDP 
(4) Variable 34: ManfImp_MrchImp 
(5) Variable 50: ManufExp_MrchExp 
(6) Variable 52: StoxVal_GDP 
(7) Variable 54: MrktCapList_GDP 
(8) Variable 68: STD_TTResv 
(9) Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp 
For example, Table 4.28a-b I. (Correlation-Granger Causality Matrix) shows GDP_gr 
(Variable 2) displaying significant correlations of 69.7%, 64.3%, and 56.9% to FoodIx, 
AgriRawIx, and MinMetalsIx. Also, Granger causality tests suggest that GDP_gr is 
Granger caused by FoodIx (p-values: Granger 1 0.4079, Granger 2 0.0486), AgriRawIx (p-
values: Granger 1 0.757, Granger 2 0.0003), and MinMetalsIx (p-values: Granger 1 0.2638, 
Granger 2 0.0161) displaying a Granger 1 p-value for each above 0.05. Granger 2 tests for 
the same independent variables display a p-value below 0.05. However, Table 4.28a-b (II. 
Multiple Regression Matrix Brazil) indicates that the multiple regression analysis does not 
reveal any significant conclusion regarding the relationship of GDP_gr (Variable 2) and its 
predictor variables MinMetalsIx and BgrMcaFoodAg (newly created PCA independent 
variable combining FoodIx and AgriRawIx). BgrMcaFoodAg and MinMetalsIx are marked 
in red letters to indicate that there are no positive regression results. The table below shows 
the typical regression result display in the matrix, here at the example of GDP_gr.  
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Table 4.29: Parameter Estimates for GDP_gr Brazil 
Independent Label DF Estimate Standard Error t-Value Pr>|t| 
Intercept Intercept 2 2.42192 0.01059 4.74 0.0011 
AgriRawIx AgriRawIx  0.06426 2.04 0.0713 0.0713 
MinMetalsIx MinMetalsIx  0.02305 0.90 0.3938 0.3938 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The regression calculus for GDP_gr (change rate variable) shows a low estimate for 
the change rates of AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx, indicating that the contribution of each 
independent variable in the model is low. In contrast a large value would indicate that a unit 
change in the predictor variable has a large effect on the dependent variable. The t-value 
and Pr>|t| value (p-value) give an indication of the impact and the significance of each 
independent variable. A big absolute t-value and small Pr>|t| (below 0.05) suggest that an 
independent variable has a large impact on the dependent variable. As shown above, no 
independent variable has a strong and significant effect on GDP_gr because the p-values 
are all above 0.05, except for the intercept. Nonetheless, statistical non-significance does 
not imply empirical non-significance. Significant correlation and causality results on 
GDP_gr itself suggest strong empirical associations as I illustrate in Chapter 5.  
 
Significant Multi Regression Dependent Variables 
Table 4.30: Significant Multiple Regression Dependent Variables for Brazil 
Dependent Variables No. Dependent Variables No. Dependent Variables No. 
GDPDefl 1 AgRawImp_MrchImp 33 CPIx* 58 
IndustValAd_GDP 6 FuelImp_MerchImp* 35 M2_GDP 60 
IndustValAd_gr 7 ExpValx* 36 ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc* 64 
ManFactValAdd_gr 9 ImpValIx* 37 ExtDebtST_GNI 65 
GrossDomSav_GDP 12 ExpVolx* 38 TTRes_TTExtDbt* 69 
GrossNatExp_GDP 13 ImpVolIx* 39 MultiDebt_TTExtD 71 
GovFinConExp_gr 15 UnitValIxExp* 40 GDP_UEnUPPPOilE* 74 
FinConExp_GDP 16 UnitValIxImp 41 Internet_100* 76 
HHFinConExp_GDP* 19 ToT 42 Phonelines_100* 77 
GrossFixCapForm_GDP 23 PPIxExp* 43 Unempl_Lforce 78 
Trade_GDP* 25 FuelExp_MerchExp* 53 MobileSubs_100* 79 
MrchTrade_GDP* 26 LivStockProdIx 57   
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The 35 dependent variables in Table 4.30 above represent all dependent variables 
with significant regression analysis results for Brazil. There are 19 variables, displayed in 
bold letters in Table 4.30, that also show significant multiple regression results for China.  
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4.3.2.2 Multiple Regression Results Brazil 
Table 4.31 below provides an overview of all significant multiple regression results 
for Brazil including the estimated values of each intercept and the respective independent 
variables that affect each specific dependent variable. Table 4.31 also displays the standard 
errors, t-values, and p-values for each of the 35 dependent variables that appear to have 
significant relationships with at least one of the 21 independent variables. These multiple 
regression results refer to a significance level of 0.05. The t-value is the estimated value 
divided by its standard error, which is an estimate of the standard deviation of the 
coefficient. The standard error is the amount the estimated value varies across cases. 
Standard error offers a measure of the precision of the multiple regression estimates. 
For example, unit value index of exports (Variable 40: UnitValIxExp) has an 
intercept estimate value of 62.1 and a standard error of 29.3 which translates into a t-value 
of 2.12. That is, the multiple regression estimate is large (2.12x) compared with its standard 
error, so it is probably different from 0. The significance level measured by the p-value is 
slightly above the 0.05 threshold. Similarly, UnitValIxExp for Brazil appears to be 
significantly affected by BMca3BevAg (combining TropBevIx and AgriRawIx) and by 
BMca1MetOil (combining CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx) at a high confidence level (sig. 
0.0002, and sig. 0.0029, respectively), with high t-values of 6.14 and 4.05. Furthermore, the 
adjusted R2 is impressively high at 0.9651, indicating a strong goodness of fit to the model 
and fairly low dispersion around the linear model line.  
The dependent variables and the respective regression results including adjusted R2, 
estimate values (Estimate), standard errors (St. Err.), t-value (t-Val), p-value (Pr>|t|), and 
degree of freedom (DF) marked in green in the Table 4.31 indicate that the identical 
dependent variable for Brazil also yields multiple regression results for China.  
Table 4.31 gives an overview; it does not discuss the multiple regression results. 
The economic analysis and discussion of the correlation, causality, and multiple regression 
results of selected dependent variables is carried out in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 also features 
comparative correlation, causality and regression analyses for identical dependent variables 
for Brazil and China, supported by empirical evidence.  
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Table 4.31 shows significant regression results below the p-value threshold of 0.05 
only. Therefore the number of DFs (Degree of Freedom) may differ from the number of 
independent variables displayed. Regression non-significant independent variables are not 
shown in Table 4.31. For information purposes, the Multi-Regression Matrix of Brazil 
above in Table 4.28 shows all independent variables, be they significant or not significant. 
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4.3.3    Multiple Regression Analysis China 
4.3.3.1 Multiple Regression Matrix China 
The statistical diagnostic tests for China revealed that out of the 79 selected 
dependent variables 49 showed significant correlation and Granger causality results to at 
least one independent variable from the commodity price or governance index sets. 
Therefore, similarly to the diagnostic test section for Brazil, these 49 macroeconomic 
variables will be included in the multiple regression analysis for China. The diagnostic tests 
also reveal that the following governance indexes do not have any effect on any of the 
dependent variables. Thus, these variables are not subject of the multiple regression 
analysis:  
1. WGIRL 
2. EFIFisc 
(In comparison, recall that four governance indexes were redundant for Brazil: EFIPropRi, 
EFIInvest, EFIMon, and WGICC.)  
Tables 4.32a-b79 (I. Correlation-Granger Causality Matrix and II. Multi Regression 
Matrix China) display the results of the correlation tests and Granger causality tests for all 
79 dependent variables for China; it is similar to Brazil’s Tables 4.28a-b (I. Correlation-
Granger Causality Matrix and II. Multi Regression Matrix). Significant positive correlation 
results between the dependent and independent variables are marked in green, as are the 
dependent variables Granger caused by independent variables. When macroeconomic 
variables Granger cause the independent variables, the table shows them with yellow 
shading.  
 
 
                                                 
79
 Tables 4.32a-b represent key matrixes in this thesis for China combining correlation analysis, Granger 
causality analysis and PCA analysis. Tables 4.32a-b have been calculated and arranged by the author. 
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Non-significant Multi Regression Dependent Variables 
Out of the 49 dependent variables included in the multiple regression analysis, 7 do 
not show any significant multiple regression results, as marked in red letters in Table 4.32a-
b. These variables are listed here:  
(1) Variable 13: GrossNatExp_GDP 
(2) Variable 16: FinConExp_GDP 
(3) Variable 54: MrktCapList_GDP 
(4) Variable 59: Infltn 
(5) Variable 63: RealIR 
(6) Variable 65: ExtDebtST_GNI 
(7) Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp 
For example, Tables 4.32a-b (I. Correlation-Granger Causality Matrix and II. Multi 
Regression Matrix) for China show that gross national expenditures to GDP (Variable 13: 
GrossNatExp_GDP) has significant correlations of 64.8% and 67.8% with political stability 
(WGIPS) and business governance (EFIBiz). The Granger causality tests suggest that 
WGIPS and EFIBiz Granger cause GrossNatExp_GDP: The Granger 1 test displays a p-
value greater than 0.05 for each independent variable (0.2330, 0.7254), and the Granger 2 
p-value is below 0.05 for each (0.0491, 0.0200). However, the multiple regression matrix in 
Tables 4.32a-b indicates no significant conclusion about the relationship between 
GrossNatExp_GDP and its predictor variables WGIPS and EFIBiz. Therefore, 
GrossNatExp_GDP appears in red letters.  
 Table 4.33: Parameter Estimates for GrossNatExp_GDP China 
Independent Label DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr>|t| 
Intercept Intercept 2 83.44054 10.75955 7.76 <0.0001 
WGIPS WGIPS  8.49673 6.73703 1.26 0.2359 
EFIBiz EFIBiz  0.27937 0.17766 1.57 0.1469 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
The p-values show that the multiple regression results for GrossNatExp_GDP are not 
significant for WGIPS or EFIBiz.  
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Significant Multi Regression Dependent Variables 
The statistical diagnostic tests revealed that of the 79 dependent variables analyzed 
for China, 42 show significant multiple regression results. The Table 4.34 displays all those 
42. As stated in the previous section, there are 19 dependent variables (displayed in bold) 
with significant multiple regression results for both China and Brazil.  
Table 4.34: Significant Multiple Regression Dependent Variables for China 
 
Dependent Variables No. Dependent Variables No. Dependent Variables No. 
GDP_gr 2 FuelImp_MerchImp 35 FuelExp_MerchExp 53 
GDPpCap_gr 3 ExpValx 36 CPIx 58 
Agri_GDP 4 ImpValIx 37 M2_gr 61 
IndustValAd_gr 7 ExpVolx 38 IRSSpread 62 
GrossSav_GDP 10 ImpVolIx 39 ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc 64 
GrossSav_GNI 11 UnitValIxExp 40 STD_TTExtDbt 67 
GovFinConExp_GDP 14 PPIxExp 43 TTRes_TTExtDbt 69 
HHFinConExp_GDP 19 HiTekExp_ManuExp 45 M2_TTReserv 70 
Trade_GDP 25 ICTExp_TTExp 46 EnrgyImp_Euse 72 
MrchTrade_GDP 26 ICTImp_TTImp 47 GDP_UEnUKPPPOilE 73 
ExpGS_GDP 27 AgrRwExp_MerchExp 48 GDP_UEnUPPPOilE 74 
ExtBalGS_GDP 29 FoodExp_MrchExp 49 Internet_100 76 
urrACC_GDP 30 FDInet_GDP 51 Phonelines_100 77 
ImpGS_GDP 31 StoxVal_GDP 52 MobileSubs_100 79 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
For example, multiple regression results reveal associations between 
ICTImp_TTImp (Variable 47), EFITrade and EFIMon. ICTImp_TTImp (Variable 47) 
correlates at 82.3% (sig. 0.01) with EFITrade and at 66.9% (sig. 0.05) with EFIMon. 
Granger 1 and Granger 2 test results for EFITrade and EFIMon show p-values of 0.5035 
and 0.0467 (EFITrade) as well as 0.0097 and 0.0239 (EFIMon), respectively. These results 
suggest that EFITrade and EFIMon cause increasing shares of information and 
communication technology imports as a portion of total imports (Variable 47), which rose 
from 12.1% to 23.2% between 1996 and 2008.  
FDInet_GDP (Variable 51) provides an example of a case in which a dependent 
variable is affected by only one independent variable, WGIRQ. The Granger causality 
matrix for China in Tables 4.11a-c and the Correlation-Granger Causality Matrix and Multi 
Regression Matrix for China in Tables 4.32a-b reveal a correlation of 68.3% (sig. 0.05). 
Granger 1 and Granger 2 p-values of 0.2727 and 0.0105, respectively, suggest that WGIRQ 
Granger causes FDInet_GDP, and not vice versa.  
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Similarly to the previous section’s Tables 4.28a-b for Brazil, the dependent 
variables in Table 4.32a-b with significant results for China are marked with a light blue 
background. Black letters (e.g., Brazil&China) indicate that the multiple regression results 
for at least one dependent variable are significant for both Brazil and China; and red letters 
(e.g., Brazil&China) indicate that the multiple regression shows (e.g.) a significant 
relationship with an independent variable for China but not for Brazil.  
For example StoxVal_GDP (Variable 52) of China shows a significant relationship 
with CMca1MetOil, the newly created PCA independent variable combining CrudeIx and 
MinMetalsIx, which correlate at 78.7% and 69.4% (sig. 0.01) with Variable 52. The 
respective Granger causality tests 1 and 2 show that CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx Granger 
cause StoxVal_GDP due to p-values of 0.0618 and <0.000 for MinMetalsIx and 0.2751 and 
0.0035 for CrudeIx, respectively. However, the adjusted R-square is moderate at 0.5205, 
and the t-value for CMca1MetOil is 3.75.  
In comparison, StoxVal_GDP of Brazil shows no significant multiple regression 
results for any independent variable, even though FoodIx and AgriRawIx (PCA combined 
into BMca2FdAg) as well as MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx (PCA combined into 
BMca1MetOil) show correlations of 87.3%, 88.6% as well as 89.6% and 82.7% (sig. 0.01), 
respectively. Granger causality tests for Brazil suggest that the independent variables 
FoodIx and AgriRawIx as well as CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx Granger cause StoxVal_GDP 
at significance levels of 99% with corresponding Granger 1 and Granger 2 p-values of 
0.0262 and 0.0034 (FoodIx), 0.6087 and <0.0001 (AgriRawIx), 0.0377 and <0.0001 
(MinMetalsIx), and 0.6548 and 0.0035 (CrudeIx), respectively. 
 
4.3.3.2 Multiple Regression Results China 
 Table 4.35 below shows the multiple regression estimates, including the p-values 
(Pr>|t|) for each of the 42 dependent variables that have significant regression relationships 
with at least one of the 21 independent variables. Table 4.35 also displays the standard 
errors (St. Err.), adjusted R-square, t-values (t-val), and degree of freedom (DF) for each of 
these statistically significant relationships for China. Dependent variables and their 
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regression results marked in green indicate that the identical dependent variable for China 
reveals also significant multi regression results for Brazil. 
 Please note that Table 4.35 contains an overview only and does not discuss multiple 
regression results. As noted previously, the economic analysis and discussion on 
correlation, causality, and multiple regression results of selected dependent variables is 
carried out in Chapter 5. Table 4.35 shows significant regression results below the p-value 
threshold of 0.05 only. Therefore the number of DFs may differ from the number of 
independent variables shown due to the fact that non-significant independent variables are 
not shown. For information purposes the multi regression matrix in Table 4.32 shows all 
dependent related independent variables, significant or not significant. 
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4.4     Conclusion 
4.4.1 Conclusion Correlation Analysis 
 The correlation analysis for Brazil’s and China’s identical 79 dependent 
variables reveals 440 significant correlation counts for China, and 352 significant 
correlation counts for Brazil.  
 
Independent Variables Set 
 From an independent variable set perspective, I note that the commodity price 
index set dominates the significant correlation count, with 47% and 44.3% of all 
significant correlation events for China and Brazil, respectively. The economic freedom 
index set displays the second largest significant correlation count, representing 34.5% of 
all significant correlation counts for China and 28.1% for Brazil. With 18.4% of all 
counts for China and 27.6% of all counts for Brazil, the WGI index set trails the other 
two sets. 
 These results suggest that supply and demand for commodities and the changes 
in commodity prices exhibit a far greater association with economic activities measured 
by the 79 dependent variables than governance which is measured by the EFI and/or the 
WGI indexes. Commodity price indexes capture the largest number of significant 
correlations. Because EFI and WGI complement each other, it is even more remarkable 
that the commodity price indexes record the largest amount of significant correlation 
counts for both China and Brazil.  
 
Individual Independent Variables  
 BRAZIL: From an individual independent variable point of view the correlation 
results reveal that trade governance in Brazil, which is measured by EFITrade, shows 
the largest number of significant correlation counts (40 counts or 11.4%), followed by 
WGIVA —voice and accountability index— with 38 counts (or 10.8%), CrudeIx with 
37 counts (or 10.5%), MinMetalsIx with 31 counts (or 8.8%), and AgriRawIx with 30 
counts (or 8.5%). That is, trade governance for Brazil appears to play a key governance 
role in context of economic activity, followed by voice and accountability (WGIVA), 
which suggests major associations with economic activity in Brazil. Furthermore, from 
a governance point of view, regulatory quality (WGIRQ 16 counts, 4.5%) and rule of 
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law (WGIRL 14 counts, 4.0%) as well as business governance (EFIBiz: 13 counts, 
3.7%) suggest strong interdependence with economic activity.  
 CHINA: The commodity price indexes lead the correlation count. Minerals and 
metals prices (MinMetalsIx: 49 counts, or 11.1%) lead the ranking, followed by 
agricultural raw materials (AgriRawIx: 46 counts, or 10.5%), and oil prices (CrudeIx: 
45 counts, or 10.2%). From a governance perspective, EFITrade —like for Brazil— 
leads the correlation count (46 counts, or 10.5% of total correlation counts), followed by 
government effectiveness measured by WGIGE (30 counts, or 6.8%), freedom of 
property rights (EFIPropRi: 19 counts, or 4.3%), and freedom of corruption 
(EFICorrup: 18 counts, or 4.1%). Surprisingly, EFIBiz, which measures business 
governance in China, trails EFITrade with 14 correlation counts (or 3.2%), respectively. 
 
Cluster Effects 
 Cluster effects refer to the occurrence of several commodity price indexes and/or 
several WGI indexes and/or several EFI indexes affecting the same dependent variable 
or a group of similar dependent variables in the correlation matrix or in the Granger 
causality matrix.80  
 BRAZIL: Cluster effects occur mainly with commodity price indexes. Soft 
commodity price indexes (FoodIx, AgriRawIx) but also minerals and metals 
(MinMetalsIx) display strong correlations to GDP_gr and GDPpCap_gr. Nearly all 
commodity price indexes show strong correlations with trade indexes such as ExpValx, 
ExpVolx, ImpValIx, ImpVolIx, as well as with unit value and unit volume related trade 
indexes (Variables 36-41). In comparison to China’s export surplus, Brazil’s export 
surplus is driven mainly by commodities and to a smaller extent by manufactured 
goods, whereas China’s export surplus is driven mainly by manufactured goods.  
 Furthermore, it appears that changes in commodity price indexes cause changes 
in Brazil’s value of stocks traded to GDP (Variable 52). These and other observations 
will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. Also, the correlation analysis suggests that 
there exists a cluster effect between commodity price indexes and food, crop, as well as 
livestock production (Variables 55-57). Changes in commodity prices seem to affect 
population migration measured by RuPp_toTPp (Variable 75: rural population to total 
                                                 
80
 Cluster effects occur in the context of the causality matrixes and multiple regression matrixes in 
Section 4.2.3 (Causality Analysis) and Section 4.3 (Multiple Regression Analysis). 
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population), and improving degrees of communication coverage measured by 
Internet_100 (Variable 76), Phonelines_100 (Variable 77), and MobilSubs_100 
(Variable 79). Last but not least, rising commodity price indexes correlate with 
improving energy efficiency measured by energy efficiency variables such as 
GDP_UEnUKPPPOilE and GDP_UEnUPPPOilE (Variables 73, 74). 
 Commodity price indexes reveal associations with a wide array of 
macroeconomic variables. But governance indexes show a more narrow correlation 
association to macroeconomic variables. WGIVA, WGIPS, and WGIGE display cluster 
effects on trade variables such as Trade_GDP and MrchTrade_GDP (Variables 25, 26), 
whereas WGIRQ and WGIRL show cluster associations with rates and debt variables 
(Variables 62-66, 68). EFIBiz, EFITrade, EFIFisc, and EFIGovtS exhibit cluster 
associations with debt variables (Variables 62-66, 68) only.  
 CHINA: Similar to Brazil, the commodity price indexes show large cluster 
effects on macroeconomic variables for China. In addition to cluster associations on 
GDP metrics (Variables 2-3), debt and reserve ratios (Variables 64-65, 67, 69-71), soft 
commodity production indexes (Variables 55-57), and trade indexes (Variables 36-41), 
correlation cluster effects in China also include GDP composition variables (Variables 
6-12) such as IndustryValAd_GDP and GrossSav_GDP, and trade variables such as 
Trade_GDP, MrchTrade_GDP, and ExpGS_GDP (Variables 25-27, and 29-31). 
 The WGI indexes do not reveal any significant correlation cluster effects. And 
EFI indexes, primarily EFITrade, EFIGovtS, EFIFin, EFIInv, and EFIPropRi appear to 
exhibit cluster effects on rates and debt ratios only (Variables 62-65, 67). 
 
4.4.2 Conclusion Causality Analysis 
 The Granger causality analyses on Brazil’s and China’s 79 dependent variables 
reveal 267 significant Granger causality counts for China and 224 for Brazil. 
Remarkably, the count ranking is the same for both. The commodity price index set is 
leading the count (China: 59.2% of all counts, Brazil: 50.4%), followed by the 
economic freedom index set (China: 22.8%, Brazil: 25.0%) and the WGI index set 
(China: 18.0%, Brazil 24.6%). 
 
  
272 
Independent Variables Set 
Commodity Price Index Set  
 The commodity price index set dominates the Granger causality count with 
59.6% and 50.4% of all counts for China and Brazil, respectively.  
 For BRAZIL, AgriRawIx (29 counts), MinMetalsIx (25 counts), and FoodIx (22 
counts) lead the causality count, followed by VegOilSeedsIx (17 counts), CrudeIx (15 
counts), and TropBevIx (5 counts). I note also, more than half of the counts for these 
commodities is of inverse causality nature. Only CrudeIx shows more Granger 
causalities than inverse causalities.    
 For CHINA, the largest count within the commodity price index set resides 
within MinMetalsIx (44 counts), AgriRawIx (37 counts), CrudeIx and VegOilSeedsIx 
(each 25 counts), followed by FoodIx (23 counts), and TropBevIx (4 counts). The 
inverse Granger count is more than half of the counts for AgriRawIx (11 Granger 
causalities : 26 inverse causalities), VegOilSeedsIx (6 : 19), FoodIx (6 : 17), and 
TropBevIx (1 : 3).    
 
Economic Freedom Index Set  
 The economic freedom index set displays the second largest causality count for 
both China and Brazil showing 22.8% of a total of 267 counts for China and 25.0% of a 
total of 224 counts for Brazil. It is revealing that for both CHINA and BRAZIL the 
EFITrade index is the dominating governance index within the EFI index set with 25 
and 27 causality counts of which 15 and 20 are of inverse causality nature, respectively. 
For both countries, trade governance measured by EFITrade emerges as one of the key 
governance dimensions. Second and third largest governance index count for China is 
EFIPropRi (Freedom of Property Rights) with 9 counts and EFIGovtS (government size 
governance) with 6 counts, of which 6 and 1 are of inverse nature, respectively. In 
contrast, second and third largest governance counts for Brazil are EFIBiz (Freedom of 
Business) with 8 counts (of which are 5 inverse), and EFICorrup (freedom of 
corruption) jointly with EFIGovtS (government size) with 6 counts each.    
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Worldwide Governance Index Set 
 The WGI indexes rank as the third largest governance set by significant 
causality counts. CHINA provides a total causality count of 48 (18.0%), whereas 
BRAZIL displays 55 (24.6%). For China, WGIGE is the dominant governance index 
with 21 counts (18 of which are of inverse nature), followed by WGIPS with 12 counts 
(10 of which are inverse). In contrast, for Brazil WGIVA dominates the causality count 
with 29 counts (16 of which are inverse) followed by WGIRQ with 9 counts (4 of which 
are inverse).  
 Overall, above results suggest that supply and demand for commodities and 
subsequent changes in commodity prices do show a far greater association with 
economic activities measured by the 79 dependent variables than changes of the EFI or 
the WGI indexes. These results are congruent with the findings of the correlation 
analysis in which the commodity price indexes dominate the correlation count for both, 
China and Brazil, followed by the EFI index set and the WGI index set. As in the 
correlation analysis, commodity price indexes capture the largest number of significant 
causality counts. In light of the fact that the EFI and the WGI indexes do complement 
each other, it is remarkable that the commodity price indexes capture 59.2% of all 
significant causality counts for China (or 158 events, 92 of which are of inverse nature), 
and 50.4% for Brazil (113 events, 67 of which are of inverse nature).  
 
Individual Independent Variables  
 BRAZIL: From and individual independent variable point of view the Granger 
causality analysis reveals that within the commodity price index set, AgriRawIx 
displays the largest causality count (29 counts, or 12.9% of total), followed by 
MinMetalsIx (25 counts, or 11.2%), FoodIx (22 counts, or 9.8%), VegOilSeedsIx (17 
counts, or 7.6%), CrudeIx (15 counts, or 6.7%), and TropBevIx (5 counts, or 2.2%).  
 From a governance dimension point of view, voice and accountability 
governance (WGIVA: degree of democracy) shows the largest causality count at 29 
events, 16 of which are of inverse nature. Trade governance for Brazil measured by 
EFITrade shows the second largest number of significant causality events (27 counts or 
12.1% of total) within all governance dimensions, followed by WGIRQ (9 counts), and 
EFIBiz (8 counts). As already indicated in the correlation analysis, WGIVA and trade 
governance for Brazil seem to play key governance roles in context of economic 
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activity in Brazil. Furthermore, regulatory quality (WGIRQ, 9 counts) and rule of law 
(WGIRL, 6 counts) as well as business governance (EFIBiz, 8 counts) suggest some 
interdependence with economic activity.  
 CHINA: As for Brazil, the commodity price indexes lead the causality count. 
The minerals and metals price index (MinMetalsIx: 44 counts or 16.5%) leads the 
ranking, followed by the agricultural raw materials price index (AgriRawIx: 37 counts 
or 13.9%), CrudeIx (25 counts or 9.4%), VegOilSeedsIx (25 counts or 9.4%), FoodIx 
(23 counts or 8.6%) and TropBevIx (4 counts or 1.5%). The Granger causality tests on 
China reveal an inverse causality ratio of 58.2% (92 counts) within the commodity price 
indexes.  
 From a governance perspective, EFITrade —similarly to Brazil— is the 
dominating governance dimension within the causality analysis displaying 25 
significant Granger causality counts, followed by WGIGE, which displays a Granger 
causality count of 21. WGIPS, EFIPropRi, WGIVA, and WGICC rank third, fourth and 
fifth, representing 12, 9 and 7 causality counts, respectively. Similarly to Brazil, trade 
governance (EFITrade) appears to play a key role in China’s economy.    
 
Cluster Effects 
 BRAZIL: Cluster effects of Granger (including inverse) causality are driven 
mainly by commodity price indexes. It is observable that soft commodity price indexes 
(FoodIx, AgriRawIx) as well as minerals and metals price indexes (MinMetalsIx) 
display associations with GDP_gr and GDPpCap_gr. Nearly all commodity price 
indexes show associations with trade indexes such as ExpValX, ExpVolX, ImpVolIx, 
ImpValIx, and unit value and unit volume related trade indexes (Variables 36-41). 
Furthermore, it appears that changes in commodity price indexes are associated 
(Granger cause) with large changes in Brazil’s stocks value traded to GDP (Variable 
52). Also, the causality analysis suggests that there exists a cluster effect between 
commodity price indexes and crop production (Variable 56), in addition to cluster 
effects on debt ratios (Variables 64, 65, 68, 69). Last but not least, rising commodity 
price indexes show some interaction with energy efficiency variables such as 
GDP_UEnUPPPOilE (Variable 74), and rural migration and communication variables 
(Variables 75-77, 79).   
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 Similarly to the correlation findings in the section above, it appears that while 
commodity price indexes reveal associations with a wide array of macroeconomic 
variables, governance indexes show a more narrow causality association to 
macroeconomic variables. WGIVA, WGIPS, and WGIGE display cluster effects on 
trade variables such as Trade_GDP and MrchTrade_GDP (Variables 25-26), whereas 
WGIRL and WGIRQ show cluster associations with a debt variable (Variable 66). 
EFIBiz, EFIFisc, and EFIGovtS show signs of cluster associations with debt variables 
(Variables 64, 66, 68 (EFIFisc excluded)).  
 CHINA: Similarly to Brazil, commodity price indexes show large causality 
cluster effects on macroeconomic variables for China. In particular, savings quota 
variables (Variables 10-12), trade variables (Variables 25-31, 35-41) as well as debt 
variables (Variables 64, 65, 69-71) and communication variables (Variables 76, 77, 79) 
show strong causality associations.  In comparison to Brazil, causality cluster effects of 
WGI or EFI indexes in relation to macroeconomic variables are less pronounced, not to 
say non-existent.  
  
4.4.3 Conclusion Principal Component Analysis  
In Section 4.2.4 I performed principal component analysis (PCA) in order to 
eliminate multicollinearity among independent variables. Upon detecting potential pairs 
of independent variables subject to multicollinearity, I applied PCA in order to combine 
those pairs. The result of this procedure is the creation of a number of new independent 
variables.  
The principal component analysis has been applied on commodity price indexes, 
WGI and EFI governance indexes, as well as on respective changes in commodity price 
indexes and changes in governance indexes in consideration of dependent variables 
measured in percentage shares and change rates.  
 
Commodity Price Indexes 
The price indexes for commodities have been divided in two subsets. (1) The 
soft commodity subset includes FoodIx, TropBevIx, AgriRawIx, and VegOilSeedsIx. 
(2) The metals and oil subset in contrast includes the composite base, minerals and 
precious metals price index (MinMetalsIx) and the composite oil price index (CrudeIx).  
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The differentiation of the soft commodity subset and the minerals and metals 
and crude subset is based on an array of considerations such as correlation associations 
and Granger causality associations. The latter is specifically relevant for MinMetalsIx 
and CrudeIx as revealed in Chapter 3. Both, MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx, are a sub asset 
class within commodities which tends to correlate relatively close to one another. 
Furthermore, in capital markets both oil and base metal commodities commonly serve 
as leading indicators of general global economic activity, broad stock market index 
moves, general consumer demand, and as leading indicators of inflation. In addition, 
base metals and oil hold a considerable, strong correlation with specific foreign 
exchange markets. MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx tend to trend with fundamental factors 
that for example also affect commodity currencies (e.g., New Zealand dollar (NZD), 
Australian dollar (AUD), Canadian dollar (CAD)81). 
The rules which I apply to bundle commodity price index pairs within each 
commodity subset in order to create a new principal component independent variable 
are based on the following: (a) A significant (sig. 0.05) correlation of at least 69.9%, 
and (b) the correlation of the respective commodity price indexes pair must be above the 
correlation of a dependent variable with a commodity price index. As a result, this 
methodology produced the following new commodity price index variables for the 
regression analysis of Brazil and China:  
(1) BMca1MetOil: CrudeIx & MinMetalsIx, Brazil 
(2) BMca2FdAg: FoodIx & AgriRawIx, Brazil 
(3) BMca3BevAg: TropBevIx &AgriRawIx, Brazil 
(4) BgrMcaFoodAg: Change rates of FoodIx & Change rates of AgriRawIx, Brazil 
(5) CMca1MetOil: MinMetalsIx & CrudeIx, China 
(6) CMca2FdAg: FoodIx & AgriRawIx, China 
(7) CMca3FdVegAg: FoodIx & VegOilSeedsIx & AgriRawIx, China 
 
                                                 
81
 Also referred to as commodity currencies due to the strong correlation with commodity prices. 
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Governance Indexes 
Governance indexes provided by the World Bank (WGI indexes) and the 
Heritage Foundation (EFI indexes) represent aggregate indicators which embody and 
combine the examination and observation of a large number of companies, enterprises, 
supranational entities, individuals, and expert survey participants in industrialized and 
developed economies as well as in developing countries. Because the individual data 
sources that underlie the aggregate indicators are collected and assembled from diverse 
think tanks, survey institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and international 
organizations, governance dimensions are highly heterogeneous which poses a 
challenge when applying multicollinearity detection methods on governance index 
pairs.  
To address these distinctive challenges and features I amended the 
multicollinearity approach by adding two new criteria: (a’) the correlation confidence 
level must be greater than 99% (sig. 0.01), and (a’’) there can be only one newly created 
governance index pair per set of independent governance variables.  
As a result of this amended methodology, the following new governance indexes 
have been established for the regression analysis of Brazil and China:  
(1) CMca4WvAPs: WGIVA & WGIPS, China 
(2) BMca4EfscGvt: EFIFisc & EFIGovtS, Brazil 
(3) CMca5EinvFin: EFIInv & EFIFin, China 
These newly established independent variables have been incorporated in the 
regression analysis in Section 4.3.  
 
4.4.4   Conclusion Multiple Regression Analysis 
BRAZIL: 44 macroeconomic variables out of the total of 79 analyzed for Brazil 
passed the statistical diagnostic tests and proceeded into the regression analysis. The 
results of the regression analysis revealed that of these 44 variables only 9 dependent 
variables failed to exhibit significant regression results. These are: 
(1) Variable 2: GDP_gr 
(2) Variable 3: GDPpCap_gr 
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(3) Variable 27: ExpGS_GDP 
(4) Variable 34: ManfImp_MrchImp 
(5) Variable 50: ManufExp_MrchExp 
(6) Variable 52: StoxVal_GDP 
(7) Variable 54: MrktCapList_GDP 
(8) Variable 68: STD_TTResv 
(9) Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp 
It is worth to note that the regression analysis of Brazil revealed the following 
governance indexes which play no role in the regression analysis:   
(1)  EFIPropRi 
(2)  EFIInvest 
(3)  EFIMon 
(4)  WGICC 
 
CHINA: In comparison with Brazil, the statistical diagnostic tests for China 
revealed that of the 79 selected dependent variables 49 made it into regression tests. Of 
those 49 dependent variables, 7 do not show any significant multiple regression results.  
(1) Variable 13: GrossNatExp_GDP 
(2) Variable 16: FinConExp_GDP 
(3) Variable 54: MrktCapList_GDP 
(4) Variable 59: Infltn 
(5) Variable 63: RealIR 
(6) Variable 65: ExtDebtST_GNI 
(7) Variable 75: RuPp_ToTPp 
From a governance angle, regression tests reveal that the following indexes do 
not have any effect on any dependent variable analyzed for China:  
(1) WGIRL 
(2) EFIFisc 
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Furthermore, of the regression significant variables for Brazil (35 variables) and 
China (42 variables), there are 19 identical dependent variables that reveal regression 
significance for both Brazil and China. These 19 dependent variables can be found in 
Table 4.31 (Regression Results Brazil) for Brazil and Table 4.35 (Regression Results 
China) for China. It is worth noting that for Brazil the number of significant governance 
regressor variables is larger than it is for China. 
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5  Comparative Econometric Result Analysis of Selected Variables 
5.1  Introduction 
Overview 
Chapter 5 offers economic interpretations of the results of the correlation, 
causality, and regression analysis carried out in the previous chapters. All data in the 
tables in this chapter have been computed and arranged by the author. The relevant 
statistical results are based on the results from Chapter 4, while the macroeconomic data 
is based on the data series provided by the World Bank (2009, 2010) introduced in 
Chapter 3.   
The objective is to uncover economically sensible associations between 
dependent and independent variables and to reveal economic pattern differences or 
similarities between Brazil and China. Such associations between dependent and 
independent variables which do not allow for sensible interpretations from an economic 
point of view are either kept in gray shaded letters in the tables and/or not further 
discussed. By association I mean a relationship that entails significant correlation 
results, and/or significant Granger causality results (including inverse), and/or 
significant regression results.  
 The following regression significant variables of Tables 4.31 and 4.35 for Brazil 
and China have been chosen to perform econometric analysis on in this section.    
The macroeconomic variables of Table 4.31 for Brazil include: GDP growth rate 
(Variable 2), GDP per capita growth rate (Variable 3), trade to GDP (Variable 25), 
exports of goods and services to GDP (Variable 27), imports of goods and services to 
GDP (Variable 31), export value index (Variable 36), export volume index (Variable 
38), unit value index of exports (Variable 40), net foreign direct investment (Variable 
51), stock value to GDP (Variable 52), consumer price index (Variable 58), M2 to GDP 
(Variable 60), energy efficiency (Variable 74: GDP_UEnUPPPOilE), and 
communication variables (Variable 76: Internet_100, Variable 79: MobileSubs_100). 
 The macroeconomic variables of Table 4.35 for China include: industry value 
added to GDP (Variable 6), gross fixed capital formation to GDP (Variable 23), trade to 
GDP (Variable 25), export value index (Variable 36), import value index (Variable 37), 
export volume index (Variable 38), import volume index (Variable 39), unit value index 
imports (Variable 41), consumer price index (Variable 58), energy efficiency (Variable 
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74: GDP_UEnUPPPOilE), and communication variables (Variable 76: Internet_100, 
Variable 79: MobileSubs_100).  
 For each dependent variable I comparatively illustrate the effects for Brazil and 
China. Also, Section 5.2 includes variables which are not displayed in Table 4.31 
(Regression Results Brazil) and Table 4.35 (Regression Results China) but nonetheless 
offer sufficient empirical grounds for further examination. These variables include 
manufacturing value added to GDP (Variable 8), manufacturing exports to merchandise 
exports (Variable 50), manufacturing imports to merchandise imports (Variable 34), 
trade tariffs (Variable 44), and rural population to total population (Variable 75).  
 I do not discriminate between dependent variables that reveal significant 
regression results and those that do not. My criteria for selecting additional dependent 
variables in this section are based on empirical significance, as well as on correlation 
significance, and/or causality significance. A dependent variable must reveal at least 
significant correlation results and yield sufficient empirical evidence to enter analyses. 
The objective is to reveal meaningful macroeconomic variables and to draw 
comparisons on surfacing explanatory variables at the example of Brazil and China. The 
length of explanatory illustrations and elaborations on empirical relationships between 
dependent and independent variables varies depending on the scope of empirical 
findings for each macroeconomic variable.  
  
Structure of Chapter 5 
Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.15: Approach and Method  
 In Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.15, I display regression metrics for Brazil and China in 
an introductory table on a selected dependent variable and indicate significance levels, 
correlation levels, regression results including adjusted R-square (labeled as R2), and —
case by case— t- and p-values. 82  The econometrics and statistics of the selected 
macroeconomic variables are based on and have been imported from the Granger 
causality and regression analyses of the matrixes of Tables 4.8a-c (Granger Causality 
Matrix Brazil), Tables 4.28a-b (Correlation-Granger Causality and Multiple Regression 
                                                 
82
 Adjusted R-square levels, correlation and t-values as well as p-values are rounded up or down to the 
second decimal digit. 
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Matrix Brazil) and Table 4.31 (Multiple Regression Results Brazil) for Brazil as well as 
the respective matrixes for China (Tables 4.11a-c, Tables 4.32a-b, and Table 4.35).  
 Empty fields marked with ‘ – ‘ in the tables indicate that correlation, causality, 
or regression significance is low and not relevant. The correlation fields showing 
asterisks ‘*‘ or ‘**‘ represent correlation results that are significant at the 95% 
confidence level (sig. 0.05) or at the 99% confidence level (sig. 0.01), respectively. The 
Granger fields in the table displayed as ‘Causal’ mean that the independent variable is 
Granger causing the macroeconomic variable. If the respective cell is labeled as ‘Iv’ or 
‘Inverse’ it means that the causality runs from the macroeconomic variable (the 
dependent variable) to the independent variable (governance dimension, and/or 
commodity price index), that is there exists an inverse causality phenomenon. If the cell 
is labeled as ‘Causal/Iv’ then the confidence levels of both, Granger 1 and Granger 2 
tests are at least at a level of 95% (sig. 0.05), i.e., there exists feedback causality. The 
regression fields labeled as ‘Regr. Sig’ indicate whether a dependent variable has 
significant regression results. In order to yield significant regression results a 
macroeconomic variable must exhibit significant correlation and causality results. That 
is, the pre-condition for regression significance is correlation and causality significance. 
When a macroeconomic variable does not exhibit regression significance, then the 
‘Regr. Sig’ cell displays ‘No’. If the ‘Regr. Sig-cell’ displays ‘Yes’, then the 
macroeconomic variable displays significant regression results. Each ‘Regr. Sig’ cell 
which is labeled ‘Yes’ also contains the respective adjusted R-square. 
After displaying the econometric parameters of a correlation significant 
relationship, causality or regression significant relationship, I seek to utilize these 
results and findings to support these with empirical and economic observations. That is, 
I seek to discuss empirical results, observations and findings for selected 
macroeconomic variables by underlining and supporting these with significant statistical 
evidence, e.g., correlation and causality significance as well as regression significance 
as established in Chapter 4. 
 As already stated in the introduction in Section 1.5, I have chosen not to perform 
a full scale inverse regression analysis. Consequently, inverse Granger causal 
relationships have not been tested on regression significance due to the implicitly 
questionable underlying suggestion that changes in macroeconomic variables (treated as 
exogenous variables in the case of inverse Granger causality) of China and Brazil cause 
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changes in the two sets of governance dimensions and in commodity price indexes, and 
that the cause and effect associations are observable on a long-term basis. As illustrated 
in Section 1.5, the rational for not performing inverse regression analysis is as follows:  
(1) The objective in this thesis is to reveal long-term regression associations in which 
macroeconomic variables are affected (Granger caused) by commodity prices and/or 
governance architecture.  
(2) Governance dimensions are complex, politically, socially and economically 
multifaceted and subject to long-term evolutionary processes in order to be effective. 
Governance structures and governance architectures are established, formulated, shaped 
and influenced at top central and/or local authority levels, and are thus exogenous. As 
such, it is problematic to envision that governance architecture (i.e., governance 
indexes) is caused by one or more than one (or a set of) macroeconomic variable(s). 
(3) Commodity prices are exogenous due to market size and due to the number of 
market participants. Commodity prices trend with the general state of the global 
economy and not solely with the trend of a single economy such as China’s. 
Undoubtedly, China’s economic expansion in tandem with global growth affected 
global commodity prices. Nonetheless, China’s global import share (Table 2.9) and 
global GDP share (Table 2.2) itself is too small to solely positively affect commodity 
prices in case the economies of the US and/or of the European Union stall or run into a 
decline.83 
 However, I acknowledge significant inverse causality relationships on a 
selective basis and offer economic and empirical arguments and evidence to lend 
credence to the rationale of an inverse causal relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and commodity price indexes and/or governance dimensions.  
  
Conclusion 
The conclusion in Section 5.3 summarizes the objective of this thesis and 
outlines the econometric approach and methods applied. The conclusion also 
summarizes significant findings of this chapter.  
                                                 
83
 Table 2.2 (China GDP Relative to world GDP 1970-2009): China’s global GDP share was 8.56% in 
2009. Table 2.9 (Import Structure China 1995-2009): China’s global import share was 7.9% in 2009. 
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5.2 Selected Macroeconomic Variables 
5.2.1 GDP Growth Rate 
Table 5.1: GDP Growth Rate 
 Variable 2 GDP_gr, Brazil  GDP_gr China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 69.7* Causal No - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx - - - 59.0* Inverse - 
AgriRawIx 64.3* Causal No 61.0* - - 
MinMetalsIx 56.9* Causal No 65.1* Causal Yes: R2 .37 
Source: This table and all following tables in this section have been created, calculated and arranged by the author. 
 BRAZIL: GDP_gr, which stood at an average of 3.0% p.a. between 1996 and 
2008 (however volatile, ranging between 0.038% and 6.1%), correlates moderately 
positive at 69.7%, 64.3%, and 56.9% (each sig. 0.05) with FoodIx, AgriRawIx, and 
MinMetalsIx.84 Granger causality analysis reveals that GDP_gr is Granger caused by 
FoodIx, AgriRawIx, and MinMetalsIx. Please see Table 4.8a-c for details 
 Rationale: There exist strong associations between Brazil’s GDP growth rate 
and Brazil’s commodities exports, as outlined in Chapter 2, specifically in iron ores, 
manganese as well as other minerals and metals, soy products and agricultural raw 
materials. These exports appear to have positive effects on Brazil’s output. Granger 
causality is significant in all cases, supporting empirical evidence with statistical 
significance that rising commodity prices cause GDP_gr. Between 1995 and 2009, 
Brazilian export shares of the respective commodity groups to total exports developed 
as follows: Food exports rose from 28.5% to 33.9%, fuels exports rose from 0.9% to 
8.9%, and ores and metals rose from 11.3% to 13.4% (Table 2.6: Export Structure 
Brazil). Nonetheless, the regression analysis discloses no significant relationship 
between the dependent variable and commodity prices, which may be due to the 
relatively small data sample of 13 data points from 1996 to 2008.  
  
  CHINA: GDP_gr of China averaged at 9.87% p.a. between 1996 and 2008, with 
its low at 7.6% in 1999 and its high at 14.2% in 2007, dropping to 9.6% in 2008. 
GDP_gr shows significant positive correlations of 59.0%, 61.0%, and 65.1% with 
VegOilSeedsIx, AgriRawIx, and MinMetalsIx. Granger causality analysis suggests that 
                                                 
84
 Correlation qualification ri: moderate (50.0% < ri <70.0%), high (70.0% < ri < 90.0%), very high 
(90.0% < ri < 100.0%).   
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MinMetalsIx causes GDP_gr, but the regression association is questionable according to 
the low adjusted R-square of 0.37.  
 Rationale: In contrast with Brazil, it appears that GDP_gr in China is Granger 
causing changes in VegOilSeedsIx suggesting that Chinese GDP growth affects the 
respective commodity price index as a result of large import volumes, specifically soy 
products from Brazil. Also, the multiple regression analysis reveals that there exists a 
significant relationship between MinMetalsIx causing GDP growth. The demand in base 
metals due to an increasing capital formation to GDP ratio in context of an expanding 
infrastructure and growing industry clusters affects the prices. The increasing 
infrastructure coverage and growing industry clusters in turn positively affect output, 
which translates into positive GDP growth rate effects, which in turn affect the 
consumption of base metals. China’s global import share of base metals and iron ore 
grew from 2.5% to 16% between 1995 and 2009, as shown in Table 2.9 (Import 
Structure China, Chapter 2). Therefore, Granger causality indicating that base metal 
prices lead or Granger cause GDP_gr is not plausible. At 0.37, the adjusted R-square 
(R2) is low, which reveals weak (at best) explanatory power of the independent variable.    
 
5.2.2 GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 
Table 5.2: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate   
Variable 3 GDPpCap_gr Brazil  GDPpCap_gr China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 72.9** - - - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx - - - 60.2* Inverse - 
AgriRawIx 67.5* Causal No 64.8* - - 
MinMetalsIx 57.9* Causal No 66.2* Causal Yes: R2 .38 
EFICorrup -59.0* Causal No - - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: GDPpCap_gr was at 1.67% p.a. on average between 1996 and 2008, 
showing high volatility between a negative growth rate of -1.45% in 1998 and a positive 
growth rate of 4.12% in 2008 (max 5.0% in 2007). GDPpCap_gr shows a similar 
pattern as GDP_gr, which correlates moderately with FoodIx (sig. 0.01), 
VegOilSeedsIx, and MinMetalsIx. The Granger causality analysis reveals that 
GDPpCap_gr is Granger caused by AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, and by EFICorrup.  
Rationale: Granger causality validates the strong associations between the 
importance of Brazil’s economic expansion measured by GDPpCap_gr and the rising 
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prices of commodity exports, specifically iron ores, manganese as well as other 
minerals and metals, and agricultural raw materials, despite insignificance of regression 
analysis results. No association can be established between the slightly improving 
EFICorrup between 1996 and 2008 and the GDP per capita change rate.   
 
CHINA: The GDP per capita change rate was at 9.05% on average p.a. between 
1996 and 2008, ranging between 6.7% in 1999 and 13.6% in 2007, and then dropping to 
9.04% in 2008. GDPpCap_gr shows significant moderately positive correlations with 
VegOilSeedsIx, AgriRawIx, and MinMetalsIx.  
Rationale: Similarly to the example of GDP_gr, it appears that GDPpCap_gr of 
China is Granger causing changes in VegOilSeedsIx. And again, multiple regression 
reveals that MinMetalsIx is causing GDPpCap_gr, and that there exists a significant 
regression relationship between MinMetalsIx and GDPpCap_gr. Similarly to GDP_gr, 
adjusted R2 for GDPpCap_gr is low at 0.38. The same rationale applies as for GDP_gr.  
 
5.2.3 Industry Value Added to GDP 
Table 5.3: Industry Value Added to GDP  
Variable 6  IndustValAd_GDP Brazil  IndustValAd_GDP China 
Independent Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx - - - 69.4** - - 
TropBevIx - - - 77.5* Inverse - 
VegOilSeedsIx - - - 57.6* - - 
AgriRawIx - - - 75.4** Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx - - - 66.2* - - 
WGIVA 55.5* - - - - - 
WGIGE 57.8* Causal Yes: R2 .27 - - - 
WGIRQ - - - 72.1** - - 
EFITrade 57.3* - - - - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: IndustValAd_GDP ranged between 25.7% and 30.1% between 1996 
and 2008, closing at 26.7% by the end of 2008. IndustValAd_GDP shows moderate 
positive correlation (each sig. 0.05) with WGIVA, WGIGE, and EFITrade, suggesting 
that there exist significant associations to WGIVA (voice and accountability, i.e., level 
of democracy), trade governance, and government effectiveness. Surprisingly, the 
regression analysis revealed that WGIGE is significantly affecting the dependent 
variable. However, model fit displayed by adjusted R2 is low at 0.27.  
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Rationale: There is no plausible rationale regarding the improving government 
effectiveness (WGIGE) and the rise of IndustValAd_GDP. The correlations are low and 
do not yield sufficient statistical support to draw a conclusive empirical summary.  
 
CHINA: The correlation of TropBevIx (sig. 0.05) and AgriRawIx (sig. 0.01) 
with industry value added to GDP is high, and the inverse Granger causality is 
significant. The correlation with FoodIx (sig. 0.01), VegOilSeedsIx (sig. 0.05), and 
MinMetalsIx (sig. 0.05) is moderate.  
Rationale: In comparison to Brazil it appears that the development of Chinese 
industry value added to GDP is Granger causing prices of tropical beverages 
(TropBevIx) and agricultural raw materials (AgriRawIx). The correlations are high at 
77.5% and 75.4% respectively, suggesting that price increases in global commodity 
prices may be also driven by China’s absolute and relative expansion of its industrial 
sector relative to GDP, which ranged between 44.8% and 47.95% from 1996 to 2008 
relative to a growing Chinese GDP.  
 
5.2.4 Manufacturing Value Added to GDP 
Table 5.4: Manufacturing Value Added to GDP 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: ManuValAdd_GDP shows no meaningful correlation or causality to 
any of the independent variables.  
Rationale: ManuValAdd_GDP was at 16.8% in 1996, declining to 15.3% in 
2008. Brazil’s manufacturing sector was shrinking during the analysis period, 
supporting the argument that the commodity export sector is growing at the expense of 
Brazil’s manufacturing base as described in Chapter 2.  
  
CHINA: ManuValAdd_GDP was almost twice the size of Brazil’s metric and 
stood at 33.5% in 1996 and 33.9% in 2008. The lowest point during this period was at 
Variable 8 ManuValAdd_GDP Brazil ManuValAdd_GDP China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx - - - 59.3* - - 
TropBevIx - - - 58.8* Inverse - 
AgriRawIx - - - 65.8* Inverse - 
WGIRQ - - - 77.1* - - 
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31.4% in 2002. There exists a moderate but significant (sig. 0.05) correlation between 
the dependent variable and commodity price indexes such as FoodIx, TropBevIx and 
AgriRawIx, suggesting that the increasing metric may affect the increase in TropBevIx, 
and AgriRawIx (inverse Granger causality). Also, WGIRQ shows high correlation with 
ManuValAdd_GDP, suggesting that improving regulatory quality plays a favorable role 
for the manufacturing sector.  
Rationale: Similarly to the rational regarding industry value added to GDP, the 
rise in manufacturing added value to GDP represents a pull effect on prices for 
agricultural raw materials and tropical beverages judging by significant correlation in 
context of inverse Granger causality. Even though the ratio remains relatively stable 
around the 32% and 33% mark between 1996 and 2003, its absolute impact in contrast 
rises due to the significantly growing denominator (GDP) from USD872 billion in 1996 
to USD2.69 trillion in 2008 (constant USD), inherently increasing demand for 
commodities. 
 
5.2.5 Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP  
Table 5.5: Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
 
BRAZIL: GrossFixCapForm_GDP shows moderate correlation at the 95% 
confidence level with all soft commodity price indexes except with FoodIx, which 
correlates highly at 70.4%, and except MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx for which there 
appears to be no correlation.  AgriRawIx and FoodIx —combined to BMca2FdAg— 
appear to Granger cause GrossFixCapForm_GDP. The multi regression results unveil a 
low adjusted R2 of 36.5%, suggesting that a move of the dependent variable (criterion 
variable) is impacted by only 36.5% by the move of Bmca2FdAG, the new principal 
component independent variable (predictor variable) combining food and agricultural 
raw material price indexes.  
Variable 23 GrossFixCapForm_GDP Brazil GrossFixCapForm_GDP China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 70.4* Causal Yes: R2 .36 - - - 
TropBevIx 63.2* - - - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx 61.3* - - - - - 
AgriRawIx 56.4* Causal Yes: R2 .36 56.6* Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx - - - 67.3* Inverse - 
CrudeIx - - - 75.6** - - 
EFITrade - - - 88.3* Inverse - 
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Rationale: Gross fix capital formation to GDP developed relatively sluggishly 
from 16.9% to 18.3% between 1996 and 2008. From 2001 to 2003, 
GrossFixCapForm_GDP declined even from 17% to 15.3% driven by supply side 
shortcomings which resulted in a relatively low capacity utilization ratio of Brazil’s 
industrial sector. Gross fix capital formation growth rate was at -0.34% in 1998 and -
0.82% in 1999, then at -5.23% in 2002 and -4.59% in 2003. The problem of capacity 
utilization gaps has not been addressed by the Lula administration’s first and second 
term. The improving capacity utilization in Brazil and the subsequently rising gross 
fixed capital formation from 15.3% in 2003 to 18.3% in 2008 was primarily a result of a 
buoyant global economy and accelerating global demand for commodities. It was not so 
much attributable to the initially weak domestic GDP growth rate of 1.15% in 2003 
which then gradually improved to 3.16% in 2005 and 5.14% in 2008. Baer (2008, p. 
157) notes that even though gross fixed capital formation improved after 2003, a 
significant portion of the growth in gross fixed capital formation has been due to a 
significant increase in capital goods prices in heavy industries due to the buoyant global 
economy. Therefore, the low correlation of TropBevIx and VegOilSeedsIx in addition 
to a low adjusted R2 for FoodIx and AgriRawIx suggests that the explanatory power of 
the predictor variables is weak in explaining the rise of gross fixed capital formation to 
GDP in Brazil between 1996 and 2008.  
    
CHINA: The Granger causalities of China’s GrossFixCapForm_GDP are of 
inverse nature to agricultural raw materials prices, minerals and metals prices, and 
EFITrade. The increase in gross fixed capital formation to GDP from 33.8% in 1996 to 
40.2% in 2008 is causing AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, and EFITrade. There is no 
indication of inverse causality to CrudeIx, which highly correlates with the dependent 
variable (sig. 0.01).   
Rationale: These results are not surprising considering China’s large 
infrastructure investments in the transport sector, telecom sector, and energy sector 
which were at 2% of GDP in 1991, then increased to over 8% of GDP in 2004 and 
reached as high as almost 9% of GDP in 2008 (Naughton, 2007, pp. 446). In 
comparison, Brazil spent only 1% of its GDP on infrastructure improvements, 
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potentially undermining ongoing economic expansion. 85  China’s expanding 
infrastructure investments in transport (e.g., ports, airports, and road network), 
telecommunication, industry parks, and utility grids carries immense demand for related 
commodities (especially base metals), causing rising commodity prices in specific 
commodities sub-segments. This empirical observation is supported by statistical 
evidence such as inverse Granger causality to MinMetalsIx and AgriRawIx, indicating 
that as a result of China’s expanding economy, e.g., expanding 
GrossFixCapForm_GDP, demand in these commodities rose, affecting respective prices 
accordingly (Table 2.9: Import Structure China 1995-2009). This rationale also applies 
for CrudeIx in context of China’s rising share of global fuel imports from 1.6% to 6.7% 
between 1995 and 2009 (Table 2.9: Import Structure China 1995-2009), which is also 
due to the increasing fixed capital formation base during the same period. China’s share 
of fuel imports to total merchandise imports rose from 4.97% to 16.25% between 1996 
and 2008, thereafter dropping to 13.4% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis. 
GrossFixCapForm_GDP not only correlates high at 88.3% (sig. 0.05) with 
EFITrade, it also causes (inverse Granger causality) EFITrade (trade governance) which 
improved dramatically from 30.0 to 71.4 index points between 1996 and 2008. This 
suggests that China’s growing demand in commodities influenced trade governance to 
the better in order to facilitate access to commodity rich regions outside of China. 
Statistical evidence such as high correlation and inverse Granger causality of gross fixed 
capital formation to GDP with trade governance supports empirical observations which 
suggest that trade governance is a passive agent in the context of (i) increasing import 
volumes between 1996 and 2008, and (ii) China’s admission into the WTO in 
December 2001, which was subject to improving trade governance provisions imposed 
on China (e.g., reducing trade tariffs and non-tariff-barriers).   
Also, it is worth to mention that China’s terms of trade (Variable 42) 
deteriorated from 105.9 index points in 1996 to 73.9 index points in 2008, correlating 
moderately and highly negative with all commodity price indexes except for 
TropBevIx. This suggests that China’s economic expansion, reflected by expanding 
GrossFixCapForm_GDP between 1996 and 2008, has a positive effect on commodity 
                                                 
85
 In comparison, investments in infrastructure of developed economies can reach up to 2% to GDP p.a. 
(Naughton, 2007, pp. 446ff).   
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prices, which in turn negatively impact China’s terms of trade due to China’s massive 
imports of commodities on an absolute and relative basis as illustrated in Chapter 2.  
  
292 
5.2.6 Trade Variables  
Table 5.6.1: Trade to GDP 
 Variable 25 Trade_GDP Brazil Trade_GDP China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
AgriRawIx - - - 59.8* Causal/Iv No 
MinMetalsIx - - - 73.7** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .62 
CrudeIx 57.2* - - 79.4** Causal Yes: R2 .62 
WGIVA 77.2** Inverse - - - - 
WGIPS 64.6* Causal Yes: R2 .36 - - - 
WGIGE 75.0** - - - - - 
WGICC - - - -89.7** - - 
EFITrade 68.1* Inverse - 91.1** Inverse - 
EFICorrup 61.9* - - - - - 
Source: Tables 5.6.1 - 5.6.3 calculated and arranged by the author. 
Table 5.6.2: Exports of Goods and Services to GDP 
 Variable 27 ExpGS_GDP Brazil ExpGS_GDP China 
Independents Corr %  Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
AgriRawIx - - - 66.3* Causal/Iv No 
MinMetalsIx - - - 80.6** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .71 
CrudeIx 56.0* - - 84.1** Causal Yes: R2 .71 
WGIVA 82.3* Inverse - - - - 
WGIPS 56.2* Causal No - - - 
WGIGE 71.2* Causal No - - - 
WGICC - - - -87.9** - - 
EFITrade 72.8* Inverse - 92.9** Inverse No 
EFICorrup 56.9* Causal No - - - 
 
Table 5.6.3: Imports of Goods and Services to GDP 
In this section trade variables are represented by Trade_GDP (Variable 25), 
ExpGS_GDP (Variable 27), and ImpGS_gr (Variable 31). Change rates of exports and 
imports (Exp_gr, Imp_gr) do not show any significant statistics for Brazil or China. 
Variable 31 ImpGS_GDP Brazil ImpGS_GDP China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr %  Granger Regr. Sig 
MinMetalsIx - - - 63.5* Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .42 
CrudeIx - - - 71.8** Causal Yes: R2 .42 
WGIVA 56.7* Inverse - - - - 
WGIPS 73.7** - - - - - 
WGIGE 73.1** - - - - - 
WGICC - - - -89.9** - - 
EFITrade - - - 86.8** Inverse - 
EFIGovtS - - - -89.5** - - 
EFIMon 66.9* - - - - - 
EFICorrup 64.1* - - - - - 
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However, trade to GDP and exports of goods and services to GDP display some 
statistical similarities for both Brazil and China. Therefore I will mainly elaborate on 
Trade_GDP, which will serve as proxy argumentation for exports of goods and services 
to GDP for both Brazil and China. Imports to GDP will be discussed separately due to 
the fact that the statistical results and the empirical findings differ by nature in 
comparison to exports of goods and services to GDP.    
 
BRAZIL: Trade governance measured by EFITrade improved significantly for 
Brazil, rising from 57.0 to 71.6 index points between 1996 and 2008. In the same 
period, trade to GDP rose from 14.9% to 27.4%, correlating at 68.1% and (inversely) 
causing EFITrade. Remarkably, trade to GDP correlates highly positive with the degree 
of democracy (WGIVA) and even Granger causing the degree of democracy of Brazil. 
Also, the correlation to WGIGE is highly positive at 75%. Furthermore, increasing trade 
to GDP correlates with political stability (WGIPS) and freedom of corruption 
(EFICorrup), while the correlation to crude is surprisingly low at 57.2%. The regression 
results reveal that WGIPS is Granger causing Trade_GDP, but goodness of fit measured 
by adjusted R2 is low at 0.36, including a low explanatory power value of 2.8 for the t-
variable. 
The statistical results for ExpGS_GDP, which grew from 6.6% to 13.8% 
between 1996 and 2008, are similar to those of trade to GDP while the correlation 
coefficients and the adjusted R2 ratio are slightly less pronounced at the example of 
exports of goods and services to GDP compared to trade to GDP.  
Imports of goods and services to GDP, which rose from 8.4% to 13.6% between 
1996 and 2008, reveal positive correlations with WGIVA, WGIPS and WGIGE (both 
high correlation, sig. 0.01), EFIMon, and with EFICorrup, but —remarkably— not with 
EFITrade.  
Rationale: The external sector has historically been a key sector for Brazil’s 
economy. Trade policies were a central tool used by Brazilian governments since the 
1950s, which gained even more importance in the 1970s for the support of Brazil’s 
growing export base. State export taxes were eliminated and administrative procedures 
for exporters reduced and simplified on an ongoing basis since the mid-1950s, and 
export incentives such as subsidized credits were installed (albeit then eliminated in the 
mid-1980s).  
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It is therefore conclusive to observe that statistically growing Trade_GDP leads 
trade policy development (EFITrade), judging by the moderately positive correlation of 
68.1% (sig. p-value 0.05) and the significant inverse Granger causality (Granger 1 sig. 
0.0032, Granger 2 sig. 0.5735). Brazil’s growing external sector, specifically between 
1996 and 2008, had a profound effect on shaping and improving trade policies. Between 
1996 and 2001 Brazil’s external balance (Variable 29: ExpGS_GDP) was negative, 
ranging between -1.32% and -2.2%, as a result of trade liberalization following the 
implementation of the Real Plan, which subsequently led to an appreciation of the Real 
and eventually to rising import shares relative to export shares to GDP. The turnaround 
of the negative external balance of goods and services to GDP (Variable 29: 
ExpGS_GDP) in 2002 was attributable to the Real devaluation which took place three 
years earlier in conjunction with occasional import restrictions and a generally low GDP 
growth rate from 2001 to 2003, all of which encouraged exports in commodities and 
reduced imports. 
The statistical analysis validates the empirical observations and importance of 
trade governance to trade variables. Trade_GDP —similar to ExpGS_GDP— correlates 
positively with CrudeIx, WGIVA, WGIPS, WGIGE, and —as discussed— with 
EFITrade. The multi regression analysis of Trade_GDP reveals significant causal 
associations to WGIPS only though. However, as mentioned, adjusted R2 is low at 0.36. 
That is, the predictor variable WGIPS (political stability) explains by only 36% the 
variance of Trade_GDP. The explanatory power of this regression model is therefore 
rather low.  
It is remarkable that there exists Granger causality from trade to GDP to the 
degree of democracy (WGIVA) which improved from 0.183 index points to 0.48 index 
points between 1996 and 2008, suggesting that the improving degree of democracy is 
caused by improving trade openness measured by the rising trade to GDP from 14.9% 
to 27.4%. And expressed in terms of imports and exports to GDP: Imports to GDP grew 
from 8.3% to 13.6%, while exports to GDP rose from 6.6% to 13.8%. This supports the 
hypothesis that for Brazil improving degrees of democracy are supported by trade 
openness, specifically by exports of goods and services.  
On the import side I note that Imp_GDP (Variable 31) shows fewer and less 
pronounced statistical flags with independent variables than ExpGS_GDP or 
Trade_GDP show. Imp_GDP shows moderate to high correlations to improving indexes 
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of WGIVA, WGIPS, WGIGE, EFIMon, and EFICorrup, but surprisingly not to 
EFITrade. It is, however, revealing that rising imports to GDP —similarly to exports to 
GDP— Granger cause the degree of democracy (WGIVA) in Brazil, underscoring the 
above argument that trade openness positively influences the degree of democracy.  
 
CHINA: In contrast to Brazil’s moderate trade to GDP ratio, China’s trade to 
GDP ratio (Trade_GDP) grew from 38.1% to 62.1% between 1996 and 2008. China’s 
trade to GDP ratio was more than twice the size of Brazil’s in 2008.  
It is remarkable that the Chinese Trade_GDP and ExpGS_GDP is only Granger 
caused by commodity prices and not by any governance dimension. Based on the 
statistical analysis, Trade_GDP is inversely Granger causing trade governance. The 
same applies to ExpGS_GDP which also Granger causes trade governance (correlation: 
92.9% (sig. 0.01)). Also, AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx show feedback causalities with 
Trade_GDP and ExpGS_GDP. The regression results of exports of goods and services 
to GDP and trade to GDP are solid, displaying an adjusted R2 of 0.71 and 0.62, 
respectively. The corresponding t-values are 3.62 and 3.17 respectively. The adjusted R2 
for trade to GDP is lower than the adjusted R2 for exports of goods and services to GDP 
due to a larger dispersion of Chinese imports to GDP (which are included in trade to 
GDP) compared to Chinese exports of goods and services to GDP between 1996 and 
2008.  
Imports of goods and services to GDP (Variable 31) rose from 18.0% to 27.2% 
between 1996 and 2008 and are Granger caused by crude and base metals, correlating 
moderately at 63.5% with minerals and metals prices (MinMetalsIx) and correlating 
highly at 71.8% with crude prices (CrudeIx). Also, the regression results are highly 
significant (p-value: 0.01), too, yet the goodness of fit is relatively weak considering the 
adjusted R2 of 0.4187 (PCA combined t-value for minerals and metals and crude is 
3.11). Also remarkable is the following: In comparison to Brazil, Chinese ImpGS_GDP 
inversely Granger causes EFITrade, correlating at 86.8% (sig. 0.01). It is also 
noteworthy to observe a high correlation of -89.5% between imports and government 
size (EFIGovtS) and a high correlation of -89.9% between imports and control of 
corruption (WGICC), which deteriorated from -0.20 to -0.46 between 1996 and 2008.  
Rationale: Similarly to Brazil, trade governance has been the centerpiece of 
economic policy in China in the context of its gradual transition to a market economy. 
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By the end of the 1970s, China established Special Economic Zones (SEZ) as main 
trading hubs —resembling the economic framework of treaty ports in China set up by 
Britain in the mid-1850s. SEZ imports were tax free as long as the imports were used to 
produce goods for exports.  
By the end of the 1970s, two SEZs had been established in Guangdong as well 
as one each in Fujian, and Shenzen (1992).86 The proximity of Guangdong to Hong 
Kong transformed Guangdong into one of China’s export powerhouses. In the context 
of newly created SEZ’s, the central government allowed the establishment of foreign 
trade companies, which facilitated trade between foreign firms and treaty ports. Local 
governments and the SEZs itself were allowed to create foreign trading companies 
(FTC). By 1990 there were approximately 5,000 foreign trading companies residing in 
China’s SEZs; all were state owned. The picture has changed by the end of 2005 when a 
significant part of foreign trading companies were privately held. Foreign trading 
companies were instrumental in seeking the most price competitive suppliers and 
producers, which were often TVEs.  
The SEZs often served as laboratories for experimental reforms, which were 
applied slowly and gradually to record results and effects. Once a reform proved to be 
successful, it would be gradually applied on a nationwide level. Critiques state that 
SEZ’s were often considered to foster corruption and illegal trade activities. Statistically 
this is reflected by the very high and significant (sig. 0.01) negative correlations of -
89.7%, -87.9%, and -89.9% between Trade_GDP, ExpGS_GDP, and ImpGS_GDP and 
the WGICC corruption index.  
The key trade regions in China are along the shorelines of the South East, the 
Far South and the North Coast. As of 2005 the lower Yangtze area, the Far South, and 
the North Coast contributed about 38%, 36% and 18% to Chinas total exports, with only 
8% remaining for the rest of China (Naughton, 2007, p. 396). Guangdong and the lower 
Yangtze region have very high agriculture and base metals related trade to GDP ratios 
of 175% and 90%, resembling those of Malaysia and reaching the average of East Asia. 
The rest of China has a much lower trade to GDP ratio of approximately 25%, 
resembling the ratio of Brazil in 2008. As discussed above, statistical findings validate 
the importance of trade governance for China’s economy. The causality analysis 
                                                 
86
 The involvement and lobbyism of local officials were key elements in the establishment of SEZs, 
particularly at the example of Guangdong in 1978. 
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revealed that China’s trade to GDP is Granger caused by AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, and 
CrudeIx. The correlation is relatively high and at confidence levels of 99% in case of 
MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx. The regression analysis confirms the significant effect of 
CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx on Trade_GDP, showing an adjusted R2 of 62%. 
The regression analysis results combined with the relatively strong adjusted R2 
lend credence to the argument that Trade_GDP is to a larger extent affected by 
ExpGS_GDP than by ImpGS_GDP in regards to MinMetalsIx. As shown in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 (Tables 3.3a and 3.3b), exports of goods and services to GDP 
(ExpGS_GDP) grew from 20.1% to 34.9% between 1996 and 2008, representing a 
larger share in China’s Trade_GDP than imports of goods and services (ImpGS_GDP). 
87
 Imports of goods and services to GDP grew from 18.0% to 27.2% in the same period.  
The regression and empirical analysis reveals that ImpGS_GDP is significantly 
affected by prices of minerals and metals and crude, which are combined into 
CMca1MetOil in the principal component analysis. The adjusted R2 is low at 0.42 
though. The analysis of ImpGS_GDP for China also reveals a very high correlation of 
86.8% with improved trade governance, which in turn is caused by ImpGS_GDP. In 
comparison, Brazil imports show no relationship to trade governance. The regression 
analysis for ExpGS_GDP on the other hand reveals that CMca1MetOil significantly 
affects ExpGS_GDP displaying an adjusted R2 of 0.71. That is, 71% is the portion in 
the variance of ExpGS_GDP which can be explained by CMca1MetOil. 
Overall, considering the causality convention in this thesis, I observe that the 
significant regression results on commodity prices Granger causing trade to GDP and 
export of goods and services to GDP are supported by empirical data.  Higher 
commodity prices cause larger export and import values relative to GDP. Without 
improved trade governance, China’s trade profile would look differently today in size 
and shape, with possible lower effects on global commodity prices as result of lower 
commodity related trade activities with its top trade partners. Also, feedback causalities 
express that the WTO-imposed Chinese trade openness paved the way for immense 
Chinese external demand for energy and agricultural commodities, as well as base 
metals and ores, which are pivotal factors for the expansion of the Chinese capital 
formation and manufacturing base (e.g., infrastructure in energy, telecommunication, 
                                                 
87
 Imports of goods and services (ImpGS_GDP) and exports of goods and services to GDP 
(ExpGS_GDP) combined equal trade to GDP (Trade_GDP).  
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and industrial parks). Rising trade to GDP causes the rise of global commodity prices, 
especially those of base metals, and energy. This is empirically and statistically 
validated, despite the significant regression results above. That is, the inverse causality 
from trade variables to commodity prices is empirically and statistically significant.     
 
5.2.7 Manufacturing Trade Variables 
(1) Manufacturing Exports to Merchandise Exports 
Table 5.7.1: Manufacturing Exports to Merchandise Exports 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: All commodity price indexes correlate highly negatively (except 
TropBevIx: moderately negative) between -83.9% and -85.8% with manufactured 
exports to total merchandise exports (Variable 50). Despite improving trade governance, 
exports of manufactured products to total merchandise exports declined from 53.8% in 
1996 to 44.9% in 2008. Furthermore, there exists a Granger causal relationship from 
deteriorating business freedom (EFIBiz), deteriorating regulatory quality (WGIRQ), 
deteriorating fiscal governance (EFIFisc), and deteriorating government size 
(EFIGovtS) to declining exports of manufactured products to merchandise exports 
between 1996 and 2008.   
 Rationale: As already indicated in Chapter 2, key export products of Brazil are 
commodities. Commodity exports rise at the expense of exports of manufactured 
products, judging by the declining trend of exported manufactured products to exports 
from 53.8% to 44.9% between 1996 and 2008 (negative correlation). This relationship 
is also illustrated by the highly negative (sig. 0.01) correlation between falling 
Variable 50 ManufExp_MrchExp Brazil ManufExp_MrchExp China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx -84.1** - - - - - 
TropBevIx -50.2 - - - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx -85.4** - - - - - 
AgriRawIx -85.8** - - - - - 
MinMetalsIx -84.2** - - 71.8** Inverse - 
CrudeIx -83.9** - - 80.6** - - 
WGIRQ 67.7* Causal No - - - 
EFIBiz 70.3** Causal No - - - 
EFITrade -75.3** - - 96.7** Inverse - 
EFIFisc 79.3** Causal No -56.3* - - 
EFIGovtS 74.2** - - -86.2** - - 
EFICorrup - - - 77.3** - - 
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ManufExp_MrchExp and rising commodity price indexes. The rise of commodity 
exports at the expense of manufacturing exports may potentially lead to the Dutch 
Disease risk, induced by neglecting the domestic manufacturing base while favoring 
commodity related export sectors, as discussed in Chapter 2. Table 2.6 (Export 
Structure Brazil) in Chapter 2 illustrates that Brazil’s export of manufactured goods to 
total exports declined from 52.8% to 44.9% between 1995 and 2008, then dropped to 
38.2% in 2009. In contrast, export shares for fuels rose from 0.9% to 8.9% between 
1995 and 2009, while ores and metals exports rose from 11.3% to 13.4% and food 
exports rose from 28.5% to 33.9%.  
This empirical observation is supported by significant statistical results such as 
negative correlations between ManufExp_MrchExp and all commodity price indexes 
(except TropBevIx (correlating moderately negative)), and positive correlations of 
ManufExp_MrchExp with deteriorating government size governance (EFIGovtS), 
deteriorating regulatory quality (WGIRQ), deteriorating business governance (EFIBiz), 
and deteriorating fiscal freedom (EFIFisc); WGIRQ, EFIBiz, and EFIFisc Granger 
cause the decline of ManufExp_MrchExp. Furthermore, despite improving trade 
governance, exports in manufactured products to merchandise exports correlate 
negatively at -75.3% with trade governance. All these correlation coefficients are 
significant at the 0.01 level (except WGIRQ sig. 0.05, and TropBevIx sig. >0.05). 
However, —surprisingly— none of these relationships are regression significant at the 
confidence level of 95%.  
 
CHINA: In comparison to Brazil, China’s ManufExp_MrchExp (Variable 50) 
grew from 84.4% in 1996 to 92.9% in 2008, more than twice that of Brazil in 2008. 
There are significant positive correlations between ManufExp_MrchExp and 
MinMetalsIx (71.8%), CrudeIx (80.6%), and EFITrade (96.7%). Remarkably, 
ManufExp_MrchExp (inversely) Granger causes EFITrade and MinMetalsIx. The 
Granger 1 (Granger 2) test result for CrudeIx and ManufExp_MrchExp is at 0.055 
(0.8851) and slightly above the 0.05 threshold.  
Rationale: China’s export model is validated by the strong correlation 
association and inverse causality between ManufExp_MrchExp and trade governance. 
Also, the correlation and the inverse Granger causality to MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx 
suggest a strong pull effect on commodity prices as a result of China’s expanding 
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manufacturing base which relies on input factors such as oil and base metals. The 
inverse Granger causality on MinMetalsIx supports this hypothesis. The Granger 
causality results for CrudeIx have borderline character due to the Granger 1 (Granger 2) 
test result of 0.055 (0.8851). The statistical findings are conclusive with empirical 
findings.  
It is revealing that China’s high tech exports to manufacturing exports (Variable 
45: HiTekExp_ManuExp) and information/technology/communication exports to total 
exports (Variable 46: ICTExp_TTExp) show very high correlations of 93.2% (sig. 0.01) 
and 90.4% (sig. 0.01) with trade governance (EFITrade). HiTekExp_ManuExp and 
ICTExp_TTExp grew from 12% to 28.7% and from 12.3% to 27.5% between 1996 and 
2008, respectively. The inverse causality running from Variables 45 and 46 to EFITrade 
indicates that the rise of Variables 45 and 46 affect improving trade governance. This 
observation validates China’s aggressive promotion strategies supporting the gradual 
export of high technology products made by Chinese companies. These promotion 
strategies include tax breaks for research and development (R&D) as well as imports of 
high tech products, subsidized credits, and procurement subsidies from government 
owned firms. In comparison, for Brazil there exists no significant correlation of trade 
governance with high technology exports to total merchandise exports.  
The rapid growth of high technology exports, which are part of overall 
merchandise exports, highly correlate with China’s rising research and development 
capacity in the private enterprise sector. High tech products in China are part of an 
integrated international assembly line for companies such as Quanta (Taiwan), Motorola 
(US), IBM (US), Dell (US), BenQ (Taiwan), Intel (US), and Seagate (US).88 Gradually, 
China shifted its competence from an assembly line focused export strategy to a high 
technology focused export strategy. Policy makers support and specifically emphasize 
research and development activities in China, which is manifested by the impressive 
number of engineering and technical graduates, which stood at 920,000 in 2004, since 
then growing by 6.5% each year. Also, research and development expenditures signal a 
strong private sector involvement. In 2003, 63% of research and development expenses 
                                                 
88
 As production capacity moved into industry clusters to mainland China, especially from Hong Kong 
and from Taiwan, both Hong Kong and Taiwan de-industrialized from low technology production to the 
extent that Hong Kong moved up the specialization ladder providing for higher skilled labor activities. 
Today, the majority of Hong Kong’s GDP is generated by service industries such as finance and 
insurance, telecommunication and transport. Taiwan on the other hand moved out of low technology 
production into a higher degree of high technology manufacturing production. 
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were shouldered by the private sector which employed 60% of researchers, resembling 
the ratios of developed economies (Naughton, 2007, pp. 350-362).89 
 
(2) Manufacturing Imports to Merchandise Imports 
Table 5.7.2: Manufacturing Imports to Merchandise Imports 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: ManufImp_MrchImp increased from 70.0% in 1996 to 75.96% in 
2001, thereafter declining gradually to 70.2% in 2008. The dependent variable 
correlates positively with the following deteriorating governance dimensions: 
Regulatory quality (WGIRQ), business governance (EFIBiz), fiscal governance 
(EFIFisc), government size (EFIGovtS), and financial freedom (EFIFin). The dependent 
variable correlates negatively with WGIVA. There are no significant regression results. 
Rationale: All positively correlating governance indexes Granger cause the 
dependent variable. 90 The significant Granger causality suggests that there exist 
plausible and valid associations between the declining dependent variable since 2001 
and the deteriorating governance dimensions above, which is detrimental to the business 
sector and negatively affecting it.  
 
                                                 
89
 In 2004, China’s number of graduates stood at six million, half of which graduated in science and 
engineering, and 25% in each economics and law. However, 50% of these graduates come from 3-year 
technical schools, which are comparable with community colleges in the US (Naughton, 2007, p. 362). 
As such the large number of graduates may not be comparable in the context of academic and practical 
standards compared to peers in Europe or the US. Nonetheless, the ambition of China’s policy makers in 
view of seeding research and development capabilities becomes obvious considering the faculty 
composition and sheer number of annual Chinese technical graduates. 
90
 Due to the relatively strong run up of ManufImp_MrchImp from 69.95% in 1996 to 75.96% in 2001, 
the declining metrics to 70.2% in 2008 may be also seen as a mean reversion effect judging by the 
ManufImp_MrchImp 13-year average of 72.2% and the 19-year average of 69.1%.   
Variable 34 ManfImp_MrchImp Brazil ManfImp_MrchImp China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
WGIVA -62.6* - - 57.1* Inverse - 
WGIPS - - - 64.2* - - 
WGIRQ 68.7** Causal No - - - 
EFIBiz 66.0* Causal No - - - 
EFIFisc 68.8** Causal No - - - 
EFIGovtS 60.7* Causal No - - - 
EFIFin 69.2** Causal No - - - 
EFIPropRi - - - 84.1* Inverse - 
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CHINA: ManufImp_MrchImp declined from 79.1% in 1996 to 61.9% in 2008, 
after peaking at 79.6% in 2002. ManufImp_MrchImp Granger inversely causes the 
following deteriorating governance dimensions: WGIVA (democracy index), and 
EFIPropRi (property rights governance).  
Rationale: ManufImp_MrchImp has been relatively volatile during the analysis 
period of thirteen years with annual changes of 3-6% (in 2000 and 2008), indicating a 
relative volatile share percentage within the group of merchandise imports. The 
correlations with WGIVA and WGIPS are moderate only. The statistical validation of 
any empirical observation is therefore rather weak.  
 
5.2.8 Trade Indexes 
The following four variable pairs represent each country’s opposite trade 
variable counterpart. The objective is to illustrate the correlation and causality 
associations for Brazil and China:  
(1) Export value index Brazil is compared with import value index China. 
(2) Export volume index Brazil is compared with import volume index China.  
(3) Unit value index exports Brazil is compared with unit value index imports China.  
(4) Export value index China is compared with export volume index China in order to 
demonstrate the closely aligned directional results of volume and value correlation, 
causality, and regression results for China only.   
 
 (1) Export Value Index Brazil / Import Value Index China 
Table 5.8.1: Export Value Index Brazil / Import Value Index China 
Variable 36 / 37 36 ExpValx Brazil 37 ImpValIx China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 83.0** Inverse - 76.7** Causal/Iv No 
VegOilSeedsIx 78.4** Inverse - 72.8** Inverse - 
AgriRawIx 90.0** Inverse - 85.7** Causal/Iv No 
MinMetalsIx 96.3** Inverse - 94.1** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .87 
CrudeIx 99.0** Inverse - 98.0** Inverse - 
WGIVA 82.2** Causal Yes: R2 .65 -65.4* - - 
WGIGE - - - 69.7** Inverse - 
EFIBiz -89.5** - - -63.3* - - 
EFITrade 90.4** - - 93.1** - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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BRAZIL:  ExpValx, which grew from 86.6 index points to 359.1 index points 
between 1996 and 2008, is Granger causing all commodity price indexes, showing 
high/very high significant positive correlations. WGIVA Granger causes ExpValx; the 
goodness of fit is rather modest as expressed by the adjusted R-square of 0.65 (t-value 
of 4.78). 
Rationale: The statistical findings on trade indexes such as export value index 
reveal one of the strongest correlation and causality associations in the econometric 
analysis. As illustrated in Chapter 4 and earlier in Chapter 5, there is a strong statistical 
indication that commodity related export values of Brazil Granger cause the rise in 
commodity prices, especially when exports are China-related. The increasing export 
value index due to rising commodity exports of food, vegetables oils and seeds, 
agricultural raw materials, and minerals and metals is mainly driven by China’s 
expansion. As indicated earlier, there appears to be inverse causality from Trade_GDP 
to WGIVA. It is therefore remarkable to observe that now WGIVA appears to Granger 
cause ExpValx. The regression results are significant for Brazil’s democracy 
governance (WGIVA), however, the adjusted R2 is rather low. I note that there exist 
significant statistical relationships between WGIVA and trade indexes, and trade related 
variables such as Trade_GDP and ExpGS_GDP. 
 
CHINA: The regression results for the import value index (ImpValIx) are 
significant for MinMetalsIx: The adjusted R2 is at 0.87 and significant, and the t-value 
is at 4.52. Furthermore, all commodity price indexes reveal feedback causality to 
ImpValIx. The correlation is highly significant at p-values below 0.01. EFITrade 
correlates very high at 93.1% (sig. 0.01).  
Rationale: These results summarize the findings of the previous sections. 
Namely, China’s improved trade openness and trade governance is reflected by the 
increased ImpValIx which rose from 61.7 to 502.7 index points between 1996 and 2008 
and appears to lead (inversely Granger cause) all commodity price indexes. China’s 
global import share in virtually all main commodity groups increased between 1996 and 
2008, as illustrated in Table 2.9 (Import Structure China). Even though there are 
feedback causality effects, there are clear empirical indications that ImpValIx Granger 
causes commodity price indexes. This has been statistically validated by Granger 
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causality significance. Rising commodity prices in turn affect import values. This 
association is reflected by the adjusted R2 of 0.87 on MinMetalsIx.  
 
(2) Export Volume Index Brazil / Import Volume Index China 
Table 5.8.2: Export Volume Index Brazil / Import Volume Index China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
 BRAZIL: The adjusted R2 is high at 0.92 for ExpVolx in relation to the 
explanatory variables MinMetalsIx, CrudeIx, and WGIVA. The goodness of fit is 
strong. Also, the t-values for PCA-combined MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx, and WGIVA 
are fairly high at 3.11 and 4.03, suggesting high reliability of the predictive power of 
both independent variables. Brazil’s export volume inversely Granger causes 
agricultural raw material prices and minerals and metals prices. 
 Rationale: The Brazilian export volume index (ExpVolx) grew from 74.1 to 
190.5 index points between 1996 and 2008. The majority of agricultural raw materials 
and minerals and metals exports went to China, which has been Brazil’s top trading 
partner since 2009 (Table 2.10: Top 10 export Trading Partners Brazil). For agricultural 
raw material prices and minerals and metals prices Granger causality directions go both 
ways (feedback causality); p-values for Granger 1 and Granger 2 are below 0.05. The 
causality acknowledges foremost the effects of commodity prices to ExpVolx. Trade 
governance shows a very high and significant correlation to ExpVolx, which causes 
trade governance.  
 
CHINA: The adjusted R2 for China’s ImpVolIx is 0.77 (MinMetalsIx only), and 
the t-value stands at 4.26, indicating a strong model fit. Similarly to Variable 37 
(ImpValIx), Chinese ImpVolIx rose dramatically, from 61.07 to 328.6 index points 
between 1996 and 2008. The causality results also indicate feedback effects on all 
Variable 38 / 39 38 ExpVolx Brazil 39 ImpVolIx China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx - - - 64.4** Causal/Iv No 
VegOilSeedsIx - - - 61.3** Causal/Iv No 
AgriRawIx 68.5** Causal/Iv No 76.5** Causal/Iv - 
MinMetalsIx 82.7** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .92 88.2** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .77 
CrudeIx 88.8** Causal Yes: R2 .92 93.2** Inverse - 
WGIVA 92.4** Causal Yes: R2 .92 -62.8* - - 
WGIGE - - - 66.0** Inverse - 
EFITrade 94.5** Inverse - 95.8** Inverse - 
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commodity prices, as well as on WGIGE and EFITrade. The correlation coefficients 
range between moderate and very high at 0.01 significance levels.   
Rationale: The rising import volumes between 1996 and 2008 lead all 
commodity price indexes. These results are congruent with China’s import value index 
(Variable 37: ImpValIx). It is remarkable that the regression analysis yields results for 
MinMetalsIx on both dependent variables, ImpVolIx and ImpValIx. This indicates that 
the prices of minerals and metals are a very large factor in affecting value and volume 
of Chinese imports. Trade governance is caused by ImpVolIx and correlates very highly 
at high significance levels with ImpVolIx, highlighting the key role of trade governance 
for China’s economy.  
 
(3) Unit Value Index Exports Brazil / Unit Value Index Imports China 
Table 5.8.3: Unit Value Index Exports Brazil / Unit Value Index Imports China 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
 BRAZIL: The rise of all commodity prices is regression significant for 
UnitValExpIx. The adjusted R2 is very high at 0.9651, and the t-values for 
BMca3BevAg (PCA variable: TropBevIx & AgriRawIx) and BMca1MetOil (PCA 
variable: MinMetalsIx & CrudeIx) of 6.14 and 4.05 suggest strong explanatory power.  
 Rationale: The regression results summarize the effects on Variable 36 
(ExpValx) and Variable 38 (ExpVolx), as discussed earlier in 5.2.8(1) and 5.2.8(2). The 
unit value index of exports rose from 117.0 to 188.96 index points between 1996 and 
2008 and is Granger caused by the rise of all commodity price indexes (except food and 
vegetables oils and seeds) as well as trade governance. The adjusted R-square of 0.97 
statistically validates the empirical significance of commodity price effects on trade 
related variables such as UnitValIxExp.      
Variable 40 / 41  40 UnitValIxExp Brazil  41 UnitValIxImp China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 98.3** - - 89.8** Inverse - 
TropBevIx 76.2** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .97 - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx 92.8** Inverse - 83.0** Inverse - 
AgriRawIx 97.2** Causal Yes: R
2
 .97 94.6** Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx 91.2** Causal Yes: R
2
 .97 96.5** Inverse - 
CrudeIx  88.2** Causal Yes: R
2
 .97 98.7** - - 
WGIGE - - - 70.6* Inverse - 
EFIBiz -77.4* - - -59.3* - - 
EFITrade 68.3* Causal No 82.2** - - 
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   CHINA: All commodity price indexes (except TropBevIx) correlate highly with 
UnitValIx. Chinese UnitValIxImp Granger causes all commodity prices (except 
TropBevIx and CrudeIx) at high/very high correlation and very high confidence levels. 
This underscores and validates the observed global price effects of Chinese commodity 
imports such as minerals and metals, and food, vegetables oils and seeds, and 
agricultural raw materials. Also, the correlation with trade governance is high. 
 Rationale: Generally, the above findings support the claim that Brazil is directly 
benefiting from increased commodity demand by China, which affects global 
commodity prices on a broad scale judging by the inverse causality of Chinese 
UnitValIxImp to commodity prices in context of the relevant empirical data in Chapter 
2. This underscores and validates once again that the prices of commodities such as 
minerals and metals, food prices, vegetables oils and seeds, and agricultural raw 
materials are affected by Chinese imports of these commodities. 
 
(4) Export Value Index China / Export Volume Index China 
Table 5.8.4: Export Value Index China / Export Volume Index China 
 
Variable 36 / 38    36 ExpValx China  38 ExpVolx China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 80.0** Inverse - 76.3** Inverse - 
TropBevIx - - - - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx 76.2** Inverse - 72.4** Causal Yes: R2 .99 
AgriRawIx 87.9** Inverse - 85.4** Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx 96.2** Causal  Yes: R2 .97 95.3** Causal Yes: R2 .99 
CrudeIx  98.6** Inverse - 97.8** Inverse - 
WGIGE 70.6** Inverse - 69.8** Inverse - 
EFITrade 91.4** Causal Yes: R2 .97 93.3** Causal Yes: R2 .99 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
CHINA: The regression results reveal a strong goodness of fit. The adjusted R-
square is 0.97 for ExpValx. The t-values for MinMetalsIx and EFITrade of 7.87 and 
4.76 are high. The regression results for ExpVolx also reveal a strong adjusted R2 of 
0.99. The high t-values of 3.73, 4.45, and 10.48 for VegOilSeeds, MinMetalsIx, and for 
EFITrade suggest a strong explanatory power of the independent variables. 
Furthermore, the correlation results are significant at the 99% confidence level, showing 
high/very high correlations across the board with trade governance and all commodity 
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price indexes except with tropical beverages (China produces tea mainly for domestic 
consumption).  
Rationale: The explanatory power of the coefficients of the predictor variables 
MinMetalsIx and EFITrade is very high for ExpValx. Similarly, for ExpVolx the 
explanatory power is high for VegOilSeedsIx, MinMetalsIx, and EFITrade. Their t-
values are high at 3.73, 4.45, and 10.48. EFITrade’s t-value at 10.48 is supporting the 
key finding that trade governance is one of the dominating governance dimensions in 
China’s governance architecture. The R-square for ExpVolx is very high, almost 1. 
China’s rising ExpValx from 60.6 to 573.3 index points and rising ExpVolx from 56.7 
to 507.3 index points between 1996 and 2008 are interlinked with China’s growing 
economic expansion. Empirical observations are supported by statistical significance 
considering the feedback (both ways) Granger causalities from previous sections. 
China’s improved trade governance from 30.0 to 71.4 index points between 1996 and 
2008 furthermore reveals its importance on China’s external sector, Granger causing 
export values and export volumes.  
 
5.2.9 Trade Tariffs  
Table 5.9: Weighted Tariffs Brazil / China 
 
Variable 44 TariffAllweight Brazil TariffAllweight China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
AgriRawIx -56.2* Inverse - -56.8* Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx -71.3** Inverse - -71.8** Inverse - 
CrudeIx -81.0** - - -80.1** - - 
WGIVA -89.4** Inverse - - - - 
WGIPS - - - 58.3* Inverse - 
WGIRQ 83.9** Inverse - - - - 
WGIRL 79.7** Inverse - 56.0* - - 
WGICC - - - 86.2** Inverse - 
EFIBiz 73.8** Inverse - 63.7* - - 
EFITrade -86.7** Inverse - -93.9** Inverse - 
EFIFisc 67.5* - - 61.0* - - 
EFIGovtS 71.8** - - 88.3* - - 
EFIPropRi - - - 63.0* - - 
EFICorrup - - - -67.4* - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL / CHINA: Trade tariffs are an integral instrument of trade governance. 
The table above shows the effect of weighted tariffs (which correlate very high with 
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simple average tariffs) on commodities and governance dimensions including EFITrade 
and EFIBiz. The weighted tariffs for both Brazil and China negatively correlate and 
inversely Granger cause AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx. CrudeIx correlates negatively 
with Brazil’s TariffAllweight; however, the Granger causality results are insignificant.  
Rationale: Lower tariffs in China and Brazil support trade flow and 
subsequently support pull demand for commodities in China. The EFITrade index, 
which rose from 57 to 71.6 index points for Brazil and from 30 to 71.4 index points for 
China in the period between 1996 and 2008, is inversely Granger caused by 
TariffAllweight. This suggests that changes in tariffs are leading trade governance. It is 
remarkable that declining tariffs in Brazil inversely Granger cause deteriorating 
business governance (EFIBiz), which has fallen from 70.0 to 54.4 index points between 
1998 and 2008. 
Trade governance encompasses various instruments. Tariffs are one of them, and 
favorable changes in tariffs constitute favorable changes in trade governance. It is 
therefore coherent that TariffsAllWeight inversely Granger cause trade governance 
represented by EFITrade. As established earlier, EFITrade significantly correlates with 
all trade variables and trade indexes of Brazil and China. Even though the regression 
analysis results are insignificant for EFITrade, the strong correlation of EFITrade with 
nearly all trade variables and trade indexes suggests that trade governance remains the 
key policy dimension for Brazil’s and China’s economic policy tool set.   
 
5.2.10 Foreign Direct Investment  
Table 5.10: Foreign Direct Investment 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: The correlation with EFIMon is moderate at the significance level of 
0.05.  
Variable 51 FDInet_GDP Brazil FDInet_GDP China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
TropBevIx - - - 55.6* - - 
WGIRQ - - - 68.3* Causal Yes: R2 .41 
WGIRL - - - 64.1* - - 
EFIGovtS - - - 75.8** - - 
EFIMon 64.1* Inverse - -74.0** - - 
EFIInvest - - - 79.2** Inverse - 
EFIFin - - - 79.2** Inverse - 
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Rationale: FDInet_GDP grew from 1.33% in 1996 to 2.75% in 2008 (peak at 
5.08% in 2000) and shows no notable correlation and causality results to any of the 
independent variables except to monetary policy (EFIMon). Applying neo-liberalization 
policies in the early 1990s, Brazil attracted large amounts of foreign direct investments 
as shown in Chapter 2. The inverse Granger causality indicates that EFIMon is caused 
by FDInet_GDP, which is economically neither plausible nor intuitive. An alternative 
and more conclusive rationale for the moderate correlation with EFIMon may be the 
positive effects of the Plano Real and the subsequent positive development of the 
consumer price index (Variable 58) and inflation (Variable 59) in light of improving 
monetary policy governance.  
 
CHINA: FDInet_GDP in China declined from 4.7% to 3.3% between 1996 and 
2008. Regulatory quality (WGIRQ), which deteriorated from 0.195 to -0.15 during that 
time span, appears to affect FDINet_GDP. 
Rationale: The correlation and causality analysis does not yield plausible results 
in light of the declining net FDI to GDP ratio from 4.7% to 3.3% during the analysis 
period. The regression result on regulatory quality is significant but economically 
inconclusive considering a rather volatile WGIRQ development from 0.195 index points 
in 1996 to -0.49 in 2002 and to -0.15 in 2008. R-square, the goodness of fit, is low at 
0.419.  
Trade and FDI are closely linked in China. In comparison to other North East 
Asian countries, which displayed a net FDI to GDP ratio of 1% to 2% over the last 20 
years, China’s relative and absolute net FDI is impressive (see also Section 2.5 for 
illustrations on FDI in China).91 Specifically the regions of Guangdong, Fujian and 
lower Yangtze were main recipients of FDI.   
The Chinese government began to selectively open its markets for FDI in the 
early 1990s. Key structural element for rising FDI in China was the development and 
emergence of industrial clusters in suburban areas. Typical industrial clusters consist of 
tens if not hundreds of small firms that compete with each other but also cooperate in 
establishing a complete production line for a small number of large firms within an 
industry segment. For example, the sock cluster in Zhuji produces approximately 35% 
                                                 
91
 China’s peers such as Thailand and Vietnam recorded similar FDI ratios during the analysis period as a 
result of their relatively low cost environment. 
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of the world socks output (Naughton, 2007, p. 293). Townships and village enterprises 
(TVEs) —from a legacy communist command economy point of view— benefited from 
an existing institutional and financial support framework, which represented a crucial 
competitive advantage in the emergence of industry clusters. Many TVEs, which were 
originally pivotal elements of the rural command industry, developed and transformed 
into private firms in light of China’s transforming economy from a command style to a 
more market based economy.92  
China has a relatively favorable FDI climate today. This is constituted by low 
taxes, investment protection agreements —in theory— , arbitration mechanisms, and 
adequate legal provision frameworks, which the latter at least exist on paper. 
Nonetheless, there are severe practical enforcement obstacles and repatriation barriers 
for cash accounts of foreign subsidiaries and branches of foreign firms. That is, existing 
investment protection agreements and arbitration mechanisms are still in need of 
significant improvements. China’s FDInet_GDP declined slowly and gradually from 
4.7% to 3.3% between 1996 and 2008. However, this decline does not signify a less 
favorable FDI climate in China, but may instead be explained by the rapid growth rate 
of GDP relative to FDI during that period. 
Based on the fact that the diagnostic tests carried out above do not reveal 
meaningful Granger causalities on FDInet_GDP, I conclude that neither in the case of 
China nor Brazil do governance policies or commodity prices affect FDInet_GDP in the 
analysis period of 1996 to 2008.  
 
                                                 
92
 The Asian crisis in 1997-1998 triggered an increasingly prudent lending practice by government owned 
banks, which in turn was driven by improved government oversight. The result was that banks were more 
cautious to lend to TVE’s, which were less and less backed by local governments due to liquidity 
constraints in context of the economic transition into a more market based framework. As a result, TVEs 
were required to seek additional sources of funding, which in many cases led to successful initial public 
offerings, or, in the worst case, to bankruptcies and subsequent restructuring.  
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5.2.11 Stocks Traded Total Value to GDP  
Table 5.11: Stocks Traded Total Value to GDP 
Variable 52 StoxVal_GDP Brazil StoxVal_GDP China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 87.3** Causal/Iv No 60.8* Inverse - 
TropBevIx 73.2** - - - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx 88.4** Inverse - 66.7* Inverse - 
AgriRawIx 88.6** Causal No 68.6** - - 
MinMetalsIx 89.6** Causal/Iv No 78.7** Causal Yes: R2 .52 
CrudeIx 82.7** Causal No 69.4** Causal Yes: R2 .52 
WGIGE - - - 73.6** - - 
EFITrade 61.7** Causal No 57.5* - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: The dependent variable’s high correlation is significant with all 
commodity price indexes except with EFITrade, which correlates only moderately with 
StoxVal_GDP. StoxVal_GDP is Granger caused by trade governance, and by all 
commodity prices except TropBevIx and VegOilSeedsIx. 
Rationale: In the mid-1960s the then government introduced a myriad of 
institutional settings to encourage the establishment of bond and stock markets as 
alternate sources for state and private funding, in addition to the promotion of 
investment banks as intermediaries. Brazil’s capital markets have since then improved 
significantly.  
The I-Bovespa (or Bovespa index), Brazil’s main composite index, consists of 
more than 50 constituents (whose exact number varies). Its market capitalization is 
dominated by more than 50% of energy and minerals and metals stocks, e.g., 
represented by shares of Petrobras and Vale Do Rio Doce, two of many formerly state 
owned firms. In addition, the Bovespa index consists of a number of commodity firms 
which further solidify the percentage share of energy and base metal firms in the 
index.93 Therefore, it is plausible that the rise of oil prices, metal prices as well as other 
commodity prices positively affected the market value of —specifically— stock listed 
Brazilian commodity firms due to a generally buoyant world economy between 1996 
and 2008. This rationale has been validated by the Granger causality analysis, which 
supports the empirical observation that the rise of the Brazilian Bovespa index is 
Granger caused by rising commodity prices of food, vegetables oils and seeds, 
                                                 
93
 Including Braskem and Mineracão e Metálicos SA, among others. 
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agricultural raw materials, minerals and metals and crude. Similarly, improving trade 
governance measured by EFITrade appears to also affect Brazil’s stock market index to 
GDP (StoxVal_GDP).  
StoxVal_GDP, which rose from 13.4% to 44.4% between 1996 and 2008 
correlates highly with all commodity price indexes (sig. 0.01). Commodity prices 
significantly correlate (sig.: 0.01, 0.05) with World GDP and World GDP per capita, as 
established in Chapter 3. Therefore, rising global demand in commodities, especially 
from China, benefited Brazilian stock listed exporters, especially those in the 
commodity sector, which in turn had a positive impact on Brazil’s StoxVal_GDP. Even 
though the regression analysis results are not significant, highly significant correlation 
results and highly significant Granger causality results (except for VegOilSeedsIx, 
which displays inverse Granger causality) provide sufficient statistical support to state 
that the rise of the I-Bovespa between 1996 and 2008 is caused by rising commodity 
prices. Similarly, market capitalization of listed firms to GDP rose from 25.8% to 
100.3% between 1996 and 2007. The drop to 35.9% at year-end 2008 was due to the 
global financial crisis. 
 
CHINA: In comparison to Brazil, China’s StoxVal_GDP correlates to a much 
lower degree with commodity price indexes. Nonetheless, the regression analysis’ p-
value for MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx is significant with an adjusted R2 however of only 
0.52, but with a high t-value of 3.75.  
Rationale: At the beginning of 2000, 90% of initial public offerings (IPOs) were 
associated with SOEs. In the context of the economic transition, focus on trade 
openness, and additional funding opportunities, the government’s policy aimed to 
convert as many viable SOEs into publicly traded, albeit state controlled firms. Sinopec 
and Petrochina are prominent examples of successful SOE IPOs.94 China’s main stock 
index, the Shanghai Composite index SSE which consists of about 50 names, is 
dominated by state controlled energy conglomerates, base metal firms, as well as soft 
                                                 
94
 The stock structure of publicly traded, state controlled firms in China can be separated in circulating 
and non-circulating shares. The government majority is usually represented by classified, non-circulating 
shares. The establishment of exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzen allowed Chinese investors to acquire 
circulating A and B shares, the latter being denominated in foreign currency. H shares are traded in Hong 
Kong and part of the Hang Seng stock index. 
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commodity companies.95 Approximately 50% of the SSE index’ market capitalization is 
constituted by oil, energy, and commodity companies. Therefore, a similar correlation 
and Granger causality rationale applies as is the case with Brazil (despite inverse 
causality for FoodIx and VegOilseedsIx). China’s rising stock indexes are certainly 
attributable to the fast paced growth of the economy during the last decades. However, 
rising commodity price indexes played a role in Granger causing China’s 
StoxVal_GDP, which rose from 29.9% to 222.3% between 1996 and 2007. The drop to 
120.7% in 2008 was due to the financial crisis.  
Compared to Brazil’s stock market, China has an on-shore market (Shanghai, 
Shenzen) and an off-shore market (Hong Kong). Both markets are subject to 
idiosyncratic features due to double-listing and macroeconomic dependency to China. 
For example, on-shore stock markets in mainland China are characterized by a 
relatively small number of circulating shares per issuer and a relatively strong domestic 
investor demand in light of the absence of international investors. The mainland’s stock 
markets have been relatively closed markets and not commonly accessible for 
international investors. Also, mainland’s stock exchanges are relatively narrow in flow 
volume. The average price earnings ratios of the indexes at mainland China’s stock 
exchanges are higher compared to the indexes of the off-shore markets in Hong Kong 
(e.g., Hang Seng index). In addition, low disclosure standards in mainland China, policy 
driven stock investments by institutional entities and relatively inexperienced domestic 
asset managers and traders are a source of high daily price volatilities.96 
At the end of 1996, StoxVal_GDP in China was low at 29.9%, but surging to 
222% in 2007, then declining to 120.7% at the end of 2008 due to the global financial 
crisis. Chinese market capitalization to GDP of companies traded increased from 13.3% 
in 1996 to 61.6% in 2008, peaking at 177.6% in 2007. In comparison, Brazil’s stock 
value traded to GDP increased only from 13.4% to 44.4% between 1996 and 2008, and 
its market capitalization to GDP ratio increased from 25.8% in 1996 to 35.9% in 2008, 
peaking at 100.3% in 2007. In comparison, stock value traded to GDP (StoxVal_GDP) 
in the United States during the same period increased from 92% to 255% between 1996 
                                                 
95
 E.g., for energy and metals: Patrician (oil), CNOOC (oil), Sinopec (oil), Chalco (Aluminum), Handan 
Iron & Steel, Jiangxi Copper, Shanghai Petrochemical, and Wuhan Iron Steel. 
96
 The standard deviation of prices and/or of economic measures is often referred to as volatility by 
market practitioners. Volatility is segregated in different concepts such as observed (past) volatility and 
implied volatility. In the context of this thesis I utilize the concept of observed volatility in order to refer 
to standard deviations of indexes and macroeconomic measures (Please see also Appendix 3.15).   
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and 2008, peaking at 307% in 2007. The United States market capitalization to United 
States GDP increased from 109% in 1996 to 143% in 2007, dropping to 82% in 2008 
due to the global financial crisis. 
China’s stock market valuation relative to GDP is relatively high compared to 
Brazil’s and also to the US’ stock market valuation. This suggests that China’s 
mainland stock markets may be overvalued given their closed nature, relative small 
flow volume and the absence of alternative investment opportunities for mainland retail 
investors —excluding real estate— compared to the large scale of investment 
opportunities for investors in Brazil and the US.97 Also, in comparison to Hong Kong’s 
Hang Seng index, the SSE’s price earnings ratio (P/E) has been higher between 1996 
and 2008. Furthermore, stock markets in mainland China are narrow in equity 
derivatives transactions even though the SSE is larger in size than Brazil’s Bovespa.98 
                                                 
97
 Shanghai Stock exchange (SSE) indexes include the SSE 50 index and the SSE 180 index. SSE index 
shares consist of A shares and B shares as already illustrated in Chapter 3. H shares are traded in the 
Hong Kong Hang Seng index whose main index contains about 50 shares. The P/E (price to earnings) 
ratio of the SSE is usually significantly higher than Hang Seng’s P/E ratio due to various factors such as 
limited capital investment opportunities in mainland China for retail investors compared to more viable 
investment opportunities for investors based in Hong Kong, and rigid foreign exchange and currency 
expatriation policies in mainland China which deter outflows of the RMB. Also, the mainland China 
investor base/mix is more retail driven, whereas in Hong Kong the investor base is more institutionally 
driven. The relatively closed stock markets of mainland China are therefore the primary place for 
investment participation in capital markets despite the qualified foreign institutional investor and 
qualified domestic institutional investor scheme introduced by mainland regulators at the beginning of the 
2000s. In addition, the number of free float A and B shares at mainland China exchanges is usually much 
lower than the free float of H shares at the Hang Seng index in Hong Kong. This conclusion is also 
supported by Seah, Tan, Hsiang (2005, pp. 5-16) who analyzed P/E ratio differences between the SSE 
index and the Hang Seng index. In conclusion, the P/E ratios of mainland China stock markets have been 
historically significantly higher compared to the P/E ratios of the Hang Seng index, which is constituted 
to a large extent by the same firms listed at the SSE or the Shenzen stock exchange (double-listing). The 
SSE’s P/E ratio was at a yearly average of 21.6x in 2010, 28.7x in 2009, 14.9x in 2008, and 59.2x in 
2007; in comparison, Hang Seng’s P/E ratio was at 16.7x, 18.1x, 7.3x, and 22.5x during the same period, 
respectively. For comparison purposes: Brazil’s I-Bovespa average P/E ratio was 45.8x in 2010, 17.2x in 
2009, 32.7x in 2008, and 15.6x in 2007 (Data Source: World Federation of Exchanges, 2011a. Empirical 
observations: Made by the author in context of credit portfolio risk management for corporates, high yield 
and acquisition finance transactions domiciled in APAC).  
98
 The equity market capitalization of the Bovespa index was at USD465 bio as of December 2008, 
dropping from USD1.1 trio as of June 2008 due to the global financial crisis (BMFBovespa, 2011). In 
December 2009 and 2010 Bovespa’s market capitalization stood at USD1.33 trio and USD1.54 trio. In 
comparison, SSE’s equity market capitalization was at USD1.4 trio, USD2.7 trio, and USD2.72 trio in 
December 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. Hang Seng’s equity market capitalization was at USD1.3 
trio, USD2.3 trio, and USD2.7 trio during the same periods, respectively, and NYSE’s equity market 
capitalization stood at USD9.2 trio, USD11.8 trio, and USD13.4 trio in December 2008, 2009, and 2010 
(World Federation Of Exchanges, 2011b). The number of listed companies for 2008 / 2009 / 2010 was as 
follows: Hang Seng index 1,414 / 1,319 / 1,261, Shanghai index 894 / 870 / 864, and I-Bovespa 381 / 386 
/ 392 (Data Source: World Federation of Exchanges, 2011c).  
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Also, M2 to GDP in China increased substantially from 90.7% in 1996 to 139.9% in 
2008, adding even more pressure on investment markets, specifically stock markets. 
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5.2.12 Consumer Price Index and M2 to GDP 
In this section I illustrate the associations of commodity prices and governance 
with (1) CPIx and (2) M2 to GDP. Both variables constitute monetary metrics.  
 
(1) Consumer Price Index 
The commodity boom starting in 2000, specifically between 2005 and 2008, was 
one of the longest and broadest commodity booms of the post-World War II period. 
Apart from the strong and sustained global economic growth, the recent boom was 
fueled by numerous factors such as lax monetary policy in the US and Europe and a 
general buoyant global demand. At the same time, the combination of adverse weather 
conditions and the diversion of specific food commodities such as sugar cane into the 
production of biofuels fueled shortage in soft commodities resulting in price increases.  
This section includes a brief correlation and Granger causality analysis of the 
United States CPIx, and M2 to GDP in context of commodity prices in order to put into 
perspective the CPIx and M2 to GDP associations of Brazil and China.  
Table 5.12.1: US CPIx and US M2 to GDP and Commodity Price Indexes 
Commodity Correlation & 1971-2009 1996-2008 
Class Causality US CPIx US M2_GDP US CPIx US M2_GDP 
FoodIx Pearson Corr .364* .380* .627* .582* 
 
Granger 1 0.4369 0.1889 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Granger 2 0.4016 0.111 0.8388 0.0143 
TropBevIx Pearson Corr -0.135 0.073 0.152 0.044 
 
Granger 1 0.3868 0.9899 0.1163 0.2183 
 
Granger 2 0.1424 0.4002 0.6299 0.0059 
VegOilSeedsIx Pearson Corr .327* 0.283 .585* .567* 
 
Granger 1 0.4447 0.6552 0.0042 0.0086 
 
Granger 2 0.6748 0.005 0.2237 0.0905 
AgriRawIx Pearson Corr .728** .319* .722** .629* 
 
Granger 1 0.1875 0.2836 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Granger 2 0.0818 0.1453 0.4342 0.0308 
MinMetalsIx Pearson Corr .678** .546** .863** .755** 
 
Granger 1 0.2003 0.9733 0.0142 0.1966 
 
Granger 2 0.3892 0.0007 0.5392 0.0001 
CrudeIx Pearson Corr .669** .594** .937** .869** 
 
Granger 1 0.2275 0.5168 0.1379 0.1903 
 
Granger 2 0.6574 <.0001 0.4497 0.0049 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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UNITED STATES: The run-up of energy commodity prices, base metal prices, 
and soft commodity prices from 1971 until the end of the 1980s and from the early 
1990s until late 1990s, and then once again from the early 2000s until the financial 
crisis in late 2008, is subject of a large number of publications which analyze the 
implications of global commodity price increases on inflation and monetary policy of 
the United States (US). Clearly, higher prices of energy and soft commodities have an 
effect on US consumer price inflation measured by US CPIx. Since the mid-1980s, 
nonetheless, sharp increases and decreases in energy commodity, base metals and soft 
commodity prices have had little, if any, impact on CPIx in the US as shown above in 
light of the only moderate correlation coefficients in the period from 1971 to 2009. 
Prevalent academic literature is ambiguous on the question if rising global commodity 
prices are inflationary in nature, thus requiring a tightening US monetary policy, or if 
rising commodity prices are not inflationary by nature, therefore not requiring a US 
monetary policy response prior to the crisis of 2009. The embedded proposition in this 
question suggests that expansionary US monetary policy indeed affects global 
commodity prices.99   
The table above reveals that between 1971 and 2009 US consumer goods prices 
measured by CPIx and commodity prices show mostly low and moderate correlations 
(sig. 0.05 to sig. 0.01). Also, the inverse Granger causality calculations show no 
significant results. In addition, the correlation of US money expansion measured by 
M2_GDP and all commodity price indexes during the same period is low to moderate, 
ranging from 7.3% (TropBevIx) to 59.4% (CrudeIx). Also, not shown in the table, the 
correlation analysis revealed that US M2_GDP and US CPIx correlate at 28.4% 
(negligibly low correlation) between 1971 and 2009 (non sig. >0.05). These findings, 
based on annual data points, suggest that evidence is weak of US M2_GDP affecting 
global commodity prices in the long run over a period of almost 40 years. It also reveals 
that commodity price increases in the long run do not significantly affect US CPIx. 
The picture changes considerably when shortening the time horizon from 1971-
2009 to 1996-2008. Empirical findings, as shown above, reveal that correlation between 
global commodity prices and US CPIx as well as US M2_GDP increased significantly 
                                                 
99
 I point out that the focus of this study is not the research of effects of US monetary policy on 
commodity prices. The above discussion of US M2_GDP and US CPIx on commodity price indexes 
serves as a comparison only in order to illustrate and contrast the significant correlation of Chinese CPIx 
to commodity price indexes.  
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between 1996 and 2008. For example, US M2_GDP and CrudeIx correlate at 59.4% 
(sig. 0.01) between 1971 and 2009. Between 1996 and 2008, however, US M2_GDP 
and CrudeIx correlate much higher at 86.9% (sig. 0.01) than between 1971 and 2009. 
Similarly, higher correlation is also observable between US M2_GDP and (i) FoodIx, 
(ii) VegOilSeedsIx, (iii) AgriRawIx and (iv) MinMetalsIx from 1996-2008 compared to 
1971-2009.  
These findings support the suggestion that there may exist a significant 
relationship between commodity prices indexes and US M2_GDP between 1996 and 
2008, especially when taking Granger causality results into consideration and the high 
correlation between US M2_GDP and US CPIx (not shown in the table), which 
increased from 28.4% between 1971 and 2009 to 94.9% (sig. 0.01) between 1996 and 
2008. US M2_GDP rose from 62% to 83% between 1996 and 2008. Rising M2_GDP in 
the US between 1996 and 2008 seems to have affected global commodity price indexes 
much stronger than it did between 1971 and 2009. This supports the first standard 
monetarist proposition on commodity prices, which links the increase of money supply 
to the increase of commodity prices (at least when considering the period from 1996 to 
2008).  
Nonetheless, as the table below reveals, between 1996 and 2008 China’s CPIx 
correlates stronger with commodity prices than the US CPIx does. That is, there exist 
commodity price effects on CPIx in China which may not be explained by US M2, 
especially when taking the CPIx of Brazil into consideration, which correlates lower 
with commodity price indexes in contrast to China’s CPIx.  
Table 5.12.2: CPIx Brazil and China 
Variable 58 CPIx Brazil CPIx China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 58.8* Inverse - 89.3** Inverse - 
TropBevIx - - - 56.4* - - 
VegOilSeedsIx 55.8* Inverse - 86.9** Inverse - 
AgriRawIx 70.6* Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .45 93.0** Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx 83.3** Inverse - 95.1** Causal Yes: R2 .93 
CrudeIx 90.8** - - 96.7** Causal Yes: R2 .93 
WGIVA 94.1** Inverse - -62.1* - - 
WGIGE - - - 66.6** Causal No 
EFITrade 94.3** Inverse - 81.5** - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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BRAZIL: The correlation between the Brazilian CPIx and FoodIx and 
VegOilSeedsIx is moderate at 58.8% and 55.8% (sig. 0.05). The CPIx correlation is 
high at 70.6% and 83.3% with AgriRawIx and MinMetalsIx. The correlation is very 
high and above 90% (sig. 0.01) with CrudeIx, WGIVA and EFITrade. Nonetheless, the 
Brazilian CPIx correlation with commodity price indexes is lower than correlation 
between the Chinese CPIx and commodity price indexes. The Brazilian CPIx correlates 
at 94.9% with Brazilian M2_GDP (sig. 0.001, not shown in table), revealing a strong 
affinity to Brazilian M2.100  
Rationale: Brazil’s CPIx is less in tune with rising commodity prices than 
China’s, but rather in sync with expansive Brazilian M2 to GDP, which grew from 
31.4% to 59.1% between 1996 and 2008. It appears that the inflationary push through 
effect from commodities in Brazil is not as pronounced as this is the case for China, 
which gives credence to the suggestion that Brazil’s economy is far less susceptible to 
imported commodity related inflation than it is the case with China.  
 
CHINA: The regression analysis results show that MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx, 
combined to CMca1MetOil, Granger cause China's CPIx with an adjusted R2 of 0.93 
(estimate: 0.049, t-val 9.52, sig. <0.0001). Chinese CPIx and all commodity prices 
except TropBevIx correlate high/very high between 86.9% and 96.7% (sig. 0.01), 
whereas correlation between US CPIx and commodity prices ranged lower between 
58.5% and 93.7%. This finding weighs particularly strong given the fact that Chinese 
M2_GDP apparently has had little effect on Chinese CPIx judging by the low and 
insignificant correlation of 51.9% (sig> 0.05) between 1996 and 2008 (not displayed in 
the table). The Chinese M2_GDP grew by 18% p.a. on average from 90.7% in 1996 to 
139.9% in 2008, and correlated high at 83% (sig. 0.01) with US M2_GDP. However, 
the correlation analysis shows little to none effect of Chinese M2_GDP on commodity 
price indexes, as shown in Table 5.12.3 below.  
Rationale: The relationship between global commodity prices and consumer 
good prices, expressed by CPIx, is vastly discussed in academic literature in the context 
of commodity prices inflating consumer good prices through cost-push mechanisms, 
specifically when taking into consideration the velocity of commodity demand. The 
                                                 
100
 In comparison, the Brazilian CPIx correlates at 91% (sig. 0.001) with the US M2_GDP between 1996 
and 2008 (Source: Separate correlation analysis by the author, not shown in the tables above). 
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above findings suggest that the rising Chinese CPIx is to a lesser extent affected by 
Chinese M2_GDP expansion than by strong demand related commodity push-through 
effects in domestic China, which in turn affect commodity prices. This suggests that 
prices of food, vegetables and oil seeds, agricultural raw materials as well as minerals 
and metals lead CPIx in China. The Granger causality analyses of prices of minerals and 
metals and oil, key import commodities for China as seen in Chapter 2 (Table 2.9 
Import Structure China), support this rationale. The adjusted R-square is highly 
significant at 0.93, and the t-value of MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx is high at 9.52. 
In conclusion, China’s increasing importance on global commodity import 
markets, which is represented by China’s rising global import shares in virtually all 
commodity categories between 1995 and 2009, has driven prices of minerals and 
metals, food products, seeds and oils, agricultural raw materials, and fuels.101 China’s 
total global import share rose from 2.5% in 1995 to 6.1% in 2005, then to 7.9% in 2009 
(Table 2.9: Import Structure China 1995-2009). In comparison, US global import share 
declined overall from 14.7% in 1995 to 12.8% in 2009. 
 
(2) M2 to GDP 
Table 5.12.3: M2 to GDP Brazil and China 
Variable 60 M2_GDP Brazil M2_GDP China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 56.3* Inverse - - - - 
AgriRawIx 64.5** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .93 - - - 
MinMetalsIx 83.4** Causal Yes: R2 .93 - - - 
CrudeIx 90.4** Causal Yes: R2 .93 61.5* - - 
WGIVA 83.1** - - - - - 
EFITrade 84.8** - - 87.6** - - 
EFIMon - - - 60.6* Inverse - 
EFICorrup - - - 86.2** - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: The rising M2_GDP in Brazil appears to be Granger caused by rising 
commodity prices such as AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, and CrudeIx. The regression 
analysis results are significant on all three commodity price indexes, displaying a high 
                                                 
101
 See also Section 2.4.3.2 for China’s (and the United States) commodities import structure, illustrating 
the sharp increase of commodity related imports to China. Between 1996 and 2009 global Chinese import 
shares in iron ores were up from 2.5% to 16.0%, foods and seeds and oils up from 2.3% to 4.6%, 
agricultural raw materials up from 5.5% to 18.2%, and fuels up from 1.6% to 6.7% (Source: Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.3.2, Table 2.9: Import Structure China 1995-2009).   
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adjusted R2 of 0.93 for AgriRawIx and BMca1MetOil, which combines CrudeIx and 
MinMetalsIx.  
Rationale: This finding may imply that M2_GDP, which rose from 31.4% in 
1996 to 59.1% in 2008, was induced by relaxed monetary governance to maintain 
relatively stable monetary supply during times when monetary policies sought to 
accommodate Brazilian GDP in the context of higher commodity prices. This rationale 
supports the Neo-Structuralist view that money supply can be a passive agent due to 
price increases by monopolistic entities, or in this case by external factors such as 
commodity price effects due to China’s significant demand in commodities. 
 
CHINA: Chinese M2_GDP correlates to 60.6% (sig. 0.05) with EFIMon. 
M2_GDP appears to inversely Granger cause monetary governance. Monetary 
governance improved from 62.7 to 72.9 index points between 1996 and 2008.   
Rationale: Inflation has been very volatile in China. Transport and energy 
bottlenecks were frequently accompanied by inflation. Based on the above inverse 
Granger causality it appears that monetary policy has not been an effective instrument 
in moderating inflation. However, based on the improved and relatively low annual 
inflation data observed since 1996, it appears that monetary governance was indeed 
effective. The findings in the previous paragraphs in context of the significant 
regression results on prices for oil and minerals and metals suggest that monetary 
governance has adapted gradually to a changing, more open macroeconomic 
environment. 
 
5.2.13 Energy Efficiency  
Table 5.13: Energy Efficiency (GDP_UEnUPPPOilE)  
Variable 74 GDP_UEnUPPPOilE Brazil GDP_UEnUPPPOilE China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 70.9** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .46 - - - 
VegOilSeedsIx 64.4** Inverse - - - - 
AgriRawIx 80.6** Inverse - 58.9* Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx 91.4** Inverse - 76.8** Causal No 
CrudeIx 95.9** - - 86.5** Causal No 
WGIVA 89.8** - - - - - 
WGIGE - - - 60.1* Inverse - 
EFITrade 96.0** Inverse - 95.4** Causal Yes: R2 .89 
EFICorrup - - - 71.2** - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
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BRAZIL: The correlation of energy efficiency measured by 
GDP_UEnUPPPOilE102 with VegOilseedsIx is moderate, high with FoodIx, AgriRawIx, 
and WGIVA, and very high with MinMetalsIx, CrudeIx, and trade governance. The 
regression analysis reveals a weak adjusted R2 of 0.46 for FoodIx.  
Rationale: The inverse Granger causality is questionable since higher energy 
efficiency measured in GDP_UEnUPPPOilE is not a catalyst for higher commodity 
prices. Typically, it should be the way around. Brazil’s energy efficiency measured by 
GDP_UEnUPPPOilE improved from 6.17 to 8.06 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP 
per one kilogram of oil equivalent of energy use between 1996 and 2008 (or, 0.16 kg oil 
equivalent per 1USD GDP in 1996 to 0.12 kg oil equivalent per USD1 GDP in 2008). 
Brazil’s improved energy efficiency may be attributed to its relatively new and efficient 
production and manufacturing base. Brazil’s energy efficiency fares relatively well 
compared to that of other developed and industrialized economies, which range between 
0.15 and 0.2 kg oil equivalent per 1USD GDP. For example, Germany’s energy 
efficiency measured in PPP GDP per kilogram of oil equivalent of energy use was at 
5.41 in 1996, improving to 9.10 in 2008, whereas the United States’ energy efficiency 
improved only from 3.67 to 6.26 during the same period. 
The Brazilian energy efficiency correlates very high at 91.4% and 95.9% (sig. 
0.01) with rising prices of minerals and metals as well as with oil. Even though the 
results of Granger (inverse) causality are not plausible, the relationship represented by 
very high positive correlation between improving energy efficiency and rising 
commodity prices is economically plausible. 
 
CHINA: The regression results show a strong goodness of fit with an R-square 
of 0.89 for EFITrade with a t-value of 5.05, indicating strong explanatory power of the 
independent variable. Also, CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx correlate highly at the 
significance level of 0.01 with the dependent variable. All three explanatory variables 
are Granger causing GDP_UEnUPPPOilE. 
Rationale: China is the second largest electricity producer after the US. China 
predominantly depends on coal. Compared with Brazil’s energy efficiency, China’s 
energy efficiency is low due to its relative old state of manufacturing facilities 
                                                 
102
 GDP_UEnUPPPOilE= Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP per one kilogram of oil equivalent of 
energy use (PPP US$ per one kg of oil equivalent). 
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compared with Brazil’s. China’s energy efficiency measured by GDP_UEnUPPPOilE 
nonetheless improved significantly between 1996 and 2008 in relative terms. It grew by 
166.7% from 1.8 to 3.9 units purchasing power parity of GDP per one kilogram of oil 
equivalent of energy use (or, 0.55 to 0.26 kg oil equivalent for USD1 GDP from 1996 to 
2008). Energy efficiency measured by GDP_UEnUPPPOilE for China is correlating 
highly (sig. 0.01) with rising minerals and metals prices as well as with rising crude 
prices. Increasing commodity prices Granger cause GDP_UEnUPPPOilE, suggesting 
that China’s energy efficiency improved due to rising prices of oil and base metals, 
which are key input factors for a variety of sectors (infrastructure, energy, oil, 
automotive, petrochem).  
China’s improving energy efficiency may be due to the following factors: 
Firstly, energy prices in China are mainly marked at market prices due to increasing 
competition among utility firms. Secondly, China’s open economy and its increased 
access to markets overseas enabled Chinese companies to purchase state of the art 
production technology from Europe and the US, which is more efficient than existing 
Chinese manufacturing technology. Obviously, China benefits from the FDI trade with 
energy efficient manufacturing imports. Thirdly: The expansion of China’s energy-
intensive industries such as steel, construction and petrochemical industry, the higher 
use of air-conditioning and heating, and the below expectation hydro power output 
weigh heavily on China’s energy consumption, all of which serves as motivation for a 
more efficient use of energy. Furthermore, volatile coal imports from Inner Mongolia, 
relatively weak power transmission grids and capacity, as well as recurring summer 
energy consumption peaks force Chinese municipalities to impose energy rations in 
order to maintain a continuous electricity supply. As a result, energy efficiency is 
compelled to significantly improve further. This association is represented by rising 
prices of minerals and metals and crude which Granger cause GDP_UEnUPPPOilE.   
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5.2.14 Rural Migration  
Table 5.14: Rural Migration  
Variable 75 RuPp_ToTPp Brazil RuPp_ToTPp China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
AgriRawIx -59.3* Inverse - -64.5* Causal/Iv No 
MinMetalsIx -76.7** Causal/Iv No -80.6** Causal/Iv No 
CrudeIx -86.1** Causal No -89.1** Causal No 
WGIVA -91.2** Inverse - - - - 
WGIPS - - - 58.3* Inverse - 
WGIGE - - - -57.9* Inverse - 
WGIRQ 85.4** - - - - - 
WGIRL 85.8** - - - - - 
WGICC - - - 82.1** - - 
EFIBiz 77.6** Causal No 62.4* Causal No 
EFITrade -89.6** Inverse - -98.3** Inverse - 
EFIFisc 74.0** Causal No - - - 
EFIGovtS 78.3** Inverse - 81.6** - - 
EFIInvest - - - 79.9** Causal No 
EFIFin - - - 79.9** Causal No 
EFIPropRi - - - 73.4** Causal No 
EFICorrup - - - -67.3* - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: Rural population to total population declined from 21.5% in 1996 to 
14.4% in 2008 (please see also Appendix 2.1f: Macroeconomic Figures 1996 – 2008). 
The dependent variable correlates negatively with AgriRawIx, CrudeIx (sig. 0.01), and 
MinMetalsIx (sig. 0.01), as well as with WGIVA and EFITrade. It is Granger caused by 
CrudeIx and MinMetalsIx. Also, deteriorating business and fiscal governance Granger 
cause rural migration; the correlation is at 77.6% and 74.0% and highly significant. In 
addition, improving trade governance correlates highly negatively, at almost 90%, with 
rural migration. That is, improving trade governance moves in an opposite direction 
compared with the rural population to total population ratio. However, inverse causality 
from RuPp_ToTPp to EFITrade is not plausible.  
Rationale: Rural migration is typically a result of specific push factors, 
including —but not limited to— limited employment diversification, lower wage levels 
compared to urban wage levels, and high taxes. Pull factors in contrast are generally 
adverse conditions in the place of origin such as economic hardship, poverty, and 
unemployment. Industry clusters in the Brazilian industry centers offered better labor 
opportunities, which represent a main pull factor for rural migration. Advances in 
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communication and transportation technology, which emerged in the late 1950s, also 
supported rural migration trends.  
Brazil underwent profound changes since the great depression. It developed 
from an exporter of a small number of primary products to a large scale trader and 
exporter of commodities. In the same time, its population —originally predominantly 
rural— became increasingly urbanized. Brazil's population density varies significantly 
between regions. In 2000 the population density ranged between two and three 
inhabitants per square kilometer in the Amazon region, whereas it was above 30 in the 
North East and above 150 in the state of São Paulo (Baer, 2008, p. 250). One distinctive 
feature of Brazil’s population distribution is the degree of concentration within a few 
hundred kilometers of the seacoast. Rural migration and its unfavorable side effects 
represented by the emergence of favelas, which in turn radiated significant criminal 
activities, gained momentum in the context of import substitution programs in the 1950s 
and 1970s. Workers were drawn from infrastructure-weak regions to trade hubs and 
industrial centers in the East and South East such as Fortaleza, Recife, São Paulo, and 
Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, improvements in communication supported rural 
migration trends. An example of wanted rural migration to the inner regions of Brazil 
was the greenfield construction project of the federal capital Brasilia, inaugurated in 
1960. The objective was to promote and industrialize the inner regions of Brazil and to 
counterbalance rural migration to the shore lines by generating rural migration to the 
interior.103  
The empirical observations above are statistically validated by a highly negative 
correlation of -89.6% of rural population to total population with EFITrade. It is also 
remarkable to observe that the dependent variable rural population to total population is 
Granger causing (inverse causality) the degree of democracy index WGIVA. This 
suggests that a rising percentage of urban population to total population is positively 
affecting democracy development in Brazil. 
 
CHINA: Similarly to Brazil, there exists a highly negative correlation between 
rural population to total population and rising commodity prices (MinMetalsIx, 
CrudeIx: sig. 0.05) as well as improving trade governance (negative correlation of 
                                                 
103
 Brasilia, which resembles and reflects ‘aesthetics of randomness and utilitarian simplicity’ (Philippou, 
2008, p. 2), was designed and constructed by world renowned architect Oscar Niemeyer under the 
presidency of Juscelino Kupitschek in an attempt to urbanize inner Brazilian landscapes.   
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almost 1, sig. 0.01). All associations appear to be Granger causing the dependent 
variable, which declined from 67.7% in 1996 to 56.9% in 2008. 
Rationale: Brazil’s disparity between rural and urban population is more 
pronounced than China’s. For example, rural migration in Brazil set in at the 
end/beginning of the 1930s/1940s. By 1960 rural population to total population of 
Brazil stood at 55%, whereas it was at 84% in China in the same year (World Bank, 
2009, 2010). As of 2008, rural population to total population was at 14.4% for Brazil 
and 56.9% for China. This distinctive feature underscores China’s historical economic 
structure, which has often been labeled as bottom heavy. The emergence of the 
communist era helped to cultivate the historic roots in China’s sociological disparity. 
Urban population has been seen as the vanguard of socialism, whereas rural population 
was instrumental for delivering agricultural products and food. As a result, China’s 
society has been systematically divided into urban and rural societies.  
Since the 1950s, different administrative and governance structures and different 
systems of rights and privileges —favoring urban population— have shaped China’s 
society, practically leading to two kinds of citizenship: one urban and one rural. The 
latter was granted weaker rights with respect to property and health care benefits.  
The rural and urban divide has been maintained through strict mobility controls 
since the end of the 1950s until the end of the 1970s. Mobility controls have been lifted 
only very selectively. Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, however, the picture has 
changed significantly with the CCP granting controlled and gradual migration 
development, which has been identified as a major factor in industrial and export 
productivity in the context of China’s outwards oriented assembly economy. As a result, 
rural population to total population started to gradually decline from 80.4% in 1980 to 
70% by 1993 and 56.9% in 2008. Rural migration affected particularly the cities of 
Kumming (Southwest), Guangzhou and Shenzen (Far South), Shanghai (South East), 
Guangdong (Pearl River Delta), Congqing (Upper Yangtze), and Beijing (North). These 
cities symbolize the rise and the success of the SEZ’s and industrial cluster centers, 
which in turn transformed these cities in industrial powerhouses, benefiting directly 
from open trade policies, which in turn attracted rural migrant workers in large 
numbers. This empirical significance is statistically validated by the very high and 
negative correlation of -98.3% (sig. 0.01) of the dependent variable with Chinese 
EFITrade — inverse Granger causality is not plausible though. It is also remarkable that 
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rural population to total population inversely Granger causes deteriorating political 
stability expressed by a declining WGIPS index from -0.35 to -0.39 points between 
1996 and 2008. This statistical finding is empirically validated by the rising number of 
violent protests in urban areas by migrant workers and also traditional urban residents.  
Rural migration of the past 50 years has significantly changed China’s 
population spread. Today, only approximately 6% of China’s inhabitants live in the dry, 
mountainous West of China, whereas approximately 94% live in the eastern and most 
developed part of China —the Yangtze macro area which Shanghai is the center of. 
10% of China’s population lives in Lower Yangtze, which produces about 25% of the 
country’s GDP, the Northeast has about 10% of China’s population, which cultivates 
about 20% of the country’s arable land (Naughton, 2007, pp. 113-135).  
 Rationale BRAZIL/CHINA continued: In addition to the above rational, and 
despite non-significant regression results on rural migration, the correlation and the 
causality analysis reveal additional significant results for both Brazil and China. 
Freedom of business declined for both during the observation period and appears to 
represent a pull factor. This observation is statistically validated by the correlations of 
RuPp_ToTPp with deteriorating EFIBiz at 77.6% (sig. 0.01) for Brazil and at 62.4% 
(sig. 0.05) for China. Rising prices for commodities, especially those of price inelastic 
energy commodities, minerals and metals, and agricultural raw materials seem to also 
represent a pull factor for rural migration in Brazil and China. Correlations between 
RuPp_ToTPp and CrudeIx, MinMetalsIx and AgriRawIx are negative at -59.3%, -
76.7% and -86.1% for Brazil, and negative at -64.5%, -80.6%, and -89.1% for China, 
respectively. Granger causality is significant for both Brazil (except for agricultural raw 
materials) and China. Furthermore, the declining regulatory quality governance and the 
declining rule of law governance seem to play a role also for rural migration in Brazil, 
judging by the significant and high correlation of 85.4% with WGIRQ and 85.8% with 
WGIRL.  
In conclusion, improving trade governance in Brazil and China and increasing 
trade flows may represent one of the main factors for rural migration analyzed in this 
study; this is validated by the statistical significance of the revealed associations above. 
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5.2.15 Communication Coverage: Internet and Mobile Coverage  
(1) Internet  
Table 5.15.1: Internet Coverage  
Variable 76 Internet_100 Brazil Internet_100 China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 72.9** Inverse - 80.5** Inverse - 
VegOilSeedsIx 69.3** Inverse - 78.5** Inverse - 
AgriRawIx 82.6** Inverse - 86.2** Inverse - 
MinMetalsIx 92.0** Inverse - 91.7** Causal/Iv Yes R2.83 
CrudeIx 96.1** - - 97.4** Inverse - 
WGIVA 90.2** Causal Yes: R2.796 -64.9* - - 
WGIGE - - - 72.4** Inverse - 
EFITrade 94.2** Inverse - 89.0** - - 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: Internet coverage per hundred inhabitants increased from 0.45% to 
37.5% between 1996 and 2008. The regression analysis yields an adjusted R2 of 0.796 
with WGIVA, which implies strong explanatory power (t-value >6). Trade governance 
correlates highly at 94.2% (sig. 0.01). The inverse Granger causality of EFITrade, 
however, is not plausible. The correlation with VegOilSeedsIx, FoodIx, AgriRawIx, and 
MinMetalsIx and with CrudeIx is moderate, high, and very high. However, the inverse 
Granger causality to the respective commodity price indexes is questionable.  
 
CHINA: In contrast to Brazil, the democracy index in China, which is very low, 
has no effect on the increasing internet coverage which rose from 1% to 22.5% between 
1996 and 2008. Improved trade governance shows a high correlation at 89% (sig. 0.01) 
with internet coverage.  
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(2) Mobile Coverage  
Table 5.15.2: Mobile Coverage 
Variable 79 MobileSubs_100 Brazil MobileSubs_100 China 
Independents Corr % Granger Regr. Sig Corr % Granger Regr. Sig 
FoodIx 73.0** Inverse - 67.5* Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .96 
VegOilSeedsIx 68.7** Inverse - 63.9* Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .96 
AgriRawIx 81.7** Inverse - 77.4** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .96 
MinMetalsIx 92.0** Inverse - 88.3** Inverse - 
CrudeIx 97.6** Causal/Iv Yes: R2 .95 94.7** - - 
WGIVA 87.5** - - -63.6* - - 
WGIGE - - - 67.2* Inverse - 
EFITrade 92.3** Inverse - 96.0** Causal Yes: R2 .96 
Source: Calculated and arranged by the author. 
BRAZIL: The correlation with EFITrade is significant (sig. 0.01) and very high 
at 92.3% for Brazil. The inverse Granger Causality is questionable. Regression results 
on mobile coverage are significant, but economically not plausible and questionable in 
context of CrudeIx affecting mobile coverage in Brazil. Similarly, mobile phone 
coverage shows high and very high correlations (sig. 0.01) respectively with voice and 
accountability (87.5%) and trade governance (92.3%), whereby inverse Granger 
causality of the dependent variable is questionable. Similarly, inverse Granger causality 
to FoodIx, VegOilseedsIx, AgriRawIx, and MinMetalsIx by the dependent variable is 
not plausible.  
Rationale for BRAZIL for Variables 76 and 79: For Brazil, improving trade 
governance, measured by improving EFITrade, correlates highly with internet and 
mobile coverage (significance of 0.01 each); the inverse Granger causality is 
questionable. The increased internet and mobile coverage penetration in Brazil is a 
result of consolidation activities in the telecom sector and improved investments in 
telecommunications infrastructure by telecom firms such Telebras. Mobile coverage in 
Brazil increased from 1.5% to 78.5% between 1996 and 2008. It is also revealing to 
observe statistical significance between increasing internet penetration and mobile 
coverage with WGIVA which correlate at 90.2% and 87.5% (sig. 0.01), lending 
credence to the suggestion that improving degrees of democracy (WGIVA) in Brazil 
positively affect internet coverage (R2 0.796) and mobile communication coverage, 
which rose significantly between 1996 and 2008.  
 
CHINA: Similarly, mobile phone penetration shows very high correlation 
(significance of 0.01) with EFITrade. Also, the correlation with specific commodity 
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price indexes ranges between moderate (FoodIx, VegOilSeedsIx) and very high 
(CrudeIx), whereby all independent variables (except MinMetalsIx and WGIGE) appear 
to Granger cause the dependent variable (MobileSubs_100). The regression results 
reveal an adjusted R2 of 0.96 and a t-value of 4.07 for all PCA combined commodities 
(food, vegetables and oils, agricultural raw materials) and 12.74 for EFITrade, implying 
strong explanatory weight of the independent variables.  
Rationale for CHINA for Variables 76 and 79: Prior to 1994, the phone line 
penetration was very low, at 1%. In wake of China’s market transition, China’s Ministry 
of Phone and Telecommunications (MPT) split its regulatory and operational activities 
into two competing entities: China Telecom and China United Telecom. China United 
Telecom went public as joint investment company in 1994. The regulatory oversight 
remained with the MPT. Due to these two newly created competitive entities, phone 
pricing and waiting periods for phone line connections changed favorably. Due to a 
better market based pricing, telecom investments soared from 0.2% relative to GDP in 
1980 to 1.5% in 1993. The fiber optic network improved to approximately 650,000km 
in 2008, with more than 220million people having internet access. Today, China is the 
largest telecom market in the world with more than 700mio users. Phone penetration 
improved from 1% in 1989 to 25.7% in 2008. The internet and mobile phone coverage 
rose impressively from 0.01% to 22.5% and from 0.6% to 48.4% during that period. 
Nonetheless, the dependent variable’s association to commodity price indexes is not 
plausible. But the empirical significance of trade governance, which positively affects 
internet and mobile phone coverage, is statistically validated by the high correlation of 
EFITrade at 89.0% with Internet_100 and at 96.0% with MobileSubs_100. The latter 
displays a very high adjusted R-square of 0.96 and a t-value of 12.74. 
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5.3 Conclusion  
Objective of Chapter 5 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the effects of commodity prices and 
governance on seventy-nine identical macroeconomic variables for Brazil and China 
between 1996 and 2008, and to identify significant regression relationships between the 
dependent variables and the explanatory variables. The latter are represented by 
commodity price indexes and governance indexes. Chapter 5 is based on the regression 
results and statistical findings for Brazil and China of Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 5 I selected a number of meaningful economic measurements based 
on significant statistical results in Chapter 4. It is easy and convenient to confound the 
significance of statistical results with empirical and economic significance. Empirical 
observations or relationships do not require statistical significance in order to be valid or 
true. The statistical results are therefore neither necessary nor sufficient to qualify an 
empirical relationship as essential, significant, or relevant. However, statistical and 
econometric analysis can be helpful in detecting and underscoring the existence of 
significant empirical relationships.  
In Chapter 5 I intended to support empirical observations by adding statistical 
and econometric findings in order to lend credence to the claim of empirical 
significance of associations between dependent and independent variables for Brazil and 
China. The econometric analysis of specific dependent variables has been performed in 
a comparative fashion, contrasting the observations of Brazil and China.  
 
Approach and Method 
The key statistical methods applied in Section 5 in order to establish an 
inferential analysis on the economies of Brazil and China include (i) Pearson correlation 
analysis, (ii) Granger causality analysis, (iii) principal component analysis, and (iv) 
multiple regression analysis. All relevant data series are based on data provided by the 
World Bank (2009, 2010).   
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Findings  
A large number of statistical findings in Chapter 4 seem to have found validation 
by empirical observations throughout Chapter 2, 3, and Chapter 5. Specifically, I note 
that for China I present a large number of examples in which macroeconomic variables 
seem to inversely Granger cause changes in commodity price indexes and to some 
extent governance indexes.  
The findings on econometric associations have been illustrated and 
demonstrated throughout the entire thesis, especially throughout Chapters 4 and 5. To 
avoid repetition I will therefore refrain from again elaborating on each single specific 
finding for Brazil and China. Nonetheless, for completeness purposes, I provide major 
findings of the econometric analysis below. 
 
For Brazil I observed the following: 
Governance 
(1) Trade governance is a key governance dimension within Brazil’s governance 
architecture and trade policies have been effective instruments to support the 
external sector. The importance of trade governance in Brazil’s governance 
architecture has on average not come at the expense of the quality and 
development of other governance dimensions (e.g., WGIVA, WGIPS).   
(2) Voice and accountability (WGIVA, i.e., degree of democracy) appears to be 
affected by an improving trade openness measured by trade to GDP.  
(3) Rural migration Granger causes improving degree of democracy (WGIVA).   
Commodity Prices  
(4) GDP growth appears to be positively affected by increasing commodity prices. 
(5) Foreign reserves are greatly affected by a commodity biased external sector. 
(6) The external sector is dominated by the export of commodities.  
(7) The commodity export sector grows at the expense of exports and imports of 
manufactured products, which deteriorated significantly, potentially undermining 
Brazil’s manufacturing and industrial base in the long-run, especially in light of 
increasing Chinese imports to Brazil. In this context, the business governance 
(EFIBiz) deteriorated.  
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(8) Terms of trade: Surprisingly, improving terms of trade do not reveal any 
significant correlation to any commodity price indexes except to TropBevIx.   
(9) Trade indexes and trade variables show strong associations to rising commodity 
price indexes. 
(10) Stock market value to GDP shows strong associations with rising commodity 
price indexes. 
 
For China I observed the following key relationships: 
Governance 
(1) Trade governance is the centerpiece of China’s governance architecture and trade 
policies are a key policy instrument to support China’s manufacturing base, 
which, however, is greatly dependent on FDI. China’s emphasis on trade 
governance as a centerpiece of its governance architecture though comes —on 
average— at the expense of the remaining governance dimensions, which either 
deteriorated or were of poor quality to begin with.  
(2) Rural migration negatively affects (inverse Granger causality) political stability 
expressed by a declining WGIPS. 
Commodity Prices 
(3) FDI in China is promoted by improved and favorable trade governance and a 
relatively supportive regulatory framework which is confined within the 
framework of SEZs. 
(4) Gross domestic savings to GDP are rising and household final consumption to 
GDP is declining in light of the absence of a countrywide social security and 
retirement scheme —among others— and in light of deteriorating business 
governance.   
(5) China’s economic expansion measured by rising gross fixed capital formation to 
GDP Granger causes the rise of global commodity prices. 
(6) The correlation of the Chinese CPIx with commodity prices indexes is higher than 
the correlation of the Brazilian CPIx with commodity price indexes.  
(7) China’s terms of trade show highly negative correlations with commodity price 
indexes, which are affected by China’s economic expansion. China’s requires 
significant import volumes of such commodities on an absolute and relative basis 
as illustrated in Chapter 2.  
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(8) Chinese M2 to GDP shows little correlation with commodity price indexes. 
(9) Similar to Brazil, China’s stock market value to GDP shows strong associations 
with the rise of commodity price indexes.  
(10) Trade indexes and trade variables correlate with commodity prices and Granger 
cause commodity prices. 
 
Limitations 
In this section, I point out some limitations in regards to the performed analysis 
and respective results.  
Firstly, this thesis analyzes the effects of governance and commodity prices on 
macroeconomic variables. It also recognizes significant inter-relations among dependent 
variables such as trade to GDP and FDI. However, the ramifications of these effects 
between dependent, endogenous variables are neither being analyzed nor accounted for 
as this is not objective of the thesis and as this would be too large a task to perform 
within the boundaries of this thesis.  
Secondly, the size of observation samples is relatively small. A larger sample 
size and a higher degree of data granularity could potentially have improved the 
accuracy of correlation coefficients, Granger causality p-values, beta coefficients and 
adjusted R-square in a number of cases, and could also potentially have diminished the 
multicollinearity problem. However, due to limitations in governance data supplied by 
the World Bank (2009, 2010), I only observed and analyzed annual data points between 
1996 and 2008. Consistent World Bank governance data exists since 1996 only, 
whereas EFI data dates back to 1994. In addition, governance indexes are observable on 
an annual basis only. 
Thirdly, the findings and results of the econometric analysis are confined to the 
time span of 1996 and 2008. As is the case with time series analysis, the empirical 
observations and statistical validations yield point in time observations only. 
Observations and conclusions should therefore not be extrapolated beyond 2008. 
Fourthly, governance indexes and commodity price indexes are quantitatively 
highly aggregated metrics, consisting of a wide array of specific governance 
architecture elements and price constituents. The macroeconomic variables applied in 
this thesis are highly aggregated metrics itself. They illustrate and measure the effects of 
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governance and commodity prices on the socio-economic landscape of Brazil and China 
only in a highly aggregated fashion. Therefore, one has to be careful not to draw wrong 
conclusions regarding the effects of specific governance dimension subsets and 
commodity price constituents on the Brazilian and Chinese socio-economic landscape 
as a whole and specific facets and characteristics of it and vice versa.  
Having said all that, because the stated objective of this thesis is to measure the 
mentioned effects on a highly aggregated basis, the selected commodity price and 
governance indexes as well as the selected macroeconomic variables applied are 
acceptable and fit well; they comply with my data and methodology requirements. 
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6.  Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter I will first supply an executive summary of my key 
findings in the section Overall Conclusion. In the Sectional Summaries I will then give 
a more detailed summary of each chapter and section before finally providing 
suggestions for potential future research in the final remarks.  
 
Overall Conclusion  
Scope and Objective 
The macroeconomic variables I chose in the comparative analysis in this thesis 
represented a meaningful macroeconomic topic-mix.  
As illustrated and rationalized in Sections 1.3 and 1.5, macroeconomic variables 
serve as dependent (endogenous) variables, and commodity price and governance 
indexes serve as independent (exogenous) variables.  
The main objective of this thesis has been to investigate the effects of 
commodity prices and governance architecture from a holistic viewpoint, with reference 
to a set of 79 identical multi-topic macroeconomic variables for Brazil and China 
between 1996 and 2008. The goal was to identify significant correlation, causality and 
regression relationships between these macroeconomic variables and the explanatory 
variables, represented by six commodity indexes and two sets of governance indexes of 
which each has nine and six governance dimensions, respectively.  
The thesis’ research does not include annual data points from 2009 onwards due 
to the global financial crisis unfolding at the end of 2008 and effectively materializing 
in 2009. The extraordinary negative effects on global macroeconomics also hit 
commodity price indexes, which experienced a flash crash between 2008 and 2009, e.g., 
MinMetalsIx -30.2%, CrudeIx -36.3%.104 Due to the crisis-related distorting effects on 
macroeconomics and on governance, I refrained from including annual 2009 data in the 
econometric analysis. For example, between 2008 and 2009 trade governance in China 
improved from 71.4 to 72.2 index points and voice and accountability in Brazil 
improved from 0.48 to 0.51 index points. However, due to the global financial crisis 
                                                 
104
 Extreme annual price changes between 2008 and 2009 were observed for (i) Manganese Ore 
(metallurgical FOB ($/mtu Mn)): -61.3%, and (ii) Phosphate Rock (Khouribga, 70% BPL, contract, FAS 
Casablanca): -64.8%. Source: UNCTAD 2010 (Free market commodity price indexes, Annual, 1960-
2009).  
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China’s trade to GDP declined from 62.1% to 47.1% between 2008 and 2009, and 
Brazil’s trade to GDP declined from 27.4% to 26.1% in the same period. Brazil’s GDP 
growth rate was negative at -0.19% in 2009, but China’s GDP growth rate was positive 
at 9.1%.  
As an overall result the thesis thus provides a comparative overview for identical 
macroeconomic variables of Brazil and China. This thesis also offers a coherent view of 
the macroeconomic dynamics between Brazil and China, which are both dominating 
powers in their respective regions. And, it illustrates the trade related interdependencies 
between Brazil and China by analyzing the countries’ external sector structures and 
trade profiles. Chapter 5 offered such a contrasting analysis on identical dependent 
variables for Brazil and China in light of econometric results and empirical 
observations. 
 
Key Research Findings and Observations 
The conclusions that emerge from the econometric analysis of Chapters 2 to 5 
for the period of 1996 to 2008 include significant effects from governance, especially 
trade governance, and commodities on dependent variables. I note that there are a 
significant number of examples for China in which macroeconomic variables seem to 
(inversely) Granger cause and lead changes in commodity price indexes and to a smaller 
extent governance dimensions.  
For Brazil I observed the following key points:  
Governance 
• Trade governance is a key governance dimension within Brazil’s governance 
architecture and trade policies (e.g., import and export tariffs) have been effective 
instruments to support the external sector. The importance of trade governance in 
Brazil’s governance architecture has on average not come at the expense of the 
quality and development of other governance dimensions (e.g., WGIVA, WGIPS) 
in comparison to China. 
• The voice and accountability index (democracy index) appears to be positively 
affected by improving economic and trade openness measured by trade to GDP. 
• Rural migration Granger causes improving degree of democracy (WGIVA).   
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Commodity Prices 
• GDP growth appears to be positively affected by increasing commodity prices and 
increasing exports of commodities. 
• Foreign reserve ratios are positively affected by commodity price increases, 
especially by oil and minerals and metals prices.  
• The external sector represented by trade indexes and trade variables is dominated 
by the export of commodities.  
• The commodity export sector grows at the expense of exports of manufactured 
products, which deteriorated notably, potentially undermining Brazil’s 
manufacturing and industrial base in the long-run, especially in light of increasing 
Chinese manufactured imports to Brazil. In this context, business governance 
deteriorated.  
• Improving terms of trade do not reveal any significant correlation with any 
commodity price index except with the tropical beverages price index 
(TropBevIx).  
• Trade indexes and trade variables show strong associations to rising commodity 
price indexes. 
• Stock market values are positively affected by increasing commodity prices which 
in turn support Brazil’s growing commodity export sector. 
 
For China I observed the following key points:  
 Governance 
• Trade governance is the centerpiece of China’s governance architecture and trade 
policies are key policy instruments to support China’s manufacturing base. 
Nonetheless, China’s emphasis on trade governance as a centerpiece of its 
governance architecture comes at the expense of the remaining governance 
dimensions, which either deteriorated or were at low quality rating levels to begin 
with. 
• Rural migration negatively affects political stability expressed by a declining 
WGIPS index. 
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Commodity Prices 
• FDI in China is promoted by favorable trade policies and a relatively supportive 
regulatory framework which, however, is limited within the framework of SEZs. 
• Gross domestic savings to GDP is increasing, and household final consumption to 
GDP is declining due to the absence of a country-wide social security and 
retirement scheme —among others— and due to relatively unfavorable business 
governance which includes high barriers of entry (e.g., capital requirements) for 
entrepreneurs and small businesses.  
• China’s economic expansion as, e.g., reflected by increasing gross capital 
formation to GDP affects rising (Granger causes) global commodity prices.  
• The correlation of the Chinese CPIx with commodity price indexes is higher than 
the correlation of the Brazilian CPIx with commodity price indexes.  
• Terms of trade declined as a result of rising commodity prices (significant, highly 
negative correlations) which are affected by China’s economic expansion.  
• Chinese M2 to GDP shows little correlation with commodity price indexes.  
• Stock market values reveal strong positive associations with rising commodity 
prices. 
• Trade indexes and trade variables show significant causalities with increasing 
global commodity price indexes.  
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Sectional Summaries 
Regional Analysis 
Brazil and China have undergone significant economic changes and integration 
development over the past 50 years, specifically over the last two decades. From the 
mid-1990s to the early 2000s, Brazil and China offered general trade complementarities 
in their export structures. Brazil has largely benefited from its vast natural resources, 
which have dominated the country’s export structure. That structure in turn has been 
shaped by China’s immense demand for soft, energy, minerals and metals commodities 
since the late 1990s in order to ensure economic growth. China benefited from its vast 
and skilled labor base, coupled with low wages in high density areas, which attracted 
FDI to its SEZs and enabled the country to serve as an ‘assembly bench’ for export 
markets mainly in Europe and in the United States. 
Then, starting in the early 2000s, a new trading pattern emerged. The Chinese 
trade deficit with Brazil narrowed from 47% in 2003 to 22% in 2008 (Table 2.13 Trade 
Balance Brazil and China 2000–2008), suggesting that Chinese exports to Brazil 
increased in value. Meanwhile, Brazil’s export balance of goods and services to GDP 
declined even though it retained a relatively strong position as a global provider of 
natural resources. The increasingly tight trade relations between Brazil and China have 
resulted from their complementarities: Brazil’s abundance of commodities and China’s 
dynamic industrialization strategy. Brazil’s continued structural weaknesses, coupled 
with increasing Chinese exports of manufactured products to Brazil suggest a major 
threat to Brazil’s industrial base, one that haunts public discussions about Brazilian job 
losses and a potential return to a commodity-based economy. Furthermore, Chinese 
acquisitions and investments in the Brazilian commodity sector appear likely to increase 
significantly in the future considering China’s need to import commodities to maintain 
its domestic growth. Brazil’s concentration on exporting commodities and the threat of 
rising Chinese manufactured imports as described in Chapter 2 have led to significant 
concerns and apprehensions in Brazil among policy makers, economic advisors and the 
general public. Brazil faces the risk to become locked into a role as a commodity 
exporter, which can undermine the positive trends of a widening industrial base and 
increased exports. Together with increasing dependence on exported primary products, 
the Sino-Brazilian relationship has fundamental effects and consequences for the 
Brazilian development paradigm and for the domestic support of the idea of stronger 
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relations with China. The main question revolves around the direction and quality of the 
developing relationship between the two countries. Will Brazil and China develop as 
partners, continue to forge joint ventures and enter mutually beneficial FDI agreements 
—and achieve balanced trade relations? Or will the two countries emerge as competitors 
on both regional and global levels?  
 Key factors in Brazil’s economic expansion have been its commodity biased 
export basis but also improved governance in a number of governance dimensions 
represented by World Bank governance indicators (WGI) and economic freedom 
indexes (EFI). China on the other hand requires imports of urgently needed base metals, 
energy and agricultural raw materials in order to fuel its economic expansion, which 
benefited greatly from improved trade governance.  
 
Governance Analysis 
The qualitative and quantitative comparative analysis of Brazil’s and China’s 
governance dimensions, measured by the worldwide governance index and the 
economic freedom index, revealed that Brazil improved its governance architecture 
measured by the WGI in all dimensions except regulatory quality and rule of law. 
Specifically, Brazil made great strides in improving its democracy governance, 
measured by the voice and accountability index (WGIVA), which rose from 0.18 to 
0.51 index points between 1996 and 2009. In comparison, China’s democracy index 
(WGIVA) developed relatively flatly and at very low levels, from -1.66 to -1.65 index 
points during the same period. For China, I also note that all WGI indexes deteriorated 
except government effectiveness (WGIGE), which improved slightly from 0.04 to 0.12 
between 1996 and 2009.  
In terms of the economic freedom indexes, trade, monetary, and corruption 
governance improved for both Brazil and China. Monetary governance developed 
favorably between from 1996 to 2009, as expressed by the improving monetary 
governance indexes (EFIMon) which rose from 70.0 to 75.8 index points and from 62.7 
to 70.6 index points for Brazil and China, respectively. Similarly, EFI’s corruption 
index (EFICorrup) improved for Brazil and China, rising from 27.0 to 35.0 and 21.6 to 
36.0, respectively. The key governance dimension with the widest econometric effect on 
macroeconomic variables for both, Brazil and China, is trade governance (EFITrade), 
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which rose dramatically from 57.0 to 69.2 for Brazil and from 30.0 to 72.2 for China 
between 1996 and 2009.  
 
Correlation Analysis 
 The correlation analysis of Brazil’s and China’s identical 79 dependent variables 
revealed that there exist 440 significant correlation counts for China, and 352 significant 
correlation counts for Brazil.  
 
Independent Variable Set  
 From an independent variable set perspective I note that the commodity price 
index set dominates the significant correlation count with 47.0% and 44.3% of all 
significant correlation events for China and Brazil, respectively. The economic freedom 
index set displays the second largest significant correlation count, representing 34.5% of 
all significant correlation counts for China and 28.1% of all significant correlation 
counts for Brazil. With 18.4% of all counts for China and 27.6% of all counts for Brazil, 
the WGI index set trails the commodity price index set and the EFI index set. 
 
Individual Independent Variables 
 From an individual, independent variable point of view the correlation results 
revealed that trade governance in Brazil measured by EFITrade shows the largest 
number of significant individual correlation counts, followed by WGIVA —voice and 
accountability index—, CrudeIx, MinMetalsIx, and AgriRawIx. That is, trade 
governance for Brazil seems to be a key governance factor for economic activity, 
followed by the voice and accountability governance. Furthermore, regulatory quality 
and rule of law as well as business governance suggest strong interdependence with 
economic activity.  
 For China, commodity price indexes lead the correlation count with the 79 
selected macroeconomic variables. The minerals and metals price index leads the 
ranking, followed by the agricultural raw materials index and the oil price index. From a 
governance perspective, trade governance (EFITrade) —similarly to Brazil— leads the 
correlation count for China, followed by government effectiveness measured by 
WGIGE, property rights governance (EFIPropRi), and freedom from corruption 
(EFICorrup).  
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Cluster Effects 
 For Brazil, cluster effects are mainly represented by commodity price indexes. It 
is observable that soft commodity price indexes but also minerals and metals price 
indexes display associations to key measures such as GDP growth rate (GDP_gr) and 
GDP per capita growth rate (GDPpCap_gr). Nearly all commodity price indexes show 
associations with export and import value and volume trade indexes such as ExpValx, 
ExpVolx, ImpValIx, ImpVolIx, and unit value as well as unit volume related trade 
indexes, underscoring the importance of commodity exports for Brazil’s economy. 
Furthermore, it appears that changes in commodity prices are key drivers for Brazil’s 
booming stock exchanges. While commodity price indexes reveal associations with a 
wide array of macroeconomic variables, it appears that governance indexes show a 
more narrow correlation association to macroeconomic variables. Voice and 
accountability (WGIVA), political stability (WGIPS), and government effectiveness 
(WGIGE) display cluster effects on trade variables such as trade to GDP (Trade_GDP) 
and merchandise trade to GDP (MrchTrade_GDP), whereas regulatory quality 
(WGIRQ) and rule of law (WGIRL) show cluster associations with interest rates and 
debt variables. EFIBiz, EFITrade, EFIFisc, and EFIGovtS exhibit cluster associations 
with debt variables.  
 For China, the commodity price indexes show large cluster effects on GDP 
ratios, debt and reserve ratios, soft commodity production indexes, and trade indexes. 
The correlation cluster effects for China also include GDP composition variables such 
as industry value added to GDP (IndustryValAd_GDP), gross savings to GDP 
(GrossSav_GDP), and trade variables such as Trade_GDP, MrchTrade_GDP, and 
ExpGS_GDP. The WGI governance indexes do not reveal any significant correlation 
cluster effects. The EFI indexes, primarily EFITrade, EFIGovtS, financial and 
investment freedom (EFIFin, EFIInv), and property rights (EFIPropRi) appear to exhibit 
cluster effects on rates and debt ratios only. 
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Granger Causality Analysis 
 The Granger causality analysis of Brazil and China reveals 267 significant 
Granger causality counts for China and 224 for Brazil. Remarkably, the count ranking is 
the same for both, with the commodity price index set leading the count (China: 59.2% 
of all counts, Brazil: 50.4%), followed by the economic freedom index set (China: 
22.8%, Brazil: 25.0%) and the WGI index set (China: 18.0%, Brazil 24.6%).  
 
Independent Variable Sets 
 From an independent variable set perspective I note that the commodity price 
index set dominates the Granger causality count with 59.2% and 50.4% of all counts for 
China and Brazil, respectively. For Brazil, AgriRawIx, MinMetalsIx, FoodIx, lead the 
causality count, followed by VegOilSeedsIx, CrudeIx, and TropBevIx. I note also that 
more than half of the counts for these commodities is of inverse causality nature, except 
for CrudeIx, which shows more Granger causalities than inverse Granger causalities. 
For China, the largest counts within the commodity price index set reside within 
MinMetalsIx, AgriRawIx, and CrudeIx and VegOilSeedsIx, followed by FoodIx, and 
TropBevIx. The inverse Granger count is more than half for AgriRawIx, 
VegOilSeedsIx, FoodIx, and TropBevIx.  
 The economic freedom index set displays the second largest causality count for 
both, China and Brazil. It is revealing that for both China and Brazil the EFITrade index 
is the dominating governance index within the EFI index set with 25 and 27 causality 
counts, of which 15 and 20 are of inverse causality nature, respectively. For both 
countries trade governance measured by EFITrade emerges as one of the key 
governance dimensions.  
 The WGI governance index set ranks as the third largest set measured by 
significant causality counts. For China, improved WGIGE is the dominant WGI 
governance index with 21 counts (of which 18 are of inverse nature). For Brazil in 
contrast, it is the improved WGIVA index which dominates the causality count with 29 
counts (of which 16 are of inverse nature).  
 Overall, these results suggest that commodity prices show a far greater 
association with economic activities measured by the 79 dependent variables than the 
EFI index or the WGI index does. These results are congruent with the findings of the 
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correlation analysis, in which the commodity price index dominates the correlation 
count for both China and Brazil, followed by the EFI index set and the WGI index set.  
 
Individual Independent Variables 
 The Granger causality analysis reveals that within the commodity price index set 
for Brazil, AgriRawIx displays the largest causality count, followed by individual price 
indexes such as MinMetalsIx, FoodIx, VegOilSeedsIx, CrudeIx, and TropBevIx. From a 
governance dimension point of view, the voice and accountability index shows the 
largest causality count. Trade governance for Brazil shows the second largest number of 
significant causality counts within all governance dimensions. Voice and accountability 
and trade governance seem to play key roles in context of economic activity in Brazil. 
Furthermore, from a governance point of view I found that deteriorating regulatory 
quality and rule of law as well as deteriorating business governance affect economic 
activity. For China, commodity price indexes lead the causality count with the minerals 
and metals price index dominating the overall ranking, followed by AgriRawIx, 
CrudeIx, VegOilSeedsIx, FoodIx and TropBevIx. From a governance perspective, 
EFITrade —similarly to Brazil— is the most dominating governance dimension within 
the causality analysis for China, followed by WGIGE, WGIPS, EFIPropRi, and 
WGIVA and WGICC.  
 
Cluster Effects 
 For Brazil, cluster effects are mainly driven by commodity price indexes. Nearly 
all commodity price indexes show associations with trade indexes. While commodity 
price indexes reveal associations with a wide array of macroeconomic variables, it 
appears that governance indexes show a more narrow correlation association with 
macroeconomic variables; mainly WGIVA, WGIPS, and WGIGE display cluster effects 
on trade variables. EFIBiz, EFITrade, EFIFisc, and EFIGovtS exhibit cluster 
associations with debt variables only. For China, as for Brazil, commodity price indexes 
show large cluster effects on macroeconomic variables. However, cluster effects for 
China are larger in scope. The WGI indexes do not reveal any significant correlation 
cluster effects. And EFI indexes, primarily EFITrade, EFIGovtS, EFIFin/EFIInv, and 
EFIPropRi appear to exhibit cluster effects on interest rates and debt ratios only.  
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Principal Component Analysis  
The principal component analysis has been applied on commodity price indexes, 
WGI and EFI governance indexes, as well as on changes in commodity price indexes 
and changes in governance indexes in consideration of dependent variables measured in 
growth rates. The key propositions to sense multicollinearity include (a) a minimum 
correlation between independent variables of at least 69.9%, and (b) the correlation 
coefficient between independent variables is larger than the correlation coefficient 
between dependent and independent variables. 
 
Commodity Price Indexes 
 The differentiation of the commodity indexes into the soft commodity subset, 
and the minerals and metals and crude subset is based on an array of considerations 
such as correlation associations and Granger causality associations. The latter is 
specifically relevant for MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx as revealed in Chapter 3. 
MinMetalsIx and CrudeIx are sub asset classes within commodities which tend to 
correlate relatively closely with each other. Both oil and base metals prices commonly 
serve as leading indicators of general global economic activity, broad stock market 
index moves, and general consumer demand. They are also leading indicators of 
inflation.  
 
Governance Indexes  
Governance dimensions are highly heterogeneous in nature. There are a high 
number of individual data sources from think tanks, survey institutions, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations, which underlay the 
aggregate indicators. It was thus challenging to apply multi-collinearity detection on 
governance index pairs. In order to consider these distinctive features of governance 
indexes I amended the multicollinearity approach by considering two additional criteria 
(a’) and (a’’) to the criteria (a) and (b) mentioned above: (a’) The significance level has 
to be larger than 99.9%, and (a’’) the variable pair with the highest correlation 
coefficient only can proceed to the principal component analysis. As a result, the 
following independent governance pairs were selected: WGIVA-WGIPS and EFIInv-
EFIFin for China, and EFIFisc-EFIGovtS for Brazil. 
 
  
347
Multiple Regression Analysis 
Out of 79 macroeconomic variables for Brazil, 44 dependent variables passed 
the statistical diagnostic tests with significant results and progressed to the regression 
analysis. The results of the regression analysis revealed that of these 44 dependent 
variables only nine dependent variables —and four independent variables— played no 
significant role in the regression analysis. That is, 35 dependent variables revealed 
regression significance for Brazil. 
The statistical diagnostic tests of China revealed that out of the identical 79 
dependent variables a total of 49 dependent variables progressed to the multiple 
regression analysis, of which seven dependent variables —and two independent 
variables— do not show any significant multiple regression results. That is, 42 variables 
revealed regression significance for China. Furthermore, out of the 35 and 42 regression 
significant dependent variables for Brazil and China, there are 19 identical dependent 
variables which do reveal simultaneous regression significance for both Brazil and 
China.  These variables are: 
(1) Industry value added growth rate (Variable 7: IndustValAd_gr) 
(2) Household final consumption expenditure (Variable 19: HHFinConExp_GDP) 
(3) Trade to GDP (Variable 25: Trade_GDP) 
(4) Merchandise trade to GDP (Variable 26: MrchTrade_GDP) 
(5) Fuel imports to merchandise imports (Variable 35: FuelImp_MerchImp) 
(6) Export value index (Variable 36: ExpValx) 
(7) Import value index (Variable 37: ImpValIx)  
(8) Export volume index (Variable 38: ExpVolx) 
(9) Import volume index (Variable 39: ImpVolIx) 
(10) Unit value index exports (Variable 40: UnitValIxExp) 
(11) Purchasing power index of exports (Variable 43: PPIxExp) 
(12) Fuel exports to merchandise exports (Variable 53: FuelExp_MerchExp) 
(13) Consumer price index (Variable 58: CPIx) 
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(14) External debt stocks to exports of goods, services and income (Variable 64: 
ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc) 
(15) Total reserves to total external debt (Variable 69: TTRes_TTExtDbt) 
(16) GDP per unit of energy use in USD purchase power parity per kg of oil 
equivalent (Variable 74: GDP_UEnUPPPOilE) 
(17) Internet per 100 (Variable 76: Internet_100) 
(18) Phonelines per 100 (Variable 77: Phonelines_100) 
(19) Mobile users per 100 (Variable 79: MobileSubs_100) 
It is worth to note that almost all of these 19 identical dependent variables for 
Brazil and China are affected by different regressors.  
From a commodity point of view the regression analysis yields the following 
findings: For Brazil, the commodity price regressor variables mainly include oil, 
minerals and metals and agricultural raw materials, whereas for China the commodity 
price regressor variables include mainly oil and minerals and metals. 
From a governance point of view it is striking that for Brazil these 19 identical 
dependent variables are affected 23 times by governance regressor variables, whereas it 
is only 18 times for China. It is also remarkable that for Brazil governance regressor 
variables mainly include voice and accountability governance (WGIVA/democracy 
index), whereas for China it is mainly trade governance (EFITrade). 
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Final Remarks and Future Research 
This thesis’ objective was to unveil significant empirical observations by 
supporting them with significant statistical findings at the example of Brazil and China. 
The majority of my econometric analysis was based on the standard approach used in 
prevalent literature. The multiple regression frameworks within the econometric 
analysis provided an evaluation method to measure the effectiveness of governmental 
policies, governance architecture and commodity prices on developing economies at the 
example of Brazil and China. My results are robust to the choice of methodology to 
calculate correlation, Granger causality, and regression analysis results of Brazil and 
China.  
I find evidence supporting the view of many economic researchers that exports 
cause the GDP of emerging economies. I also do find statistical evidence with the 
example of Brazil that the degree of democracy is positively affected by the degree of 
trade openness. I furthermore find empirical evidence supported by statistical 
significance that China’s economic expansion does affect specific commodity prices. I 
document these results by mapping out the direction of Granger causalities which is 
based on significant correlation results between macro variables and commodity prices 
as well as governance indexes.  
My research objectives and findings contribute to and fit well into the discussion 
of prevalent academic studies which analyze the interaction between commodity prices 
and macroeconomic variables as well as between governance architecture and 
macroeconomic variables. Overall, this thesis offers a promising framework and 
grounds for additional research of the effects of commodity prices and governance on 
emerging as well as developed economies. 
The thesis also offers ideas for additional research topics. Further similar 
research may for example be carried out on Canada and Australia. The Canadian dollar 
and the Australian dollar currencies are commonly labeled as commodity currencies. 
Canada and Australia are leading global commodity exporting economies. In 
comparison to the emerging economies of Brazil and China, both Australia and Canada 
are mature, developed economies with already established governance architectures. A 
comparative analysis of the effects of commodity prices and governance on Australia 
and Canada may therefore potentially lead to differing results compared to the analysis 
on Brazil and China. Australia’s and Canada’s governance architecture is more 
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developed, mature, and established, which may be the dominant cause —and not 
commodities— for the countries’ stable macroeconomic development. In comparison, 
Brazil’s and China’s governance architectures are still developing and —compared to 
Australia and Canada— to an extent still in a trial-and-error stage. A similar 
econometric analysis of the effects of commodity prices and governance on the 
Australian and the Canadian economy may therefore render complementary findings 
relative to the analysis of Brazil and China. 
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ro
du
ct
io
n
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
ye
ar
 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 
th
e 
ba
se
 
pe
rio
d 
19
99
-
20
01
.
 
It 
in
cl
u
de
s 
al
l 
cr
o
ps
 
ex
ce
pt
 
fo
dd
er
 
cr
o
ps
.
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 
an
d 
in
co
m
e 
gr
o
u
p 
ag
gr
eg
at
es
 
fo
r 
th
e 
FA
O
's
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
in
de
x
es
 
ar
e 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d 
fro
m
 
th
e 
u
n
de
rly
in
g 
v
al
u
es
 
in
 
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
do
lla
rs
,
 
n
o
rm
al
iz
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
ba
se
 
pe
rio
d 
19
99
-
20
01
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
Fo
o
d 
an
d 
A
gr
ic
u
ltu
re
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
,
 
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 
fil
es
 
an
d 
w
eb
 
sit
e.
 
 
To
pi
c 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
t: 
A
gr
ic
u
ltu
ra
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
Ba
se
 
Pe
ri
o
d 
19
99
-
20
01
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
En
er
gy
 
im
po
rt
s,
 
n
et
 
(%
 
o
f e
n
er
gy
 
u
se
) 
En
rg
yI
m
p_
Eu
se
 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
N
et
 
en
er
gy
 
im
po
rt
s 
ar
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 
as
 
en
er
gy
 
u
se
 
le
ss
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
,
 
bo
th
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 
o
il 
eq
u
iv
al
en
ts
.
 
A
 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
v
al
u
e 
in
di
ca
te
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y 
is 
a 
n
et
 
ex
po
rt
er
.
 
En
er
gy
 
u
se
 
re
fe
rs
 
to
 
u
se
 
o
f p
rim
ar
y 
en
er
gy
 
be
fo
re
 
tr
an
sf
o
rm
at
io
n
 
to
 
o
th
er
 
en
d-
u
se
 
fu
el
s,
 
w
hi
ch
 
is 
eq
u
al
 
to
 
in
di
ge
n
o
u
s 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
pl
u
s 
im
po
rt
s 
an
d 
st
o
ck
 
ch
an
ge
s,
 
m
in
u
s 
ex
po
rt
s 
an
d 
fu
el
s 
su
pp
lie
d 
to
 
sh
ip
s 
an
d 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
en
ga
ge
d 
in
 
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
En
er
gy
 
A
ge
n
cy
 
an
d 
U
n
ite
d 
N
at
io
n
s,
 
En
er
gy
 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
Y
ea
rb
o
o
k.
 
To
pi
c 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
t: 
En
er
gy
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
&
 
u
se
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Ex
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
a
n
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
(%
 
o
f G
D
P)
 
Ex
pG
S_
G
D
P 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
Ex
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
re
pr
es
en
t t
he
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f a
ll 
go
o
ds
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
m
ar
ke
t s
er
v
ic
es
 
pr
o
v
id
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
re
st
 
o
f t
he
 
w
o
rld
.
 
Th
ey
 
in
cl
u
de
 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
m
er
ch
an
di
se
,
 
fre
ig
ht
,
 
in
su
ra
n
ce
,
 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
,
 
tr
av
el
,
 
ro
ya
lti
es
,
 
lic
en
se
 
fe
es
,
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
se
rv
ic
es
,
 
su
ch
 
as
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
,
 
fin
an
ci
al
,
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
,
 
bu
sin
es
s,
 
pe
rs
o
n
al
,
 
an
d 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t s
er
v
ic
es
.
 
Th
ey
 
ex
cl
u
de
 
co
m
pe
n
sa
tio
n
 
o
f e
m
pl
o
ye
es
 
an
d 
in
v
es
tm
en
t i
n
co
m
e 
(fo
rm
er
ly
 
ca
lle
d 
fa
ct
o
r 
se
rv
ic
es
) a
n
d 
tr
an
sf
er
 
pa
ym
en
ts
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
n
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
,
 
an
d 
O
EC
D
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
 
fil
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Po
lic
y 
&
 
D
eb
t: 
N
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
: 
Sh
ar
es
 
o
f G
D
P 
&
 
o
th
er
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
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D
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o
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M
a
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o
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o
n
o
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n
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V
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In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Ex
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
a
n
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
(an
n
u
a
l %
 
gr
o
w
th
) 
Ex
pG
S_
gr
 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
A
n
n
u
al
 
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
 
o
f e
x
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
co
n
st
an
t l
o
ca
l c
u
rr
en
cy
.
 
A
gg
re
ga
te
s 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
co
n
st
an
t 
20
00
 
U
.
S.
 
do
lla
rs
.
 
Ex
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
re
pr
es
en
t 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f a
ll 
go
o
ds
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
m
ar
ke
t 
se
rv
ic
es
 
pr
o
v
id
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
re
st
 
o
f t
he
 
w
o
rld
.
 
Th
ey
 
in
cl
u
de
 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f m
er
ch
an
di
se
,
 
fre
ig
ht
,
 
in
su
ra
n
ce
,
 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
,
 
tr
av
el
,
 
ro
ya
lti
es
,
 
lic
en
se
 
fe
es
,
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
se
rv
ic
es
,
 
su
ch
 
as
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
,
 
fin
an
ci
al
,
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
,
 
bu
sin
es
s,
 
pe
rs
o
n
al
,
 
an
d 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
se
rv
ic
es
.
 
Th
ey
 
ex
cl
u
de
 
co
m
pe
n
sa
tio
n
 
o
f e
m
pl
o
ye
es
 
an
d 
in
v
es
tm
en
t i
n
co
m
e 
(fo
rm
er
ly
 
ca
lle
d 
fa
ct
o
r 
se
rv
ic
es
) a
n
d 
tr
an
sf
er
 
pa
ym
en
ts
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
n
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
,
 
an
d 
O
EC
D
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
 
fil
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Po
lic
y 
&
 
D
eb
t: 
N
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
: 
G
ro
w
th
 
ra
te
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Ex
po
rt
 
v
a
lu
e 
in
de
x
 
(20
00
 
=
 
10
0) 
Ex
pV
a
lX
 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
Ex
po
rt
 
v
al
u
es
 
ar
e 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
ex
po
rt
s 
(f.
o
.
b.
) c
o
n
v
er
te
d 
to
 
U
.
S.
 
do
lla
rs
 
an
d 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
as
 
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ba
se
 
pe
rio
d 
(20
00
). 
U
N
CT
A
D
's
 
ex
po
rt
 
v
al
u
e 
in
de
x
es
 
ar
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 
fo
r 
m
o
st
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s.
 
Fo
r 
se
le
ct
ed
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 
U
N
CT
A
D
 
do
es
 
n
o
t p
u
bl
ish
 
da
ta
,
 
th
e 
ex
po
rt
 
v
al
u
e 
in
de
x
es
 
ar
e 
de
riv
ed
 
fro
m
 
ex
po
rt
 
v
o
lu
m
e 
in
de
x
es
 
(li
n
e 
72
) a
n
d 
co
rr
es
po
n
di
n
g 
u
n
it 
v
al
u
e 
in
de
x
es
 
o
f e
x
po
rt
s 
(li
n
e 
74
) i
n
 
th
e 
IM
F'
s 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s.
 
So
u
rc
e 
U
n
ite
d 
N
at
io
n
s 
Co
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
o
n
 
Tr
ad
e 
an
d 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t, 
H
an
db
o
o
k 
o
f S
ta
tis
tic
s 
an
d 
da
ta
 
fil
es
,
 
an
d 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
Fu
n
d,
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s.
 
To
pi
c 
Pr
iv
at
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
&
 
Tr
ad
e:
 
Tr
ad
e 
in
de
x
es
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
B
as
e 
Pe
rio
d:
 
20
00
.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Ex
po
rt
 
v
o
lu
m
e 
in
de
x
 
(20
00
 
=
 
10
0) 
Ex
pV
o
lX
 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
Ex
po
rt
 
v
o
lu
m
e 
in
de
x
es
 
ar
e 
de
riv
ed
 
fro
m
 
U
N
CT
A
D
's
 
v
o
lu
m
e 
in
de
x
 
se
rie
s 
an
d 
ar
e 
th
e 
ra
tio
 
o
f t
he
 
ex
po
rt
 
v
al
u
e 
in
de
x
es
 
to
 
th
e 
co
rr
es
po
n
di
n
g 
u
n
it 
v
al
u
e 
in
de
x
es
.
 
U
n
it 
v
al
u
e 
in
de
x
es
 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
da
ta
 
re
po
rt
ed
 
by
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
th
at
 
de
m
o
n
st
ra
te
 
co
n
sis
te
n
cy
 
u
n
de
r 
U
N
CT
A
D
 
qu
al
ity
 
co
n
tr
o
ls,
 
su
pp
le
m
en
te
d 
by
 
U
N
CT
A
D
's
 
es
tim
at
es
 
u
sin
g 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
u
s 
ye
ar
's
 
tr
ad
e 
v
al
u
es
 
at
 
th
e 
St
an
da
rd
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Tr
ad
e 
Cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n
 
th
re
e-
di
gi
t l
ev
el
 
as
 
w
ei
gh
ts
.
 
Fo
r 
ec
o
n
o
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 
U
N
CT
A
D
 
do
es
 
n
o
t p
u
bl
ish
 
da
ta
,
 
th
e 
ex
po
rt
 
v
o
lu
m
e 
in
de
x
es
 
(li
n
es
 
72
) in
 
th
e 
IM
F'
s 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
ar
e 
u
se
d.
 
So
u
rc
e 
U
n
ite
d 
N
at
io
n
s 
Co
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
o
n
 
Tr
ad
e 
an
d 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t, 
H
an
db
o
o
k 
o
f S
ta
tis
tic
s 
an
d 
da
ta
 
fil
es
,
 
an
d 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
Fu
n
d,
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s.
 
To
pi
c 
Pr
iv
at
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
&
 
Tr
ad
e:
 
Tr
ad
e 
in
de
x
es
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
Ba
se
 
Pe
ri
o
d 
20
00
.
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D
ef
in
iti
o
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M
a
cr
o
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o
n
o
m
ic
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V
a
ri
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bl
es
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In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Ex
te
rn
a
l b
a
la
n
ce
 
o
n
 
go
o
ds
 
a
n
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
(%
 
o
f G
D
P)
 
Ex
tB
a
lG
S_
G
D
P 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
ba
la
n
ce
 
o
n
 
go
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
(fo
rm
er
ly
 
re
so
u
rc
e 
ba
la
n
ce
) e
qu
al
s 
ex
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
m
in
u
s 
im
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
(pr
ev
io
u
sly
 
n
o
n
fa
ct
o
r 
se
rv
ic
es
). 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
n
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
,
 
an
d 
O
EC
D
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
 
fil
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Po
lic
y 
&
 
D
eb
t: 
N
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
: 
Sh
ar
es
 
o
f G
D
P 
&
 
o
th
er
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Ex
te
rn
a
l d
eb
t s
to
ck
s 
(%
 
of
 
ex
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
, 
se
rv
ic
es
 
a
n
d 
in
co
m
e) 
Ex
tD
eb
tS
T_
Ex
pG
SI
n
c 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
To
ta
l e
x
te
rn
al
 
de
bt
 
st
o
ck
s 
to
 
ex
po
rt
s 
o
f g
o
o
ds
,
 
se
rv
ic
es
 
an
d 
in
co
m
e 
(in
cl
u
di
n
g 
w
o
rk
er
s'
 
re
m
itt
an
ce
s).
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k,
 
G
lo
ba
l D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t F
in
an
ce
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Po
lic
y 
&
 
D
eb
t: 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
de
bt
: 
D
eb
t r
at
io
s 
&
 
o
th
er
 
ite
m
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Ex
te
rn
a
l d
eb
t s
to
ck
s 
(%
 
of
 
G
N
I) 
Ex
tD
eb
tS
T_
G
N
I 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
To
ta
l e
x
te
rn
al
 
de
bt
 
st
o
ck
s 
to
 
gr
o
ss
 
n
at
io
n
al
 
in
co
m
e.
 
To
ta
l e
x
te
rn
al
 
de
bt
 
is 
de
bt
 
o
w
ed
 
to
 
n
o
n
re
sid
en
ts
 
re
pa
ya
bl
e 
in
 
fo
re
ig
n
 
cu
rr
en
cy
,
 
go
o
ds
,
 
o
r 
se
rv
ic
es
.
 
To
ta
l e
x
te
rn
al
 
de
bt
 
is 
th
e 
su
m
 
o
f 
pu
bl
ic
,
 
pu
bl
ic
ly
 
gu
ar
an
te
ed
,
 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
e 
n
o
n
-
gu
ar
an
te
ed
 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
de
bt
,
 
u
se
 
o
f I
M
F 
cr
ed
it,
 
an
d 
sh
o
rt
-
te
rm
 
de
bt
.
 
Sh
o
rt
-
te
rm
 
de
bt
 
in
cl
u
de
s 
al
l d
eb
t 
ha
v
in
g 
an
 
o
rig
in
al
 
m
at
u
rit
y 
o
f 
o
n
e 
ye
ar
 
o
r 
le
ss
 
an
d 
in
te
re
st
 
in
 
ar
re
ar
s 
o
n
 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
 
de
bt
.
 
G
N
I (
fo
rm
er
ly
 
G
N
P)
 
is 
th
e 
su
m
 
o
f v
al
u
e 
ad
de
d 
by
 
al
l r
es
id
en
t 
pr
o
du
ce
rs
 
pl
u
s 
an
y 
pr
o
du
ct
 
ta
x
es
 
(le
ss
 
su
bs
id
ie
s) 
n
o
t 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e 
v
al
u
at
io
n
 
o
f 
o
u
tp
u
t 
pl
u
s 
n
et
 
re
ce
ip
ts
 
o
f 
pr
im
ar
y 
in
co
m
e 
(co
m
pe
n
sa
tio
n
 
o
f e
m
pl
o
ye
es
 
an
d 
pr
o
pe
rt
y 
in
co
m
e) 
fro
m
 
ab
ro
ad
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k,
 
G
lo
ba
l D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t F
in
an
ce
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Po
lic
y 
&
 
D
eb
t: 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
de
bt
: 
D
eb
t r
at
io
s 
&
 
o
th
er
 
ite
m
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d:
 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Fi
n
a
l c
o
n
su
m
pt
io
n
 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
, 
et
c.
 
(%
 
o
f G
D
P)
 
Fi
n
C
o
n
Ex
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at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
: 
G
ro
w
th
 
ra
te
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
In
fla
tio
n
, 
co
n
su
m
er
 
pr
ic
es
 
(an
n
u
a
l %
) 
In
flt
n
 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
In
fla
tio
n
 
as
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
th
e 
co
n
su
m
er
 
pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
 
re
fle
ct
s 
th
e 
an
n
u
al
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
ch
an
ge
 
in
 
th
e 
co
st
 
to
 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
co
n
su
m
er
 
o
f a
cq
u
iri
n
g 
a 
ba
sk
et
 
o
f g
o
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
th
at
 
m
ay
 
be
 
fix
ed
 
o
r 
ch
an
ge
d 
at
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
in
te
rv
al
s,
 
su
ch
 
as
 
ye
ar
ly
.
 
Th
e 
La
sp
ey
re
s 
fo
rm
u
la
 
is
 
ge
n
er
al
ly
 
u
se
d.
 
So
u
rc
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
Fu
n
d,
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
an
d 
da
ta
 
fil
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
Se
ct
o
r:
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 
ra
te
s 
&
 
pr
ic
es
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
In
te
re
st
 
ra
te
 
sp
re
a
d 
(le
n
di
n
g 
ra
te
 
m
in
u
s 
de
po
sit
 
ra
te
, 
%
) 
IR
SS
pr
ea
d 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
In
te
re
st
 
ra
te
 
sp
re
ad
 
is 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 
ra
te
 
ch
ar
ge
d 
by
 
ba
n
ks
 
o
n
 
lo
an
s 
to
 
pr
im
e 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
m
in
u
s 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 
ra
te
 
pa
id
 
by
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 
o
r 
sim
ila
r 
ba
n
ks
 
fo
r 
de
m
an
d,
 
tim
e,
 
o
r 
sa
v
in
gs
 
de
po
sit
s.
 
So
u
rc
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
Fu
n
d,
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
an
d 
da
ta
 
fil
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
Se
ct
o
r:
 
In
te
re
st
 
ra
te
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
M
ed
ia
n
.
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1q
: 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
M
a
cr
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
(D
ep
en
de
n
t) 
V
a
ri
a
bl
es
 
(17
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6) 
IN
D
IC
A
T
O
R
S 
D
EF
IN
IT
IO
N
 
/ C
O
M
M
EN
TS
 
A
BB
R
E
V
IA
TI
O
N
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Li
v
es
to
ck
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
in
de
x
 
(19
99
-
20
01
 
=
 
10
0) 
Li
v
St
o
ck
Pr
o
dI
x
 
Sh
o
rt
 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
Li
v
es
to
ck
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
in
de
x
 
in
cl
u
de
s 
m
ea
t a
n
d 
m
ilk
 
fro
m
 
al
l s
o
u
rc
es
,
 
da
iry
 
pr
o
du
ct
s 
su
ch
 
as
 
ch
ee
se
,
 
an
d 
eg
gs
,
 
ho
n
ey
,
 
ra
w
 
sil
k,
 
w
o
o
l, 
an
d 
hi
de
s 
an
d 
sk
in
s.
 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
Li
v
es
to
ck
 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
in
de
x
 
in
cl
u
de
s 
m
ea
t a
n
d 
m
ilk
 
fro
m
 
al
l s
o
u
rc
es
,
 
da
iry
 
pr
o
du
ct
s 
su
ch
 
as
 
ch
ee
se
,
 
an
d 
eg
gs
,
 
ho
n
ey
,
 
ra
w
 
sil
k,
 
w
o
o
l, 
an
d 
hi
de
s 
an
d 
sk
in
s.
 
So
u
rc
e 
Fo
o
d 
an
d 
A
gr
ic
u
ltu
re
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
,
 
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 
fil
es
 
an
d 
w
eb
 
sit
e.
 
 
To
pi
c 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
t: 
A
gr
ic
u
ltu
ra
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
Ba
se
 
Pe
ri
o
d 
19
99
-
20
01
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g,
 
v
a
lu
e 
a
dd
ed
 
(%
 
o
f G
D
P)
 
M
a
n
u
V
a
lA
dd
_
G
D
P 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
re
fe
rs
 
to
 
in
du
st
rie
s 
be
lo
n
gi
n
g 
to
 
IS
IC
 
di
v
isi
o
n
s 
15
-
37
.
 
V
al
u
e 
ad
de
d 
is 
th
e 
n
et
 
o
u
tp
u
t 
o
f 
a 
se
ct
o
r 
af
te
r 
ad
di
n
g 
u
p 
al
l o
u
tp
u
ts
 
an
d 
su
bt
ra
ct
in
g 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 
in
pu
ts
.
 
It 
is 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d 
w
ith
o
u
t 
m
ak
in
g 
de
du
ct
io
n
s 
fo
r 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n
 
o
f 
fa
br
ic
at
ed
 
as
se
ts
 
o
r 
de
pl
et
io
n
 
an
d 
de
gr
ad
at
io
n
 
o
f 
n
at
u
ra
l 
re
so
u
rc
es
.
 
Th
e 
o
rig
in
 
o
f 
v
al
u
e 
ad
de
d 
is 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
St
an
da
rd
 
In
du
st
ria
l C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
(IS
IC
), 
re
v
isi
o
n
 
3.
 
 
N
o
te
: 
Fo
r 
V
A
B 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
gr
o
ss
 
v
al
u
e 
ad
de
d 
at
 
fa
ct
o
r 
co
st
 
is 
u
se
d 
as
 
th
e 
de
n
o
m
in
at
o
r.
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
n
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
,
 
an
d 
O
EC
D
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
 
fil
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Po
lic
y 
&
 
D
eb
t: 
N
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
: 
Sh
ar
es
 
o
f G
D
P 
&
 
o
th
er
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
re
s 
ex
po
rt
s 
(%
 
of
 
m
er
ch
a
n
di
se
 
ex
po
rt
s) 
M
a
n
u
fE
x
p_
M
rc
hE
x
p 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
s 
co
m
pr
ise
 
co
m
m
o
di
tie
s 
in
 
SI
TC
 
se
ct
io
n
s 
5 
(ch
em
ic
al
s),
 
6 
(ba
sic
 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
s),
 
7 
(m
ac
hi
n
er
y 
an
d 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
 
eq
u
ip
m
en
t),
 
an
d 
8 
(m
isc
el
la
n
eo
u
s 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
d 
go
o
ds
), e
x
cl
u
di
n
g 
di
v
isi
o
n
 
68
 
(no
n
-
fe
rr
o
u
s 
m
et
al
s).
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
st
af
f e
st
im
at
es
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
Co
m
tr
ad
e 
da
ta
ba
se
 
m
ai
n
ta
in
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
U
n
ite
d 
N
at
io
n
s 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
D
iv
isi
o
n
.
 
To
pi
c 
Pr
iv
at
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
&
 
Tr
ad
e:
 
Ex
po
rt
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
G
en
er
a
l c
o
m
m
en
ts
 
M
er
ch
an
di
se
 
ex
po
rt
 
sh
ar
es
 
m
ay
 
n
o
t s
u
m
 
to
 
10
0 
pe
rc
en
t b
ec
au
se
 
o
f u
n
cl
as
si
fie
d 
tr
ad
e.
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N
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
re
s 
im
po
rt
s 
(%
 
o
f m
er
ch
a
n
di
se
 
im
po
rt
s) 
M
a
n
fI
m
p_
M
rc
hI
m
p 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
s 
co
m
pr
ise
 
th
e 
co
m
m
o
di
tie
s 
in
 
SI
TC
 
se
ct
io
n
s 
5 
(ch
em
ic
al
s),
 
6 
(ba
sic
 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
s),
 
7 
(m
ac
hi
n
er
y 
an
d 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
 
eq
u
ip
m
en
t),
 
an
d 
8 
(m
isc
el
la
n
eo
u
s 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
d 
go
o
ds
), e
x
cl
u
di
n
g 
di
v
isi
o
n
 
68
 
(no
n
fe
rr
o
u
s 
m
et
al
s).
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
st
af
f e
st
im
at
es
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
Co
m
tr
ad
e 
da
ta
ba
se
 
m
ai
n
ta
in
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
U
n
ite
d 
N
at
io
n
s 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
D
iv
isi
o
n
.
 
To
pi
c 
Pr
iv
at
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
&
 
Tr
ad
e:
 
Im
po
rt
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
G
en
er
a
l c
o
m
m
en
ts
 
M
er
ch
an
di
se
 
im
po
rt
 
sh
ar
es
 
m
ay
 
n
o
t s
u
m
 
to
 
10
0 
pe
rc
en
t b
ec
au
se
 
o
f u
n
cl
as
sif
ie
d 
tr
ad
e.
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
er
ch
a
n
di
se
 
tr
a
de
 
(%
 
o
f G
D
P)
 
M
rc
hT
ra
de
_
G
D
P 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
M
er
ch
an
di
se
 
tr
ad
e 
as
 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f G
D
P 
is 
th
e 
su
m
 
o
f m
er
ch
an
di
se
 
ex
po
rt
s 
an
d 
im
po
rt
s 
di
v
id
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f G
D
P,
 
al
l i
n
 
cu
rr
en
t U
.
S.
 
do
lla
rs
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
Tr
ad
e 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
an
d 
W
o
rld
 
Ba
n
k 
G
D
P 
es
tim
at
es
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Pr
iv
at
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
&
 
Tr
ad
e:
 
To
ta
l m
er
ch
an
di
se
 
tr
ad
e.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g,
 
v
a
lu
e 
a
dd
ed
 
(an
n
u
a
l %
 
gr
o
w
th
) 
M
a
n
Fa
ct
V
a
lA
dd
_
gr
 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
A
n
n
u
al
 
gr
o
w
th
 
ra
te
 
fo
r 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
v
al
u
e 
ad
de
d 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
co
n
st
an
t 
lo
ca
l c
u
rr
en
cy
.
 
A
gg
re
ga
te
s 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
co
n
st
an
t 
20
00
 
U
.
S.
 
do
lla
rs
.
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
re
fe
rs
 
to
 
in
du
st
rie
s 
be
lo
n
gi
n
g 
to
 
IS
IC
 
di
v
isi
o
n
s 
15
-
37
.
 
V
al
u
e 
ad
de
d 
is 
th
e 
n
et
 
o
u
tp
u
t o
f 
a 
se
ct
o
r 
af
te
r 
ad
di
n
g 
u
p 
al
l o
u
tp
u
ts
 
an
d 
su
bt
ra
ct
in
g 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 
in
pu
ts
.
 
It 
is 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d 
w
ith
o
u
t 
m
ak
in
g 
de
du
ct
io
n
s 
fo
r 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n
 
o
f 
fa
br
ic
at
ed
 
as
se
ts
 
o
r 
de
pl
et
io
n
 
an
d 
de
gr
ad
at
io
n
 
o
f 
n
at
u
ra
l 
re
so
u
rc
es
.
 
Th
e 
o
rig
in
 
o
f 
v
al
u
e 
ad
de
d 
is 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
St
an
da
rd
 
In
du
st
ria
l C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
(IS
IC
), r
ev
isi
o
n
 
3.
 
So
u
rc
e 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
n
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
,
 
an
d 
O
EC
D
 
N
at
io
n
al
 
A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 
da
ta
 
fil
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Po
lic
y 
&
 
D
eb
t: 
N
at
io
n
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
: 
G
ro
w
th
 
ra
te
s.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
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In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
a
rk
et
 
ca
pi
ta
liz
a
tio
n
 
o
f l
ist
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
(%
 
o
f G
D
P)
 
M
rk
tC
a
pL
ist
_
G
D
P 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
M
ar
ke
t 
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n
 
(al
so
 
kn
o
w
n
 
as
 
m
ar
ke
t 
v
al
u
e) 
is 
th
e 
sh
ar
e 
pr
ic
e 
tim
es
 
th
e 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f 
sh
ar
es
 
o
u
ts
ta
n
di
n
g.
 
Li
st
ed
 
do
m
es
tic
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
do
m
es
tic
al
ly
 
in
co
rp
o
ra
te
d 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
lis
te
d 
o
n
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y's
 
st
o
ck
 
ex
ch
an
ge
s 
at
 
th
e 
en
d 
o
f t
he
 
ye
ar
.
 
'L
ist
ed
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s'
 
do
es
 
n
o
t i
n
cl
u
de
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t c
o
m
pa
n
ie
s,
 
m
u
tu
al
 
fu
n
ds
,
 
o
r 
o
th
er
 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
in
v
es
tm
en
t v
eh
ic
le
s.
 
So
u
rc
e 
St
an
da
rd
 
&
 
Po
o
r'
s,
 
Em
er
gi
n
g 
St
o
ck
 
M
ar
ke
ts
 
Fa
ct
bo
o
k 
an
d 
su
pp
le
m
en
ta
l S
&
P 
da
ta
,
 
an
d 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
an
d 
O
EC
D
 
G
D
P 
es
tim
at
es
.
 
To
pi
c 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
Se
ct
o
r:
 
Ca
pi
ta
l m
ar
ke
ts
.
 
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
o
n
ey
 
a
n
d 
qu
a
si 
m
o
n
ey
 
(M
2) 
a
s 
%
 
of
 
G
D
P 
M
2_
G
D
P 
Lo
n
g 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
M
o
n
ey
 
an
d 
qu
as
i m
o
n
ey
 
co
m
pr
ise
 
th
e 
su
m
 
o
f 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
ba
n
ks
,
 
de
m
an
d 
de
po
sit
s 
o
th
er
 
th
an
 
th
o
se
 
o
f t
he
 
ce
n
tr
al
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
tim
e,
 
sa
v
in
gs
,
 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
de
po
sit
s 
o
f r
es
id
en
t 
se
ct
o
rs
 
o
th
er
 
th
an
 
th
e 
ce
n
tr
al
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t. 
Th
is 
de
fin
iti
o
n
 
o
f m
o
n
ey
 
su
pp
ly
 
is 
fre
qu
en
tly
 
ca
lle
d 
M
2;
 
it 
co
rr
es
po
n
ds
 
to
 
lin
es
 
34
 
an
d 
35
 
in
 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
Fu
n
d's
 
(IM
F)
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
(IF
S)
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
Fu
n
d,
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
St
at
ist
ic
s 
an
d 
da
ta
 
fil
es
,
 
an
d 
W
o
rld
 
Ba
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er
 
th
an
 
th
o
se
 
o
f t
he
 
ce
n
tr
al
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t, 
an
d 
th
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f r
es
id
en
t 
se
ct
o
rs
 
o
th
er
 
th
an
 
th
e 
ce
n
tr
al
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t. 
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at
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re
la
tiv
e 
to
 
th
e 
le
v
el
 
o
f M
2 
in
 
th
e 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
ye
ar
.
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at
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.
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m
in
er
al
s 
m
et
al
s);
 
28
 
(m
et
al
lif
er
o
u
s 
o
re
s,
 
sc
ra
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Appendix 3.4a: Commodity Price Index Constituents — Food 
 
FOOD INDEX 
Wheat: 1. Argentina, Trigo Pan Upriver FOB. (International Grains Council (IGC), 
London, U.K.). 2. United States, n° 2, Hard Red Winter (ordinary), FOB Gulf. 
(International Grains Council (IGC), London, U.K.). 
Maize: 1. Argentina, Rosario FOB. (International Grains Council (IGC), London, U.K.). 
2. US, yellow n° 3, FOB Gulf. (International Grains Council (IGC), London, U.K.).  
Rice: Thailand, white milled, 5% broken, nominal price quotes, FOB Bangkok, including 
export duty. (International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington D.C., U.S.A.).  
Sugar (¢/lb.): In bulk, average of I.S.A. daily prices (calculated in accordance with article 
61 of the International Sugar Agreement, 1992), FOB stowed Caribbean ports. 
(International Sugar Organization, London, U.K.). 
Beef (¢/lb.): Australia and New Zealand, frozen boneless, 85% visible lean meat, U.S. 
import price, FOB, port of entry. Prior to December 1975: 90% visible lean meat. 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington D.C., U.S.A.).  
Bananas (¢/lb.): Central America and Ecuador, first class quality tropical pack, Chiquita, 
Dole and Del Monte, U.S. importer's price, FOB U.S. ports. (International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Washington D.C., U.S.A.). 
Pepper: White Sarawak/Muntok, European market. (The Public Ledger, London, U.K.). 
Prior to June 2003, white Sarawak, closing quotations, Singapore. (Market News Service, 
ITC, UNCTAD/WTO, Geneva, Switzerland). 
Soybean meal: Hamburg, in bulk, 44/45% protein, Hamburg FOB ex-mill (Oil World, 
Hamburg, Germany). 
Fish meal: Any origin, in bulk, 64/65% protein, Bremen, free carrier price. Prior to March 
2006, any origin, 64/65% proteins, cost and freight, Hamburg (calculated from the 
Hamburg wholesale price), Oil World, Hamburg, Germany.  
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Appendix 3.4b: Commodity Price Index Constituents — Tropical Beverages 
 
TROPICAL BEVERAGES INDEX 
Coffee (¢/lb.): Average of daily prices. As from October 2001, I.C.A. 2001: 1. Ex-dock 
New York: Colombian mild Arabicas: Excelso, UGQ, screen size 14. 2. Ex-dock New 
York: Brazilian and other natural Arabicas: Santos 4. 3. Other mild Arabicas, weighted 
average of: -3.1. Ex-dock New York: El Salvador Central Standard, Guatemala Prime 
Washed, Mexico Prime Washed and Costa Rica Hard Bean. - 3.2. Ex-dock 
Bremen/Hamburg: El Salvador Strictly High Grown, Guatemala Hard Bean, Nicaragua 
Strictly High Grown and Costa Rica Hard Bean. 4. Robustas, weighted average of: - 4.1. 
Ex-dock New York: Côte d'Ivoire Grade 2, Uganda Standard, Indonesia EK Grade 4 and 
Vietnam Grade 2. - 4.2. Ex-dock Le Havre/Marseilles: Côte d'Ivoire Grade 2, Cameroon 
Grade 1, Indonesia EK Grade 4, Uganda Standard and Vietnam Grade 2. 5. Composite 
indicator price 1976 version, arithmetic mean of: -Ex-dock New York: Other mild Arabicas 
-Ex-dock New York: Robustas. As from October 2009, I.C.A. 2001:6. ICO Composite 
indicator price, weighted as follows: 
-13% Colombian milds (45% New York and 55% Bremen/Hamburg) 
-23% Other mild Arabicas (40% New York and 60% Bremen/Hamburg) 
-30% Brazilian naturals (23% New York and 77% Bremen/Hamburg) 
-34% Robustas (17% New York and 83% Le Havre/Marseilles) 
For previous weights of I.C.A. 2001, please refer to the International Coffee Organization's 
(ICO) website. (International Coffee Organization (ICO), London, U.K.). 
Cocoa (¢/lb.): Average of the daily prices of the nearest three active future trading months 
on the London Terminal Market and on the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange 
at time of the London close (Article 26 of the International Cocoa Agreement, 1993). The 
average price expressed in US dollars is converted into SDR equivalent at the appropriate 
daily official US dollar/SDR exchange rate published by the IMF. Estimates for the years 
1971 to 1985 are calculated using the monthly averages of the US dollar/SDR exchange 
rate (International Cocoa Organization (ICCO), London, U.K.). 
Tea (¢/kg): Kenya, Best Pekoe Fannings 1, Mombasa auction prices. (International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington D.C., U.S.A.).  
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Appendix 3.4c: Commodity Price Index Constituents — Vegetables 
 
VEGETABLES OILSEEDS AND OILS INDEX 
Soybeans: In bulk, n° 2 yellow, United States, CIF Rotterdam. (Oil World, Hamburg, 
Germany).  
Soybean oil Crude, in bulk, The Netherlands, FOB ex-mill. Prior to April 1973: The 
Netherlands, any origin, ex-tank, Rotterdam. (Oil World, Hamburg, Germany).  
Sunflower oil: In bulk, European Union, FOB North Western European ports. (Oil World, 
Hamburg, Germany).  
Groundnut oil: In bulk, any origin, CIF Rotterdam. (Oil World, Hamburg, Germany).  
Copra: In bulk, Philippines/Indonesia, CIF North Western European ports. (Oil World, 
Hamburg, Germany).  
Coconut oil: In bulk, Philippines, CIF Rotterdam. Prior to 1973: Sri Lanka, 1% bulk, CIF 
European ports. (Oil World, Hamburg, Germany).  
Palm kernel oil: in bulk, Malaysia, CIF Rotterdam. Prior to September 1980: Dutch, FOB 
ex-mill. (Oil World, Hamburg, Germany). 
Palm oil: In bulk, Malaysia/Indonesian origin, 5% ffa (free fatty acid), CIF North 
Western European ports. (Oil World, Hamburg, Germany). 
Cottonseed oil: In bulk, United States, Prime Bleachable Summer Yellow (PBSY), FOB 
Gulf. Prior to October 1994: United States, P.B.S.Y., CIF Rotterdam. (Oil World, 
Hamburg, Germany). 
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Appendix 3.4d: Commodity Price Index Constituents — Agricultural Raw Materials 
 
AGRICULTURAL RAW MATERIALS INDEX 
Linseed oil: In bulk, any origin, ex-tank Rotterdam. Prior to January 1977: any origin, CIF 
London/Hull. Prior to 15 September 1969: Argentina, bulk, CIF United Kingdom. (Oil 
World, Hamburg, Germany).  
Tobacco: Unmanufactured, import unit value based on United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) trade data (UNCTAD secretariat). 
Prior to March 2003: United States, unmanufactured tobacco, general import price. 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington D.C., U.S.A.).  
Cotton (¢/lb.): 1. Long staple: Sudan Barakat, X4B CFR Far Eastern quotations. Prior 
to August 2005: CIF North Europe quotations. 2. Medium staple: 
U.S., Memphis/Eastern, Middling 1-3/32", CFR, Far Eastern quotations. Prior to August 
2008: Medium staple: U.S. Memphis Territory, Middling 1-3/32", CIF North Europe 
quotations. 3.  Short staple: U.S., Memphis/Orleans/Texas, Midd. 1-3/32", CFR Far Eastern 
quotations. Prior to June 2005: U.S. Orleans/Texas, Midd. 1-3/32", CIF North Europe 
quotations. 4. Pakistan, Sind/Punjab, Afzal 1-1/32",CIF North Europe quotations. 5. Cotton 
Outlook Index A FE, CFR Far Eastern quotations, Middling 1-3/32". Prior to August 2004: 
Cotton Outlook Index A NE, CIF North Europe quotations. 6. Cotton Outlook Index B NE 
(coarse count), CIF North Europe quotations. The Cotlook North European B Index is 
discontinued as from August 1, 2008. 7. Extra long: Egypt, Giza 88, Good +3/8, CFR Far 
Eastern quotations. Prior to August 2005: Egypt, Giza 70, Good +3/8, FOB.  (Cotton 
Limited, Liverpool, U.K.). 
Wool: 1. Fine wool, 19 micron, Australia. (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Washington D.C., U.S.A.). 2. Coarse wool, 23 micron, Australia. (International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Washington D.C., U.S.A.). 
Jute: Bangladesh, BWD (Bangladesh White D), FOB Mongla. Revised series since 2004. 
(Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Rome, Italy). (Prior to 2004: The Public 
Ledger, London, U.K.). Prior to March 1980: Chittagong-Chalna, minimum export price. 
(Ministry of Jute, Bangladesh). 
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Sisal: 1. Tanzania/Kenya, N° 2 & 3 long, FOB. Revised series since 2004. (Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Rome, Italy). Prior to 2007: CIF main European ports. 
(Prior to 2004: The Public Ledger, London, U.K.). 2. Tanzania/Kenya N° 3 & UG, FOB. 
Revised series since 2004. (Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Rome, Italy). Prior 
to 2007: CIF main European ports. (Prior to 2004: The Public Ledger, London, U.K.). 
Cattle hides (¢/lb.): United States, Chicago packer's heavy native steers, over 53 lbs, 
wholesale dealer's price, FOB shipping point. (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Washington D.C., U.S.A.).  
Non-coniferous woods ($ equivalent): Imported, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or 
peeled of a thickness exceeding 6mm, UK import price index (2005=100), dollar 
equivalent.(Office for National Statistics, Newport, Wales, U.K.). 
Tropical logs ($/m3): 1. Sapelli, loyal and marchand, U.K. import price, FOB. 
(International Tropical Timber Organization, Yokohama, Japan). Prior to June 2000: FOB 
Cameroon. Prior to 1979: Niangon, FOB, Côte d'Ivoire. (International Tropical Timber 
Organization, Yokohama, Japan; prior to January 1995: Market News Service, 
ITC/UNCTAD/GATT, Geneva, Switzerland). 2. Okoume, Gabon, superior quality, FOB. 
(International Tropical Timber Organization, Yokohama, Japan). Prior to September 2007: 
loyal et marchand, FOB. (Société Nationale des Bois du Gabon, SNBG; prior to May 2006, 
Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, Paris, France). 
Tropical sawn wood ($/m3): Malaysia, Meranti, select and better, CIF plus commission 
U.K. (International Tropical Timber Organization, Yokohama, Japan). Prior to August 
2008: Dark Red Meranti, Malaysia, select and better, CIF French ports. (Marchés tropicaux 
et méditerranéens, Paris, France). 
Plywood (¢/sheet): Southeast Asia, Lauan, 3-ply, Extra, 182 cm x 91 cm x 4 mm, 
wholesale price, spot Tokyo. (World Bank, Washington D.C., USA; prior to January 2002: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokyo, Japan). 
Rubber (SGD/kg): 1. In bales, n° 1 RSS, FOB Singapore. Discontinued series by SICOM. 
(Singapore Commodity Exchange Limited, Singapore). 2. TSR 20, New York. 
(International Rubber Study Group, London, U.K.). 3. N° 3 RSS, monthly average of 
weighted daily future prices. (Singapore Commodity Exchange Limited, Singapore). 
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Appendix 3.4e: Commodity Price Index Constituents — Ores, Minerals, Metals 
 
ORES, MINERALS AND METALS INDEX 
Phosphate rock: Khouribga, 70% BPL, contract, FAS Casablanca. (World Bank, 
Washington D.C., U.S.A.). 
Manganese ore ($/mtu Mn): 48/50% Mn, max 0.1%P, metallurgical FOB. (Metal Bulletin 
Limited, London, U.K.). 
Iron ore (¢/Fe unit): 1. Brazilian to Europe, Vale, Itabira, Southern and South-eastern 
System Fines (SSF), 64.5% Fe content, FOB. (The Tex Report, Tokyo, Japan). 2. 
Australian to Japan, fines, 64% Fe content, Hamersley, FOB.  As of April 2004, prices 
are in dry metric ton. Prior to April 2004: the price was quoted in dry long tons units. (The 
Tex Report, Tokyo, Japan). 
Aluminium: London Metal Exchange, high grade, cash (Metal Bulletin Ltd. London, UK). 
Copper (£/t): 1. London Metal Exchange, grade A, electrolytic wire bars and cathodes, 
cash. (Metal Bulletin Limited, London, U.K.). 2. US Producer/Refinery, FOB (Quotation is 
US producer/delivered prices less 1.4¢ shipping cost). (Platts, Metals Week, New York, 
U.S.A.). 
Nickel (£/t): 1. London Metal Exchange, cash (Metal Bulletin, London, U.K.). 2. New York 
dealer, cathodes 4X4 , 99.9% Ni, FOB North American shipping point; spot, estimated 
market price. (Platts, Metals Week, New York, U.S.A.). 
Lead ($/t, £/t): 1. London Metal Exchange, settlement and cash seller's price in warehouse 
excluding duty, range main U.K. ports; Purity 99.97% Pb. (Metal Bulletin Limited, 
London, U.K.). 2. North America, Producer. The weighted average, based on 1993 
production figures, of the list prices of those North American (Canadian and United States) 
primary and secondary producers still quoting list prices, in addition to those producers 
who have switched to London Metal Exchange pricing, the LME cash price plus 
appropriate market premiums or discounts. Prior to 9 December 1971: US domestic price in 
New York, refined lead. (Platts, Metals Week, New York, U.S.A.).  
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Zinc (¢/lb.,): 1. London Metal Exchange, settlement and cash seller's price in warehouse 
excluding duty, range main U.K ports; Virgin zinc, special high grade. Prior to November 
1988: high grade. (Metal Bulletin Limited, London, U.K.). 2. North America, special high 
grade. Price based on London Metal Exchange base price plus premiums or discounts, 
depending on market conditions. From January 1971 to September 1980: US Prime 
Western delivered. Prior to January 1971: US Prime Western FOB East St Louis. (Platts, 
Metals Week, New York, U.S.A.). 
Tin (Mal$/kg): 1. London Metal Exchange, high grade, cash. Prior to August 1989: United 
Kingdom, free market, spot, minimum 99.85% Sn, London. (Metal Bulletin Limited, 
London, U.K.). 2. Kuala Lumpur Tin Market (KLTM), ex-smelter (International Tin 
Council reference price since 4 July 1972). Tin trade was suspended between 24 October 
1985 and end of January 1986. (Metal Bulletin Limited, London, U.K.). 
Tungsten ore ($/mtu Wo3): Wolframite and scheelite, minimum content of WO3: 65%, 
CIF Europe. Prior to April 1992: wolfram. (Metal Bulletin Limited, London, U.K.). 
Gold ($/troy ounce): United Kingdom, 99.5% fine, London afternoon fixing, average of 
daily rates. (Metal Bulletin Limited, London, U.K.). 
Silver Handy & Harman, (¢/troy ounce):  99.9% grade refined, average of sellers daily 
prices, New York. (Metal Bulletin Limited, London, U.K.). 
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Appendix 3.4f: Commodity Price Index Constituents — Crude Index 
 
CRUDE INDEX 
Average of United Kingdom Brent (light), Dubai (medium), and West Texas Intermediate 
(heavy) crude prices, reflecting relatively equal consumption of light, medium, and heavy 
crudes worldwide. - United Kingdom: Brent Blend 38- API, spot, FOB, United Kingdom 
ports; - Dubai: Fateh 32- API, spot, FOB Dubai; - United States: West Texas Intermediate 
40- API, spot, FOB, Midland Texas. (International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington 
D.C., U.S.A.). 
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Appendix 3.5: Commodity Price Indexes Weights 
     
Commodity Weights (%)  Commodity  Weights (%) 
       
ALL FOOD       AGRICULTURAL RAW 
MATERIALS 
    
FOOD AND TROPICAL 
BEVERAGES 
       Linseed oil 0.07 0.01 
Food        Tobacco 20.08 2.72 
  Wheat   6.56  4.04    Cotton     
  Maize   6.95  4.28   Extra long  1.24 0.17 
  Rice  16.17  9.96   Long 1.65 0.22 
  Sugar   13.68  8.43   Medium/long 13.95 1.88 
  Bovine meat  6.06  3.73   short 3.09 0.42 
  Bananas   9.08  5.59    Wool     
  Pepper  2.53  1.56   Fine 0.61 0.08 
  Soybean meal  14.91  9.18   Coarse 0.84 0.11 
  Fish meal  3.72  2.29    Jute 0.45 0.06 
Tropical beverages        Sisal      
  Coffee       3L 0.05 0.01 
Colombian mild Arabicas  0.99  0.61   UG 0.13 0.02 
  Brazilian and other Arabicas  1.37  0.85    Hides and skins  6.21 0.84 
Other mild Arabicas  1.97  1.21    Tropical logs 31.40 4.25 
 Robustas  1.20  0.74    Rubber 20.23 2.73 
  Cocoa beans  1.68  1.03   Total 100.0 13.52 
  Tea  1.82  1.12      
Vegetable oilseeds and oils       MINERALS, ORES AND 
METALS 
  
  Soybeans  3.14  1.93    Phosphate rock 2.67 0.66 
  Soybean oil  1.88  1.16    Manganese ore 1.20 0.30 
  Sunflower oil  0.69  0.42    Iron ore 13.65 3.40 
  Groundnut oil  0.14  0.09    Aluminium 23.93 5.96 
  Copra  0.06  0.04    Copper 38.89 9.68 
  Coconut oil  0.66  0.41    Nickel 6.70 1.67 
  Palm kernel oil  0.55  0.34    Lead 2.10 0.52 
  Palm oil  4.19  2.58    Zinc 7.22 1.80 
Total 100.0 61.59    Tin 3.62 0.90 
         Tungsten ore 0.02 0.0 
        Total 100.0 24.89 
    Price Index - all groups   100.0 
Data Source: UNCTAD (2009), Section Product Information. Table created and arranged by the author. 
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Appendix 3.8: Pearson Correlations — Commodity Price Index vs. Constituents 
1971-2009 & 1996-2008 
MinMetalsIx ’71-‘09 ’96-‘08 AgriRawIx ’71-‘09 ’96-‘08 
Phosphate .678** .657* Linseed .654** .856** 
Manganese .738** .702** Tobacco .762** .577* 
IronOre BRL .924** .931** Cotton SUDAN .578** .744** 
IronOre AUS JP .896** .906** Cotton US EST .500** 0.328 
Alum LME .836** .947** Cotton US Tx .598** 0.452 
CopperGradeALME .975** .984** Cotton FAREASTERN 0.285 0.457 
Copper LME .990** .995** Cotton EGY 0.294 0.217 
Copper US .991** .993** Fine Wool .819** .819** 
Nickel LME .920** .898** Wool .716** .716** 
Nickel NA .929** .905** Jute .378* .744** 
Lead GBP .930** .929** SisalKENIA2_3 .677** .708** 
Lead US$ .920** .945** SisalKENIA3 .711** .845** 
Lead NA .940** .964** Cattle US .535** -.557* 
ZincHiGrade .875** .852** NonconiferousWoodsUK .754** .899** 
Zinc US .875** .840** TropLog UK IMPORT .924** .939** 
Tin LME .471** .919** TropLog Gabun .798** 0.527 
Tin MAY .757** .917** TropSawnwood MAL .717** 0.315 
Tin .482** .922** Plywood .797** .926** 
Tungsten .554** .960** RubberNo1SPORE .726** .926** 
GLD .831** .878** Rubber NY .936** .971** 
Silv .634** .951** Rubber SPORE .959** .973** 
VegOilSeedsIx ’71-‘09 ’96-08 FoodIx ’71-‘09 ’96-08 
Soybeans US .890** .954** Wheat ARG .879** .896** 
Soybeans NL .976** .990** Wheat US .881** .912** 
Sunflower US .937** .958** Maize ARG .930** .928** 
Groundnut .855** .907** Maize US .928** .926** 
Copra PH IN .909** .925** Rise Thai .932** .964** 
coconut PH .899** .921** Sugar .704** .822** 
Palm MAY .896** .920** Beef AUS .443** .617* 
PalmOil IND .974** .976** Bananas CentrAm .594** .894** 
Cottonseed US .895** .910** Pepper EU 0.175 0.189 
TropBevIx ’71-‘09 ’96-08 Soybean HH .819** .952** 
Coffee COL .957** .941** FishMeal B .697** .850** 
Coffee BRL .954** .895**    
CoffeeOtherEXNY .962** .941**    
Coffee EX NY .949** .904**    
Coffee COMP .981** .965**    
Coffee GER .944** .942**    
Coffee FR .930** .892**    
CoffeeCOMP97 .975** .974**    
Cocoa NY .885** .683**    
Cocoa SDR .879** .624*    
Tea .552* .700**    
  Data Source: Calculated and arranged by the author.
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O
V
) 
Y
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s 
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s 
Ye
s 
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s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
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o
n
o
m
ist
 
In
te
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ge
n
ce
 
U
n
it 
(E
IU
) 
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pe
rt
 
(C
B
IP
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
 
 
9 
G
lo
ba
l I
n
te
gr
ity
 
In
de
x
 
 
(G
II)
 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
10
 
G
al
lu
p 
W
o
rld
 
Po
ll 
(G
W
P)
 
 
 
Su
rv
ey
 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
11
 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
G
lo
ba
l C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
B
ar
o
m
et
er
 
(G
CB
) 
Su
rv
ey
 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
12
 
W
o
rld
 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fo
ru
m
 
G
lo
ba
l C
o
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s 
Su
rv
ey
 
 
(G
CS
) 
Su
rv
ey
 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
13
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
H
o
u
se
 
(F
R
H
,
 
CC
R
) 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
14
 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
 
In
de
x
 
o
f E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
(H
ER
)  
 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
15
 
Ci
n
gr
an
el
li 
Ri
ch
ar
ds
 
H
u
m
an
 
Ri
gh
ts
 
D
at
ab
as
e 
&
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 
Te
rr
o
r 
Sc
al
e 
(H
U
M
)   
Ex
pe
rt
 
(G
O
V
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
16
 
IF
A
D
 
R
u
ra
l S
ec
to
r 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
A
ss
es
sm
en
ts
 
(IF
D
) 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(G
O
V
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
17
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
Ex
ch
an
ge
s 
B
o
ar
d 
M
ed
ia
 
Su
st
ai
n
ab
ili
ty
 
In
de
x
 
(M
SI
)   
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
18
 
iJ
ET
 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Se
cu
rit
y 
Ri
sk
 
R
at
in
gs
 
(IJ
T)
 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(C
B
IP
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
19
 
In
st
itu
tio
n
al
 
Pr
o
fil
es
 
D
at
ab
as
e 
(IP
D
)  
Ex
pe
rt
 
(G
O
V
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
20
 
A
fri
ca
n
 
El
ec
to
ra
l I
n
de
x
 
(IR
P)
 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
21
 
La
tin
o
ba
ro
m
et
ro
 
(L
B
O
)   
Su
rv
ey
 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
22
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
Ex
ch
an
ge
s 
B
o
ar
d 
M
ed
ia
 
Su
st
ai
n
ab
ili
ty
 
In
de
x
 
(M
SI
)   
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
23
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Bu
dg
et
 
Pr
o
jec
t O
pe
n
 
B
u
dg
et
 
In
de
x
 
(O
B
I) 
 
 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
24
 
W
o
rld
 
Ba
n
k 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Po
lic
y 
an
d 
In
st
itu
tio
n
al
 
A
ss
es
sm
en
ts
 
(P
IA
) 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(G
O
V
) 
Pa
rt
ia
l 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
25
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 
an
d 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
R
isk
 
Co
n
su
lta
n
cy
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
in
 
A
sia
 
Su
rv
ey
 
(P
R
C)
 
 
 
Su
rv
ey
 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
26
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 
R
isk
 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
R
isk
 
G
u
id
e 
(P
RS
) 
Ex
pe
rt
 
(C
B
IP
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
27
 
R
ep
o
rt
er
s 
W
ith
o
u
t B
o
rd
er
s 
Pr
es
s 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
 
(R
SF
)   
Ex
pe
rt
 
(N
G
O
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
28
 
U
.
S.
 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f S
ta
te
 
Tr
af
fic
ki
n
g 
in
 
Pe
o
pl
e 
R
ep
o
rt
 
(T
PR
)  
Ex
pe
rt
 
(G
O
V
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
29
 
V
an
de
rb
ilt
 
U
n
iv
er
sit
y'
s 
A
m
er
ic
as
 
B
ar
o
m
et
er
 
(V
A
B)
 
 
Su
rv
ey
 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
30
 
In
st
itu
te
 
fo
r 
M
an
ag
em
en
t D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t W
o
rld
 
Co
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s 
Y
ea
rb
o
o
k 
(W
CY
) 
Su
rv
ey
 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
n
a
 
31
 
G
lo
ba
l I
n
sig
ht
 
B
u
sin
es
s 
Ri
sk
 
an
d 
Co
n
di
tio
n
s 
 
(W
M
O
)   
Ex
pe
rt
 
(C
B
IP
) 
Y
es
 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
n
a
 
So
u
rc
e:
 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
(20
10
 
a).
 
Ta
bl
e 
cr
ea
te
d 
an
d 
ar
ra
n
ge
d 
by
 
th
e 
au
th
o
r.
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In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
B
u
sin
es
s 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
EF
IB
iz
 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
B
u
sin
es
s 
fre
ed
o
m
 
is 
a 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
 
o
f t
he
 
ab
ili
ty
 
to
 
st
ar
t, 
o
pe
ra
te
,
 
an
d 
cl
o
se
 
a 
bu
sin
es
s 
th
at
 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 
th
e 
o
v
er
al
l 
bu
rd
en
 
o
f r
eg
u
la
tio
n
,
 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
 
o
f g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
in
 
th
e 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
pr
o
ce
ss
.
 
Th
e 
bu
sin
es
s 
fre
ed
o
m
 
sc
o
re
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
co
u
n
tr
y 
is 
a 
n
u
m
be
r 
be
tw
ee
n
 
0 
an
d 
10
0,
 
w
ith
 
10
0 
eq
u
al
in
g 
th
e 
fre
es
t b
u
sin
es
s 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t. 
Th
e 
sc
o
re
 
is 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
10
 
fa
ct
o
rs
,
 
al
l w
ei
gh
te
d 
eq
u
al
ly
,
 
u
sin
g 
da
ta
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
W
o
rld
 
Ba
n
k’
s 
D
o
in
g 
Bu
sin
es
s 
st
u
dy
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
o
f w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
.
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
T
ra
de
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
EF
IT
ra
de
 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
Tr
ad
e 
fre
ed
o
m
 
is 
a 
co
m
po
sit
e 
m
ea
su
re
 
o
f t
he
 
ab
se
n
ce
 
o
f t
ar
iff
 
an
d 
n
o
n
-
ta
rif
f b
ar
rie
rs
 
th
at
 
af
fe
ct
 
im
po
rt
s 
an
d 
ex
po
rt
s 
o
f 
go
o
ds
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
.
 
Th
e 
tr
ad
e 
fre
ed
o
m
 
sc
o
re
 
is 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
tw
o
 
in
pu
ts
: 
Th
e 
tr
ad
e-
w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
ta
rif
f r
at
e 
an
d 
N
o
n
-
ta
rif
f 
ba
rr
ie
rs
 
(N
TB
s).
 
D
iff
er
en
t i
m
po
rt
s 
en
te
rin
g 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y 
ca
n
,
 
an
d 
o
fte
n
 
do
,
 
fa
ce
 
di
ffe
re
n
t t
ar
iff
s.
 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
ta
rif
f u
se
s 
w
ei
gh
ts
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
ta
rif
f b
as
ed
 
o
n
 
sh
ar
e 
o
f i
m
po
rt
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
go
o
d.
 
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
o
f w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
.
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u
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A
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: 
H
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Fo
u
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tio
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(20
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Ta
bl
es
 
cr
ea
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an
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ar
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n
ge
d 
by
 
th
e 
au
th
o
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In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Fi
sc
a
l F
re
ed
o
m
 
EF
IF
isc
 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
Fi
sc
al
 
fre
ed
o
m
 
is 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 
o
f t
he
 
bu
rd
en
 
o
f g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t f
ro
m
 
th
e 
re
v
en
u
e 
sid
e.
 
It 
in
cl
u
de
s 
bo
th
 
th
e 
ta
x
 
bu
rd
en
 
in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f 
th
e 
to
p 
ta
x
 
ra
te
 
o
n
 
in
co
m
es
 
(in
di
v
id
u
al
 
an
d 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
) a
n
d 
th
e 
o
v
er
al
l a
m
o
u
n
t o
f t
ax
 
re
v
en
u
e 
as
 
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f 
G
D
P.
 
Th
u
s,
 
th
e 
fis
ca
l 
fre
ed
o
m
 
co
m
po
n
en
t 
is 
co
m
po
se
d 
o
f 
th
re
e 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
fa
ct
o
rs
: 
Th
e 
to
p 
ta
x
 
ra
te
 
o
n
 
in
di
v
id
u
al
 
in
co
m
e,
 
Th
e 
to
p 
ta
x
 
ra
te
 
o
n
 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 
in
co
m
e,
 
an
d 
To
ta
l t
ax
 
re
v
en
u
e 
as
 
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f G
D
P.
 
In
 
sc
o
rin
g 
th
e 
fis
ca
l f
re
ed
o
m
 
co
m
po
n
en
t, 
ea
ch
 
o
f t
he
se
 
n
u
m
er
ic
al
 
v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
is 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
eq
u
al
ly
 
as
 
o
n
e-
th
ird
 
o
f t
he
 
fa
ct
o
r.
 
Th
is 
eq
u
al
 
w
ei
gh
tin
g 
al
lo
w
s 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y 
to
 
ac
hi
ev
e 
a 
sc
o
re
 
as
 
hi
gh
 
as
 
67
 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
tw
o
 
o
f t
he
 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
ev
en
 
if 
it 
re
ce
iv
es
 
a 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 0
 
o
n
 
th
e 
th
ird
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
o
f w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
.
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t S
iz
e 
EF
IG
o
v
tS
 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
Th
is 
co
m
po
n
en
t c
o
n
sid
er
s 
th
e 
le
v
el
 
o
f g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t e
x
pe
n
di
tu
re
s 
as
 
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f G
D
P.
 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
s—
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
 
an
d 
tr
an
sf
er
s—
ac
co
u
n
t f
o
r 
th
e 
en
tir
e 
sc
o
re
.
 
So
m
e 
le
v
el
 
o
f g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t e
x
pe
n
di
tu
re
s 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 
tr
u
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
go
o
ds
,
 
im
pl
yi
n
g 
an
 
id
ea
l l
ev
el
 
gr
ea
te
r 
th
an
 
ze
ro
.
 
H
o
w
ev
er
,
 
id
en
tif
yi
n
g 
th
at
 
id
ea
l l
ev
el
 
se
em
s 
to
o
 
ar
bi
tr
ar
y,
 
st
at
ic
,
 
an
d 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 
ap
pl
y 
u
n
iv
er
sa
lly
.
 
Fo
r 
th
es
e 
re
as
o
n
s,
 
th
e 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
tr
ea
ts
 
ze
ro
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t s
pe
n
di
n
g 
as
 
th
e 
be
n
ch
m
ar
k.
 
M
o
re
o
v
er
,
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
ts
 
th
at
 
ha
v
e 
n
o
 
pu
bl
ic
 
go
o
ds
 
w
ill
 
be
 
pe
n
al
iz
ed
 
by
 
lo
w
er
 
sc
o
re
s 
in
 
th
e 
o
th
er
 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
(su
ch
 
as
 
pr
o
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
fre
ed
o
m
) 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
o
f w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
.
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In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
M
o
n
et
a
ry
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
EF
IM
o
n
 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
fre
ed
o
m
 
co
m
bi
n
es
 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 
o
f 
pr
ic
e 
st
ab
ili
ty
 
w
ith
 
an
 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
o
f 
pr
ic
e 
co
n
tr
o
ls.
 
B
o
th
 
in
fla
tio
n
 
an
d 
pr
ic
e 
co
n
tr
o
ls 
di
st
o
rt
 
m
ar
ke
t 
ac
tiv
ity
.
 
Pr
ic
e 
st
ab
ili
ty
 
w
ith
o
u
t 
m
ic
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
is 
th
e 
id
ea
l s
ta
te
 
fo
r 
th
e 
fre
e 
m
ar
ke
t. 
Th
e 
sc
o
re
 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
o
n
et
ar
y 
fre
ed
o
m
 
fa
ct
o
r 
is 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
tw
o
 
fa
ct
o
rs
: 
Th
e 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
in
fla
tio
n
 
ra
te
 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
o
st
 
re
ce
n
t 
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
an
d 
Pr
ic
e 
co
n
tr
o
ls.
 
Th
e 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
in
fla
tio
n
 
ra
te
 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
o
st
 
re
ce
n
t 
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
se
rv
es
 
as
 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
in
pu
t i
n
to
 
an
 
eq
u
at
io
n
 
th
at
 
ge
n
er
at
es
 
th
e 
ba
se
 
sc
o
re
 
fo
r 
m
o
n
et
ar
y 
fre
ed
o
m
.
 
Th
e 
ex
te
n
t o
f p
ric
e 
co
n
tr
o
ls 
is 
th
en
 
as
se
ss
ed
 
as
 
a 
pe
n
al
ty
 
o
f u
p 
to
 
20
 
po
in
ts
 
su
bt
ra
ct
ed
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
ba
se
 
sc
o
re
.
 
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
o
f w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
.
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d:
 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
 
—
 
In
v
es
tm
en
t, 
Fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l 
IN
D
IC
A
TO
R
S 
D
EF
IN
IT
IO
N
 
/ C
O
M
M
EN
T
S 
A
BB
R
EV
IA
TI
O
N
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
In
v
es
tm
en
t F
re
ed
o
m
 
EF
II
n
v
es
t 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
Th
is 
co
m
po
n
en
t s
cr
u
tin
iz
es
 
ea
ch
 
co
u
n
tr
y’
s 
po
lic
ie
s 
to
w
ar
d 
th
e 
fre
e 
flo
w
 
o
f i
n
v
es
tm
en
t c
ap
ita
l (
fo
re
ig
n
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 
in
te
rn
al
 
ca
pi
ta
l f
lo
w
s) 
in
 
o
rd
er
 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
its
 
o
v
er
al
l i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
cl
im
at
e.
 
Th
e 
au
th
o
rs
 
as
se
ss
 
al
l c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
u
sin
g 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ru
br
ic
.
 
Qu
es
tio
n
s 
ex
am
in
ed
 
in
cl
u
de
 
w
he
th
er
 
th
er
e 
is 
a 
fo
re
ig
n
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t c
o
de
 
th
at
 
de
fin
es
 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y’
s 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
la
w
s 
an
d 
pr
o
ce
du
re
s;
 
w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
en
co
u
ra
ge
s 
fo
re
ig
n
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
th
ro
u
gh
 
fa
ir 
an
d 
eq
u
ita
bl
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
o
f 
in
v
es
to
rs
; 
w
he
th
er
 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
re
st
ric
tio
n
s 
o
n
 
ac
ce
ss
 
to
 
fo
re
ig
n
 
ex
ch
an
ge
; 
w
he
th
er
 
fo
re
ig
n
 
fir
m
s 
ar
e 
tr
ea
te
d 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 
do
m
es
tic
 
fir
m
s 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
la
w
; 
w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
im
po
se
s 
re
st
ric
tio
n
s 
o
n
 
pa
ym
en
ts
,
 
tr
an
sf
er
s,
 
an
d 
ca
pi
ta
l 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
s;
 
an
d 
w
he
th
er
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
in
du
st
rie
s 
ar
e 
cl
o
se
d 
to
 
fo
re
ig
n
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t. 
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
o
f w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
.
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l F
re
ed
o
m
 
EF
IF
in
 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
fre
ed
o
m
 
is 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 
o
f b
an
ki
n
g 
se
cu
rit
y 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 
o
f i
n
de
pe
n
de
n
ce
 
fro
m
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t c
o
n
tr
o
l. 
St
at
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
o
f 
ba
n
ks
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
in
st
itu
tio
n
s 
su
ch
 
as
 
in
su
re
rs
 
an
d 
ca
pi
ta
l 
m
ar
ke
ts
 
is 
an
 
in
ef
fic
ie
n
t 
bu
rd
en
 
th
at
 
re
du
ce
s 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
an
d 
ge
n
er
al
ly
 
lo
w
er
s 
th
e 
le
v
el
 
o
f a
v
ai
la
bl
e 
se
rv
ic
es
.
 
Th
e 
au
th
o
rs
 
sc
o
re
 
th
is 
co
m
po
n
en
t b
y 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
o
f 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
re
gu
la
tio
n
 
o
f 
fin
an
ci
al
 
se
rv
ic
es
; 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
o
f 
st
at
e 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
in
 
ba
n
ks
 
an
d 
o
th
er
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
se
rv
ic
es
; t
he
 
di
ffi
cu
lty
 
o
f o
pe
n
in
g 
an
d 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
fin
an
ci
al
 
se
rv
ic
es
 
fir
m
s 
(fo
r 
bo
th
 
do
m
es
tic
 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n
 
in
di
v
id
u
al
s);
 
an
d 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
in
flu
en
ce
 
o
n
 
th
e 
al
lo
ca
tio
n
 
o
f c
re
di
t. 
Th
e 
au
th
o
rs
 
u
se
 
th
is 
an
al
ys
is 
to
 
de
v
el
o
p 
a 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
 
o
f t
he
 
co
u
n
tr
y’
s 
fin
an
ci
al
 
cl
im
at
e 
an
d 
as
sig
n
 
it 
an
 
o
v
er
al
l s
co
re
 
o
n
 
a 
sc
al
e 
o
f 0
 
to
 
10
0.
 
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
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pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
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tio
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m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
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sit
e 
o
f w
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te
d 
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er
ag
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.
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In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Pr
o
pe
rt
y 
R
ig
ht
s 
EF
IP
ro
pR
i 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
Th
e 
pr
o
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
co
m
po
n
en
t 
is 
an
 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
o
f t
he
 
ab
ili
ty
 
o
f i
n
di
v
id
u
al
s 
to
 
ac
cu
m
u
la
te
 
pr
iv
at
e 
pr
o
pe
rt
y,
 
se
cu
re
d 
by
 
cl
ea
r 
la
w
s 
th
at
 
ar
e 
fu
lly
 
en
fo
rc
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
st
at
e.
 
It 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 
to
 
w
hi
ch
 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y’
s 
la
w
s 
pr
o
te
ct
 
pr
iv
at
e 
pr
o
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
an
d 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 
to
 
w
hi
ch
 
its
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t e
n
fo
rc
es
 
th
o
se
 
la
w
s.
 
It 
al
so
 
as
se
ss
es
 
th
e 
lik
el
ih
o
o
d 
th
at
 
pr
iv
at
e 
pr
o
pe
rt
y 
w
ill
 
be
 
ex
pr
o
pr
ia
te
d 
an
d 
an
al
yz
es
 
th
e 
in
de
pe
n
de
n
ce
 
o
f t
he
 
jud
ic
ia
ry
,
 
th
e 
ex
ist
en
ce
 
o
f c
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
jud
ic
ia
ry
,
 
an
d 
th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 
o
f i
n
di
v
id
u
al
s 
an
d 
bu
sin
es
se
s 
to
 
en
fo
rc
e 
co
n
tr
ac
ts
.
 
Th
e 
m
o
re
 
ce
rt
ai
n
 
th
e 
le
ga
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n
 
o
f p
ro
pe
rt
y,
 
th
e 
hi
gh
er
 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y’
s 
sc
o
re
; s
im
ila
rly
,
 
th
e 
gr
ea
te
r 
th
e 
ch
an
ce
s 
o
f g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t e
x
pr
o
pr
ia
tio
n
 
o
f p
ro
pe
rt
y,
 
th
e 
lo
w
er
 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y’
s 
sc
o
re
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
 
 
To
pi
c 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
In
de
x
es
.
 
Pe
ri
o
di
ci
ty
 
A
n
n
u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
re
ga
tio
n
 
m
et
ho
d 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
o
f w
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
es
.
 
 
 
 
In
di
ca
to
r 
N
a
m
e 
Fr
ee
do
m
 
fr
o
m
 
C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
EF
IC
o
rr
u
p 
D
ef
in
iti
o
n
 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
er
o
de
s 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
fre
ed
o
m
 
by
 
in
tr
o
du
ci
n
g 
in
se
cu
rit
y 
an
d 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 
in
to
 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
s.
 
Th
e 
sc
o
re
 
fo
r 
th
is 
co
m
po
n
en
t 
is 
de
riv
ed
 
pr
im
ar
ily
 
fro
m
 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
’
s 
Co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n
s 
In
de
x
 
(C
PI
) f
o
r 
20
07
,
 
w
hi
ch
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
e 
le
v
el
 
o
f 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
in
 
17
9 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 
Th
e 
CP
I 
is 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
a 
10
-
po
in
t 
sc
al
e 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 
a 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 
10
 
in
di
ca
te
s 
v
er
y 
lit
tle
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
an
d 
a 
sc
o
re
 
o
f 0
 
in
di
ca
te
s 
a 
v
er
y 
co
rr
u
pt
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t. 
In
 
sc
o
rin
g 
fre
ed
o
m
 
fro
m
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
, 
th
e 
au
th
o
rs
 
co
n
v
er
t t
he
 
ra
w
 
CP
I d
at
a 
to
 
a 
sc
al
e 
o
f 0
 
to
 
10
0 
by
 
m
u
lti
pl
yi
n
g 
th
e 
CP
I s
co
re
 
by
 
10
.
 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 
if 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y’
s 
ra
w
 
CP
I d
at
a 
sc
o
re
 
is 
5.
5,
 
its
 
o
v
er
al
l f
re
ed
o
m
 
fro
m
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
sc
o
re
 
is 
55
.
 
Fo
r 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
th
at
 
ar
e 
n
o
t c
o
v
er
ed
 
in
 
th
e 
CP
I, 
th
e 
fre
ed
o
m
 
fro
m
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
sc
o
re
 
is 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
by
 
u
sin
g 
th
e 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
fro
m
 
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
ly
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
an
d 
re
lia
bl
e 
so
u
rc
es
.
4 
Th
is 
pr
o
ce
du
re
 
co
n
sid
er
s 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t 
to
 
w
hi
ch
 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
 
pr
ev
ai
ls 
in
 
a 
co
u
n
tr
y.
 
Th
e 
hi
gh
er
 
th
e 
le
v
el
 
o
f 
co
rr
u
pt
io
n
,
 
th
e 
lo
w
er
 
th
e 
le
v
el
 
o
f o
v
er
al
l e
co
n
o
m
ic
 
fre
ed
o
m
.
 
So
u
rc
e 
Th
e 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
.
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pi
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Fr
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.
 
Pe
ri
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u
al
.
 
 
A
gg
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Co
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3.
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: 
D
a
ta
 
Se
ri
es
 
Br
a
zi
l 
D
at
a 
So
u
rc
e 
fo
r 
A
pp
en
di
x
es
 
3.
12
a-
d:
 
W
o
rld
 
B
an
k 
(20
09
,
 
20
10
), W
o
rld
 
Ba
n
k 
(20
10
a),
 
H
er
ita
ge
 
Fo
u
n
da
tio
n
 
(20
11
b).
 
Ta
bl
es
 
cr
ea
te
d 
an
d 
ar
ra
n
ge
d 
by
 
th
e 
au
th
o
r.
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Appendix 3.15: Data Series Standard Deviations 1996–2008 
 
Variable  Brazil  China Variable Brazil China Variable Brazil China
 SD  SD SD SD SD SD
FoodIx 37.69   37.69    HHFinConExp_gr 2.83     4.26       CropProdIX 21.84    12.56    
TropBevIx 32.23   32.23    HHFinConExp_GDP 1.86     4.06       LivStockProdIX 15.24    14.12    
VegOilSeedsIx 54.26   54.26    HHFinConExpPCap_gr 2.98     1.85       CPIx 21.38    5.98      
AgriRawIx 30.35   30.35    GroCapF_GDP 0.79     3.07       Infltn 3.85      2.88      
MinMetalsIx 91.21   91.21    GroCapF_gr 8.34     4.17       M2_GDP 8.14      17.43    
CrudeIx 89.85   89.85    GrossFixCapForm_GDP 0.79     3.45       M2_gr 5.39      4.08      
WGIVA 0.13     0.14      GrossFixCapForm_gr 7.14     2.66       IRSSpread 8.39      0.35      
WGIPS 0.20     0.10      Trade_GDP 4.95     13.33     RealIR 13.26    3.10      
WGIGE 0.12     0.15      MrchTrade_GDP 4.13     12.85     ExtDebtST_ExpGSInc 106.25  17.57    
WGIRQ 0.15     0.17      ExpGS_GDP 3.49     7.49       ExtDebtST_GNI 11.36    1.85      
WGIRL 0.07     0.08      ExpGS_gr 4.70     12.32     STD_ExpGSInc 15.96    4.53      
WGICC 0.14     0.17      ExtBalGS_GDP 2.34     2.42       STD_TTExtDbt 2.96      17.45    
EFIBiz 7.68     3.87      CurrACC_GDP 2.38     3.41       STD_TTResv 23.62    5.92      
EFITrade 6.62     14.03    ImpGS_GDP 1.69     5.97       TTRes_TTExtDbt 21.52    138.09  
EFIFisc 8.95     1.85      ImpGS_gr 11.41   11.69     M2_TTReserv 1.42      2.10      
EFIGovtS 9.98     3.54      AgRawImp_MrchImp 0.51     0.51       MultiDebt_TTExtD 1.82      3.26      
EFIMon 3.95     7.70      ManfImp_MrchImp 3.36     5.49       EnrgyImp_Euse 8.51      3.21      
EFIInvest -       9.61      FuelImp_MerchImp 3.33     3.33       GDP_UEnUKPPPOilE 0.11      0.41      
EFIFin 3.76     9.61      ExpValX 90.08   172.84   GDP_UEnUPPPOilE 0.71      0.63      
EFIPropRi -       4.39      ImpValIx 65.31   150.70   RuPp_ToTPp 2.33      3.53      
EFICorrup 4.32     4.35      ExpVolX 45.89   157.21   Internet_100 12.91    6.88      
GDPDefl 38.97   13.84    ImpVolIx 27.52   100.86   Phonelines_100 4.79      8.96      
GDP_gr 1.99     1.91      UnitValIxExp 27.12   4.67       Unempl_Lforce 0.86      0.53      
GDPpCap_gr 2.10     2.03      UnitValIxImp 22.62   18.03     MobileSubs_100 25.07    16.38    
Agri_GDP 0.64     2.95      ToT 6.18     11.90    
Agri_gr 2.18     1.30      PPIxExp 47.58   114.52  
IndustValAd_GDP 1.37     1.03      TariffAllweight 3.21     5.58      
IndustValAd_gr 2.93     2.10      HiTekExp_ManuExp 3.89     7.10      
ManuValAdd_GDP 1.04     0.67      ICTExp_TTExp 0.94     7.14      
ManFactValAdd_gr 3.33     3.62      ICTImp_TTImp 2.33     5.27      
GrossSav_GDP 2.66     5.99      AgrRwExp_MerchExp 0.39     0.38      
GrossSav_GNI 2.61     5.60      FoodExp_MrchExp 2.19     1.83      
GrossDomSav_GDP 2.05     4.85      ManufExp_MrchExp 3.33     2.83      
GrossNatExp_GDP 2.34     2.42      FDInet_GDP 1.22     0.64      
GovFinConExp_GDP 0.49     0.99      StoxVal_GDP 11.31   55.95    
GovFinConExp_gr 2.10     1.77      FuelExp_MerchExp 3.10     0.68      
FinConExp_GDP 2.05     4.85      MrktCapList_GDP 21.52   43.08    
FinConExp_gr 2.30     3.36      FoodPrdIx 17.84   14.28    
 
 
Source: Data and Table calculated and arranged by the author based on Data Series introduced in Chapter 3. SD = Standard Deviation.
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ATTACHMENT 
CD-ROM115 
1. Location of CD-ROM:  
 In the envelope inside the back cover page of this thesis document. 
 
2. Explanatory comments:  
CD-ROM contains PDF files showing the syntax of the unit root tests, Granger 
causality tests, and multiple regression tests which have been performed with 
SAS. The correlation calculations have been carried out with PASW. 
 
3. CD-ROM Structure: 
1. The Folder structure of the CD-ROM mirrors the relevant folder structure of 
the thesis. Each respective sectional folder has subfolders, which contain the 
relevant PDF files. Each subfolder is labeled respectively. The titles of the 
respective sectional folders and/or subfolders are held in abbreviated form. 
2. Files: The header of a PDF or any other document is labeled on basis of the 
respective name of the section, table and/or figure of reference. For each 
respective SAS computation step please see the PDF document which contains 
the SAS program, log, and output syntax. 
3. Sets: Due to the large scale of the data series and other operational reasons I 
have separated the data series in two sets: Set 1 and Set 2. The cut-off variable 
for Set 1 is usually Variable 39 (ImpVolIx). The continuing variable in Set 2 is 
usually Variable 40 (UnitValIxExp). 
4. File denotation example (for SAS): ‘China09 Granger Set1 Program’. 
Denotation: ‘09’ is an archive-related label. ‘Granger’ indicates the statistical 
diagnosis test type. ‘Set 1’ indicates the data cut-off set type. 
‘Program/Output/Log’ indicates the SAS processing type. The files containing 
the data for Brazil and China are marked with the label add-on ‘BRL’ and/or 
‘CHN’, respectively. 
                                                 
115
 Sources: The CD-ROM file content has been analysed, computed, calculated, and arranged by the 
author. The CD-ROM file content has been created on September 10, 2011. 
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ATTACHMENT 
CD-ROM 
4. CD-ROM Content: 
Folder File Name Comment 
Chapter 2 / Section 2.5.1 Dualism  
 2.5.1_FDI 00-2009 gr BRL and CHN Output Correlation PASW 
 2.5.1_FDI 00-2009 gr BRL and CHN Correlation PASW 
 2.5.1_FDI 91-2009 gr BRL and CHN Output Correlation PASW 
 2.5.1_FDI 91-2009 gr BRL and CHN Correlation PASW 
   
Chapter 2 / Section 2.5.2 Cooperation  
 2.5.2_PMI Apr2007 - May2011 BRL and CHN Output Correlation PASW 
 2.5.2_PMI Apr2007 - May2011 BRL and CHN Correlation PASW 
 Figure 2.1_PMI Index Brazil China Data PMI Data 
 Figure 2.1_PMI Index Brazil China PMI Figure 
   
Chapter 3 / Section 3.3.3 Commodity Price Indexes  
 Table 3.7_Granger Causality SAS Granger Causality 
 Table 3.10_Granger Causality SAS Granger Causality 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.2.1.2 Unit Root Test Results  
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test BRL SAS Editor Unit Root Brazil 
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test BRL SAS LOG Output Unit Root Brazil 
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test BRL change rates SAS Editor Unit Root Brazil 
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test BRL change rates SAS Log Output Unit Root Brazil 
   
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test China SAS Editor Unit Root China 
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test China SAS Log Output Unit Root China 
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test China change rates SAS Editor Unit Root China 
 4.2.1.2_Unit Root Test China change rates SAS LOG Output Unit Root China 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.2.3.2 Causality Analysis Brazil  
 4.2.3.2_Brazil09 Granger Set1 SAS Output Granger Brazil 
 4.2.3.2_Brazil09 Granger Set1 SAS Program Granger Brazil 
 4.2.3.2_Brazil09 Granger Set2 SAS Output Granger Brazil 
 4.2.3.2_Brazil09 Granger Set2 SAS Program Granger Brazil 
 4.2.3.2_Brazil Granger change r Output Selected Granger Brazil 
 4.2.3.2_Brazil Granger change r Output Granger Brazil 
 4.2.3.2_Brazil Granger change r Program Granger Brazil 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.2.3.3 Causality Analysis China  
 4.2.3.3_China09 Granger All Set 1&Set 2 SAS Granger China 
 4.2.3.3_China09 Granger Set1 SAS Output Granger China 
 4.2.3.3_China09 Granger Set1 SAS Program Granger China 
 4.2.3.3_China09 Granger Set2 SAS Output Granger China 
 4.2.3.3_China09 Granger Set2 SAS Program Granger China 
 4.2.3.3_China Granger change rates SAS Output Selected Granger China 
 4.2.3.3_China Granger change rates SAS Output Granger China 
 4.2.3.3_China Granger change rates SAS Program Granger China 
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CD-ROM 
 
Folder File Name Comment 
Chapter 4 / Section 4.2.4.2.1 PCA of Commodity Price Ix  
 4.2.4.2.1_BMca1MetOil PCA Commodities Brazil 
 4.2.4.2.1_BMca2FdAg PCA Commodities Brazil 
 4.2.4.2.1_BMca3BevAG PCA Commodities Brazil 
 4.2.4.2.1_Brazil09PCA SAS Program Log Output PCA Commodities Brazil 
   
 4.2.4.2.1_China09PCA SAS Program Log Output PCA Commodities China 
 4.2.4.2.1_CMca1MetOil PCA Commodities China 
 4.2.4.2.1_CMca2FdAg PCA Commodities China 
 4.2.4.2.1_CMca3FdVegAg PCA Commodities China 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.2.4.2.2 PCA of Changes in Commodity Price Ix  
 Table 4.16_Brazil PCA change rates Program and Result PCA Commodities Brazil 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.2.4.3.1 PCA of WGI Indexes  
 4.2.4.3.1_China09 EG Governance PCA WGI China 
 4.2.4.3.1_Cmca4wvaps PCA WGI China 
 Table 4.19 CMca4WVaPs PCA WGI China 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.2.4.4.1 PCA of EFI Indexes  
 4.2.4.4.1_Bmca4efscgvt EFI HTM Table Brazil 
 4.2.4.4.1_Brazil09 PCA EFI SAS Program Output EFI Brazil 
 Table 4.23_BMca4EfscGvt EFI Brazil 
 Table 4.25_CMca5EInvFin EFI China 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.3.2 Multiple Regression Analysis Brazil  
 4.3.2_Brazil09REG SAS Program&Output Regression Brazil 
 4.3.2_Brazil09REGSet1 Data Series Brazil 
 4.3.2_Brazil09REGSet2 Data Series Brazil 
 4.3.2_Brazil09REG change rates SAS Program&Output Regression Brazil 
   
Chapter 4 / Section 4.3.3 Multiple Regression Analysis China  
 4.3.3_China09REG SAS Program&Output Regression China 
 4.3.3_China09REGSet1#LN00017 Data Series China 
 4.3.3_China09REGSet2#LN00017 Data Series China 
 4.3.3_China09REG change rates SAS Program&Output Regression China 
   
Chapter 5  Section 5.2.12 CPIx and M2 to GDP  
 5.2.12_Granger Corr CPIx US 71-09 96-08 SAS Output Granger and Correlation 
Analysis: CPIx and M2 to 
GDP 1971-2009, 1996-
2008. 
 5.2.12_Granger Corr CPIx US 71-09 96-08 SAS Program 
 5.2.12_Granger Corr M2_GDP US 71-09 96-08 SAS Output 
 5.2.12_Granger Corr M2_GDP US 71-09 96-08 SAS Program 
   
   
   
/
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